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Note on Style  
 
Where possible, this thesis has followed the New Zealand Law Style Guide.1 This thesis differs, 
inter alia, with respect to the format of headings, which have been numbered rather than listed 
alphabetically for the purposes of clarity. In addition, for ease of reading, abbreviations have 
been used for some country names. The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation2 and TaxCite: 
A Federal Citation and Reference Manual3 have been used for the citation of the relevant 
United States legislative material and Internal Revenue Service material.  
 
Due to recognised technical constraints associated with Microsoft Word 2013, which was used 
to write this thesis, there are anomalies in the continuity of the footnote numbering in pages 
containing, and following, certain figures and tables included in this thesis. This affects the 
footnotes following: Figure 2.6 (pages 50-51), Figure 2.7 (pages 52-56), Table 2.1 (pages 57-
71), Figure 3.1 (pages 78-97), Figure 4.3 (pages 120-138), Figure 5.3 (pages 158-178) and 
Table 6.1 (pages 184-210). Accordingly, there may be more than one set of footnotes occurring 
within certain chapters. Thus, the first time a text or article is cited in a set of footnotes, it has 
been cited in full, notwithstanding that it may have previously been cited in a prior set of 
footnotes in that same chapter. 
 
This thesis reflects the tax dispute resolution systems in place in the selected jurisdictions under 
study up until 30 November 2016. 
  
                                                          
1 Geoff McLay, Christopher Murray and Jonathan Orpin New Zealand Law Style Guide (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters, 
Wellington, 2011). 
2 The Columbia Law Review Association, The Harvard Law Review Association, The University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review and The Yale Law Journal The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation (20th ed, The Harvard Law 
Review Association, Cambridge, MA, 2015). 
3 Virginia Tax Review Association, New York University School of Law, American Bar Association Section of 
Taxation TaxCite: A Federal Citation and Reference Manual (American Bar Association Section of Taxation, 
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Glossary of Dispute Resolution Terms 
 
This glossary is a collection of dispute resolution terms used in this thesis. The glossary is not 
all-encompassing and moreover, it is not intended to be a prescriptive guide to how dispute 
resolution terms should be used generally. Rather, it is intended to assist in the understanding 
of certain dispute resolution terms used in the context of this study.1 
 
Adjudication is a process in which the participants present arguments and evidence to a 
dispute resolution practitioner (the adjudicator) who makes a determination which is 
enforceable by the authority of the adjudicator.  
 
Advisory dispute resolution processes are processes in which a dispute resolution practitioner 
considers and appraises the dispute and provides advice as to the facts of the dispute, the law 
and, in some cases, possible or desirable outcomes, and how these may be achieved. Advisory 
processes include case appraisal, case presentation and early neutral evaluation. 
 
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is an umbrella term for processes, other than judicial 
determination, in which an impartial person assists those in a dispute to resolve the issues 
between them.  
 
Arbitration is a process in which the participants to a dispute present arguments and evidence 
to a dispute resolution practitioner (the arbitrator) who makes a determination. Arbitration can 
be binding (conventional arbitration) or non-binding (advisory arbitration). 
 
Blended dispute resolution processes are processes in which the dispute resolution 
practitioner plays multiple roles. For example, in conciliation and in conferencing, the dispute 
resolution practitioner may facilitate discussions, as well as provide advice on the merits of the 
dispute.  
 
Case appraisal is a process in which a dispute resolution practitioner (the case appraiser) 
investigates the dispute and provides advice on possible and desirable outcomes and the means 
whereby these may be achieved.  
 
                                                          
1 This glossary is based on definitions from: National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council Dispute 
Resolution Terms: The Use of Terms in (Alternative) Dispute Resolution (Barton, 2003) 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/LegalSystem/AlternateDisputeResolution/Pages/NADRACpublications.aspx> (last 
accessed 7 November 2016); Stephanie Smith and Janet Martinez “An Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems 
Design” (2009) 14 Harv Negot L Rev 123 at 165-169; and Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 
“Glossary” (15 September 2015) <http://www.mbie.govt.nz/about/our-work/roles-and-
responsibilities/government-centre-dispute-resolution/tools-and-resources/glossary> (last accessed 7 November 
2016). For the purposes of this study, some definitions have been modified by the researcher. 
xiv 
 
Case presentation (or mini-trial) is a process in which the participants present their evidence 
and arguments to a dispute resolution practitioner who provides advice on the facts of the 
dispute, and, in some cases, on possible and desirable outcomes and the means whereby these 
may be achieved. 
 
Collaborative practice is a process in which the parties, their lawyers and any other experts 
involved, agree not to go to court or threaten to go to court in resolving a dispute. All involved 
also agree that if the process is not adhered to, the lawyers cannot represent the parties in any 
subsequent, related litigation. The process supports the use of interests-based negotiation 
between the parties. 
Co-mediation is mediation conducted by two or more mediators. The respective mediators 
may bring different skills to the process, for example, technical or subject matter expertise, or 
dispute resolution expertise. 
 
Conciliation is a process in which the participants, with the assistance of the dispute resolution 
practitioner (the conciliator), identify the disputed issues, develop options, consider 
alternatives and endeavour to reach an agreement. The conciliator may have an advisory role 
on the content of the dispute or the outcome of its resolution, but not a determinative role. The 
conciliator may advise on or determine the process of conciliation whereby resolution is 
attempted, and may make suggestions for terms of settlement, give expert advice on likely 
settlement terms, and may actively encourage the participants to reach an agreement. 
 
Conference/Conferencing is a general term, which refers to meetings in which the participants 
and/or their advocates and/or third parties discuss issues in dispute. Conferencing may have a 
variety of goals and may combine facilitative and advisory dispute resolution processes. 
 
Coaching is a set of skills and strategies used to support peoples’ abilities to engage in, manage, 
or productively resolve conflict. In this process, a neutral third party (the conflict coach) works 
one-on-one with someone experiencing conflict with another person. Coaching enables the 
coachee to talk about the conflict with the conflict coach, consider options for managing the 
conflict, and design an approach to discuss the conflict with the other person. 
 
Determinative dispute resolution processes are processes in which a dispute resolution 
practitioner evaluates the dispute (which may include the hearing of formal evidence from the 
participants) and makes a determination. Examples of determinative dispute resolution 
processes are arbitration and expert determination. 
 
Dispute resolution practitioner is a person who conducts themselves impartially to assist 
those in dispute to resolve the issues between them. Practitioners may work for government or 
xv 
 
in the private sector, either as part of a dispute resolution organisation or as an individual 
directly engaged by parties. 
 
Early neutral evaluation (ENE) (or neutral evaluation) is a process in which the participants 
to a dispute present, at an early stage in attempting to resolve the dispute, arguments and 
evidence to a dispute resolution practitioner. That practitioner makes a determination on the 
key issues in dispute, and most effective means of resolving the dispute without determining 
the facts of the dispute. 
 
Evaluative mediation is a term used to describe processes where a mediator, as well as 
facilitating negotiations between the participants, also evaluates the merits of the dispute and 
provides suggestions as to its resolution. Note: ‘evaluative mediation’ may be seen as a 
contradiction in terms since it is inconsistent with the definition of ‘mediation’ provided in this 
glossary.  
 
Expedited arbitration is a form of arbitration in which certain modifications are introduced 
in order to ensure that the arbitration can be conducted and an award rendered in a shortened 
time frame and consequently, at a reduced cost. 
 
Expert determination is a process in which the participants to a dispute present arguments 
and evidence to a dispute resolution practitioner, who is chosen on the basis of their specialist 
qualification or experience in the subject matter of the dispute (the expert) and who makes a 
binding or non-binding determination.  
 
Facilitation is a process in which the participants, with the assistance of a dispute resolution 
practitioner (the facilitator), identify problems to be solved, tasks to be accomplished or 
disputed issues to be resolved. Facilitation may conclude there, or it may continue to assist the 
participants to develop options, consider alternatives and endeavour to reach an agreement. 
The facilitator has no advisory or determinative role on the content of the matters discussed or 
the outcome of the process, but may advise on or determine the process of facilitation.  
 
Facilitative dispute resolution processes are processes in which a dispute resolution 
practitioner assists the participants to a dispute to identify the disputed issues, develop options, 
consider alternatives and endeavour to reach an agreement about some issues or the whole 
dispute. Examples of facilitative processes are mediation and facilitation. 
 
Fact finding is a process in which the participants to a dispute present arguments and evidence 
to a dispute resolution practitioner (the investigator) who makes a determination as to the facts 




Final offer arbitration is a form of arbitration in which each party submits a proposal to the 
arbitrator. At the conclusion of the hearing, the arbitrator is required to select one of the parties’ 
proposals, without modification. 
 
Joint facilitation is a form of facilitation conducted by two facilitators working together. One 
facilitator is submitted by each party. 
 
Judicial dispute resolution (or judicial ADR) is a term used to describe a range of dispute 
resolution processes which are conducted by judges or magistrates. 
 
Judicial settlement conferencing is a form of judicial dispute resolution involving a meeting 
of parties to proceedings, convened by a judge, designed to explore the possibility of a 
resolution of a disputed matter without a trial.  
 
Med-arb is a hybrid process in which the dispute resolution practitioner first uses one process 
(mediation) and, if unsuccessful, then a different one (arbitration). 
 
Mediation is a process in which the participants to a dispute, with the assistance of a dispute 
resolution practitioner (the mediator), identify the disputed issues, develop options, consider 
alternatives and endeavour to reach an agreement. The mediator has no advisory or 
determinative role in regard to the content of the dispute or the outcome of its resolution, but 
may advise on or determine the process of mediation whereby resolution is attempted.  
 
Negotiation is a process of exchanging information, interests, positions and proposals through 
direct communication of the parties in an effort to resolve a dispute. 
 
Ombudsman (or ombudsperson or ombud) in the “classical” case is a person who is 
typically appointed by a legislative body to represent the public with concerns of the public 
with regards to the conduct of governmental agencies and conduct formal investigations. An 
“internal” or organisational ombudsman is a third party within an organisation who deals with 
conflicts on an informal and confidential basis and gives disputants information on how to 
resolve the problem at issue.  
 
Shuttle mediation is an asynchronous option within the option of mediation where the 
mediator may move between participants who are located in different rooms, or meet different 
participants at different times for all or part of the process. The mediator facilitates the process 
by acting as a conduit for the exchange of information and conveying offers and counter offers. 
 
Summary jury trial is a flexible, non-binding process designed to promote settlement in 
complex, trial-ready cases. The judge will hear an abbreviated presentation of evidence, may 
xvii 
 
offer an advisory verdict, and may offer parties an opportunity to ask questions and hear the 
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Dispute systems design (DSD) refers to a deliberate effort to identify and improve the way an 
organisation addresses conflict by decisively and strategically arranging its dispute resolution 
processes. A number of principles have been put forward by various DSD practitioners for best 
practice in effective DSD. These principles emanate from the six fundamental DSD principles 
proposed by the seminal theorists Ury, Brett and Goldberg in Getting Disputes Resolved: 
Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of Conflict in 1988. To date, tax dispute resolution is an 
area that has not been extensively examined utilising DSD principles. However, with the recent 
trend of some tax authorities towards employing interests-based dispute resolution procedures, 
namely, various forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes, the application of 
DSD principles in the context of tax dispute resolution arguably warrants greater research.  
 
The purpose of this study is to develop the application of DSD principles in the particular 
context of tax dispute resolution. Utilising a comparative case study methodology, 14 DSD 
principles drawn from the literature have been used to evaluate the effectiveness of the design 
of the current tax dispute resolution processes of the jurisdictions of New Zealand (NZ), 
Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). Through comparing the DSD 
evaluations conducted, this study has sought to develop a set of tax DSD principles to be 
adapted by tax administrations and used in either developing new or improving existing tax 
dispute resolution systems. Semi-structured interviews with 30 selected stakeholders in NZ 
have then been conducted in order to externally evaluate the tax DSD principles developed and 
also consider whether adaption of the principles is required in the context of the NZ tax dispute 
resolution procedures.  
 
The findings from the case studies indicate that the 14 DSD principles from the literature can 
generally be applied in the tax dispute resolution context without significant substantive 
modification. The interview findings suggest that the overarching design principle which must 
be borne in mind in the design of any tax dispute resolution system is that the system must be 
fair and perceived as fair. However, there is insufficient support from the interviews to justify 
any concrete changes being made to the tax DSD principles developed from the case studies. 
Thus, the interview findings are limited to the making of suggestions for certain modifications 
to the tax DSD principles potentially being made. Therefore, further research is necessary in 
order to confirm or refute the suggested changes. The interview findings further indicate that 
the tax DSD principles developed do not require adaptation specifically for NZ. Although, this 
may in part be due to the sample of participants interviewed being drawn only from NZ.  
 
Against the background of the overarching design principle of fairness, this study has a wide 
ranging applicability to tax administrations and their stakeholders in developing or improving 
their tax dispute resolution systems.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background to the Topic 
Dispute systems design (DSD) involves an organisation’s conscious effort to channel disputes 
into a series of steps or options to manage conflict.1 DSD concerns the design and 
implementation of a dispute resolution system that is a series of procedures for handling 
disputes, rather than handling individual disputes on an ad hoc basis.2 The origin of DSD can 
be traced to the publication of Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the Costs 
of Conflict by Ury, Brett and Goldberg in 1988.3 Ury, Brett and Goldberg’s research drew on 
empirical evidence in the particular context of the unionised coal industry. The authors 
described how patterns of disputes can be found in closed settings and that by institutionalising 
avenues for addressing these disputes ex-ante, conflicts could be handled more effectively and 
satisfactorily than through ex-post measures. 
 
DSD is based on three inter-related theoretical propositions. The first is that dispute resolution 
procedures can be categorised according to whether they are primarily interests-based, rights-
based or power-based in approach.4 The second is that interests-based procedures have the 
potential to be more cost effective than rights-based procedures, which in turn may be more 
cost effective than power-based procedures.5 The third proposition is that the costs of disputing 
may be reduced by creating “interests-oriented” systems, that is, systems which emphasise 
interests-based procedures.6 
 
Interests, rights and power-based approaches can be defined as follows. Interests-based 
approaches focus upon the underlying interests of the parties with the aim of producing 
solutions which satisfy as many of those interests as possible.7 Examples of interests-based 
approaches include negotiation and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) approaches such as 
facilitation and mediation. Rights-based approaches determine who is “right” according to an 
independent and objective standard such as precedent, socially accepted behavioural standards 
                                                          
1 William L Ury, Jeanne M Brett and Stephen B Goldberg Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut 
the Costs of Conflict (Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, first published 1988, 
1993 ed); Cathy A Costantino and Christina S Merchant Designing Conflict Management Systems: A Guide to 
Creating Productive and Healthy Organizations (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1996); and Lisa B Bingham 
“Control Over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory Commercial Arbitration” (2004) 67 Law & Contemp Probs 
221. 
2 John Lande “Principles for Policymaking About Collaborative Law and Other ADR Processes” (2007) 22 Ohio 
St J on Disp Resol 619 at 630. 
3 Ury, Brett and Goldberg, above n 1.  
4 At 4-9. 
5 At 4, 10-15. 
6 At 18. 
7 At 6. 
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or legal benchmarks.8 Examples of rights-based approaches include adjudication and ADR 
processes such as arbitration and early neutral evaluation (ENE). Power-based approaches are 
characterised by the use of power (defined as “the ability to coerce someone into something he 
[or she] would not otherwise do”) and frequently involve an exchange of threats and/or acts of 
aggression.9 Examples of power-based approaches include strikes, voting and warfare.  
 
As indicated above, DSD postulates that interests-based procedures have the potential to be the 
most cost-effective but also recognises that rights and power-based procedures may be 
necessary and desirable components of a dispute resolution system.10 Additionally, within each 
category of interests, rights and power-based approaches, there are low and high-cost 
procedures.11 For example, interests-based negotiation, which takes place between the parties 
alone, has the potential to be a low-cost interests-based procedure. Interests-based mediation is 
generally a higher cost interests-based procedure.12 For rights-based processes, expedited 
arbitration may provide a less costly way to determine rights than full scale arbitration, which 
in turn may cost less than litigation.13 The underlying DSD proposition is that dispute systems 
designers should endeavour to create interests-oriented systems that promote the resolution of 
disputes through the use of interests-based procedures wherever possible but also provide “low-
cost ways to determine rights or power for those disputes that cannot or should not be resolved 
by focusing on interests alone.”14 
 
The DSD process is comprised of a number of stages. In general, the DSD process involves 
assessing the needs of disputants and other stakeholders in the system; planning and designing 
a system to address those needs; implementing the system and providing necessary training 
and education for disputants and relevant dispute resolution professionals; and evaluating the 
system and making periodic modifications as needed.15 This study focuses on the design stage 
of the DSD process. 
 
Within the design stage of DSD, a number of principles for the design of low-cost interests-
oriented dispute resolution systems have been formulated by various practitioners in the DSD 
                                                          
8 At 7. 
9 At 7. 
10 At 16-17. 
11 At 8, 18; Bobette Wolski “The Model Dispute Resolution Procedure for Australian Workplace Agreements: A 
Dispute Systems Design Perspective” (1998) 10(1) Bond LR 1 at 17. 
12 Wolski, above n 11, at 17. 
13 At 17. Power-based approaches can also be arranged from low to high-cost. Voting can be a low-cost power 
procedure. Limited strikes and symbolic strikes are relatively low-cost power contests, while full strikes and lock 
outs are high-cost. 
14 Ury, Brett and Goldberg, above n 1, at 18. 
15 Lande, above n 2, at 630. 
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field.16 These principles emanate from six fundamental DSD principles proposed by Ury, Brett 
and Goldberg. Their six basic principles of DSD are as follows:17 
 
(1) Put the focus on interests; 
(2) Build in “loop-backs” to negotiation; 
(3) Provide low cost rights and power backups; 
(4) Build in consultation before, feedback after; 
(5) Arrange procedures in a low-to-high-cost sequence; and 
(6) Provide the necessary motivation, skills, and resources. 
 
Although the term “principles” is used to describe the design guidelines which have been 
proposed by various DSD practitioners, “they are not immutable.”18 Design implies custom 
tailoring. The principles should be adapted to meet the needs of users of the system, the 
resource constraints of the particular enterprise, and the wider legislative environment within 
which the system operates.19 However, some of these principles are now regarded as 
fundamental to the general design of an effective dispute resolution system.  
 
To date, the area of tax dispute resolution has not been evaluated extensively using DSD 
principles. One reason for this may be because tax disputes have traditionally not been regarded 
as interests-based disputes.20 McDonough states that: “Tax disputes … are more typically 
focused on obtaining a result, such as ‘what dollar amount to pay’” as opposed to considering 
the needs and interests of each party.21 In a tax dispute the individual interests of parties tend 
to be subsumed in the argument over legal rights. It is usually only when the parties enter into 
a form of “problem-solving” in an effort to resolve the conflict that interests are taken into 
account.22 Thus, Bentley asserts that conflict resolution that is rights and power-based favours 
the revenue administration and collection authority.23 However, “such situations usually 
                                                          
16 See Ury, Brett and Goldberg, above n 1; Costantino and Merchant, above n 1; Mary P Rowe “Dispute Resolution 
in the Non-Union Environment: An Evolution Toward Integrated Systems for Conflict Management?” in Sandra 
Gleason (ed) Frontiers in Dispute Resolution in Labor Relations and Human Resources (Michigan State 
University Press, East Lansing, 1997) 79; Jennifer Lynch CCRA: Contemporary Conflict Resolution Approaches 
(Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, Ottawa, 1998); Karl A Slaikeu and Ralph H Hasson Controlling the 
Costs of Conflict: How to Design a System for Your Organization (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1998); and Society 
of Professionals in Dispute Resolution Designing Integrated Conflict Management Systems: Guidelines for 
Designers and Decision Makers in Organizations (Washington DC, 2001). 
17 Ury, Brett and Goldberg, above n 1, at 42. 
18 Wolski, above n 11, at 18. 
19 At 18. 
20 Duncan Bentley Taxpayers’ Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation (Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, 2007) at 183 
21 Kirsten J McDonough “Resolving Federal Tax Disputes Through ADR” (1993) 48(2) Arb J 38 at 41. 
22 Bentley, above n 20, at 181. 
23 At 183.  
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constitute a ‘bad’ experience for the taxpayer.”24 Even though tax disputes are overtly focused 
on the rights of each party, an important factor is the cost of taking the matter further. Where 
the costs become too high for the taxpayer, the revenue authority becomes the effective arbiter 
of both parties’ rights as the taxpayer has to withdraw. The revenue authority’s power to impose 
tax, interest and penalties, or the threat to do so, may then become a further factor which 
influences the outcome of the dispute.25 Also of relevance is that, relative to the taxpayer, the 
revenue authority is a “well-resourced disputant” and is also considerably more experienced as 
a litigant in tax disputes.26 
 
The concept of DSD originated in the context of workplace conflict. However, the DSD 
principles developed “have equal applicability to all other places where people convene 
regularly for a purpose and have continuing relationships.”27 Arguably, in the tax context, 
taxpayers and revenue authorities have a continuing relationship with respect to the compulsory 
imposition of tax (and interest and penalties where applicable) by the revenue authority. 
However, the nature of the fundamental relationship between the tax authority and the taxpayer 
in a tax dispute is primarily a legal one which is distinct from a relationship concerned with the 
underlying needs and concerns of the parties.  
 
The application of DSD in tax dispute resolution may thus differ from other dispute resolution 
contexts in the respect that the application of an interests-orientated system may be limited by 
the underlying legal relationship and the particular power imbalance that exists between the 
revenue authority and the taxpayer. In addition, in jurisdictions such as New Zealand (NZ), 
Australia and the United Kingdom (UK), the ultimate discretionary power of the Commissioner 
of the revenue authority to settle tax disputes is governed by the statutorily recognised duty of 
the Commissioner to maximise the taxes collected, and to foster the integrity and effective 
functioning of the tax system given the limited resources available to the Commissioner.28 This 
statutory duty governs all methods of tax dispute resolution. 
 
                                                          
24 At 183. 
25 At 181. 
26 Niels Campbell and Michael Hendriksen “The conference phase of the tax disputes process – what you need to 
know” (paper presented to the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants Annual Tax Conference, 
Wellington, 26-27 October 2012) at [10.21]. 
27 Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, above n 16, at 33. 
28 This power is recognised in NZ, Australia and the UK in various guises such as the “Care and Management of 
Taxes”, the “Good Management Rule” and the “Collection and Management of Taxes”. See Tax Administration 
Act 1994 (TAA 1994), ss 6 and 6A; Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth), s 15; 
and Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 (UK), ss 5 and 9. Apparently there is no similar provision 
governing the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the United States (US) tax system. Email from [redacted] 
(Principal, Co-leader, [redacted], Washington DC) to Melinda Jone regarding the US tax dispute resolution system 
(6 June 2014).  
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Nevertheless, in most jurisdictions, certain types of taxpayers may have various forms of 
contact with the revenue authority. For example, under a self-assessment system (which 
generally relies on voluntary taxpayer compliance), companies and other entities, in particular, 
can have several different tax returns to self-assess may also have numerous other contacts 
with the revenue authority during the tax year.29 A conflict arising in one area can spill over 
into the other areas in the way returns are completed and contacts are made. Thus, in order to 
reduce conflict escalation, improve their relationships with taxpayers and consequently, 
enhance voluntary compliance, there has been a recent trend by tax authorities internationally 
in employing different initiatives, including interests-based ADR processes, to resolve tax 
disputes without litigation.30  
 
The applicability of ADR to tax dispute resolution is not the focus of this study, as this has 
already been established both in the prior literature31 as well as in practice.32 However, as noted 
by Bentley, “ADR provides flow-on improvements in taxpayer compliance by making it easier 
to resolve disputes with revenue authorities or even to allay concerns.”33 It also improves the 
effectiveness and efficiency of tax administration, as ADR focuses on avoiding time-
consuming and expensive litigation before the courts.34 These outcomes align with the aim of 
DSD in reducing the cost of handling disputes and producing more satisfying and durable 
resolutions. Consequently, the use of DSD principles in evaluating the design of tax dispute 
resolution systems is arguably an area worthy of further research. 
 
1.2 Research Gap 
The research gap in this study primarily consists of two main aspects. These aspects are 
discussed in sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 and respectively pertain to the limited use of DSD analysis 
in the context of tax dispute resolution to date, and the lack of DSD analytical frameworks for 
                                                          
29 Bentley, above n 20, at 183. 
30 Bentley, above n 20; EY Tax Dispute Resolution: A New Chapter Emerges – Tax Administration Without 
Borders (2010); Inspector-General of Taxation Review into the Australian Taxation Office’s Use of Early and 
Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Report to the Assistant Treasurer (Sydney, May 2012). 
31 See, for example, Mark Keating “Comment: New Zealand’s tax dispute procedure: Time for a change” (2008) 
14 NZJTLP 425; Melinda Jone and Andrew J Maples “Mediation as an alternative option in Australia's tax 
disputes resolution process” (2012) 27(3) ATF 527; Melinda Jone and Andrew J Maples “Mediation as an 
Alternative Option in New Zealand's Tax Dispute Resolution Procedures” (2012) 18 NZJTLP 412; Melinda Jone 
and Andrew J Maples “Mediation as an Alternative Option in New Zealand's Tax Disputes Resolution Procedures: 
Refining a Proposed Regime” (2013) 19 NZJTLP 301; Neil Russ and Sam Davies “A better way of resolving tax 
disputes?” (2013) 92(7) Chartered Acct J 71; Nicola White “Mediating Tax Disputes: Global Developments” (12 
December 2013) CEDR <http://www.cedr.com/articles/?item=Mediating-Tax-Disputes-Global-Developments> 
(last accessed 7 November 2016). 
32 A number of countries around the world currently utilise ADR in their tax dispute resolution procedures. These 
are outlined in section 1.5 of this chapter.  
33 Bentley, above n 20, at 172. 
34 At 172. 
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analysing dispute resolution systems both generally and in the tax dispute resolution context. 
  
1.2.1 Dispute systems design in the context of tax dispute resolution 
DSD originated in the ADR movement within the context of organisational conflict and 
workplace disputes.35 DSD is not a dispute resolution methodology itself. Rather it is “the 
intentional and systematic creation of an effective, efficient, and fair dispute resolution process 
based upon the unique needs of a particular system.”36 Nabatchi and Bingham observe that: 
“All organizations have dispute systems (by design or not); however, those dispute systems are 
not always effective at minimizing the various dysfunctional conflicts experienced by 
organizations.”37 However, the ideas of DSD have grown in popularity as organisations have 
recognised their potential to produce satisfactory dispute outcomes in a timely, efficient, and 
cost-sensitive manner. Robinson, Pearlstein and Mayer state that:38 
 
Many corporations have embraced the concept of “dispute systems design,” both in order 
to avoid the expense and destructiveness of individual dispute litigation, and because they 
realize that improved communication and conflict handling are key to the development of 
high performance organizations.  
 
Bingham notes that organisational DSDs can take a “myriad of forms, including a multi-step 
procedure culminating in mediation, arbitration, ombudspersons programs giving disputants 
many different process choices, or simply a single-step binding arbitration design.”39 Although, 
Nabatchi and Bingham state that “most effective dispute systems have at least one ADR 
process option, with mediation generally being the preferred choice.”40 This follows from the 
proposition that: “In general, interest-based approaches are cheaper and more effective than 
rights-based approaches, which are cheaper and more effective than power-based 
approaches.”41  
 
                                                          
35 Susan D Franck “Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design” (2007) 92 Minn L Rev 
161 at 177. 
36 At 178. 
37 Tina Nabatchi and Lisa B Bingham “From Postal to Peaceful: Dispute Systems Design in the USPS REDRESS
 
Program” (2010) 30 Rev Pub Personnel Admin 211 at 212. 
38 Peter Robinson, Arthur Pearlstein and Bernard Mayer “DyADS: Encouraging ‘Dynamic Adaptive Dispute 
Systems’ in the Organized Workplace” (2005) 10 Harv Negot L Rev 339 at 343. 
39 Lisa B Bingham “Designing Justice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems for Managing Conflict” (2008) 24 
Ohio St J on Disp Resol 1 at 11. 
40 Nabatchi and Bingham, above n 37, at 213. 
41 At 213. 
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The field of dispute resolution has broadly adapted the concept of DSD beyond organisations 
with employment conflict and courts to other legal and administrative contexts.42 There are 
now growing numbers of conflict management or dispute resolution programs in the 
substantive areas of education, the environment, criminal justice, community or neighbourhood 
justice, domestic relations and family law and in settings ranging from federal, state, and local 
governments to a variety of private and non-profit organisations.43  
 
However, with respect to DSD in the context of tax dispute resolution, Bentley states that: “The 
layers of dispute resolution within tax systems are a relatively recent phenomenon.”44 
Furthermore, as noted above in section 1.1, there is a growing trend towards the use of ADR 
processes in tax dispute resolution around the world.45 Both tax administrations and taxpayers 
are recognising that “ADR may allow more tax disputes to be resolved earlier, or avoided 
altogether, thereby giving both parties greater certainty and the ability to channel scarce 
resources into more productive activities.”46 In addition, Bentley states that “the focus of these 
mechanisms on a problem-solving approach to dispute resolution is consistent with the current 
emphasis by revenue authorities on building and maintaining strong compliance relationships 
with taxpayers.”47  
 
Hence, the movement towards ADR processes in tax dispute resolution generally accords with 
revenue authorities “moving away from a ‘command and control’ culture to one designed to 
build trust, support and respect in the community” which in turn encourages voluntary 
compliance.48 It is also consistent with the body of literature49 which posits an “expanded 
‘service’ paradigm which recognises the role of enforcement, but also emphasises the role of 
                                                          
42 Bingham, above n 39, at 11. 
43 At 11-12. For review articles on the use of DSD in the contexts of employment, education, the environment, 
criminal justice, family disputes, civil litigation in courts, and community disputes, see Symposium “Conflict 
Resolution in the Field: Assessing the Past, Charting the Future” (2004) 22 Conflict Resol Q 1.  
44 Bentley, above n 20, at 172. 
45 EY, above n 30; Inspector-General of Taxation, above n 30. 
46 EY, above n 30, at 4. 
47 Bentley, above n 20, at 172. 
48 At 166.  
49 See, for example, James Alm and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez “Institutions, paradigms, and tax evasion in 
developing and transition countries” in James Alm and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (eds) Public Finance in 
Developing and Transition Countries (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK and Northhampton, MA, 2003) 
147; Doreen McBarnet “When compliance is not the solution but the problem: From changes in law to changes 
in attitude” in Valerie Braithwaite (ed) Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion (Ashgate 
Publishing, Aldershot, 2003) 229; Valerie Braithwaite “Dancing with tax authorities: Motivational postures and 
non-compliant actions” in Valerie Braithwaite (ed) Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and 
Evasion (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 2003) 15; Erich Kirchler, Erik Hoelzl and Ingrid Wahl “Enforced versus 
voluntary tax compliance: The ‘slippery slope’ framework” (2008) 29 J Econ Psychol 210; James Alm, Todd 
Cherry, Michael Jones and Michael McKee “Taxpayer information assistance services and tax compliance 
behavior” (2010) 31 J Econ Psychol 577; James Alm and Benno Torgler “Do Ethics Matter? Tax Compliance and 
Morality” (2011) 101 J Bus Ethics 635. 
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the tax administration as a facilitator and a provider of services to taxpayer-citizens.”50 In 
practice, various tax administrations around the world, including Inland Revenue in NZ,51 the 
Australian Taxation Office (ATO) in Australia,52 HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) in the 
UK53 and the IRS in the US, 54 are currently undertaking forms of modernisation programmes 
or reinvention projects aimed at, among other things, simplifying (and digitalising) tax 
administration, and transforming into more service-orientated organisations. One reason for 
these changes is to increase voluntary compliance by having a simpler tax system55 and through 
improving the “client” experience.56 
 
Furthermore, the former Australian Commissioner of Taxation, Michael D’Ascenzo has 
observed that:57 
 
Procedural fairness, courtesy and integrity underpin a world class tax administration. This 
is important because the success of any tax system is highly dependent on people’s 
propensity to voluntarily comply with their tax obligations.  
 
In addition, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Centre for 
Tax Policy and Administration has noted that “[t]axpayers who are aware of their rights and 
expect, and in fact receive, a fair and efficient treatment are more willing to comply.”58 It thus 
follows that DSDs incorporating ADR processes also align with the procedural justice 
research59 which concerns “the perceived fairness of the procedures involved in decision-
                                                          
50 Alm, Cherry, Jones and McKee, above n 49, at 577. 
51 Inland Revenue “Business transformation: Inland Revenue is changing” (6 September 2016) 
<http://www.ird.govt.nz/transformation/how-changing/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
52 Australian Taxation Office “Reinventing the ATO” (16 September 2016) <https://www.ato.gov.au/About-
ATO/About-us/Reinventing-the-ATO/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
53 HM Revenue and Customs “HMRC announces next step in its ten-year modernisation programme” (23 
November 2015) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/issue-briefing-hmrc-announces-next-step-in-its-
ten-year-modernisation-programme/hmrc-announces-next-step-in-its-ten-year-modernisation-programme-to-
become-a-tax-authority-for-the-future> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
54 Internal Revenue Service “IRS Future State” (4 March 2016) <https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/irs-future-
state> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
55 Inland Revenue, above n 51. 
56 Australian Taxation Office Reinventing the ATO – Program Blueprint (Canberra, March 2015) at 2.  
57 Michael D’Ascenzo “It is the Community’s Tax System” (2006) 2(1) JATTA 9 at 13. 
58 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Centre for Tax Policy and Administration 
Principles of Good Tax Administration – Practice Note (GAP001, 21 September 2001) at 3, [3]. 
59 See, for example, Edgar A Lind and Tom R Tyler The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (Plenum, New 
York, 1988); Tom R Tyler Why Citizens Obey the Law: Procedural Justice, Legitimacy and Compliance (Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1990); Tom R Tyler “The Psychology of Legitimacy: A Relational Perspective on 
Voluntary Deference to Authorities” (1997) 1 Pers Soc Psychol Rev 323; Kristina Murphy “Regulating More 
Effectively: The Relationship between Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Tax Non-compliance” (2005) 32 J 
Law & Soc 562. 
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making and the perceived treatment one receives from a decision maker.”60 The studies in this 
area demonstrate that people’s reactions to their personal experiences with authorities are 
rooted in their evaluations of the fairness of procedures those agencies use to exercise their 
authority.61 People who feel treated in a procedurally fair manner by authorities tend to attribute 
greater legitimacy and trustworthiness to them, and perceiving authorities as legitimate and 
trustworthy, they are more willing to comply voluntarily.62 Moreover, this has been found 
regardless of the decision outcome.63 
 
Notwithstanding the global trend towards the use of ADR in tax dispute resolution, to date the 
concept of DSD has not been extensively used in analysing the effectiveness of the design of 
tax dispute resolution systems around the world. To the researcher’s knowledge, currently only 
two researchers have undertaken studies utilising DSD principles in analysing dispute 
resolution systems (and complaint handling systems) in the tax context.64 These studies were 
conducted in Australia by Bentley65 and Mookhey.66 Bentley’s and Mookhey’s studies analyse 
the effectiveness of the design of the ATO’s complaint handling and tax dispute resolution 
procedures, respectively, utilising Ury, Brett and Goldberg’s six DSD principles. Given the 
limited research in utilising DSD to analyse tax dispute resolution systems, this study seeks to 
expand the research in this area, namely through analysing a number of different countries and 
utilising a more comprehensive range of DSD principles in the analysis. 
 
1.2.2 Lack of dispute systems design analysis frameworks 
This study focuses on evaluating the design of tax dispute resolution systems as distinct from 
evaluating the functioning of tax dispute resolution systems in practice. Accordingly, this study 
does not seek to provide an empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of the actual functioning 
                                                          
60 Murphy, above n 59, at 566. 
61 Lind and Tyler, above n 59; Tom R Tyler and Steven L Blader Cooperation in Groups: Procedural Justice, 
Social Identity, and Behavioral Engagement (Psychology Press, Philadelphia, PA, 2000). 
62 Murphy, above n 59, at 566.  
63 At 566. Procedural justice (or procedural fairness) is a commonly referred to dimension of fairness in the context 
of tax dispute resolution. However, other dimensions of fairness referred to in DSD, as outlined in the 
organisational justice literature, include: distributive fairness (relating to the perceived fairness of the outcomes 
received); interpersonal fairness (relating to the quality of the interpersonal treatment received when procedures 
are enacted); and informational fairness (relating to perceptions of the accuracy, relevance, ease of understanding 
and timeliness of information received). For further information, see Yochi Cohen-Charash and Paul Spector “The 
Role of Justice in Organizations: A Meta-Analysis” (2001) 86 Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 278; Jason A 
Colquitt, Donald E Conlon, Michael J Wesson, Christopher OLH Porter and K Yee Ng “Justice at the Millennium: 
A Meta-Analytic Review of 25 years of Organizational Justice Research” (2001) 86 J Applied Psychol 425; 
Nabatchi and Bingham, above n 37. 
64 The researcher has subsequently added to these studies. See “Publications Informing and Incorporated into this 
Thesis”, at page xi of this thesis. 
65 Duncan Bentley “Problem resolution: Does the ATO approach really work?” (1996) 6(1) Revenue LJ 17, 
updated in Bentley, above n 20, at ch 5. 
66 Sheena Mookhey “Tax dispute systems design” (2013) 11 EJTR 79. 
10 
 
of tax dispute resolution systems. The literature identifies metrics such as efficiency, equity 
and voice as being relevant for conducting such an evaluation.67 Budd and Colvin outline that 
the metric of efficiency concerns the effective use of scarce resources, in particular time and 
money; equity relates to fairness and justice; and voice concerns the ability to participate and 
affect decision making.68 Thus, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the functioning of a 
dispute resolution system generally analyses the system in terms of what the system seeks to 
achieve (using concepts such as efficiency, equity and voice). Whereas in evaluating the design 
of dispute resolution systems, this study looks at how the system achieves these objectives 
(through using DSD principles). 
 
With respect to evaluating the design of dispute resolution systems, a number of models for 
designing and implementing organisational conflict management systems have been proposed 
in the literature.69 However, some DSD commentators70 claim that:71  
 
The conflict management models and theory developed by practitioners have been built 
on experience and have shown significant results, but the premises that shape the models 
need to be articulated and tested. 
 
Roche and Teague also note that much of the DSD literature is:72 
 
… highly prescriptive and draws heavily on …descriptive data concerning the prevalence 
of such systems and their associated dispute resolution practices, especially in the United 
States. Rigorous empirical studies conducted to test theory are few so far. 
 
Furthermore, within the DSD literature, there is no framework which has been developed for 
the purpose of analysing dispute resolution systems generally. Barendrecht states that:73 
 
                                                          
67 See John W Budd and Alexander JS Colvin “Improved metrics for workplace dispute resolution procedures: 
efficiency, equity, and voice” (2007) 47 Indus Rel 460. See also, Costantino and Merchant, above n 1, at 168-186, 
who outline similar goals of dispute resolution systems as including: efficiency, effectiveness and satisfaction 
with the process, relationship and outcomes.  
68 Budd and Colvin, above n 67, at 463. 
69 Six main DSD authors have proposed conflict management models in the DSD literature (see above n 16). 
70 For example, John P Conbere “Theory Building for Conflict Management System Design” (2001) 19 Conflict 
Resol Q 215 and Stephanie Smith and Janet Martinez “An Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems Design” 
(2009) 14 Harv Negot L Rev 123. 
71 Conbere, above n 70, at 234. 
72 William Roche and Paul Teague “Do Conflict Management Systems Matter?” (2012) 51 Hum Resource Mgmt 
231 at 231. 
73 Maurits Barendrecht “In Search of Microjustice: Five Basic Elements of a Dispute System” (Tilburg University 
Legal Studies Working Paper No. 002/2009, 29 January 2009) at 4.  
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Within this emerging discipline, attempts have been made to establish design principles 
for setting up dispute systems, but this has not yet led to a generally accepted framework 
for analyzing existing dispute systems, and evaluating their performance. Such a 
framework can also be useful for coordinating efforts to improve dispute systems. 
 
Although, as noted in section 1.1 above, DSD necessarily implies “custom tailoring.”74 Tully 
states that the DSD principles which have been developed for use in the design process are 
“guidelines rather than fixed rules.”75 DSD principles should thus, be adapted to, inter alia, the 
requirements of the organisation and the particular needs of users of the system.76 Nevertheless, 
the above calls for further research in testing the DSD models and theory proposed in the 
literature as well as calls for the development of a DSD framework for analysing the design of 
dispute resolution systems provide a further reason for undertaking this study. Furthermore, 
the development of a DSD framework may be beneficial given that, as noted by Costantino 
and Merchant:77 
 
Typically … conflict in organizations is viewed and managed in a piecemeal, ad hoc 
fashion, as isolated events, which are sometimes grouped by category if the risk exposure 
is great enough but that are rarely examined in the aggregate to reveal patterns and systemic 
issues. 
 
Accordingly, this study seeks to contribute to the DSD research through applying the DSD 
principles established in the literature in the context of taxation and subsequently developing a 
tax DSD framework. Thus, as stated in section 1.2.1 above, an evaluation of the tax dispute 
resolution systems of a number of countries using a comprehensive range of DSD principles, 
will be conducted. Following this, a framework of general tax DSD principles which can be 
applied (and adapted, if necessary) by different jurisdictions in analysing the effectiveness of 
the designs of their tax dispute resolution systems, will be developed. 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Research and Research Questions 
This study aims to develop the application of DSD principles in the particular context of tax 
dispute resolution through the development of guidance in tax DSD principles. The guidance 
will be developed following the DSD evaluations of the tax dispute resolution systems of a 
number of selected jurisdictions. External evaluation of the guidance developed will then be 
sought from interviews conducted with stakeholders in NZ. Accordingly, there are three 
interrelated objectives of this study. The first objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
                                                          
74 Wolski, above n 11, at 18. 
75 The Laws of Australia (2013) vol 13(6) Dispute Systems Design at [13.6.360]. 
76 Wolski, above n 11, at 18. 
77 Costantino and Merchant, above n 1, at xiii. 
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design of the current tax dispute resolution systems of NZ, Australia, the UK and the US using 
DSD principles.78 The second objective is to identify similarities and differences in the DSD 
evaluations of the selected jurisdictions in endeavour to develop a set of general tax DSD 
principles to be adapted by tax administrations in either developing or improving their tax 
dispute resolution procedures from a DSD perspective. Using feedback sought from NZ 
stakeholders, the third objective is to evaluate (and modify, if necessary) the general tax DSD 
principles developed and then adapt (if necessary) the guidance in the context of the NZ tax 
dispute resolution procedures.  
 
These objectives are addressed through several research questions which are stated below: 
 
RQ 1: How do the designs of the tax dispute resolution systems of NZ, Australia, the 
UK and the US compare when they are evaluated using DSD principles? 
 
RQ 2: What general guidance in DSD principles in the context of tax dispute 
resolution can be derived from the DSD evaluations conducted in RQ 1 and 
the feedback from the interviews?  
 
RQ 3: How can the general guidance in DSD principles in the context of tax dispute 
resolution (derived in RQ 2) be adapted in the context of the NZ tax dispute 
resolution procedures?  
 
1.4 Overview of Research Methodology 
The two main paradigms that are traditionally presented as being fundamentally opposed are 
those of positivism/postpositivism and interpretivism/constructivism.79 The positivist approach 
seeks objectivity in the explanation of social reality.80 In contrast, interpretivism seeks to 
provide an understanding of social reality based on the subjective interpretation of the 
researcher.81 Against the background of these opposing paradigms, this study is guided by the 
alternative research paradigm of pragmatism. Creswell and Plano Clark state that pragmatism 
sidesteps the contentious issues of truth and reality, accepts, philosophically, that there are 
singular and multiple realities that are open to empirical inquiry and orients itself toward 
                                                          
78 Section 1.5 of this chapter contains the rationale behind the selection of the countries. 
79 Martina Yvonne Feilzer “Doing Mixed Methods Research Pragmatically: Implications for the Rediscovery of 
Pragmatism as a Research Paradigm” (2010) 4 J Mixed Methods Res 6 at 6. 
80 Margaret McKerchar Design and Conduct of Research in Tax, Law and Accounting (Thomson Reuters, 
Pyrmont, 2010) at 72. 
81 At 75. 
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solving practical problems in the “real world”.82 In this respect, pragmatism allows the 
researcher to be free of mental and practical constraints imposed by the “forced choice 
dichotomy between postpositivism and constructivism.”83 Thus, researchers do not have to “be 
the prisoner of a particular method or technique”.84 
 
McKerchar additionally states that pragmatists start with an open mind seeking to gain a deep 
understanding of the phenomenon under study and as such, “freely choose the methods, 
techniques and procedures that best meet the needs and purposes of the research.”85 
Accordingly, this supports the use of doctrinal legal analysis, comparative analysis and semi-
structured interviews in order to best meet the needs and purposes of this study. Through case 
studies of the four selected jurisdictions, doctrinal legal analysis and comparative analysis are 
employed to describe the four jurisdictions’ tax dispute resolution systems, and evaluate and 
compare the dispute resolution systems using DSD principles. Inductive reasoning is applied 
to the above analysis in order to develop guidance in best practice tax DSD principles. Semi-
structured interviews with NZ stakeholders are then used to seek external feedback on the tax 
DSD guidance developed and consequently adapt, if necessary, the tax DSD guidance in the 
context of the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures.  
 
1.5 Selection of Countries 
The four countries, NZ, Australia, the UK86 and the US, were selected for this study primarily 
on the basis that they had the most information available on the ADR processes utilised in their 
tax dispute resolution systems. In addition, NZ has been included as this is the jurisdiction in 
which the researcher resides. Other countries with ADR processes in their tax dispute 
resolution systems were considered, namely from a list of countries identified in a report on 
ADR in tax dispute resolution by EY in 2010, Tax Dispute Resolution: A New Chapter Emerges 
– Tax Administration Without Borders.87 EY identified the following countries as having post-
filing ADR processes:88 
                                                          
82 John W Creswell and Vicki L Plano Clark Designing And Conducting Mixed Methods Research (Sage, 
Thousand Oaks, 2007) at 20-28. 
83 At 27. 
84 Colin Robson Real World Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researchers (Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1993) at 291. 
85 McKerchar, above n 80, at 79. 
86 The UK is not a country, but a union of countries including England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. 
However, for the purpose of this study the UK is treated as a country because of the close economic and political 
ties between the countries in the union and given that HMRC is the tax authority for all of the countries in the 
union. 
87 See EY, above n 30. 
88 EY looked at the ADR processes including advance pricing agreements (APAs), pre-filing ADR and post-filing 
ADR, in 21 countries. However, the ADR processes which are included in this study are post-filing ADR 











 The Netherlands 





Somewhat surprisingly, New Zealand was not included as one of the countries identified as 
having ADR processes in their tax dispute resolution systems. However, other sources have 
identified NZ as including ADR within its tax dispute resolution system.89 Further countries in 
addition to the above were identified by the researcher, via a search on Google, as including 







Many countries were unable to be selected as they either did not feature post-filing ADR 
processes in their current tax dispute resolution systems90 or if they did, there was relatively 
limited information available on the ADR processes utilised.91 The limited amount of 
information available from these countries indicated that a detailed analysis of the effectiveness 
of the design of the tax dispute resolution systems (incorporating their ADR processes) would 
not be able to be conducted utilising DSD principles. 
 
                                                          
89 For example, Campbell and Hendriksen, above n 26, at [4.12]; Inspector-General of Taxation, above n 30, at 8, 
[1.44]; and Graham Tubb “Tax Disputes Procedures: A Current Snapshot” (paper presented to New Zealand Law 
Society Tax Conference, Auckland, 5 September 2013) 149 at 154, regard Inland Revenue’s conference 
facilitation process as a form of ADR. For further details on the facilitation process, see section 1.1.2.1 of 
Appendix 1.1 of this thesis.  
90 For example, Brazil, France, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Vietnam. 
91 For example, Bangladesh, Belgium, China, Germany, India, Italy, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, the 
Netherlands, South Africa, Turkey.  
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For the purposes of this study, it is fitting that the four jurisdictions: NZ, Australia, the UK and 
the US, have a common legal heritage based on the common law92 together with a similar 
culture, are at a similar stage of industrial and economic development whilst having historical 
connections, close economic relationships and Anglo-American traditions, as these factors 
provide common grounds for undertaking a comparative analysis. NZ, Australia, the UK, the 
US and Canada are the major western, common law countries which are traditionally compared 
against each other. However, Canada has been excluded from this study. Notwithstanding that 
the EY report identifies a “Mediation process for Appeals” utilised by the Canada Revenue 
Agency (CRA),93 a search by the researcher on the CRA website and subsequent 
correspondence with a Canadian tax practitioner and academic confirmed the EY report to be 
“misinformed.”94 That is, while tax mediation has been considered by the CRA in the past,95 
there is currently no mediation process in place for resolving tax disputes.96  
 
In line with the principles of pragmatism, NZ was selected as a country within which the 
general guidance in tax DSD principles developed could be adapted given that this is the 
jurisdiction in which this research is being conducted. Moreover, despite a number of reviews 
and amendments to the current NZ tax dispute resolution procedures since their enactment 
under Part IVA TAA 1994 in 1996, commentators and professional organisations in NZ have 
raised various concerns with respect to their operation. Many of these concerns can be referred 
back to a joint submission to Inland Revenue prepared by the Taxation Committee of the New 
Zealand Law Society (NZLS) and the former National Tax Committee of the New Zealand 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (NZICA)97 in August 2008.98 This submission led to lengthy 
discussions between NZLS, NZICA and Inland Revenue and resulted in various administrative 
                                                          
92 An exception is the US state of Louisiana where state law is based on French and Spanish civil law. However, 
federal laws in Louisiana are based on common law. 
93 EY, above n 30, at 31. 
94 Email from [redacted] (Counsel, [redacted], Canada and Assistant Professor, [redacted], Canada) to Melinda 
Jone regarding mediation in the CRA (28 March 2014). 
95 See Deen C Olsen “Alternative Dispute Resolution” (paper presented to the Forty-Ninth Canadian Tax 
Foundation Tax Conference, 1997) Report of the Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Tax Conference (Canadian Tax 
Foundation, Toronto, 1998). 
96 Karen Stilwell “Mediation of Canadian Tax Disputes” (Master of Laws Thesis, University of Toronto, 2014).  
97 From 1 July 2014 Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (CA-ANZ) was launched as the new 
trading name merging the former Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia (ICAA) and NZICA. The name 
Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (or CA-ANZ) will be used hereafter in this thesis, except for 
instances where it is more applicable to refer to the former NZICA. 
98 See Taxation Committee of the New Zealand Law Society and National Tax Committee of the New Zealand 
Institute of Chartered Accountants The Disputes Resolution Procedures in Part IVA of the Tax Administration Act 
1994 and the Challenge Procedures in Part VIIIA of the Tax Administration Act 1994 (Wellington, August 2008).  
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improvements to the process (including the introduction of conference facilitation)99 as well as 
some legislative reforms made in 2010-2011.100 
 
In particular, it has been argued that the dispute process is stacked too heavily in favour of the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue and that taxpayers are suffering from “burn off” due to the 
costs and complexity involved with the procedures.101 Notwithstanding the abovementioned 
improvements to the procedures, to date it appears that these views of the NZ tax dispute 
resolution procedures have largely remained unchanged.102 Consequently, a number of 
suggestions have been made for the greater use of ADR processes by Inland Revenue.103 The 
ongoing dialogue between Inland Revenue and various stakeholders therefore, provides a 
relevant background against which to seek feedback on the guidance in tax DSD developed as 
well as to adapt the guidance in the context of the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures. 
 
1.6 Significance of the Research 
Scholars such as Bentley claim that: “For all tax systems, dispute system design within the tax 
administration is becoming critical to the successful engagement of taxpayers with the 
system.”104 Research further suggests that there are clear benefits of providing a wide range of 
dispute mechanisms to resolve conflict generally and moreover, some tax administrations have 
proved the successful use of ADR mechanisms designed to operate in the tax context.105 
                                                          
99 See Inland Revenue “Changes to the disputes resolution process” (12 July 2010) 
<http://www.ird.govt.nz/technical-tax/general-articles/changes-to-disputes-res-proc.html> (last accessed 7 
November 2016). 
100 As enacted by the Taxation (Tax Administration and Remedial Matters) Act 2011. 
101 Taxation Committee of the New Zealand Law Society and National Tax Committee of the New Zealand 
Institute of Chartered Accountants, above n 98, at [2.1(d)]. 
102 See, for example, Mark Keating and Michael Lennard “Developments in tax disputes – Another step 
backwards?” (paper presented to the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants Annual Tax Conference, 
Auckland, 11-12 November 2011); Shelley Griffiths “Resolving New Zealand Tax Disputes: Finding the Balance 
Between Judicial Determination and Administrative Process” (paper presented to Australasian Tax Teachers 
Association Conference, Sydney, 17 January 2012); Susan Glazebrook “Taxation Disputes in New Zealand” 
(paper presented to the Australasian Tax Teachers Association Conference, Auckland, 22 January 2013); Denham 
Martin “Honest Taxpayers Need Advocates and Real Rights” (2013) 212 NZLawyer 22; Fred Ward “Changes to 
the Disputes Resolution Process – A Practitioner’s Perspective” (paper presented to the New Zealand Law Society 
Tax Conference, Auckland, 5 September 2013) 165; Sarah Miles “The Price we Pay for a Specialised Society: Do 
Tax Disputes Require Greater Judicial Specialisation?” (2015) 46 VUWLR 361; Alison Pavlovich “The Tax 
Disputes Process and Taxpayer Rights: Are the Inconsistencies Proportional?” (2016) 22 NZJTLP 70. 
103 See, for example, Keating, above n 31; James Peck and Andrew J Maples “Comment: The Tax Disputes 
Resolution Process in New Zealand: What about the Little Fellas?” (2010) 16 NZJTLP 348; Taxation Committee 
of the New Zealand Law Society and National Tax Committee of the New Zealand Institute of Chartered 
Accountants Disputes: A Review, July 2010 (Wellington, September 2010); PricewaterhouseCoopers 
“Submission on the Taxation (Tax Administration and Remedial Matters) Bill” (18 February 2011); Jone and 
Maples “Mediation as an Alternative Option in New Zealand's Tax Dispute Resolution Procedures”, above n 31; 
Jone and Maples “Mediation as an Alternative Option in New Zealand's Tax Disputes Resolution Procedures: 
Refining a Proposed Regime”, above n 31; Russ and Davies, above n 31. 
104 Bentley, above n 20, at 408. 
105 Bentley, above n 20; EY, above n 30. 
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Nevertheless, to date, limited research has been conducted to examine the effectiveness of tax 
dispute resolution systems (incorporating ADR processes) from a DSD perspective. Through 
evaluating the tax dispute resolution systems of four selected jurisdictions using DSD 
principles, this cross-jurisdictional study broadens the existing research in this area, in 
particular, outside of Australia. Furthermore, in the process of doing so, this study also provides 
a detailed overview of the current tax dispute resolution systems of the four selected 
jurisdictions. 
 
This study also responds to calls by commentators in the DSD field that further research is 
necessary in testing the DSD models developed by practitioners and that a DSD framework for 
analysing dispute resolution systems is needed.106 In the process of developing a DSD 
framework in the tax context, this research additionally provides a comprehensive synthesis of 
the DSD principles proposed in the prior literature. Moreover, the development of the tax DSD 
framework in this study may potentially provide guidance for DSD practitioners to follow in 
building DSD best practice frameworks in other (non-tax) contexts featuring dispute resolution 
systems.  
 
A tax DSD framework may be of benefit to revenue authorities and policymakers around the 
world through providing DSD guidance to follow in either improving existing or developing 
new tax dispute resolution procedures. Improving tax dispute resolution procedures can in turn 
enhance taxpayers’ perceptions of fairness of the tax administration overall and thereby, 
potentially improve voluntary compliance.107 An ultimate outcome of this research (albeit 
beyond the scope of this present study) would be for the theoretical tax DSD principles 
developed to be tested in practice by policymakers. Although, as noted in section 1.1 above, 
the application of the tax DSD guidance developed (and of interests-based procedures) may, 
among other things, be limited by the fact that in a tax dispute the individual interests of the 
parties tend to be subsumed in the argument over legal rights. That is, the fundamental 
relationship between the parties in dispute is a legal one as opposed to one concerning the 
underlying needs and concerns of the parties. 
 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
This chapter has provided a background to the thesis topic, identified gaps in the research, 
outlined the research objectives and questions, provided an overview of the research 
methodology, justified the choice of countries selected for this study and discussed the 
significance of the research. The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. 
                                                          
106 Conbere, above n 70; Roche and Teague, above n 72; Barendrecht, above n 73. 
107 Bentley, above n 20, at 172. See also, Organisational Review Committee Organisational Review of the Inland 
Revenue Department: Report to the Minister of Revenue (and on tax policy, also to the Minister of Finance) 
(Wellington, 1994) at [10].  
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Chapter 2 will discuss certain definitional aspects of the study and review selected prior DSD 
literature. An overview of the DSD field will be provided and the four stages of the DSD 
process will be outlined. The principles for best practice in effective DSD in the literature will 
be reviewed through conducting a documentary analysis of six conflict management models 
proposed by previous DSD authors. From this analysis, an initial framework of DSD principles 
to be utilised in evaluating the tax dispute resolution systems of the four selected jurisdictions 
in this study will be derived. Following this, the extant studies utilising DSD principles in 
evaluating tax dispute resolution systems by Bentley and Mookhey will be discussed.  
 
Chapter 3 will present the research paradigm and methodological approaches utilised in this 
study. Justification for the pragmatism research paradigm adopted will be provided. The 
incorporation of the black letter law and comparative research approaches in this study will be 
outlined. Details in relation to the design and conduct of the case studies and semi-structured 
interviews, will then be discussed. This will include a description of the documentary evidence 
utilised for the case studies and of the sample of stakeholders selected for the interviews.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 will present the case studies of the four jurisdictions. Chapter 4 will present 
the case studies of the two Australasian jurisdictions (NZ and Australia) and chapter 5 will 
contain the case studies of the two non-Australasian jurisdictions (the UK and the US). In each 
of these chapters, the current tax dispute resolution procedures of the selected jurisdictions will 
first be set out and an evaluation of the effectiveness of the design of these procedures against 
the initial framework of DSD principles (derived in chapter 2) will then be conducted.  
 
Chapter 6 will consequently summarise the case study findings from chapters 4 and 5. 
Similarities and differences in the DSD principles applied by the four jurisdictions will be 
identified and compared. As a result, guidance in tax DSD principles for tax administrations 
will be developed.  
 
Chapters 7 and 8 will discuss the feedback received from the interviews conducted with the 
selected NZ stakeholders on the tax DSD principles developed in chapter 6. Chapter 7 will 
present the interview findings on the tax DSD principles in the general context and based on 
these findings, chapter 8 will outline suggested changes to the tax DSD principles. In addition, 
chapter 8 will further discuss the interview findings on the tax DSD principles in the NZ context 
and subsequently, make recommendations with respect to the application of the suggested 
changes to the tax DSD principles in the context of the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures. 
 
Lastly, chapter 9 will provide an overview of the research and its findings, and discuss the 
contributions of the study to the literature and to the fields of tax dispute resolution and DSD. 
The limitations of the thesis, suggestions for future areas of research and concluding remarks 
will also be presented. 
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Chapter 2: Definitional Aspects and Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present certain definitional aspects relevant to this study and 
review selected prior literature on dispute systems design (DSD). This chapter is organised as 
follows. Section 2.2 discusses some of the definitional aspects with respect to tax disputes and 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the context of tax dispute resolution. Section 2.3 
provides a background to the field of DSD. Section 2.4 outlines the four general stages of the 
DSD process. Section 2.5 reviews six conflict management models proposed in the DSD 
literature and their associated DSD principles. Section 2.6 then provides a summary of the six 
models. Section 2.7 consequently derives an initial framework of DSD principles to be utilised 
in evaluating the tax dispute resolution systems of the selected jurisdictions in this study. 
Following this, section 2.8 outlines the extant studies conducted by Bentley1 and Mookhey2 
which utilise DSD principles in the context of evaluating tax dispute resolution systems. Lastly, 
section 2.9 provides a chapter summary. 
 
2.2 Definitional Aspects 
The following subsections discuss selected definitional aspects pertaining to tax disputes 
(section 2.2.1) and ADR in the context of tax dispute resolution (section 2.2.2). 
 
2.2.1 Tax disputes 
Tax disputes between taxpayers and tax authorities are a common feature of modern tax 
systems around the world. Conventionally, they are said to occur when there is a disagreement 
between the taxpayer and the tax authority in respect of the taxpayer’s tax liabilities or 
entitlements and related issues.3 This is the definition of tax disputes that has been adopted for 
the purposes of this study. Although, in principle, there are several types of tax disputes. Some 
of them do not involve the tax authority as a party. These may arise between two or more 
parties in a legal agreement or commercial dealing.4 For example, one of the parties may 
disagree with the meaning of a contractual agreement, or the operation of a statute, and whether 
or to what extent a tax is payable by one of the parties.5 In addition, some tax disputes may not 
directly involve the taxpayer as a party. Such tax disputes can occur where there is 
                                                          
1 Duncan Bentley “Problem resolution: Does the ATO approach really work?” (1996) 6(1) Revenue LJ 17, updated 
in Duncan Bentley Taxpayers’ Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation (Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, 2007) ch 5. 
2 Sheena Mookhey “Tax dispute systems design” (2013) 11 EJTR 79. 
3 Binh Tran-Nam and Michael Walpole “Independent Tax Dispute Resolution and Social Justice in Australia” 
(2012) 35 UNSWLJ 470 at 477.  
4 At 472. 
5 At 472-473. 
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disagreement with the provisions of a tax treaty.6 For example, a taxpayer may believe that the 
actions of the taxpayer’s country, a treaty country, or both, will or may result in taxation that 
is not in accordance with a particular tax treaty and thus, may request competent authority 
assistance. Consequently, the dispute is generally dealt with between the competent authorities 
of the two treaty countries. The taxpayer is usually not permitted to participate in any formal 
meetings between the competent authorities. Hence, these tax disputes are “intergovernmental 
disputes between the treaty nations rather than disputes between the [revenue authority] and 
taxpayers.”7 As this research is confined to tax disputes occurring between the revenue 
authority and taxpayers, the abovementioned types of tax disputes are excluded from the scope 
of this study.  
 
Tran-Nam and Walpole further state that “tax disputes are said to take place when the taxpayer 
takes a contrary view to that of the tax administration, and decides to take some action 
regarding this disagreement.”8 Thus, also excluded from the definition of tax disputes in this 
study, are those cases in which taxpayers disagree with tax administrators but do not take any 
action apart from complying with the decisions of tax administrators. This more restrictive 
definition is mainly due to the fact that those taxpayers who disagree but do nothing about it 
are unobservable to independent researchers.9  
 
In addition, it is necessary to distinguish tax disputes from taxpayer complaints. A complaint 
can be defined as “an expression of dissatisfaction or concern about goods, services, actions or 
inaction that is made by a complainant (often a consumer) or by another person on their 
behalf.”10 Furthermore, “a complaint may not involve any disagreement.”11 In the context of 
tax administration, complaints can be about: undue delays; unclear or misleading information; 
staff behaviour; or mistakes, which could result from misunderstanding, omissions or 
oversights.12 Generally, complaints cannot be filed by taxpayers for substantive tax issues, for 
example, relating to how much tax is owed or about laws that the taxpayer thinks are wrong.13 
These issues are usually dealt with through a tax administration’s review and appeal 
procedures. Whilst stated in the context of tax dispute resolution in New Zealand (NZ), but 
nevertheless applicable to tax dispute resolution generally, the Organisational Review 
                                                          
6 United States General Accounting Office IRS Initiatives to Resolve Disputes Over Tax Liabilities (Washington 
DC, May 1997) at 26. 
7 At 26. 
8 Tran-Nam and Walpole, above n 3, at 477. 
9 At 477. 
10 Tania Sourdin Alternative Dispute Resolution (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2012) at 133. 
11 At 8. 
12 Canada Revenue Agency “Make a service complaint?” (12 April 2016) <http://www.cra-
arc.gc.ca/gncy/cmplntsdspts/srvccmplnts/menu-eng.html> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
13 Canada Revenue Agency, above n 12. 
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Committee of the Inland Revenue Department (the Richardson Committee) also drew a 
distinction between “clarification or confirmation issues” and “process problems” 
(complaints), which do not constitute a dispute, and “a ‘tax dispute’ [which] occurs when the 
Commissioner and taxpayer do not agree on the facts and/or interpretation of tax law on which 
an assessment has been based.”14 Against this background, the complaint handling procedures 
of the revenue authorities (including any external recourse to independent ombudsmen or 
equivalent) of the selected jurisdictions in this study, are excluded from the scope of this 
research. 
 
The income tax systems pertaining to the jurisdictions selected for this study all currently 
operate on a self-assessment basis for income tax. That is, certain taxpayers are responsible for 
calculating their own tax obligations, filing their tax returns on a timely basis and paying the 
correct amount of tax to the tax authority. Self-assessment is based on the idea of voluntary 
taxpayer compliance. Although, to make it easier for taxpayers to meet their self-assessment 
obligations, many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries, including Australia and the United Kingdom (UK), now pre-populate income tax 
returns with certain information held by the revenue authority or reliable third parties.15 
However, taxpayers still remain responsible for the ensuring accuracy of their assessment. 
Nevertheless, taxpayer audits are an important tool in tax enforcement under self-assessment 
regimes and in most jurisdictions featuring self-assessment regimes tax disputes principally 
arise through taxpayer audits.16 It follows that such tax disputes can generally be classified as 
post-filing tax disputes and are accordingly dealt with using post-filing dispute resolution 
processes (as distinct from pre-filing processes17 and advance pricing agreements (APAs)).18 
Thus, the scope of this study is limited to post-filing tax disputes and the tax dispute resolution 
processes (including ADR processes) examined are limited to post-filing processes. 
 
  
                                                          
14 Organisational Review Committee Organisational Review of the Inland Revenue Department Report to the 
Minister of Revenue (and on tax policy, also to the Minister of Finance) (Wellington, 1994) at [10.1], [10.9]. 
15 Inland Revenue Making Tax Simpler – Towards a New Tax Administration Act: A Government Discussion 
Document (November 2015) at 57. In 2015, Inland Revenue also proposed the pre-population of individual 
income tax returns in NZ: at 55-65. 
16 Tran-Nam and Walpole, above n 3, at 478; Suzette Chapple “Income Tax Dispute Resolution: Can we Learn 
from Other Jurisdictions?” (1999) 2 JAT 312 at 318; Bentley Taxpayers’ Rights: Theory, Origin and 
Implementation, above n 1, at 174. 
17 Pre-filing dispute resolution processes enable taxpayers to resolve issues and disputes with tax authorities prior 
to filing a tax return, thus, giving taxpayers certainty that, once an issue has been resolved, the position will not 
be challenged by the tax authority during the audit process: EY Tax Dispute Resolution: A New Chapter Emerges 
– Tax Administration Without Borders (2010) at 11. 
18 APAs specifically cover transfer pricing issues and allow taxpayers and tax authorities to agree on an 
appropriate transfer pricing methodology in advance of a return being filed: at 9. 
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2.2.2 Alternative dispute resolution in the context of tax dispute resolution  
Post-filing tax disputes between taxpayers and the tax authority can be resolved by various 
methods including “negotiating with the other party directly” or “asking a court or tribunal to 
make a decision.”19 Guidance in the UK notes that the vast majority of tax disputes are settled 
by out of court agreement following discussions between the tax authority and the taxpayer.20 
Relatively few disputes are referred to the Court for resolution.21 Furthermore, increasingly 
parties involved in tax disputes are encouraged or required to make genuine efforts to resolve 
tax disputes via ADR before these disputes can be settled by judicial determination. These 
obligations with respect to ADR can include an initial obligation or requirement of the revenue 
authority to implement ADR processes22 and/or an on-going obligation to use ADR in 
managing and resolving tax disputes.23 
 
The dispute resolution literature further provides the following reasons contributing towards 
the increase in popularity of ADR in resolving disputes generally:24 
 
 Overloaded court dockets. 
 Increasing cost and decreasing satisfaction with litigation. 
 Societal movement toward more natural and humane methods of dispute 
resolution. 
 Desire to empower disputants to participate in resolving their own disputes. 
 Increasing interest in flexible dispute resolution. 
 Interest in confidentiality and avoidance of publicity. 
 
The term “Alternative Dispute Resolution” or “ADR” has traditionally been used to refer to 
dispute resolution processes that are “alternative” to traditional court proceedings.25 However, 
                                                          
19 Australian Taxation Office “ATO plain English guide to alternative dispute resolution” (1 June 2015) 
<http://www.ato.gov.au/About-ATO/About-us/In-detail/Key-documents/ATO-plain-English-guide-to-
alternative-dispute-resolution/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
20 HM Revenue and Customs Resolving Tax Disputes: Practical Guidance for HMRC Staff on the Use of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Large or Complex Cases (April 2012) at 3. 
21 At 3. 
22 For example, in the United States (US), the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990 and the Internal 
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 directed that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
implement ADR procedures in their administrative dispute process.  
23 For example, in Australia, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) is obliged to consider ADR as a means of 
resolving tax disputes under various provisions contained in the Legal Services Directions 2005 (Cth) and the 
Civil Disputes Resolution Act 2011 (Cth). In the UK, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) is encouraged to use 
ADR through the UK Government-wide Dispute Resolution Commitment. In NZ, unlike in the other three 
jurisdictions in this study, there is currently no requirement or obligation for Inland Revenue to implement ADR 
processes or any ongoing requirement or obligation to utilise ADR in managing or resolving tax disputes.  
24 Cathy A Costantino and Christina S Merchant Designing Conflict Management Systems: A Guide to Creating 
Productive and Healthy Organizations (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1996) at 35-37. 
25 Sourdin, above n 10, at 2. 
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ADR has also been used as an acronym for “appropriate”, “assisted” or “additional” dispute 
resolution processes.26 It has been noted that “it seems ludicrous to speak of ‘alternative dispute 
resolution’ when in fact means other than litigation have long been the primary means of 
resolving disputes.”27 Current anecdotal evidence from (A)DR practitioners purports that the 
term ‘dispute resolution’ or ‘DR’ is now the preferred term amongst the profession. However, 
in this study the term ‘ADR’ will be used given that in the researcher’s view, in the context of 
tax dispute resolution, ADR processes presently remain as ‘alternative’ dispute resolution 
processes.  
 
Figure 2.1: Dispute Resolution Processes to Manage or Resolve a Dispute in Australia28 
 
 
                                                          
26 At 2; National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council Dispute Resolution Terms: The Use of Terms 
in (Alternative) Dispute Resolution (Barton, 2003) 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/LegalSystem/AlternateDisputeResolution/Pages/NADRACpublications.aspx> (last 
accessed 7 November 2016) at 4. 
27 Family Court of Australia Response of the Family Court of Australia to the Attorney-General's Department 
Paper on Primary Dispute Resolution Services in Family Law (Sydney, 1997) at 7. 
28 Reproduced from the Australian National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council Your Guide to 
Dispute Resolution (Barton, 2012) 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/LegalSystem/AlternateDisputeResolution/Pages/NADRACpublications.aspx> (last 
accessed 7 November 2016) at 6. 
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The National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council (NADRAC)29 describes ADR 
as “an umbrella term for processes, other than judicial determination, in which an impartial 
person assists those in a dispute to resolve the issues between them.”30 While the NADRAC do 
not specifically define the word ‘assists’, Sourdin notes that, in the context of describing ADR, 
it can be taken to mean that an impartial third party (often referred to as an impartial ADR 
practitioner) “either assists the parties in a dispute or conflict to reach a decision by agreement, 
or makes a recommendation or a decision that may be binding or non-binding on the parties.”31 
Referring to Figure 2.1, which illustrates dispute resolution processes that can be used to 
manage or resolve a dispute, the NADRAC definition includes “Processes that Help You”, 
“Processes that Give You Advice” and “Processes that Make a Decision” (excluding court and 
tribunal determinations).  
 
However, there are other definitions for ADR that exist which are narrower in scope. For 
example, the Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR) defines ADR as:32  
 
A body of dispute resolution techniques which avoid the inflexibility of litigation and 
arbitration, and instead focus on enabling parties to achieve a better or similar result, with 
the minimum of direct and indirect cost. 
 
Along similar lines, ADR processes are defined in section 3(1) of the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) as: 
 
[P]rocedures and services for the resolution of disputes, and includes: 
(a) conferencing; and 
(b) mediation; and 
(c) neutral evaluation; and 
(d) case appraisal; and 
(e) conciliation; and 
(f) procedures or services specified in the regulations; 
but does not include: 
(g) arbitration; or 
(h) court procedures or services. 
                                                          
29 The NADRAC was established in 1995 and was an independent advisory council to the Australian Attorney-
General on dispute resolution. However, it was closed following the Australian Government's announcement on 
8 November 2013 to abolish or rationalise a number of non-statutory bodies. For further information on the 
NADRAC, see National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council Alternative Dispute Resolution in the 
Civil Justice System: Issues Paper (Barton, 2009) 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/LegalSystem/AlternateDisputeResolution/Pages/NADRACpublications.aspx> (last 
accessed 7 November 2016) at 1, [1.1]-[1.2].  
30 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, above n 26, at 4. 
31 Sourdin, above n 10, at 3. 
32 Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution “Glossary of terms” 
<http://www.cedr.com/about_us/library/glossary.php> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
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The above definitions generally exclude arbitration (as well as judicial determination) from 
ADR. However, for the purposes of this study, in order to encompass a wide range of processes, 
the NADRAC’s definition of ADR has been adopted.33 The NADRAC definition includes ADR 
processes used within or outside courts and tribunals. 
 
It should additionally be noted that, in the context of this study, ‘alternative’ dispute resolution 
processes or methods that may be utilised by revenue authorities which do not involve an 
impartial third party assisting those in a dispute to resolve the issues between them, generally 
do not fall within the NADRAC definition of ADR outlined above.34 Thus, an agreement 
between a revenue authority and certain qualifying taxpayers to advance the resolution of issues 
arising from an audit of the taxpayer from one or more tax periods, to other tax periods ending 
prior to the date of that agreement, would not fall within the definition of ADR.35 
 
The NADRAC state that the main types of ADR include mediation, arbitration and 
conciliation.36 These three types of ADR are described below:37 
 
 Mediation is a process in which the parties to a dispute, with the assistance of a 
dispute resolution practitioner (the mediator), identify the disputed issues, develop 
options, consider alternatives and endeavour to reach an agreement. The mediator has 
no advisory or determinative role in regard to the content of the dispute or the 
outcome of its resolution, but may advise on or determine the process of mediation 
whereby resolution is attempted.38 
 
 Arbitration is a process in which the parties to a dispute present arguments and 
evidence to a dispute resolution practitioner (the arbitrator) who makes a 
determination.39 
 
                                                          
33 The NADRAC definition of ADR is used by various bodies and organisations including the Australian Disputes 
Centre (ADC), the Mediators Standards Board (MSB), the Law Council of Australia and the ATO. 
34 However, there are exceptions to this in the general context of ADR. For example, collaborative practice is a 
form of ADR which involves a team approach and does not ordinarily involve a third party who is an impartial 
facilitator: Sourdin, above n 10, at 3.  
35 See, for example, the IRS’s Accelerated Issue Resolution (AIR) program: Internal Revenue Service Rev. Proc. 
94-67, 1994-2 C.B. 800. See also, section 1.4.3.2 of Appendix 1.4 of this thesis. 
36 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, above n 29, at 3, [2.5]. 
37 A glossary of definitions for other types of ADR processes is provided in the “Glossary of Dispute Resolution 
Terms”, at page xii of this thesis. See also, National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, above n 
26. 
38 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, above n 26, at 9.  
39 At 4. 
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 Conciliation is a process in which the parties to a dispute, with the assistance of a 
dispute resolution practitioner (the conciliator), identify the issues in dispute, develop 
options, consider alternatives and endeavour to reach an agreement. The conciliator 
may have an advisory role on the content of the dispute or the outcome of its 
resolution, but not a determinative role. The conciliator may advise on or determine 
the process of conciliation whereby resolution is attempted, and may make 
suggestions for terms of settlement, give expert advice on likely settlement terms, 
and may actively encourage the participants to reach an agreement.40 
 
However, within the different forms of ADR, there can be considerable variation in process 
features and application. For example, various ADR commentators have discussed the different 
variations that exist in respect of mediation models or approaches. Boulle, Goldblatt and Green 
suggest four separate mediation models: settlement, facilitative, transformative and 
evaluative.41 In each model the objective is different. In settlement mediation, the objective is 
to reach a compromise. In facilitative mediation, the objective is to promote negotiation in 
terms of underlying needs and interests rather than legal rights or obligations. In the 
transformative model, underlying causes of behaviour may be considered. In evaluative 
mediation the primary focus is on settlement according to legal rights. The NADRAC 
description of mediation above assumes that a facilitative model of mediation will operate.42 
However, the mediation models are not distinct alternatives to one another. A mediation may 
commence in one mode and then adopt the characteristics of another model (for example, it 
may commence in the facilitative mode, but later develop into the settlement or evaluative 
model).43  
 
The NADRAC additionally observes that “there is little consistency in how ADR terms are 
used. Even when mentioned in … legislation, ADR processes are not clearly defined.”44 
Sourdin notes that definitional variations “can also indicate where reforms can occur or have 
taken place because of the evolving nature of many ADR processes.”45 Furthermore, the 
NADRAC states that “different [ADR] terminology has evolved in different sectors and social 
groups” and “the meaning and implications of particular words depend largely on the context 
in which they are used.”46 The variations in ADR process definitions mainly relate to the 
                                                          
40 At 5. 
41 Laurence Boulle, Virginia Goldblatt and Phillip Green Mediation: Principles, Process and Practice (2nd ed, 
LexisNexis, Wellington, 2008) at 35. 
42 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, above n 26, at 3. 
43 Boulle, Goldblatt and Green, above n 41, at 35. 
44 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, above n 29, at 6, [2.15]. 
45 Sourdin, above n 10, at 5. 
46 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, above n 26, at 1. 
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position and role of the dispute resolution practitioner.47 For example, the most common 
variation in descriptions of mediation relates to whether or not a practitioner is able to provide 
a view as to the likely outcome should a dispute proceed to litigation. In most instances, a 
process that has an advisory component (in relation to the content of the dispute or the outcome 
of its resolution) would not be regarded as mediation.48 Accordingly, the NADRAC considers 
that:49 
 
… ‘mediation’ is a purely facilitative process, whereas ‘conciliation’ may comprise a 
mixture of different processes including facilitation and advice … the term ‘mediation’ 
should be used where the practitioner has no advisory role on the content of the dispute 
and the term ‘conciliation’ where the practitioner does have such a role.  
 
In the context of tax dispute resolution, a further ADR process which is of relevance is 
facilitation (also referred to as “facilitated discussion”).50 Facilitation in the tax dispute 
resolution context is generally a process where a trained facilitator assists the parties to 
negotiate their dispute. The facilitator “helps the parties identify disputed issues, develop 
options, consider alternatives, and attempt to reach an agreement.”51 The facilitator does not 
establish facts, take sides, give advice, make a decision or decide who is “right or wrong.”52 
The facilitator merely guides the parties through the process and assists them to ensure that 
there are open lines of clear communication, and messages are correctly received. The 
facilitator is typically a revenue authority member of staff who has been trained in mediation 
techniques.53 Thus, in the tax dispute resolution context, the main difference between facilitated 
discussions and mediation is that in the former, “the people brought in to help the disputing 
parties are not independent of the disputing parties, but will work neutrally.”54 
 
More recently tax authorities, such as the ATO and HMRC, have adopted a broader 
classification for different types of ADR that may be used in tax dispute resolution. The ATO 
outline that ADR processes can generally be classified as facilitative, advisory or 
determinative, and can be expected to have the following features:55  
                                                          
47 Sourdin, above n 10, at 5. 
48 At 5. See also, Robert Fisher “When should mediators bite their tongue?” (2010) 150 NZLawyer 18 at 18. 
49 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, above n 26, at 3. 
50 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 20, at 5. For example, Inland Revenue, the ATO and HMRC all have 
various forms of facilitation programs. For further details on these programs, see section 1.1.2.1 of Appendix 1.1; 
section 1.2.2.2 of Appendix 1.2; and section 1.3.2 of Appendix 1.3 of this thesis, respectively.  
51 Australian Taxation Office, above n 19. 
52 Australian Taxation Office, above n 19. 
53 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 20, at 5. 
54 At 5.  
55 Australian Taxation Office, above n 19. 
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 In facilitative processes, an ADR practitioner assists the parties to identify the 
disputed issues, develop options, consider alternatives and endeavour to reach an 
agreement about some issues or the whole of the dispute. In facilitative processes the 
ADR practitioner manages the process but does not provide advice or make a decision 
on the result of the dispute. Mediation and facilitation are types of facilitative 
processes. 
 
 In advisory processes, an ADR practitioner considers and appraises the dispute and 
provides advice on some or all of the facts of the dispute, the law, and possible or 
desirable outcomes. The ADR practitioner manages the process and provides 
professional advice on the matters in dispute or possible outcomes or both, but does 
not decide the result of the dispute. Neutral evaluation and case appraisal are 
examples of advisory processes.  
 
 In determinative processes, an ADR practitioner evaluates the dispute (which may 
include the hearing of formal evidence from the participants) and makes a 
determination. Arbitration and expert determination are examples of determinative 
processes. 
 
In addition, there are blended dispute resolution processes in which the ADR practitioner plays 
multiple roles. For example, in conciliation and conferencing, the ADR practitioner may 
facilitate discussions as well as provide advice on the merits of the dispute.56 While the above 
classification of facilitative, advisory and determinative ADR processes provides a different 
classification to Ury, Brett and Goldberg’s categories of interests, rights and power-based 
processes (see chapter 1, section 1.1 of this thesis), it can be seen that facilitative ADR 
processes broadly align with interest-based dispute resolution procedures. Furthermore, the 
ADR processes utilised in the context of the tax dispute resolution systems of tax authorities 
such as the ATO and HMRC largely relate to “collaborative dispute resolution” processes such 
as mediation and facilitated discussion.57 The ATO and HMRC outline that determinative ADR 
processes, such as arbitration, are:58  
 
[G]enerally not appropriate for tax disputes because it can incur similar costs and delays 
as litigation, potentially conflicts with the statutory responsibilities of the Commissioner 
as decision-maker, and can lack the openness and transparency of court or tribunal 
decisions. 
                                                          
56 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, above n 26, at 5. 
57 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 20, at 3. 
58 Australian Taxation Office, above n 19. See also, HM Revenue and Customs, above n 20, at 3. 
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The (lack of) appropriateness of arbitration in the context of tax dispute resolution is further 
evident in the recent elimination by the IRS of its Appeals Arbitration program, effective from 
21 September 2015, due to the “general lack of demand for arbitration and the fact that its use 
as a tool to settle disputes without litigation has not proven successful.”59 
 
2.3 Background to Dispute Systems Design 
DSD is a phrase coined by Ury, Brett and Goldberg to reflect an organisation’s effort to identify 
and improve the way it manages conflict.60 Bingham and Nabatchi state that “[m]ost research 
in conflict management has been process-orientated, focusing on the methods, costs and 
benefits of different alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures.”61 In this respect, 
research in the field has been largely conducted at the micro-level.62 However, emerging 
research is focusing on a more macro-level examination of conflict management in 
organisations. Instead of examining dispute resolution processes, researchers have begun to 
look at dispute resolution systems: “the complete composition, arrangement, and structure of 
dispute resolution processes in organizations.”63 The examination of dispute resolution 
processes as part of a more complete system has led to the concept of DSD, “the conscious, 
purposeful, and deliberate planning of conflict management systems within an organization.”64  
 
The notion of DSD arose from research on grievance mediation in the unionised coal industry 
during the 1980s, a period when wildcat strikes and consequent disruption in production 
plagued the industry.65 Grievance mediation is an ADR process in which labour and 
management use mediation before binding arbitration.66 In a coal-mining experiment, Ury 
mediated disputes shortly after they arose, rather than waiting for the eve of an arbitration 
hearing.67 Researchers found several positive effects of grievance mediation in the industry, 
                                                          
59 Internal Revenue Service Rev. Proc. 2015-44, 2015-38 I.R.B. 354 at [3.0]. For further details on the IRS Appeals 
Arbitration program see also, section 1.4.2.5 of Appendix 1.4 of this thesis. 
60 William L Ury, Jeanne M Brett and Stephen B Goldberg Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut 
the Costs of Conflict (Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, first published 1988, 
1993 ed). 
61 Lisa B Bingham and Tina Nabatchi “Dispute System Design in Organizations” in William J Pammer and Jerri 
Killian (eds) Handbook of Conflict Management (Marcel Dekker, New York, 2003) 105 at 105-106. 
62 At 106. 
63 At 106. 
64 At 106. 
65 Ury, Brett and Goldberg, above n 60, at xvi-xvii. 
66 Peter Feuille “Why Does Grievance Mediation Resolve Grievances?” (1992) 8 Negotiation J 131; Peter Feuille 
and Deborah M Kolb “Waiting in the Wings: Mediation’s Role in Grievance Resolution” (1994) 10 Negotiation 
J 249; Peter Feuille “Grievance Mediation” in Adrienne E Eaton and Jeffrey H Keefe (eds) Employment Dispute 
Resolution and Worker Rights in the Changing Workplace (Industrial Relations Research Association, 
Champaign, 1999) 187. 
67 Stephen B Goldberg “The Mediation of Grievances under a Collective Bargaining Contract: An Alternative to 
Arbitration” (1982) 77 Nw U L Rev 270. 
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including high settlement rates, a decline in wildcat strikes, and high participant satisfaction 
with the experiment.68 
 
These findings suggested that mediation was a better process than strikes as a means of dispute 
resolution, and led the researchers to conjecture about how organisations could more 
effectively manage conflict. Researchers identified three basic approaches to resolving 
conflict: power, rights and interests.69 As noted in chapter 1, section 1.1 of this thesis, power 
represents the ability to impose on others decisions about the outcomes of disputes and can be 
exercised at the individual, group, or organisational levels. Examples of power-based 
approaches to organisational dispute resolution include strikes, lockouts, plant closings, sub-
contracting, or work relocation, and reductions in force. Rights are fixed rules or principles 
based on statutes, case law, contracts, and collective-bargaining agreements. Rights-based 
approaches to dispute resolution help determine whether legal or contractual rights have been 
violated. Examples of rights-based approaches to organisational dispute resolution include 
adjudication of statutory rights by administrative agencies or courts, binding or non-binding 
arbitration, and neutral evaluation. Interests are the needs, concerns, and desires of individuals 
or groups. Interest-based approaches use problem-solving techniques to address the perceived 
needs of the disputing parties. Examples of interest-based approaches to organisational dispute 
resolution include negotiation, facilitation and mediation. 
 
In the context of the coal-mining experiment, grievance mediation, an interest-based approach, 
was found to be more effective than wildcard strikes, a power-based approach. This prompted 
the researchers to posit that an organisation could improve its conflict management capacity 
by shifting its dispute resolution system, over time, from one dominated by power and rights-
based approached to one dominated by interest-based approaches.70 In general, interest-based 
approaches were believed to be cheaper and more effective than rights-based approaches, 
which were thought to be cheaper and more effective than power-based approaches.71 The 
theory was that using interest-based approaches would result in cost-effective, satisfying, 
longer-term, and more sustainable solutions to ongoing or recurring problems, particularly 
when those problems occurred as part of an ongoing relationship such as those in an 
employment setting. From this emerged the idea of DSD, the notion that organisations could 
deliberately and purposefully select dispute resolution approaches and processes for more 
effective conflict management.  
 
                                                          
68 Stephen B Goldberg and Jeanne M Brett “An experiment in the mediation of grievances” (1983) 106(3) Monthly 
Lab Rev 23. 
69 Ury, Brett and Goldberg, above n 60, at 4-9. 
70 Ury, Brett and Goldberg, above n 60; Roger Fisher, William L Ury and Bruce Patton Getting to Yes: Negotiating 
Agreement Without Giving In (3rd ed, Penguin, New York, 2011). 
71 Ury, Brett and Goldberg, above n 60, at 15. 
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Notwithstanding the potential benefits of interests-based approaches, it may not be possible or 
desirable to resolve all disputes by reconciling interests.72 Parties may be unwilling or unable 
to utilise interests-based procedures including negotiation and mediation. Rights or power-
based approaches may be necessary in the following circumstances: 73  
 
(1) To bring recalcitrant parties to the negotiating table. Interest-based negotiation 
cannot occur in some cases unless rights or power-based approaches are first 
employed;  
(2) To clarify the boundaries of the parties’ rights within which a negotiated resolution 
of a dispute can be sought. The parties’ perceptions of who is right may be so 
divergent that a rights-based procedure is necessary to establish a bargaining range 
within which to negotiate; 
(3) As a last resort when parties’ interests are so opposed that agreement is not 
possible;  
(4) In cases where there are significant public policy questions involved, a rights-based 
approach (for example, litigation) may be more desirable from a social perspective 
than interest-based approaches. 
 
However, rights and power-based procedures are often used where they are not necessary and 
“a procedure that should be the last resort too often becomes the first resort.”74 The goal 
therefore, is a dispute resolution system where most disputes are resolved through reconciling 
interests, some through determining who is right, and the fewest through determining who is 
more powerful (see pyramid on the right in Figure 2.2). By contrast, a distressed system is 
where few disputes are resolved through reconciling interests, while many are resolved through 
determining rights and power (see inverted pyramid on the left in Figure 2.2). The challenge 
for systems designers is to turn the pyramid the right side up. It is to design a system that 
promotes the reconciling of interests but also provides low-cost ways to determine rights or 
power for those disputes that cannot or should not be resolved by focusing on interests alone.75 
 
                                                          
72 At 18. 
73 At 16-17. 
74 At 18. 
75 At 18. 
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Figure 2.2: Moving from a Distressed to an Effective Dispute Resolution System76 
 
Other DSD practitioners have since expanded on Ury, Brett and Goldberg’s tripartite 
distinction of power, rights and interest-based approaches.77 Lynch states that:78  
 
Organizations faced with conflict can resort to different approaches used alone or in 
combination for dealing with that conflict, including: a “power-based” approach; a “rights-
based” approach; an “interest-based” approach; and a “systems approach.” 
 
A systems approach “includes all the options for dispute resolution available in the three other 
phases, and goes significantly further in its approach to conflict and its management.”79 A 
systems approach is different from the first three approaches because, “in addition to dispute 
                                                          
76 At 19, Figure 1. 
77 See Costantino and Merchant, above n 24; Mary P Rowe “Dispute Resolution in the Non-Union Environment: 
An Evolution Toward Integrated Systems for Conflict Management?” in Sandra Gleason (ed) Frontiers in Dispute 
Resolution in Labor Relations and Human Resources (Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, 1997) 79; 
Jennifer F Lynch CCRA: Contemporary Conflict Resolution Approaches (Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, 
Ottawa, 1998); Karl A Slaikeu and Ralph H Hasson Controlling the Costs of Conflict: How to Design a System 
for Your Organization (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1998); Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution 
Designing Integrated Conflict Management Systems: Guidelines for Designers and Decision Makers in 
Organizations (Washington DC, 2001). 
78 Jennifer F Lynch “Integrated Conflict Management Programs Emerge as an Organization Development 
Strategy” (2003) 21 Alt High Cost Litig 99 at 99. 




resolution techniques, it has features that focus on preventing unnecessary conflict and, when 
conflict arises, on managing it.”80 Lynch further states that:81 
 
When organizations go beyond ad hoc, case-by-case dispute resolution and turn their focus 
to systematically integrating all of these approaches [power, rights and interests-based] 
into their day-to-day business, plus add processes that shift their conflict culture toward 
prevention, the new phenomenon is called an “Integrated Conflict Management System.” 
 
Of note is the shift in terminology. That is, it is not termed “integrated dispute resolution 
system”, but rather “integrated conflict management system.”82 Lynch states that “conflict” is 
a word that includes disputes but also has a broader connotation, including such things as 
relationship strains and workplace stresses that have not yet surfaced as a dispute.83 
“Management” of conflict includes resolution plus such other initiatives as prevention and 
containment.84 Thus, “the term ‘conflict management’ includes dispute resolution and goes 
well beyond it” (as illustrated in Figure 2.3).85 
 
Figure 2.3: Terminology Shift from Dispute Resolution to Conflict Management86 
 
 
                                                          
80 Lynch, above n 78, at 100. 
81 At 99. 
82 Lynch, above n 79, at 208 (emphasis in original). 
83 At 208 
84 At 208. 
85 At 208. 
86 Lynch, above n 78, at 99, Figure 1. 
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Accordingly, when discussing dispute resolution systems design, Tully notes that the 
expression “conflict management systems design” is preferred by some authors for the reason 
that the words “conflict” and “management” are of wider scope than “dispute” and 
“resolution”.87 Costantino additionally states that the nomenclature “conflict management 
systems design” is used to “emphasise the importance of managing conflict, preventing 
disputes, and accepting conflict as inevitable.”88 This is in contrast to “dispute systems design” 
which tends to “focus more exclusively on intervention once the conflict has escalated into a 
dispute.”89 Smith and Martinez also “favour the term ‘dispute’ for conflicts that have evolved 
into defined, focused disagreements, often framed in legal terms, with ‘conflict’ encompassing 
a broader category.”90 However, they further state that they use the term “Dispute Systems 
Design” in recognition that it has “become the term of art” and because a more inclusive term, 
such as “Conflict and Dispute Prevention, Management and Resolution Systems Design” 
would be cumbersome.91 For this reason, notwithstanding the differences in the terms 
highlighted above, ‘dispute systems design’ will generally be used interchangeably with 
‘conflict management systems design’ in this study. 
 
2.4 Stages of Dispute Systems Design 
The DSD literature92 indicates that DSD can generally be conceptualised as a series of stages: 
 
(a) organisational diagnosis; 
(b) system design; 
(c) implementation; and  
(d) exit, evaluation, and diffusion. 
 
Tully notes that the tasks undertaken during the various stages of DSD cannot be neatly 
separated in time or order and variations exist between authors on such matters as terminology 
and the number of stages.93 However, the sequence of stages outlined above is generally 
followed in designing and implementing dispute resolution systems. Moreover, the process of 
                                                          
87 The Laws of Australia (2013) vol 13(6) Dispute Systems Design at [13.6.10]. 
88 Cathy A Costantino “Second Generational Organizational Conflict Management Systems Design: A 
Practitioner’s Perspective on Emerging Issues” (2009) 14 Harv Negot L Rev 81. 
89 At 81. 
90 Stephanie Smith and Janet Martinez “An Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems Design” (2009) 14 Harv 
Negot L Rev 123 at 126. 
91 At 126. 
92 See for example, Ury, Brett and Goldberg, above n 60, at 65; Costantino and Merchant, above n 24, at 46; John 
Lande “Principles for Policymaking About Collaborative Law and Other ADR Processes” (2007) 22 Ohio St J on 
Disp Resol 619 at 630; Tina Nabatchi and Lisa B Bingham “From Postal to Peaceful: Dispute Systems Design in 
the USPS REDRESS
 
Program” (2010) 30 Rev Pub Personnel Admin 211 at 215.  
93 The Laws of Australia, above n 87, at [13.6.370]. 
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DSD is cyclical. The design process is not a one-off event. The information obtained through 
system evaluation may suggest further sytems change. Many factors assessed at the outset of 
the design effort may evolve over time. In this way, systems respond to and reflect 
environmental conditions and the evolving requirements of both organisations and system 
users.94 
 
The relevant area of interest in this study, DSD principles, falls within the systems design stage 
of DSD. This stage follows the organisational diagnosis stage in which designers acquire 
information about the existing dispute resolution system (if one exists), the disputes which the 
system will handle, organisational and user needs, and the system changes which can be both 
afforded and tolerated. Diagnosis also reveals why particular procedures are being used. It 
explores the motivations that lie behind the use of procedures and the benefits that interest-
based procedures must match if they are to take hold.95 
 
The DSD process also initially involves the entry by a designer into the organisation and an 
acceptance by the organisation to undertake the design intervention thereby formulated.96 
Conbere states that DSD is “an area of professional practice that is not currently identified with 
a single profession.”97 Dispute system designers include lawyers, mediators, organisational 
psychologists, human resource developers, economists and others who work with conflict 
management in organisations.98 Costantino and Merchant provide a number of reasons for why 
it may be useful for organisations to employ the services of an experienced external consultant 
or designer:99 
 
 Internal organisational participants often listen more attentively to and accord more 
creditability to the advice of an “outside expert”; 
 External designers bring expertise and experience from their work with other 
organisations to the technical and practical aspect of design work and may be 
viewed as less threatening; 
 The objectivity and independence of the external designer may facilitate the 
surfacing of sensitive organisational issues without the same peer pressures and 
cultural and career limitations that internal dispute resolution specialists may have; 
and 
                                                          
94 At [13.6.900]. 
95 Ury, Brett and Goldberg, above n 60, at 40. 
96 The Laws of Australia, above n 87, at [13.6.380]. 
97 John P Conbere “Theory Building for Conflict Management System Design” (2001) 19 Conflict Resol Q 215 
at 226. 
98 At 226. 
99 Costantino and Merchant, above n 24, at 75. 
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 External designers may add a “big picture” perspective to the various components 
of the design effort. 
 
In addition, Tully states that stakeholders100 should, where possible, be involved in the design 
process as stakeholder participation within the design process can build system creditability.101 
Designers must commit to consulting stakeholders as much as possible, obtain information 
from them with respect to problems and needs and seek their input into design alternatives.102 
Designers may need to provide a large number of stakeholders with a structured means for 
providing input into the design process. There are several participative processes which can be 
used by designers in order to overcome the difficulties of consulting with large numbers of 
interested parties, including: design committees, partnership councils and focus groups.103 
Designers may also mediate between various interested parties to negotiate ideas for change 
and obtain agreement on potential design alternatives.104 
 
The process of designing the system is guided by a number of general design principles which 
emphasise the inclusion of interest-based processes. As stated earlier, these principles emanate 
from the six DSD principles proposed by Ury Brett and Goldberg. Nabatchi and Bingham claim 
that systems that follow these general design principles are thought to be more likely to produce 
positive dispute outcomes and improve the organisation’s overall capacity for effective conflict 
management.105 However, as noted in chapter 1, section 1.2.2 of this thesis, these general DSD 
principles are “guidelines only and should not be elevated to the status of rules.”106 Wolski 
further states that: “Although the term ‘principles’ is used to describe them, they are not 
immutable.”107 The need to design a dispute resolution system which satisfies the requirements 
of a particular organisation or relationship must remain a paramount consideration. 
 
The implementation stage of the DSD process involves “motivating the parties to use the new 
procedures and helping them develop the skills to do so.”108 Motivating the disputants to use 
the new procedures can be done in several ways, including: by demonstrating the procedures, 
                                                          
100 Stakeholders can include the immediate parties in conflict, individuals or entities subsidiary to or constituents 
of those parties, or others directly or indirectly affected by the dispute’s outcome: Smith and Martinez, above n 
90, at 131.  
101 The Laws of Australia, above n 87, at [13.6.400]. 
102 At [13.6.400].  
103 At [13.6.400]. 
104 At [13.6.400]; Ury, Brett and Goldberg, above n 60, at 69-71. 
105 Nabatchi and Bingham, above n 92, at 215. 
106 The Laws of Australia, above n 87, at [13.6.510].  
107 Bobette Wolski “The Model Dispute Resolution Procedure for Australian Workplace Agreements: A Dispute 
Systems Design Perspective” (1998) 10(1) Bond LR 1 at 18. 
108 Ury, Brett and Goldberg, above n 60, at 75. 
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using leaders as examples, using peers as proponents, setting goals, providing incentives, and 
publicising early successes.109 Ury, Brett and Goldberg further state that one of the designer’s 
most important implementation tasks is helping the disputants to acquire the skills to use the 
new procedures effectively. As the new procedures will most often be interest-based, this 
typically involves training and coaching disputants in negotiation and mediation skills.110 
 
The purpose of the evaluation stage is to determine whether the changes to the dispute 
resolution system are working as intended. Evaluation of a system may be conducted by the 
designer, an independent third party or group, or a representative task force.111 Diffusion is 
usually an optional step in the DSD process.112 However, where diffusion is applicable, the 
most common form is replication – the transfer of a procedure from one site to another.113 
Finally, external specialists must ultimately exit the system to enable the system and its users 
to operate independently (of their services). 
 
As the focus of this study is on the DSD principles within the systems design phase of DSD, 
the purpose of the next section (section 2.5) is to outline a number of models for designing 
organisational conflict management systems and their associated DSD principles. 
 
2.5 Six Conflict Management Models 
The DSD literature114 identifies six specific conflict management models that have been 
developed by DSD practitioners beginning with Ury, Brett and Goldberg. As indicated above 
in section 2.3, and also as noted by Conbere,115 the work on these conflict management models 
has been cumulative in that each author or team of authors has built on previous work. For 
example, in designing her conflict management model for the Canada Customs and Revenue 
Agency (CCRA), Lynch116 consulted with most of the previous authors, and the Society of 
Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) Track I report,117 outlining SPIDR’s conflict 
management model, included Rowe and Lynch as authors.  
 
                                                          
109 At 75. 
110 At 78. 
111 At 81; The Laws of Australia, above n 87, at [13.6.890]. 
112 Ury, Brett and Goldberg, above n 60, at 82. 
113 At 82. 
114 See, for example, Conbere, above n 97; Smith and Martinez, above n 90; Eric Brahm and Julian Ouellet 
“Designing New Dispute Resolution Systems” (September 2003) Beyond Intractability 
<http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/designing-dispute-systems> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
115 Conbere, above n 97, at 217. 
116 Lynch, above n 77. 
117 Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, above n 77.  
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It should further be noted that, although the focus of the six conflict management models is on 
DSD in the context of workplace conflict, as outlined by SPIDR, “the principles have equal 
applicability to all other places where people convene regularly for a purpose and have 
continuing relationships.”118 Moreover, “the principles apply to addressing conflict in the many 
workplaces in which employees work closely with people who are not employees.”119 Thus, it 
is recognised that DSD can be utilised in addressing a variety of conflicts both internal and 
external to an organisation, whether with employees, suppliers, service providers, contractors, 
consumers, customers, clients, community, or the broader public.120 In addition, in the tax 
dispute resolution context, the studies by Bentley121 and Mookhey122 provide support for the 
applicability of DSD in addressing disputes between revenue authorities and taxpayers.  
 
The following sections (sections 2.5.1-2.5.6) provide an overview of each of the six conflict 
management models and their associated DSD principles. The purpose of this review is to trace 
the development of the conflict management models and their DSD principles proposed by 
various authors since Ury, Brett and Goldberg. Section 2.6 will then provide a summary of the 
conflict management models and an initial set of DSD principles to be utilised in evaluating 
the effectiveness of the design of the four selected jurisdictions in this study will consequently 
be derived in section 2.7.  
 
2.5.1 Ury, Brett, and Goldberg 
Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of Conflict, written by Ury, 
Brett and Goldberg in 1988, is credited with being the first book written on DSD.123 As outlined 
above in section 2.3, through a case study of the authors’ actual experience working with coal 
miners, their union and management, Ury Brett and Goldberg set forth a classic DSD model 
comprising of three primary dispute resolution methods (interests, rights and power-based 
approaches), six fundamental principles for setting up dispute resolution procedures and four 
stages of DSD (organisational diagnosis, system design, implementation, and exit, evaluation, 
and diffusion). Ury, Brett and Goldberg’s six DSD principles are outlined below:124 
 
                                                          
118 At 33. 
119 At 33. 
120 Lisa B Bingham “Designing Justice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems for Managing Conflict” (2008) 24 
Ohio St J on Disp Resol 1 at 11-12; The Laws of Australia, above n 87, at [13.6.1010].  
121 Bentley “Problem resolution: Does the ATO approach really work?”, above n 1, updated in Bentley Taxpayers’ 
Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation, above n 1, at ch 5. 
122 Mookhey, above n 2. 
123 See Ury, Brett and Goldberg, above n 60. 
124 The three primary dispute resolution methods have been discussed in chapter 1, section 1.1 and in this chapter 
in section 2.3. The four stages of DSD have been discussed in section 2.4 of this chapter. 
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(1) Put the focus on interests.125 The preference for dispute resolution, at least for first 
use in most disputes, is for interest-based processes such as negotiation or 
mediation;  
 
(2) Build in “loop-backs” to negotiation.126 Where interest-based procedures do not 
resolve a dispute and it becomes a rights or power-based dispute, loop-backs are 
procedures that can be used to encourage parties to return from a rights or power-
based approach back to negotiations.127 Ury, Brett and Goldberg distinguish such 
procedures on the basis of whether they encourage disputants to loop-back from a 
rights contest or from a power contest. As shown in Figure 2.4, loop-backs from a 
rights-based contest such as arbitration or litigation can include information 
procedures, advisory arbitration, mini-trial and summary jury trial. Procedures such 
as these provide the parties with information about their rights and the likely 
outcome of a rights contest.128 The parties may use the information as the basis for 
further and more constructive interest-based negotiations. Loop-backs from power-
based contests include cooling-off periods and intervention by third parties (such 
as the police) (see Figure 2.4). These procedures allow time for emotions to cool 
and more rational decisions to be made;129 
 
(3) Provide low-cost rights and power backups.130 If interest-based processes do not 
succeed in resolving the dispute, as shown in Figure 2.4, a dispute resolution 
system should offer low-cost alternatives to litigation based on rights (for example, 
conventional, expedited or final offer arbitration or med-arb) or power (for 
example, voting, limited and symbolic strikes or establishing rules of prudence131); 
 
(4) Build in consultation before, feedback after.132 This principle is designed to 
prevent unnecessary conflict and head off future disputes. Notification and 
consultation in advance of taking a proposed action affecting others can prevent 
disputes that arise through sheer misunderstanding.133 Notification and consultation 
can also reduce the anger and “knee-jerk opposition” that often result when 
                                                          
125 Ury, Brett and Goldberg, above n 60, at 42-52. 
126 At 52-56. 
127 At 52. 
128 At 52. 
129 At 54. 
130 At 56-60. 
131 Rules of prudence are used where the parties may agree, tacitly or explicitly, to limit the destructiveness of 
tactics used in power contests: at 60. 
132 At 61-62. 
133 At 61. 
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decisions are made unilaterally or abruptly.134 They also serve to identify points of 
difference early on so they may be negotiated. Post-dispute analysis and feedback 
can help parties to learn from their disputes in order to prevent similar disputes in 
the future.135 One means of institutionalising consultation and post-dispute analysis 
is to establish a regular forum for discussion with parties;136 
 
(5) Arrange procedures in a low-to-high-cost sequence.137 In order to reduce the 
costs of handling disputes, the procedures outlined in design principles 1 to 4 above 
should be arranged in graduated steps in a low-to-high-cost sequence (as shown in 
Figure 2.4).138 For example, in creating a sequence, a designer might begin with 
interests-based negotiation, move to interests-based mediation, followed by a loop-
back procedure and then a low-cost rights-based procedure;139 
 
(6) Provide the necessary motivation, skills, and resources.140 Implied is 
development of the structural supports that prepare individuals to attempt to 
understand and use the process that best suits their needs. Training programs and 
technical assistance must be put in place and adequately sustained to maintain a 
properly working dispute resolution system. 
  
                                                          
134 At 61. 
135 At 61. 
136 At 61. 
137 At 62-63. 
138 At 62.  
139 At 63. 
140 At 64. 
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Figure 2.4: Low-to-High-Cost Sequence of Dispute Resolution Procedures141 
Prevention procedures 
Notification and consultation 


























Rules of prudence 
 
Ury, Brett and Goldberg also advocate for involving the parties in an organisation in the 
processes of diagnosing and designing the dispute system “to gather information and support” 
from the outset.142 They suggest three possible methods for party involvement: establishing a 
design committee that includes representatives from key interest groups; engaging in shuttle 
mediation (which can be useful if hostility between the parties is so high that joint sessions 
would be rendered unproductive); and focusing on key actors (whereby the designer secures 
the support of key actors with control over the system).143 
 
                                                          
141 Adapted from Ury, Brett and Goldberg, above n 60, at 62-63. 
142 At 69. 
143 At 69-72. 
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2.5.2 Costantino and Merchant 
In Designing Conflict Management Systems, dispute resolution practitioners Costantino and 
Merchant, add several new developments to Ury, Brett and Goldberg’s model.144 One element 
in their model relates to the process used in designing a conflict management system. 
Costantino and Merchant outline an “evolution of resolution continuum” which represents how 
organisations have historically developed their approaches to managing conflict (see Figure 
2.5).145 They suggest that there are four “quadrants” involved in the continuum, each depicting 
consecutively more preferable methods of designing conflict management systems.146 
 
Figure 2.5: Evolution of Resolution Continuum147 
 
 
In quadrant one, the elements are power-based design and power-based dispute resolution 
methods. Accordingly, whoever has power makes and enforces the rules of the organisation. 
In quadrant two, the design is conducted in a rights-based manner and the resulting system uses 
rights-based dispute resolution methods. The usual procedure under this quadrant is to provide 
legislative frameworks for determining who is right and then to pursue such rights through 
                                                          
144 See Costantino and Merchant, above n 24. 
145 At 50. 
146 At 50. 
147 At 50, Figure 4.1. 
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litigation and the courts.148 In quadrant three, the design is rights-based and the resulting system 
uses interest-based dispute resolution methods. The organisation uses interest-based ADR 
methods (although rights-based mechanisms are not necessarily absent) but imposes the ADR 
mechanisms on the disputants without identifying their concerns or preferences and without 
involving them in the design process.149 Quadrant three examples include mandatory, court-
ordered ADR and mandatory employee dispute resolution programs. In quadrant four, the 
system is designed in an interest-based manner, and the resulting system incorporates interest-
based dispute resolution methods. This approach implies interest-based systems that are 
“designed with stakeholders rather than for them.”150 
 
The concept in quadrant four is thus called “interest-based conflict management systems 
design.”151 Under such a design process, Costantino and Merchant state the importance of 
stakeholders having an “active and integral role in creating and renewing the systems they 
use.”152 There is an acceptance of the fact that conflicts will arise and, as such, the best method 
of designing an effective system is to involve the stakeholders, rather than having a system 
imposed on them. However, quadrant four conflict management systems assume the 
“willingness of organisational leaders to loosen their perceived obligation to control and 
unilaterally determine organisational operations in favor of involving those with a stake in 
organisational conflict.”153 Moreover, Costantino and Merchant state that the creation of 
quadrant four conflict management systems is “certainly not the not the only answer for all 
organisations, nor even a possibility for many.”154 Depending on the context and the 
circumstance of the particular organisation, one or another design process and conflict 
management system may be necessary. 
 
Costantino and Merchant offer six principles for designing a conflict management system 
within an organisation:155 
 
(1) Develop guidelines for whether ADR is appropriate. The goal is to prevent 
indiscriminate use of ADR when it is not appropriate; 
                                                          
148 At 51. 
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150 At 49 (emphasis in original). 
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154 At 58. 
155 At 121. 
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(2) Tailor the ADR process to the particular problem. There is recognition that 
there are several ADR processes and the best system identifies the appropriate 
ADR process for each dispute; 
(3) Build in preventive methods of ADR. This includes training potential disputants 
in interest-based problem solving, and using processes such as negotiated 
rulemaking (reg-neg)156 collaboratively; 
(4) Make sure that disputants have the necessary knowledge and skill to choose 
and use ADR. Training about conflict management, and publicity about the 
dispute system and how to access it are necessary; 
(5) Create ADR systems that are simple to use and easy to access. Strive to have 
the systems resolve disputes early, at the lowest organisational level, with the least 
bureaucracy; and 
(6) Allow disputants to retain maximum control. This includes disputants’ control 
over the choice of ADR method and the selection of any third party wherever 
possible. 
 
Another component to Costantino and Merchant’s model is evaluation, which is described as 
“the means by which the system clarifies its goals and measures progress toward and 
achievement of those goals.”157 Costantino and Merchant suggest that the evaluation process 
should be created at the beginning of the conflict management design process, not at the end.158 
Designing the evaluation methodology at the beginning of the intervention ensures that the 




Rowe, an ombudsperson at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology since 1973, has written 
various articles in which she lays out her model for conflict management systems design and 
implementation.160 Rowe notes three changes in emphasis in conflict management systems that 
have emerged over time. The first is the idea of a “system” which provides various options and 
various resource people for all persons in the workplace and all kinds of problems.161 This 
                                                          
156 Reg-neg draws to the surface the interests of stakeholders (who are also potential disputants) during policy 
making processes. The reg-neg process gives the agency and its constituents an opportunity to identify their 
respective interests and to craft modifications to regulations before they are issued: at 125-126. 
157 At 168. 
158 At 168. 
159 At 168.  
160 See, for example, Rowe, above n 77 and Mary P Rowe and Corinne Bendersky “Workplace Justice, Zero 
Tolerance and Zero Barriers” in Thomas A Kochan and David B Lipsky (eds) Negotiations and Change: From 
the Workplace to Society (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2003) 117. 
161 Rowe, above n 77, at 84. 
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approach contrasts with the more traditional methods of providing a single grievance procedure 
that is only for workers grieving against management, or one designed for a limited list of 
disputes arising under a contract. A system provides “problem-solving” options based on the 
interests of the disputants, and “justice” options based on rights and on rights and power.162 The 
second major change is the broad idea of conflict management. This may, for example, include 
the idea of teaching peers, such as managers and co-workers, how to negotiate their differences 
with each other, teaching a whole workplace to use constructive dissent for continuous 
improvement, and learning how to prevent some costly conflict.163 This implies that conflict 
management is a more comprehensive idea than just a process for ending specific grievances. 
A third change is that of “integrating conflict management options and structures with each 
other, in the context of an overall human resource strategy.”164 
 
Rowe states that to build effectiveness and trust in a conflict management system, stakeholders 
should be asked first what they want and then be provided a structured means to give input into 
both design and continuous improvement.165 She notes, however, “paradoxically or not, some 
relatively thoughtful, integrated systems are being set up by using managerial power with 
relatively little input from employees and managers.”166 Rowe also believes that certain 
characteristics of complainants must be considered in fashioning a system. That is, 
“considering what complainants actually want, which is, if possible, to raise concerns, as they 
personally wish to raise them, is critical to ensuring that a system is actually used.”167 
 
Rowe offers six specifications for an effective system:168  
 
(1) the values of the system;  
(2) the presence of many options;  
(3) multiple access points;  
(4) an organisational ombudsperson;  
(5) wide scope; and  
(6) continuous improvement. 
 
The necessary system values are a commitment to fairness and freedom from reprisal, support 
by top managers, a powerful senior manager who understands and is an advocate for the 
                                                          
162 At 84. 
163 At 84. 
164 At 84. 
165 At 85. 
166 At 85. 
167 At 85 (emphasis in original). 
168 At 87-88. 
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conflict management system, prevention of conflict where appropriate through active listening 
and effective communication, and openness to constructive questions and dissent as a means 
to continuous improvement rather than disloyalty or disrespect.169 The many options offered 
are interest-based and rights-based, with the interest-based options usually being “available in 
parallel, rather than as sequential and required steps of a single procedure.”170 Furthermore, 
parties may in some cases agree to “loop forward” from an interest-based option to a rights-
based option (or to a rights- and power-based option), or “loop back” from a rights-based option 
to an interest-based option.171 Thus, Rowe builds on the loop back mechanisms originally 
proposed by Ury, Brett and Goldberg (see section 2.5.1 above) with the inclusion of loop 
forward mechanisms. That is, mechanisms which allow parties to move directly to a rights or 
power-based procedure without going through all of the earlier interest-based options. 
 
Multiple access points entails having a variety of people who have been trained to act as “fair 
gatekeepers” for the conflict management system so that disputants can find access points of 
different ethnicity and gender, and varied technical backgrounds.172 An organisational 
ombudsperson is a “designated neutral” operating inside an organisation “who is available to 
help informally with any workplace concern, and to provide workplace mediation as 
necessary.”173 An organisational ombudsperson may further serve as a “counsellor, informal 
go-between and facilitator, … informal fact-finder, upward-feedback mechanism, consultant, 
problem prevention device and change agent.”174 The ombudsperson should report outside 
ordinary line and staff structures to the chief executive officer (CEO) or chief operating officer 
(COO) or plant manager and maintain strict confidentiality.175  
 
Wide scope means that the system is used by all organisational members without regard for 
rank, and that all conflicts that are of interest to people in the organisation can be addressed 
through the system. Continuous improvement involves “an oversight committee [that] is built 
into the system and meets regularly to improve the effectiveness of the system.”176 
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Lynch, a Canadian lawyer and consultant in designing and implementing conflict management 
systems, proposed a model in CCRA: Contemporary Conflict Resolution Approaches,177 a 
study for Revenue Canada, in 1998.178 In line with the work of Rowe, Lynch states that the 
concept of an integrated conflict management system goes beyond a “case-by-case” approach 
to resolving disputes in that “integrated systems foster an environment in which managers are 
expected to prevent, manage, contain and resolve all conflict at the earliest time and lowest 
level possible.”179 To support this goal, integrated systems give managers the skills to do so 
and create performance incentives that make managers accountable for doing so.180  
 
Lynch built on the previous models in proposing her own. She provides that an organisational 
dispute resolution model generally should provide a selection of all three dispute resolution 
approaches – power, rights and interests – with the emphasis being on interest-based options, 
yet always with recourse to a rights-based option.181 Disputants and managers should, in most 
cases, be able to choose amongst the dispute resolution options.182 The system should be 
designed to accommodate the needs of, and be accessible by, all stakeholders, including the 
disputants, supervisors, and “bystanders” (that is, “the other people who are not directly 
involved in the conflict yet are affected by it”).183 In addition, knowledgeable persons who can 
coach disputants and act as organisational referrals should be easily identifiable to disputants. 
The system should also be accessible for all types of conflicts in an organisation. For example, 
employee-supervisor, peer-to-peer and manager-to-manager conflicts.184 
 
In her study, Lynch outlines that an effective conflict management system:185 
 
(1) Responds to the interests of all stakeholders; 
(2) Reflects important values (in the instance of the CCRA, the stated values were 
“integrity, professionalism, respect and cooperation”); 
(3) Promotes the mission of the new agency; 
(4) Is supported by highly visible leadership from key leaders in all stakeholder groups; 
                                                          
177 See Lynch, above n 77. 
178 Revenue Canada and Canada Customs merged to form the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) in 
1999. CCRA subsequently split into Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) and Canada Boarder Services Agency 
(CBSA) in 2003. 
179 Lynch, above n 79, at 212. 
180 At 212. 
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182 At 101. 
183 At 101. 
184 At 101. 
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(5) Provides loop-backs forward and backward between rights-based and interest-
based options; 
(6) Is fair, friendly, flexible, and fast; 
(7) Promotes resolution at the lowest possible level; and 
(8) Provides structures and systems that assist the organisation in moving from 
“conflict resolution” to “conflict management” (which includes prevention of 
conflict). 
 
Lynch further sees the development of the conflict management system as an opportunity to 
work with new staffing and recruitment in pursuit of a cultural transformation of the 
organisation.186 Lynch states that there should be “critical mass training for everyone in a 
leadership role, both management and labor, plus all other persons who play a role in the 
conflict chain.”187 In addition, feedback, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to improve the 
system should be present.  
 
2.5.5 Slaikeu and Hasson 
Slaikeu and Hasson present their model for conflict management systems design in Controlling 
the Costs of Conflict.188 The authors draw from their work in designing conflict management 
programs for Brown and Root (now merged with Halliburton), Shell and General Electric. 
Slaikeu and Hasson provide the following four principles:189 
 
(1) Acknowledge four ways to resolve conflict; 
(2) Create options for prevention and early intervention; 
(3) Build collaborative strength through seven checkpoints; and 
(4) Use the mediation model to build consensus among decision makers and users. 
 
The four ways to resolve conflict conform to the list generated by Ury, Brett and Goldberg with 
the addition of avoidance as an option. However, a key difference is that Slaikeu and Hasson 
focus on the methods used rather than describing the nature of the process:190 
 
(1) Avoidance (the choice not to use any of the other processes); 
(2) Collaboration (the equivalent of interest-based processes); 
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188 See Slaikeu and Hasson, above n 77. 
189 At 17. 
190 At 24. 
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(3) Resort to higher-authority (the equivalent of rights-based processes in the respect 
that the method of a rights-based process is to refer to higher-authority to determine 
what ought to be done); and 
(4) Unilateral power play (the equivalent of power-based procedures). 
 
Slaikeu and Hasson note that “most organisational procedures are weighted towards higher-
authority resolutions, and many unknowingly encourage avoidance and power play resolutions, 
thereby increasing costs.”191 They suggest an alternative “preferred path” for cost control (see 
Figure 2.6), using the methods to resolve conflict in the following order, while also noting that 
parties can loop backwards or forwards, depending on individual circumstances:192  
 
(1) Individual initiative is used;  
(2) then one tries to negotiate;  
(3) next one tries mediation;  
(4) after that, one appeals to higher authority; and  
(5) finally one resorts to force, or a power play. 
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Slaikeu and Hasson state that “a good system encourages the preferred path by providing 
multiple options for collaboration and higher-authority procedures that are both fair and 
perceived as fair by participants.”1 Participants should always have the right to choose from all 
methods and also be provided with independent and confidential assistance in selecting and 
using the available options.2 These aspects are consistent with the conflict management models 
of previous authors. 
 
Furthermore, best practice includes the creation of internal and external subsystems geared 
towards encouraging prevention and early intervention in conflict. Thus, Slaikeu and Hasson 
outline a template for all organisations which includes four boxes describing aspects of the 
system in terms of internal and external components for resolution (see Figure 2.7).3 Box one 
involves site-based resolution. This refers to options available internally within a department, 
business unit or organisation. Through the chain of command or line of authority, managers, 
employees and customers attempt collaboration (individual initiative, negotiation, mediation) 
as the first recourse. Higher-authority procedures are then utilised as needed, including the 
ability to appeal a decision to the next level of supervision. Box two features internal support 
mechanisms to assist parties in selecting and using available conflict management options. 
These can include ombudspersons, human resources, internal mediators and employee 
assistance programs (EAPs). Box three provides for the convening of external ADR to prevent 
disputes from escalating prematurely to the courts or other outside entities. External ADR 
processes include mediation, arbitration, mini-trial and fact finding. Box four encompasses 
external higher authority options such as litigation and hearings by courts and governmental 
agencies. 
 
The preferred path occurs both within and across the four boxes.4 Figure 2.7 indicates that site-
based resolution is the preferred place to start, followed by internal support, external convening 
and external higher authority. Within each box, the parties are encouraged to consider 
collaborative, low-cost resolutions first while still preserving the option of moving directly to 
a higher-authority procedure if that would serve them best.5  
  
                                                          
1 Karl A Slaikeu and Ralph H Hasson Controlling the Costs of Conflict: How to Design a System for Your 
Organization (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1998) at 49. 
2 At 49. 
3 At 54-59. 
4 At 59. 
5 At 63. 
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Figure 2.7: Comprehensive System Template1 
 
 
                                                          
1 Karl A Slaikeu and Ralph H Hasson Controlling the Costs of Conflict: How to Design a System for Your Organization (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1998) at 56, Figure 6.1. 
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Slaikeu and Hasson introduce seven structural subsystems or “checkpoints” which they 
consider necessary for the success of the conflict management system:1 
 
(1) Policy. The organisation must have a clear conflict management policy that 
supports the preferred path, illustrated by a pictorial description of the system; 
(2) Roles and responsibilities. These must be defined for employees and managers 
within each box; 
(3) Documentation. Write or rewrite documents such as contracts and employee 
manuals to encourage the use of the preferred path via the pictured system; 
(4) Selection. This involves developing selection criteria and procedures to foster the 
collaborative ability of employees, managers and external specialists; 
(5) Training and education. Identify the skills needed and develop the training for 
employees, managers, and specialists; 
(6) Support. Develop systems to support early resolution of conflict, including formal 
or informal coaching for all disputants; and 
(7) Evaluation. Collect data to provide appropriate feedback to improve the system. 
 
In addition, “successful rewiring to build collaborative strength in an organization requires 
consensus among those who will use the system and those who decide whether to allocate 
resources to the effort.”2 Thus, Slaikeu and Hasson suggest that the “mediation model” should 
be used as a guide to create consensus around the design, implementation and review phases 
of conflict management systems design.3 
 
2.5.6 Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution 
The ADR in the Workplace Committee (Track I)4 of the Society of Professionals in Dispute 
Resolution (SPIDR) published Designing Integrated Conflict Management Systems: 
Guidelines for Practitioners and Decision Makers in Organizations in 2001.5 As noted above 
in section 2.5, the Track I Committee included previous authors Rowe and Lynch as well as 
                                                          
1 Karl A Slaikeu and Ralph H Hasson Controlling the Costs of Conflict: How to Design a System for Your 
Organization (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1998) at 77-79. 
2 At 159. 
3 At 159. 
4 The work of the ADR in the Workplace initiative was organised into three tracks: Track I, ADR in the 
Employment Sector; Track II, ADR in the Organized Workforce; and Track III, International Structures and the 
Role of Workplace ADR Globally. 
5 See Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution Designing Integrated Conflict Management Systems: 
Guidelines for Designers and Decision Makers in Organizations (Washington DC, 2001). SPIDR merged with 
the Academy of Family Mediators (AFM) and the Conflict Resolution Education Network (CREnet) to form the 
Association for Conflict Resolution (ACR) in 2001. 
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other well-known dispute resolution academics and practitioners.6 In developing the guidelines, 
comments were sought from a broad spectrum of the dispute resolution community, including 
practitioners working with or within private companies, non-profit organisations, and 
government agencies.  
 
SPIDR outline that organisations generally move through four phases in addressing conflict.7 
Organisations in the first phase have no defined institutional dispute resolution processes. 
Organisations in the second phase have introduced rights-based grievance procedures – some 
ending in adjudication processes such as peer review and arbitration – for the resolution of 
conflict.8 SPIDR note that “today, all unionized organizations, most government agencies, and 
most medium and large-sized non-unionized organizations have internal rights-based 
grievance processes.”9 Some organisations have moved to the third phase, by introducing 
specific interest-based processes, often some form of mediation, to supplement rights-based 
processes.10 However, increasingly, organisations are moving to the fourth phase, by 
developing integrated conflict management systems. These systems “include both grievance 
processes and mediation, but go beyond them, introducing a systematic approach to preventing, 
managing, and resolving conflict”11 
 
Reflecting the earlier work of Rowe and Lynch, the SPIDR report finds that integrated conflict 
management systems are needed as most grievance procedures and mediation programs are 
available only to address conflicts that are framed as violations of policy, contract, or law and 
“these procedures and programs are therefore not available to address many other kinds of 
interpersonal disputes that cause significant disruption” in the workplace.12 SPIDR also state 
that while the more formal dispute resolution processes such as grievance procedures and 
mediation are necessary, they are insufficient because they usually address only the symptoms 
of conflict, not the sources.13 Against this background, SPIDR propose that effective conflict 
management systems should have the following characteristics:14 
 
                                                          
6 The Track I committee was co-chaired by Ann Gosline and Lamont Stallworth. Other members of the committee 
were: Myrna Adams, Norman Brand, Cynthia Hallberlin, Carole Houk; David Lipsky, Nancy Peace and Anne 
Thomas. 
7 Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, above n 5, at 7-9. 
8 At 7. 
9 At 7. 
10 At 7. 
11 At 8. 
12 At 8. 
13 At 8. 
14 At 9. 
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(1) Options for addressing all types of problems that are available to all types of people 
in the workplace, including employees, supervisors, professionals and managers; 
(2) Creation of a culture that welcomes dissent and encourages resolution of conflict 
at the lowest level through direct negotiation; 
(3) Provision of multiple access points and persons that are easily identified as 
knowledgeable and trustworthy for approaching for advice about the conflict 
management system; 
(4) Multiple options for addressing conflict, including rights-based and interest-based 
processes; 15 and 
(5) Provision of a systemic structure that coordinates and supports the multiple access 
points and multiple options and that integrates effective conflict management 
practices into the organisations daily operations.  
 
In addition, to implement an integrated conflict management system successfully, an 
organisation must develop support throughout its infrastructure. SPIDR state that people at all 
levels of the organisation must believe and communicate the same message: “that conflict can 
and should be actively managed through one of the many channels of the integrated conflict 
management system.”16 SPIDR outline the following list of supporting strategies, processes, 
and structures necessary to achieve this:17  
 
(1) Sincere and visible championship by senior management and workplace/union 
leaders; 
(2) A “continuous” oversight body composed of representatives from all key 
stakeholder groups;  
(3) A person or persons functioning in the role of internal independent confidential 
neutral(s); 
(4) A central coordinating point (office or group); 
(5) System evaluation and monitoring mechanisms; 
(6) “Critical mass” training, “just-in-time” on-the-spot training for individuals as 
needed, and educations of managers, supervisors, union personnel, and human 
services personnel; 
(7) Alignment of the “philosophy of conflict competency” with the mission, vision, 
values, and policies of the organisation; 
(8) Institutionalised incentives for effective conflict management, woven into the 
performance appraisal system; 
                                                          
15 The provision for loop-backs in the system is also indicated: “Employees have the opportunity in appropriate 
cases to move between rights-based grievance procedures and interest-based processes … For example, an 
employee who files a grievance may also be able to pursue mediation if all disputants agree”: at 10-11. 
16 At 14. 
17 At 14-16. 
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(9) An interest-based communication strategy developed through discussions with 
workplace stakeholders and carefully implemented from the start of the process; 
(10) Cost incentives that encourage managers and employees to deal with conflict early 
and effectively; and 
(11) Sufficient financial and human resources allocated to the system. 
 
SPIDR further recognise that an integrated conflict management system will work only if 
designed with input from users and decision makers at all levels of the organisation.18 
Moreover, there is no ideal integrated conflict management system that will fit all 
organisations. Each system must be tailored to fit the organisation's needs, circumstances, and 
culture.19  
 
2.6 Summary of the Six Conflict Management Models 
Table 2.1 provides a summary of the main features of the six conflict management models 
outlined in section 2.5 above. The summary is based on a comparison of the six conflict 
management models undertaken by Conbere.20 However, it should be noted that the main 
purpose of Conbere’s research was not to compare the six conflict management models per se. 
Rather, it was to examine, using “Dublin’s Model for Theory Building”,21 the elements 
necessary “to validate and improve the developing theory about organizational conflict 
management system design and implementation.”22 
 
                                                          
18 At 6. 
19 At 6. 
20 See John P Conbere “Theory Building for Conflict Management System Design” (2001) 19 Conflict Resol Q 
215. To the researcher’s knowledge there are currently no other studies which provide a comprehensive side-by-
side comparison of the six conflict management models. 
21 Dubin outlines a framework for theory building consisting of eight elements. However, it is beyond the scope 
of this study to consider this framework. For further information, see Robert Dubin Theory Building (Free Press, 
New York, 1978). 
22 Conbere, above n 20, at 215. 
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Table 2.1: Comparison of the Six Conflict Management Models1 
Category of 
DSD principle 




Rowe Lynch Slaikeu and Hasson Society of 
Professionals in 
Dispute Resolution 
Design phase Parties in the 
organisation are 
involved in the 
design process. 





Ask stakeholder if 




interests of all 
stakeholders; 
stakeholder 
participation in the 
design process. 
Uses the mediation 
model to create 
consensus among 
decision makers and 
users.  
Four phases – most 
developed is integrated 
conflict management 
system which includes 
a participatory design.  
Types of 
processes 
Puts the focus on 
interest-based 




may be necessary. 
Has multiple 




methods of ADR. 
System has interest, 
rights and power-
based processes; has 
a focus on 
prevention.  




based process as 
necessary in some 




interest, rights, power 
and avoidance; has a 
focus on prevention. 
System has interest and 
rights-based processes; 






 Provides for loops 
backward and 
forward. 
Provides for loops 
backward and 
forward. 
Provides for loops 












included in system. 
Independent 
confidential 
neutrals who can 
coach and act as 
referrals within the 
system. 
Support system 
(including coaching) to 
support early 
resolution. 
Has a person or 
persons who function 
as internal independent 
confidential neutral(s). 
                                                          
1 The column and row headings of Table 2.1 have been adapted from John P Conbere “Theory Building for Conflict Management System Design” (2001) 19 Conflict Resol Q 
215 at 228-230, Table 1. The row heading “Support for all stakeholders” was originally “Support for all employees” (which reflected the original application of DSD in the 



























at the lowest level; 
has structures to 




Preferred path for cost 
control encourages a 
low to high cost order 
of procedures; 
encourages the 
creation of options for 
prevention and early 
resolution. 
Promotes resolution at 
the lowest level; costs 
are allocated to provide 
incentives to managers 
and employees to deal 
with conflicts early and 
effectively. 






about skills and 
dispute system; 
system is easy to 
use. 
Has multiple access 
points. 
Has multiple access 
points and provides 




Includes training and 
education.  
Has multiple access 
points; includes 
training a critical mass 





 Has guidelines 
for when ADR is 
appropriate.  
 Has conflict 
management 
coordinator and 
process advisors to 
help select the best 
option. 
Assistance is offered 












options available in 
parallel with other 
options. 




Disputants have the 
right to choose 
preferred process. 
Employees can choose 
problem-solving and/or 
enforcement of rights. 
Fairness and 
other values 
  Organisation is 
committed to 
fairness and freedom 
from reprisal. 
System is fair, 
friendly, flexible 
and fast. 
System is fair and 
perceived as fair. 
System should foster a 















  Is supported by top 
managers. 




 Senior management 
and union leaders’ 









strategy; system is 


















policy, roles and 
responsibilities, 
documentation, criteria 
for selection and hiring 
of employees, 
managers, external and 
internal specialists. 
System is aligned with 
mission, vision and 
values; incentives are 
institutionalised; 
conflict management is 
included in 
performance appraisal. 







Has evaluation to 
improve the system. 
Has evaluation to 
improve the system. 
Has evaluation to 
identify strengths and 
weaknesses of design 




When the six models are put side by side, it can be seen that although the DSD principles are 
articulated differently, a number of similarities stand out within each category of principles. As 
noted above in section 2.5, each of the models build on the models that have come before them, 
with Ury Brett and Goldberg’s concepts found in the later models. In addition, the DSD 
principles reflect the evolution of DSD from Ury, Brett and Goldberg’s tripartite distinction of 
power, rights and interest-based approaches towards a systems-based approach as outlined in 
section 2.2 above.  
 
With respect to the design phase itself, each model allows for various kinds of design centred 
on stakeholder involvement in the design process. However, Rowe notes that even though 
participative design would appear to be the most effective, there are top-down designs that have 
been effective.1  
 
The models support the development of conflict management systems with a variety of 
processes and consistent with Ury, Brett and Goldberg, all models support the inclusion of 
interest-based processes where possible. The models suggest that disputants should be offered 
the opportunity to select the process which they are most comfortable with and that they believe 
will most effectively meet their needs. With the exception of Costantino and Merchant, all 
models provide for loop-backs in the system to encourage parties to return from rights or power 
contests to interest-based negotiations. The models of Rowe, Lynch and Slaikeu and Hasson 
also provide for loops forward in the system such that parties are not necessarily required to go 
through all the earlier interests-based options in the system.  
 
To promote the early resolution of conflict, support for disputants is included in the four later 
models through the use of organisational ombudspersons, independent confidential neutrals 
within the system and/or coaching. Excepting Costantino and Merchant, all models include the 
assumption that, the conflict management process generally ought to move from low to high 
cost. All models have some elements that address supporting stakeholders to use the conflict 
management system in terms of multiple access points for disputants and/or providing training 
and education in conflict resolution. Costantino and Merchant, Lynch, and Slaikeu and Hasson 
recommend guidelines or the provision of assistance to ensure the appropriate use of ADR 
methods. Although the other models do not specifically address this, the idea is consistent with 
the other parts of their models.  
 
Most of the models explicitly support systems that are fair to parties and are free of reprisal for 
using the system. Leadership support and integration of the system into the organisation are 
also supported by the majority of the models. Slaikeu and Hasson offer further 
                                                          
1 Mary P Rowe “Dispute Resolution in the Non-Union Environment: An Evolution Toward Integrated Systems 
for Conflict Management?” in Sandra Gleason (ed) Frontiers in Dispute Resolution in Labor Relations and 
Human Resources (Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, 1997) 79 at 85. 
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recommendations about how to institutionalise the conflict management system in terms of 
developing policy and understanding roles. The models also typically emphasise the use of 
evaluation to improve the conflict management system.  
 
2.7 The Dispute Systems Design Principles Utilised in this Study 
Against the background of the conflict management models summarised in section 2.6 above, 
the following general DSD principles (with accompanying explanations) to be utilised in 
evaluating the designs of tax dispute resolution systems of the four selected jurisdictions have 
been derived by the researcher (as shown in Table 2.2).2 The DSD principles and explanations 
are expressed in the context of workplace disputes in which they were originally formulated. 
However, in line with the objectives of this study, modifications to the DSD principles in the 
context of tax dispute resolution will take place following the DSD evaluations of the tax 
dispute resolution systems of the four selected jurisdictions.  
  
                                                          




Table 2.2: The 14 General Dispute Systems Design Principles3 
(1) Stakeholders are included in the design process. Stakeholders should have an active and 
integral role in creating and renewing the systems they use. 
(2) The system has multiple options for addressing conflict including interests, rights and 
power-based processes. The system should include interests-based processes and low-cost 
rights and power-based processes should be offered should interest-based processes fail to 
resolve a dispute. 
(3) The system provides for loops backward and forward. The system should include loop-
back mechanisms which allow disputants to return from rights or power-based options back to 
interests-based options and also loop-forward mechanisms which allow disputants to move 
directly to a rights or power-based option without first going through all of the earlier interests-
based options.  
(4) There is notification before and feedback after the resolution process. Notification in 
advance of taking a proposed action affecting others can prevent disputes that arise through 
misunderstanding or miscommunication and can identify points of difference early on so that 
they may be negotiated. Post-dispute analysis and feedback can help parties to learn from 
disputes in order to prevent similar disputes in the future. 
(5) The system has a person or persons who function as internal independent confidential 
neutral(s). Disputants should have access to an independent confidential neutral to whom they 
can go to for coaching, referring and problem-solving. 
(6) Procedures are ordered from low to high cost. In order to reduce the costs of handling 
disputes, the procedures in the system should be arranged in graduated steps in a low to high 
cost sequence. 
(7) The system has multiple access points. The system should allow disputants to enter the 
system through many access points and offer a choice of persons whom system users may 
approach in the first instance. 
(8) The system includes training and education for stakeholders. Training of stakeholders in 
conflict management as well as education about the dispute system and how to access it are 
necessary. 
(9) Assistance is offered for choosing the best process. This includes the use of guidelines and/or 
coordinators and process advisors to ensure the appropriate use of processes. 
(10) Disputants have the right to choose a preferred process. The best systems are multi-option 
with disputants selecting the process. 
(11) The system is fair and perceived as fair. The system should be fair to parties and foster a 
culture that welcomes good faith dissent. 
(12) The system is supported by top managers. There should be sincere and visible championship 
by senior management. 
(13) The system is aligned with the mission, vision and values of the organisation. The system 
should be integrated into the organisation and reflect the organisational mission, vision and 
values.  
(14) There is evaluation of the system. This acts to identify strengths and weaknesses of design 
and foster continuous improvement. 
                                                          
3 Table 2.2 has previously been published in Melinda Jone “Evaluating Australia’s Tax Dispute Resolution 
System: A Dispute System Design Perspective” (2015) 13 EJTR 552 at 557; Melinda Jone “Evaluating New 
Zealand’s Tax Dispute Resolution System: A Dispute Systems Design Perspective” (2016) 22 NZJTLP 228 at 
233 and Melinda Jone “What can the United Kingdom’s Tax Dispute Resolution System Learn from Australia? – 
An Evaluation and Recommendations from a Dispute Systems Design Perspective” (2017) 32(1) ATF 59. 
63 
 
The 14 DSD principles derived generally correspond to the 12 categories of DSD principles in 
column one of Table 2.1. However, the category “Support for disputants” includes two separate 
DSD principles: “There is notification and consultation before and feedback after the resolution 
process” and “The system has a person or persons who function as internal independent 
neutral(s).” The category “Support for all stakeholders” also contains two DSD principles: 
“The system has multiple access points” and “The system includes training and education for 
stakeholders.” The next section now reviews the two extant studies which utilise DSD 
principles in evaluating tax dispute resolution systems.  
 
2.8 Bentley’s and Mookhey’s Studies 
As noted in chapter 1, section 1.2.1, to the researcher’s knowledge, only two researchers have 
conducted studies utilising DSD principles in analysing dispute resolution systems (and 
complaint handling systems) in the tax context. Both researchers utilised Ury, Brett and 
Goldberg’s six DSD principles in their analyses. Notwithstanding that the focus of Bentley’s4 
study is on the effectiveness of the design of the ATO’s complaint handling procedures, the 
use of DSD principles in his analysis is relevant to this present study. Mookhey’s5 study follows 
a similar process of analysis, but the focus of her study is on the ATO’s tax dispute resolution 
procedures. Sections 2.8.1 and 2.8.2 discuss the research conducted by Bentley and Mookhey 
respectively and section 2.8.3 provides some general comments. 
 
2.8.1 Bentley 
Bentley’s research in 1996 analyses the ATO’s complaint handling procedures developed for 
the then proposed ATO Taxpayers’ Charter (the Charter). The Charter articulates the rights of 
taxpayers, thereby providing a focus for resolution of conflicts in the area.6 However, “the 
rights protected in the Charter are limited to process and cannot deal effectively with matters 
of substance relating to the operation of the law.”7 Bentley states that “process” relates to 
procedural issues, such as the giving of reasons for a decision, whereas, “substance” refers to 
matters of law, such as whether expenditure is deductible.8 Accordingly, “it is likely that the 
majority of complaints raised under the Charter will not develop into disputes.”9 Hence, as 
                                                          
4 Duncan Bentley “Problem resolution: Does the ATO approach really work?” (1996) 6(1) Revenue LJ 17, updated 
in Duncan Bentley Taxpayers’ Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation (Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, 2007) ch 5. 
5 Sheena Mookhey “Tax dispute systems design” (2013) 11 EJTR 79. 
6 Bentley “Problem resolution: Does the ATO approach really work?”, above n 4, at 23. 
7 At 23. 
8 At 23. 
9 At 34. 
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stated above, Bentley’s research focuses on the taxpayer complaint handling procedures as 
opposed to tax dispute resolution procedures in Australia. 
 
By way of background, the Charter was introduced as a direct result of a shift in the ATO’s 
approach to compliance.10 International research by the ATO “led it to realize the importance 
of having a high concern for taxpayer interests so that it could achieve its own goal of increased 
taxpayer compliance and reduced conflict escalation.”11 Furthermore, the ATO realised that it 
needed to introduce an appropriate internal review mechanism to uphold the rights included in 
the Charter.12 Accordingly, the ATO used the Problem Resolution Unit (PRU) model as the 
basis for developing its complaint handling process under the Charter.13 PRUs were set up in 
ATO offices around the country with the aim of identifying the problems giving rise to 
complaints so that they could be reviewed and resolved.14 PRUs were to be used once the 
normal channels for review were exhausted. They concentrated on serious complaints 
involving, for example, administrative delays in issuing assessments, conducting audits and 
responding to letters.15 They also reviewed decisions and actions of ATO officers that were not 
open to other forms of review, such as the right of appeal to the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal (AAT).16 PRU staff acted as “advocates for the taxpayer within the ATO.”17 Bentley 
states that this approach is consistent with a “problem solving approach that attempts to deal 
with the underlying interests of the parties concerned, in a way that is seldom possible in a 
more formal tribunal or court setting.”18 
 
Henceforth, Bentley sought to examine whether the ATO’s complaint handling processes 
measured up to the standards of best practice developed in DSD theory. Bentley thus outlines 
the “ATO model” for complaint handling (essentially encompassing the PRU model and 
external appeal to the Commonwealth Ombudsman)19 and then utilises Ury, Brett and 
Goldberg’s six DSD principles to evaluate the effectiveness of the design of the ATO’s 
complaint handling procedures. Bentley found that the complaint handling procedures of the 
                                                          
10 Bentley Taxpayers’ Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation, above n 4, at 186. 
11 At 186. 
12 Bentley “Problem resolution: Does the ATO approach really work?”, above n 4, at 32. 
13 The ATO’s experience with the PRU model provided the basis for the ATO’s current complaint handling 
process under the Charter which is known as ATO Complaints. 
14 Bentley “Problem resolution: Does the ATO approach really work?”, above n 4, at 33. 
15 At 33. 
16 At 33. 
17 At 33. 
18 At 32. 
19 From 1 May 2015, most tax complaints previously handled by the Commonwealth Ombudsman are now 
handled by the Inspector-General of Taxation (IGT). 
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ATO has features of all six principles of best practice in DSD advocated by Ury, Brett and 
Goldberg. Bentley concludes that:20  
 
The approach of the ATO, and the conflict resolution model that it has chosen to use, 
supports the assumption that it is eager to seek to resolve the problems of taxpayers to 
better achieve its own goals of increased taxpayer compliance.  
 
However, Bentley suggests that: “The ATO model should be more flexible. Multiple entry 
points at the first level and provision for more interaction in the problem-solving process would 
make it more effective.”21 Flexibility and interaction are the basis for much interest-based 
problem-solving. Preventing flexibility and interaction by implementing an “over-formalised” 
model can be counter-productive.22 Bentley’s analysis of the ATO complaint handling process 
also highlights the need, in procedural matters, for some alternative to negotiation when it fails 
to produce a satisfactory outcome. He suggests that “low-cost, rights-based procedures should 
be available, at least to the STCT23 and the AAT.”24 In addition, Bentley notes that the ATO 
model should allow taxpayers to give feedback on the handling of their complaint for ATO 
monitoring and reporting purposes.25 
 
Bentley’s 1996 paper was updated by his further research in 200726 in which he sought to 
develop a model charter of taxpayers’ rights to be utilised as best practice in tax 
administration.27 In his model charter, Bentley proposes that: “There shall be constituted a 
dispute resolution system designed to provide an informal mechanism for early resolution of 
disputes arising between taxpayers and the revenue authority.”28 Using the analysis of the 
complaint handling procedures conducted in his earlier research as an underlying basis, Bentley 
states that:29 
 
Based on the successful application by the ATO of the principles put forward by Ury, Brett 
and Goldberg in its Charter dispute resolution process, the Model should include all six, 
with two additional principles as follows: 
                                                          
20 At 41. 
21 At 42. 
22 At 41. 
23 Section 27 of the Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015 (Cth) abolished the Small Taxation Claims Tribunal 
(STCT) of the AAT with effect from 1 July 2015.  
24 At 42. 
25 At 42. 
26 Bentley Taxpayers’ Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation, above n 4, at ch 5. 
27 See Bentley Taxpayers’ Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation, above n 4, at ch 9 for a detailed outline of 
the model charter of taxpayers’ rights. 
28 At 381. 
29 At 211-212. 
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1. Prevent unnecessary conflict through notification, consultation and feedback. 
2. Create ways of reconciling the interests of those in dispute. 
3. Build in ‘loop-backs’ to negotiation. 
4. Provide low-cost alternatives where negotiation fails. 
5. Create sequential procedures moving from low-cost to high-cost. 
6. Provide the necessary motivation, skills and resources to allow the system to 
work. 
7. Provide effective mechanisms for measuring qualitative success. 
8. Provide mechanisms for monitoring, review and improvement both at individual 
and systemic levels. 
 
The two additional DSD principles included by Bentley in 2007 can, in part, be traced to the 
work of Costantino and Merchant,30 and Slaikeu and Hasson.31 With respect to the principle of 
providing effective mechanisms for measuring qualitative success, Costantino and Merchant 
suggest that there should be evaluation of both the impact and effectiveness of the problem 
resolution system and its administration and operation.32 Applying this in the tax dispute 
resolution context, this includes mechanisms for “examining satisfaction of taxpayers with the 
resolution process, their relationship with the revenue authority and the outcome of the 
process.”33 However, with respect to the ATO complaint handling procedures, as noted in his 
earlier research in 1996, Bentley states that there does not appear to be a formal procedure for 
obtaining and measuring specific feedback from the taxpayer on the complaint handling 
process.34 
 
The principle of providing mechanisms for monitoring, review and improvement both at 
individual and systemic levels includes collecting and evaluating data to provide regular 
feedback to improve the system.35 Applying this principle in relation to the ATO complaint 
handling procedures, monthly reports are made by ATO Complaints to the ATO Executive.36 
These reports include: complaint volumes; performance against identified key performance 
indicators such as service standards and other quality assurance measures; and alerts about 
issues that have led or are likely to lead to complaints, including systemic issues.37 Quarterly 
                                                          
30 Cathy A Costantino and Christina S Merchant Designing Conflict Management Systems: A Guide to Creating 
Productive and Healthy Organizations (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1996). 
31 Karl A Slaikeu and Ralph H Hasson Controlling the Costs of Conflict: How to Design a System for Your 
Organization (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1998). 
32 Costantino and Merchant, above n 30, at ch 10. 
33 Bentley Taxpayers’ Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation, above n 4, at 201. 
34 At 200. 
35 See Costantino and Merchant, above n 30, at ch 10; Slaikeu and Hasson, above n 31, at ch 15. 
36 Bentley Taxpayers’ Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation, above n 4, at 197. 
37 At 197. 
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reviews are also conducted on random samples of complaints.38 General reports on the reviews 
are circulated in addition to individual results being provided to the relevant “ATO complaint 
resolvers.”39 The outcomes of these reviews also inform staff training and skills development 
strategies.40 
 
Notwithstanding that Bentley’s research focuses on the effectiveness of the design of the 
complaint handling procedures of the ATO, his research is of significance as it represents an 
initial application of DSD analysis in dispute resolution systems in the particular context of 
taxation. Furthermore, while Bentley’s initial analysis in 1996 is conducted using Ury, Brett 
and Goldberg’s six principles, in his updated research in 2007, Bentley introduces several DSD 
principles developed since Ury, Brett and Goldberg. Although, unlike this present study, 




Mookhey seeks to consider the effectiveness of the design of the current ATO dispute 
resolution process according to Ury, Brett and Goldberg’s six DSD principles. Mookhey’s 
study is wider in scope than Bentley’s on the basis that she classifies tax disputes with the ATO 
as generally coming within four categories:41 
 
(a) Complaints; 
(b) Objections to private binding rulings given to taxpayers on tax-related issues by the 
ATO; 
(c) Disputes as to facts or the application of tax law by a taxpayer as matters are being 
assessed by the ATO; and 
(d) Objections to assessments of liability to tax. 
 
Categories (b) and (d) generally refer to statutory rights, while categories (a) and (c) relate to 
administrative due process.42 Against the background of this expanded scope, Mookhey 
outlines the available processes for resolving tax disputes in Australia. She describes that the 
“ATO dispute resolution model”, existing at that time, as consisting of four layers:43  
 
                                                          
38 At 197. 
39 At 198. 
40 At 198. 
41 Mookhey, above n 5, at 83. 
42 Unlike in this current study, Mookhey includes complaints as a category of tax dispute. As stated in section 
2.2.1 of this chapter, complaints do not fall within the definition of tax disputes in this study as generally they 
cannot be filed for substantive tax issues. 
43 Mookhey, above n 5, at 83. 
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… [T]he ATO (internal), the Commonwealth Ombudsman (external, administrative), the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT) (external, administrative) and the courts 
(external, judicial). Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and the Taxpayers’ Charter are 
supplemental features. 
 
Mookhey goes on to evaluate the ATO dispute resolution model against the criteria of Ury, 
Brett and Goldberg’s six DSD principles. Along similar lines to Bentley in 1996, she concludes 
that: “Overall, the ATO dispute resolution model supports its assertions that it’s eager to seek 
to resolve disputes with taxpayers.”44 She states that the ATO model possesses “much of the 
best-practice principles advocated by the Ury, Brett and Goldberg model such as clear, multi-
step procedures and emphasis on negotiation, notification and consultation.”45 However, 
Mookhey also notes that there are some deficiencies in the ATO model that require reform. 
She suggests:46 
 
In particular, reforming the ATO model so that there is an increase in transaction costs at 
each level and affordable access to first-level external review is highly desirable, so as to 
increase the pressure for a negotiated outcome at an early stage.  
 
Nevertheless, her research does not go as far as exploring practical options for implementing 
the abovementioned reform of the ATO model. In addition, similar to Bentley’s research in 
1996, Mookhey states that “significantly missing from the ATO model is a formal procedure 
for obtaining feedback from taxpayers as parties to tax disputes.”47 She also notes that there 
has been “a lot of criticism levelled at the day-to-day ATO officers’ capacity to engage in 
meaningful and effective dispute resolution” and suggests that further improvement to the ATO 
model “should come with the specific dispute resolution training initiatives for ATO 
personnel.”48 
 
2.8.3 General comments 
Bentley’s and Mookhey’s studies focus on the complaint handling and tax dispute resolution 
procedures, respectively, solely in the context of Australia. Accordingly, there is scope for a 
comparative DSD analysis to be conducted on the tax dispute resolution procedures in other 
                                                          
44 At 94. 
45 At 94. 
46 At 94.  
47 At 93. In the period of time since Mookhey’s study, the ATO have implemented various feedback mechanisms. 
These are discussed in this thesis in chapter 4, section 4.3.2 under DSD Principle 4 (notification before and 
feedback after the resolution process). 
48 At 93. In the period of time since Mookhey’s study, the ATO have implemented various dispute resolution 
training initiatives. These are discussed in this thesis in chapter 4, section 4.3.2 under DSD Principle 8 (training 
and education for stakeholders). 
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jurisdictions in order to compare the effectiveness of the design of different jurisdictions’ tax 
dispute resolution procedures. Furthermore, given that it was beyond the scope of both studies 
to utilise a comprehensive range of DSD principles in analysing the effectiveness of the design 
of the ATO’s complaint handling and tax dispute resolution procedures, it is worthwhile 
developing a more comprehensive set of DSD principles which could be utilised as general 
guidance and if necessary, subsequently adapted, by international tax administrations in 
designing and/or improving their tax dispute resolution systems. Consequently, the above 
limitations in the scope of Bentley’s and Mookhey’s studies provide the basis for the objectives 
of this study outlined in chapter 1, section 1.3. 
 
2.9 Summary 
This chapter has outlined certain definitional aspects relevant to this study and reviewed 
selected prior literature on DSD. For the purposes of this study, tax disputes are defined as 
occurring when there is a disagreement between the taxpayer and the tax authority in respect 
of the taxpayer’s tax liabilities or entitlements and related issues. Excluded from this definition 
are taxpayer complaints relating to the standard of service received by taxpayers and other 
procedural issues relating to the tax dispute resolution process. In addition, as the tax disputes 
in the selected jurisdictions in this study principally arise through taxpayer audits, this study 
focuses on post-filing tax disputes and accordingly, the associated post-filing dispute resolution 
processes. 
 
This chapter also outlines the definition of ADR utilised in this study: “an umbrella term for 
processes, other than judicial determination, in which an impartial person assists those in a 
dispute to resolve the issues between them.”49 This definition, by the former NADRAC, has 
been utilised in order to encompass a broad range of dispute resolution processes used within 
and outside courts and tribunals, excluding judicial determination.  
 
The chapter then turns to reviewing the relevant literature in the area of DSD. The concept of 
DSD, in the context of workplace conflict, originated in the book Getting Disputes Resolved: 
Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of Conflict by Ury, Brett and Goldberg in 1988.50 They 
outline three approaches to resolving disputes (interests, rights and power-based) and suggest 
that an organisation can improve its conflict management capacity by shifting its dispute 
resolution system, over time, from one dominated by power and rights-based approaches to 
                                                          
49 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council Dispute Resolution Terms: The Use of Terms in 
(Alternative) Dispute Resolution (Barton, 2003) 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/LegalSystem/AlternateDisputeResolution/Pages/NADRACpublications.aspx> (last 
accessed 7 November 2016) at 4. 
50 William L Ury, Jeanne M Brett and Stephen B Goldberg Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut 




one dominated by interest-based approaches. Accordingly, the authors outline six fundamental 
DSD principles:51  
 
(1) Focusing on interests; 
(2) Building in loop-backs to negotiation; 
(3) Offering low cost rights and power-based processes when interest-based processes 
fail to resolve the dispute; 
(4) Preventing disputes by building in consultation before and feedback after the 
dispute resolution process; 
(5) Arranging procedures in a low-to-high-cost sequence; and 
(6) Providing the necessary motivation, skills and resources. 
 
Other DSD practitioners have since expanded on Ury Brett and Goldberg’s DSD principles. 
Their DSD principles are outlined in subsequent models of conflict management. Accordingly, 
this chapter has reviewed the DSD principles presented in six specific conflict management 
models identified in the prior literature and consequently derived a set of 14 DSD principles 
for the purpose of evaluating the tax dispute resolution systems of the four selected jurisdictions 
in this study. The additional principles included in the set of DSD principles derived include:52 
 
(1) Involving stakeholders in the design process;  
(2) The inclusion of internal independent confidential neutrals in the system;  
(3) Providing disputants with multiple access points to the system;  
(4) Providing assistance for choosing the most appropriate process;  
(5) Providing disputants with the right to choose a preferred process;  
(6) Having a system which is fair and perceived as fair;  
(7) Support of the system by top management;  
(8) Alignment of the system with the mission, vision and values of the organisation; 
and 
(9) The inclusion of evaluation of the system. 
 
This chapter then reviews two studies in the literature which utilise DSD principles in 
evaluating the effectiveness of the design of tax dispute resolution systems. The studies by 
Bentley and Mookhey both utilise Ury, Brett and Goldberg’s six DSD principles in evaluating 
the ATO’s complaint handling procedures and tax dispute resolution procedures, respectively. 
Set against this background, this present study seeks to expand on Bentley and Mookhey’s 
                                                          
51 At 42. 
52 See Constantino and Merchant, above n 30; Rowe, above n 1; Slaikeu and Hasson, above n 31; Jennifer F Lynch 
CCRA: Contemporary Conflict Resolution Approaches (Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, Ottawa, 1998); 
Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution Designing Integrated Conflict Management Systems: Guidelines 
for Designers and Decision Makers in Organizations (Washington DC, 2001). 
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research through evaluating the effectiveness of the design of the tax dispute resolution systems 
of a larger number of jurisdictions and through utilising a more comprehensive range of DSD 
principles in the jurisdictions’ analyses. Henceforth, the next chapter outlines the research 




Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research methodology for this study. The research framework and 
methodological approaches employed are outlined in section 3.2. Guided by the principles of 
pragmatism, this social-legal study incorporates doctrinal legal analysis (discussed in section 
3.3), comparative case study analysis (discussed in sections 3.4 and 3.5) and semi-structured 
interviews (discussed in sections 3.6). Multiple approaches have thus been adopted in order to 
meet the different objectives of this study. Section 3.7 provides a chapter summary. 
 
3.2 Research Framework and Methodological Approaches 
This study constitutes socio-legal research that evaluates the design of tax dispute resolution 
systems (which lie within existing legal frameworks) of a number of selected jurisdictions and 
subsequently provides recommendations for best practice in tax dispute systems design (DSD) 
principles. Salter and Mason note the difficulties in providing a single and conclusive definition 
of the nature and scope of socio-legal studies.1 This stems from the sheer diversity of projects 
and types of research that can be conducted within this tradition, including the deployment of 
a broad range of research methods.2 Nevertheless, what binds the socio-legal research 
community is an approach to the study of legal phenomena which is multi or inter-disciplinary 
in its approach and which is said to remedy the difficulties created by the increasingly apparent 
gap between “law in books” and “law in action.”3 The theoretical perspectives and 
methodologies in socio-legal research are largely but not exclusively informed by research 
undertaken in many other social science disciplines. 
 
It follows that the overarching research framework guiding this thesis is pragmatism. 
Pragmatists freely choose the methods, techniques and procedures that best meet the needs and 
purposes of the research.4 They are neither purists nor polarised between the differences of 
different research paradigms (that is, between the two extremes of positivism5 and 
interpretivism6). Hence, Onwuegbuzie and Leech consider the research of pragmatists to be 
                                                          
1 Michael Salter and Julie Mason Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of Legal 
Research (Pearson Education, Harlow, 2007) at 180. 
2 At 180. 
3 At 177. 
4 Margaret McKerchar Design and Conduct of Research in Tax, Law and Accounting (Thomson Reuters, Pyrmont, 
2010) at 79. 
5 The positivism approach views the world as objective realism and therefore suggests that knowledge is created 
by deductive reasoning whereby a precise and systematic process is adopted leading to the identification of causal 
relationships, logical conclusions and the making of predictions according to various confidence levels: at 72. 
6 The interpretivist approach views the world based on the researcher’s interpretation, which may be influenced 
by his or her own views, beliefs, experiences and existing knowledge. Interpretivism is based on inductive 
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more productive and the results likely to be taken more seriously.7 The research frameworks 
of pragmatism (and critical realism) are typically apparent in methodological approaches that 
use mixed methods drawn from different research frameworks in seeking to find the best, and 
probably true, answers.8 However, critical realists typically use at least one empirical method 
(for example, surveys or experiments), while pragmatists are less concerned about empirical 
reality and, as stated above, will freely choose the methods that best meet the needs and 
purposes of the research.9 
 
Accordingly, in line with the pragmatism research paradigm, this study utilises doctrinal legal 
analysis (black letter law analysis), comparative analysis and semi-structured interviews in 
order to meet the different objectives of the research. Through case studies of the four selected 
jurisdictions, doctrinal legal analysis and comparative analysis have been used to describe the 
four jurisdictions’ tax dispute resolution systems, and evaluate and compare the jurisdictions’ 
tax dispute resolution systems using DSD principles. Applying inductive reasoning to the 
above analysis, general guidance in best practice tax DSD principles has consequently been 
derived. Semi-structured interviews have then been used to obtain external feedback from New 
Zealand (NZ) stakeholders on the tax DSD guidance developed and to consider whether 
adaptation of the tax DSD guidance is required in the NZ context. 
 
3.3 Black Letter Law Approach 
As noted in section 3.2 above, this research incorporates a black letter law approach to research. 
Salter and Mason state that:10  
 
Black-letter modes of dissertation research aim to reduce the study of law to an essentially 
descriptive exposition of the meaning for lawyers of a large number of technical and 
coordinated rules contained in ‘primary sources’ (mainly cases and statutes). 
 
They further suggest that the typical black letter approach is best defined as a research 
methodology that “concentrates on seeking to provide a detailed and highly technical 
commentary upon, and systematic exposition of, the content of legal doctrine.”11 This doctrine 
                                                          
reasoning and does not provide a hard and fast explanation from which causal relationships can be identified and 
predictions made: at 75.  
7 Anthony J Onwuegbuzie and Nancy L Leech “On Becoming a Pragmatic Researcher: The Importance of 
Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methodologies” (2005) 8 Int J Soc Res Methodol 375 at 384. 
8 John W Creswell Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches (2nd ed, Sage, 
Thousand Oaks, 2003) at 12. 
9 McKerchar, above n 4, at 168. 
10 Salter and Mason, above n 1, at 49. 
11 At 49. 
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is interpreted as if it is a separate, independent and coherent “system of rules”.12 The priority 
is to gather, organise and describe legal rules, and offer commentary upon the emergence and 
significance of the authoritative legal sources that contain these rules, especially cases. Along 
similar lines McKerchar states that:13  
 
Doctrinal research is … typified by the systematic process of identifying, analysing, 
organising and synthesising statutes, judicial decisions and commentary. It is typically a 
library-based undertaking, focused on reading and conducting intensive, scholarly 
analysis. 
 
As a methodological approach doctrinal research is generally appropriate where the aim of the 
research is to determine the meaning of a particular legal provision in accordance with the 
philosophy of legal positivism.14 This type of research may or may not include hypotheses 
(consistent with deductive reasoning), but in this case hypotheses are more akin to propositions 
than hypotheses that typify quantitative research, and therefore can be accepted or rejected in 
accordance with empirical investigation.15 McKerchar further states that the scope of doctrinal 
research is typically narrow and any policy or societal implications of the law are excluded.16 
However, this present study does consider various implications in relation to the strengths and 
weaknesses in the design of selected tax dispute resolution systems. Hence, a pure black letter 
law approach has not been adopted.  
 
In spite of the fact that doctrinal legal research is still regarded as the norm by legal researchers, 
there is evidence of a softening of the traditional boundaries.17 This is said to be attributed to a 
growing recognition that law is a social construct and does not exist within a doctrinal 
vacuum.18 Nonetheless, the black letter law approach is considered relevant to this study in the 
respect that the tax dispute resolution systems which this study describes and evaluates 
(through identifying, analysing, organising and synthesising information), lie within existing 
legal frameworks. However, it is not the purpose of this research to change these legal 
frameworks. Rather, this research, inter alia, gives consideration to possible improvements to 
the design of the tax dispute resolution systems examined within these frameworks (and which 
                                                          
12 At 49. 
13 Margaret McKerchar “Philosophical Paradigms, Inquiry Strategies and Knowledge Claims: Applying the 
Principles of Research Design and Conduct to Taxation” (2008) 6 EJTR 5 at 18-19. 
14 McKerchar, above n 4, at 115. 
15 At 115. 
16 At 115. 
17 At 116. 
18 Terry Hutchinson Researching and Writing in Law (3rd ed, Thompson Reuters, Sydney, 2010) at 7. 
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could ultimately necessitate legislative changes). Furthermore, notwithstanding that it is not 
the purpose of this study to reform the law per se, McKerchar argues that:19 
 
… it is difficult to imagine that in putting forward a convincing argument for legal reform 
… the researcher will not provide some element of doctrinal research, even if only to 
demonstrate that the existing law is deficient. 
 
3.4 Comparative Approach 
This study also employs a comparative approach to the conduct of dissertation research. 
Thuronyi states that comparative law involves the study of basic structures, country 
differences, and the influence of systems on each other.20 It identifies underlying patterns and 
analyses how different rules function in different countries to resolve similar problems. Raw 
material for this study is a descriptive understanding of different countries’ laws.21 Along 
similar lines, Salter and Mason state that comparative research “asks how different legal 
systems and legal cultures have addressed problems that our law faces but in a different way, 
and with what degree of perceived success or failure.”22  
 
For law reform, comparative study can canvass the rules that apply in different countries in the 
subject area being considered and can discuss whether these rules represent good policy and 
how policymakers might go about deciding what rules to enact for their country.23 The purpose 
of a comparative approach is to learn about new possibilities from studying actual practice, to 
convince by example, and to avoid reinventing the wheel.24 As stated in section 3.3 above, it 
is not the purpose of this study to reform existing legal frameworks. However, law reform may 
ultimately occur if certain changes are made to the tax dispute resolution systems in this study. 
 
Nevertheless, this study adopts a comparative approach in the respect that it compares the tax 
dispute resolution procedures of different jurisdictions utilising a comparative case study 
methodology. Similarities and differences in the effectiveness of the design of the tax dispute 
resolution systems of four selected jurisdictions, as evaluated using the DSD principles drawn 
from the prior literature, are identified and compared. The consequent purpose of the 
comparison of the DSD evaluations is to develop and recommend a set of best practice tax 
DSD principles that can be used by tax authorities in either developing new or improving 
existing tax dispute resolution systems.  
                                                          
19 McKerchar, above n 4, at 116 
20 Victor Thuronyi Comparative Tax Law (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2003) at 3.  
21 At 3.  
22 Salter and Mason, above n 1, at 183. 
23 Thuronyi, above n 20, at 4. 
24 At 4. 
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Comparative law scholars have divided countries into families to indicate broad similarities in 
legal traditions.25 Thuronyi states that this type of analysis is useful for tax law as well, because 
it can impart structure to cross-country comparisons.26 As already discussed in chapter 1, 
section 1.5 of this thesis, the four jurisdictions in this study (NZ, Australia, the United Kingdom 
(UK) and the United States (US)) all have a common legal heritage based on the common law.27 
 
3.5 Case Study Approach 
3.5.1 Overview 
As stated in section 3.2 above, a case study approach has been adopted in this research in order 
to achieve the objectives of evaluating the effectiveness of the design of the current tax dispute 
resolution systems of the four selected jurisdictions using DSD principles and consequently 
developing general guidance in tax DSD principles. Creswell states that a case study allows 
researchers to explore “in depth a program, an event, an activity, a process, or one or more 
individuals.”28 The case(s) are “bounded by time and activity, and researchers collect detailed 
information using a variety of data collection procedures.”29 Yin further explains that:30 
 
The distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social 
phenomena … the case study allows an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life situations such as … organizational and managerial processes. 
 
The main purpose of a case study is to draw analytical generalisations to theoretical 
propositions. The analytical generalisations and theoretical propositions made in a case study 
are in the context of the subjects or cases studied, thus there is no “sample” as would be 
expected in quantitative research.31 Instead, there are multiple sources of evidence collected in 
accordance with a set of predetermined procedures or a defined protocol.32  
 
A case study design may be of either a single unit or multiple units. A single unit case study 
may be justifiable where the case represents (a) a critical test of existing theory, (b) an extreme 
or unusual circumstance, or (c) a common case, or where the case serves a (d) revelatory or (e) 
                                                          
25 At 7. 
26 At 7. 
27 Excepting the US state of Louisiana where state law is based on French and Spanish civil law. However, federal 
laws in Louisiana are based on common law. 
28 Creswell, above n 8, at 15. 
29 At 15. 
30 Robert K Yin Case Study Research: Design and Methods (5th ed, Sage, Thousand Oaks, 2014) at 4. 
31 McKerchar, above n 4, at 103. 
32 At 103. 
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longitudinal purpose.33 Thus, single unit case studies are generally more suited to the revelation 
of information or the formulation of theories.34 In contrast, a multiple unit study may be 
appropriate where the researcher deliberately chooses contrasting situations to study 
comparatively.35 For example, this would be appropriate where the researcher wanted to 
investigate the outcomes of different programs, events or activities according to location.36 
Given that this study aims to evaluate and compare the effectiveness of the design of four 
selected jurisdictions’ tax dispute resolution systems using DSD principles, a multiple unit case 
study is appropriate. The units of analysis in this study comprise of the current tax dispute 
resolution systems in the four jurisdictions selected.37 Figure 3.1 provides a diagrammatic 
representation of Yin’s case study methodology when a multiple unit strategy is adopted. 
 
                                                          
33 Yin, above n 30, at 56. 
34 McKerchar, above n 4, at 103. 
35 At 105. 
36 At 105. 
37 See chapter 1, section 1.5 of this thesis, for the rationale for the four jurisdictions selected. 
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Figure 3.1: Multiple Unit Case Study1 
 
 
                                                          
1 Robert K Yin Case Study Research: Design and Methods (5th ed, Sage, Thousand Oaks, 2014) at 60, Figure 2.5. 
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3.5.2 Case study evidence 
Yin identifies six sources of evidence commonly used in case study research:1 
 
(1) documentation; 
(2) archival records; 
(3) interviews; 
(4) direct observations; 
(5) participant-observation; and 
(6) physical artifacts. 
 
Each source of evidence has associated strengths and weaknesses as outlined in Table 3.1. Yin 
states that: “Except for studies of preliterate societies, documentary information is likely to be 
relevant to every case study topic.”2 Sarankatos identifies the role of documentary evidence in 
“descriptive-comparative research” in which “documents are studied to describe the event in 
question and, using the information available, to facilitate inter- or intra-cultural comparisons 
as well as comparisons over time.”3 Accordingly, in this study documentary information is 
used in order to describe the tax dispute resolution procedures of the four selected jurisdictions 
and to facilitate the analysis and comparison of the dispute resolution procedures. 
 
  
                                                          
1 Robert K Yin Case Study Research: Design and Methods (5th ed, Sage, Thousand Oaks, 2014) at 105. 
2 At 105. 
3 Sotoirios Sarantakos Social Research (Macmillan Education, Melbourne, 1993) at 207. 
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Table 3.1: Six Sources of Evidence Used in Case Study Research – Strengths and 
Weaknesses4 
Source of Evidence Strengths Weaknesses 
Documentation -Stable – can be reviewed 
repeatedly. 
-Unobtrusive – not created as a 
result of the case study. 
-Exact – contains exact names, 
references, and details of an 
event. 
-Broad coverage – long span of 
time, many events, and many 
settings. 
-Retrievability – can be 
difficult to find. 
-Biased selectivity, if 
collection is incomplete. 
-Reporting bias – reflects 
(unknown) bias of any given 
document’s author. 
-Access – may be deliberately 
withheld. 
Archival Records -Same as those for 
documentation. 
-Precise and usually 
quantitative. 
-Same as those for 
documentation. 
-Accessibility due to privacy 
reasons. 
Interviews -Targeted – focuses directly on 
case study topics. 
-Insightful – provides 
perceived causal inferences 
and explanations. 
-Bias due to poorly articulated 
questions. 
-Response bias. 
-Inaccuracies due to poor 
recall. 
-Reflexivity – interviewee 
gives what interviewer wants 
to hear. 
Direct Observation -Reality – covers events in real 
time. 
-Contextual – can cover the 
case’s context. 
-Time-consuming. 
-Selectivity – broad coverage 
difficult without a team of 
observers. 
-Reflexivity – event may 
proceed differently because it 
is being observed. 
-Cost – hours needed by 
human observers. 
Participant-observation -Same as those for direct 
observations. 
-Insightful into interpersonal 
behaviour and motives. 
-Same as those for direct 
observations. 
-Bias due to participant-
observer’s manipulation of 
events. 
Physical Artifacts -Insightful into cultural 
features. 





                                                          
4 Yin, above n 1, at 106, Figure 4.1. 
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Documentary evidence can take a variety of forms, including:5  
 
 letters, memoranda, email correspondence, and other personal documents, such as 
diaries, calendars and notes; 
 agendas, announcements and minutes of meetings, and other written reports of 
events; 
 administrative documents, such as proposals, progress reports, and other internal 
records; 
 formal studies or evaluations related to the case which is being studied; and 
 news clippings and other articles appearing in the mass media or in community 
newspapers. 
 
These and other types of documents are all increasingly available through Internet searches.6 
While documentary research has the advantages of convenience, low cost and replication, Yin 
cautions that “the casual investigator may mistakenly assume that all kinds of documents … 
contain the unmitigated truth.”7 In fact, important in reviewing any document is to understand 
that it was “written for some specific purpose and some specific audience other than those of 
the case study being done.”8 In this sense, the researcher is a “vicarious observer”, because the 
documentary evidence reflects a communication among other parties attempting to achieve 
some other objectives.9 Notwithstanding the above limitations of documentary information 
used in case study research, it is considered to be the most applicable source of information for 
the purposes of this study given its broad coverage. 
 
3.5.3 Reliability and validity of case study evidence 
Yin suggests three principles that can be used to improve the validity and reliability of case 
study (including documentary) evidence.10 These principles are described below: 
 
(1) Use multiple sources of evidence in order to provide “converging lines of inquiry” 
or data triangulation; 
                                                          
5 At 106. 
6 At 107. However, there are also limitations associated with information obtained from the Internet, as over time 
websites can be modified, move location or cease to exist. The availability of information from the Internet may 
also be restricted as some documents may be confidential. See Jashim U Ahmed “Documentary Research Method: 
New Dimensions” (2010) 4 IJMSS 1 at 10. 
7 Yin, above n 1, at 108. 
8 At 108. 
9 At 108. 
10 At 118-128. 
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(2) Create a case study database (a formal assembly of evidence distinct from a final 
case study report). The database may include notes, documents, tabular material 
and narratives; and 
(3) Maintain a chain of evidence which will help to establish high reliability of the data 
since it allows the reader to follow the line of thought through all steps of the 
argument. Citation and presentation of information in a structured and systematic 
way makes this task easy and the evidence convincing.  
 
Arguably, one of the most significant principles in relation to this study is principle 1. In this 
study, the main source of documentary information on the current tax dispute resolution 
systems of the four selected jurisdictions was the material obtained from the websites of the 
respective revenue authorities (including revenue authority practice statements and other 
guidance). Other sources of information, including primary sources of information (legislation) 
and secondary sources of information such as academic journal articles, formal reports and 
Master Tax Guides (or equivalent commentaries),11 where relevant, from each jurisdiction were 
also utilised. In addition, the documentary evidence included responses received to official 
information requests made to revenue authorities and other agencies, and email correspondence 
with revenue authority representatives, tax practitioners and other stakeholders in the four 
jurisdictions. The main purpose of these forms of correspondence was to enable the researcher 
to seek clarification of certain details and/or obtain additional information. Thus, multiple 
sources of documentary evidence were used in this study in order to provide “converging lines 
of inquiry”. 
 
In line with Yin’s principle 2, the documentary information collected was organised in a 
database and grouped by jurisdiction. A record of all email correspondence and official 
information requests was also kept by the researcher. Following Yin’s principle 3, the 
researcher used appropriate citation and referencing of the documentary evidence utilised in 
the multiple unit case study in order to increase the reliability of the information through 
maintaining a chain of evidence. 
 
3.5.4 Case study conduct 
Sarankatos outlines that the study of documents is generally accomplished in the following 
stages:12 
 
(1) Identification of the relevant documents; 
(2) Organisation and analysis of the documents; 
                                                          
11 Where applicable, CCH Master Tax Guides were utilised in this study as they are published and updated 
annually in a large number of jurisdictions around the world (including in the four jurisdictions in this study). 
12 Sarankatos, above n 3, at 207. 
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(3) Evaluation of the information; and 
(4) Interpretation of the data. 
 
Applying Sarankato’s guidelines, the documentary research in this study was carried out in the 
following manner: 
 
(1)  Identification of the relevant documents 
As outlined in section 3.5.3 above, the relevant documents were drawn from the websites of 
the tax administrations of the four selected jurisdictions and other applicable websites. 
Legislation, academic journal articles, formal reports and Master Tax Guides, where 
applicable, from each jurisdiction were further drawn from. Official information requests and 
email correspondence with representatives from revenue authorities and tax practitioners in the 
four selected jurisdictions were also utilised. 
 
(2)  Organisation and analysis of the documents 
Reading and note taking of the relevant documents was undertaken. Detailed descriptions of 
the current tax dispute resolution systems in each of the four jurisdictions were then produced 
in line with the black letter law approach outlined in section 3.3 above. The descriptions of the 
tax dispute resolution systems included the following components, where applicable: the 
formal dispute resolution process (including the internal and external review of decisions); 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes (including revenue authority ADR programs 
and ADR processes used at the litigation stage of tax disputes); and other dispute resolution 
initiatives of the tax authority (for example, dispute policies and dispute management plans). 
The full descriptions of the tax dispute resolution systems were reviewed by selected taxation 
academics (who had an in-depth knowledge of their jurisdiction’s tax dispute resolution 
procedures) from each of the four jurisdictions, to confirm their accuracy and completeness.13  
 
It should be noted that only brief descriptions of the basic steps of the dispute resolution 
procedures of the four jurisdictions are provided in chapters 4 and 5 as the main focus of the 
case studies is on the DSD evaluations of the dispute resolution procedures. However, for the 
further reference of the reader, the in-depth descriptions of the dispute procedures and their 
related features are provided in Appendix 1 of this thesis. This appendix is intended to provide 
a background context as well as evidentiary material for the DSD evaluations conducted 
through outlining the tax dispute resolution systems generally in place in the four jurisdictions 
up until 30 November 2016. It further provides a source of references for interested readers to 
obtain additional information on the four jurisdictions’ tax dispute resolution systems and their 
related features. This may be of particular use for readers who are not familiar with the tax 
                                                          
13 The descriptions of the tax dispute resolution procedures for NZ and the US were also discussed in-person with 
the researcher following the reviews conducted by the taxation academics of these two jurisdictions. 
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dispute resolution systems in any of the four jurisdictions under study and may also prevent 
the duplication of research efforts.  
 
(3) Evaluation of the information 
The effectiveness of the designs of the four jurisdictions’ tax dispute resolution systems 
described in Stage 2 were evaluated using the DSD principles outlined in chapter 2, section 2.7 
of this thesis. 
  
(4) Interpretation of the data 
In accordance with the comparative approach outlined in section 3.4 above, similarities and 
differences in the effectiveness of the designs of the tax dispute resolution systems across the 
four jurisdictions, as evaluated using the selected DSD principles, were identified and 
compared in a cross-case analysis. The findings were summarised in tabular form and the 
themes which emerged in the cross-case analysis formed the basis for developing best practice 
guidelines in tax DSD principles for tax administrations. 
 
Stages 1-3 of the documentary research were carried out during the “prepare, collect and 
analyse” steps of Yin’s case study methodology, while Stage 4 corresponded to the “analyse 
and conclude” step (see Figure 3.1). Feedback on the best practice tax DSD guidelines 
developed in Stage 4 was subsequently sought through semi-structured interviews conducted 
with selected NZ stakeholders. Thus, the case study findings were used to inform the design of 




As stated above, following the case studies, this study utilised interviews as a qualitative 
strategy of inquiry to obtain feedback on the tax DSD guidance from selected stakeholders in 
NZ. Self-administered survey questionnaires and interviews were both considered for the 
purpose of obtaining feedback from stakeholders in this study. However, interviews were 
selected over self-administered survey questionnaires due to the low expected response rate to 
a survey questionnaire based on past tax survey response rates.14 In addition, it was not a 
purpose of this study to draw generalisations from survey findings to a larger population. 
Interviews were further considered to be a more appropriate method given that, unlike in a 
survey questionnaire, interviews can allow for the use of probes seeking further description 
and clarification of issues from participants. Therefore, the interview method potentially 
                                                          
14 See, for example, Margaret McKerchar “The impact of income tax complexity on practitioners in Australia” 
(2005) 20(4) ATF 529; Binh Tran-Nam and Stewart Karlinsky Small Business Law Complexity in Australia (paper 
presented to the ATAX International Tax Administration Conference, Sydney, 27-28 March 2008); Philip Lignier 
“Measuring the managerial benefits of tax compliance: A fresh approach” (2009) 24(2) ATF 117. 
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allowed for more insight to be drawn from participants than the survey questionnaire method. 
Other advantages of interviews over self-administered survey questionnaires include fewer 
incomplete responses and misunderstood questions.15 The objective of the interviews was to 
seek stakeholders’ views on the general tax DSD guidance developed as well as on how the 
general tax DSD guidance could be adapted in the context of the NZ tax dispute resolution 
procedures. 
 
Minichiello, Aroni and Hays explain that the primary focus of an interview is to understand the 
significance of human experiences, as described from the interviewee’s perspective and 
interpreted by the interviewer.16 Interviews for the purposes of conducting research in social 
sciences and related applied fields can generally be classified as structured, semi-structured 
and unstructured.17 Roulston provides the underlying criteria of each of these types of 
interviews in Table 3.2 on the next page.18 Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill additionally 
distinguish between standardised and non-standardised interviews and quantitative and 
qualitative research interviews.19 Structured interviews are a form of standardised interview 
where questionnaires based on predetermined and “standardised” or identical sets of questions 
are used. These interviews are also generally referred to as “quantitative research interviews”. 
Semi-structured and unstructured interviews are forms of non-standardised interviews where 
the questions asked and their wording vary depending on the flow of the conversation in the 
particular interview and the knowledge of the respondents and interviewer. These interviews 
are also generally referred to as “qualitative research interviews.” 
 
With reference to Roulston’s guidelines in Table 3.2, this study utilised the semi-structured 
form of interview. In these kinds of interviews, the interviewer refers to a prepared interview 
guide that includes a number of questions.20 However, the questions are not fixed and after 
posing each question to the research participant, the interviewer may follow up with probes to 
elicit further description about what has been said.21  
 
  
                                                          
15 William L Neuman Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (4th ed, Allyn and 
Bacon, Boston, 2000); Earl A Babbie The Practice of Social Research (9th ed, Wadsworth Thomson Learning, 
Belmont, 2001). 
16 Victor Minichiello, Rosalie Aroni and Terrence Hays In-depth Interviewing: Principles, Techniques, Analysis 
(3rd ed, Pearson Education, Sydney, 2008) at 11. 
17 Kathryn Roulston Reflective Interviewing: A Guide to Theory and Practice (Sage, Thousand Oaks, 2010) at 14-
15. 
18 At 14-15. 
19 Mark Saunders, Philip Lewis P and Adrian Thornhill Research Methods for Business Students (5th ed, Prentice 
Hill, Harlow, 2009) at 230. 
20 Roulston, above n 17, at 15. 
21 At 15. 
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Table 3.2: Range of Interviews22 
Structured Interviews Semi-structured Interviews Unstructured Interviews 
The interviewer follows 
scripted questions in a 
particular sequence. 
Interview protocol is used as a 
guide and questions may not 
always be asked in the same 
order; the interviewer initiates 
questions and poses follow up 
probes in response to the 
interviewee’s descriptions and 
accounts. 
Both interviewer and 
interviewee initiate questions 
and discuss topics. 
The interviewee chooses 
responses from a range of fixed 
options that are coded 
quantitatively; responses are 
provided by the interviewer. 
The interviewee selects own 
terms to formulate answers to 
questions; responses are guided 
by the interviewer’s questions. 
The interviewee selects own 
terms to participate in free-
flowing conversation. 
Asymmetrical structure. Asymmetrical structure. Possibly less asymmetrical 
structure. 
Data analysed via deductive 
analysis for hypothesis testing 
in multivariate studies. 
Data analysed via inductive 
analytic methods for 
descriptions and interpretations 
in interpretive studies. 
Data analysed via inductive 
analytic methods for 
descriptions and interpretations 
in interpretive studies. 
 
3.6.2 Interview guide development 
An interview guide was developed to ensure that the interviews conducted were systematic and 
appropriately focused on the subject matter. Patton claims that a further advantage of an 
interview guide is that it helps the interviewer to manage the limited time and resources 
available in an interview situation.23 As stated in section 3.5.4 above, the development of the 
questions in the interview guide was informed by the findings from the case studies. The 
interview guide was reviewed by an accounting academic experienced in the design and 
conduct of research and also reviewed by and discussed with an ADR academic. It was then 
pilot tested by a tax academic/practitioner and an ADR practitioner. All of the above 
individuals were not subsequently involved as actual interview participants. Changes were 
made to the interview guide following the reviews of the guide and the pilot tests. This namely 
included the insertion of question 8 which asked whether the system should recognise the 
different ethnic backgrounds of taxpayers (as suggested by the ADR practitioner pilot). A copy 
of the interview guide is contained in Appendix 6 of this thesis. 
 
The interview guide consisted of three parts. The first part sought feedback on the tax DSD 
principles in the context of tax dispute resolution generally. These questions asked the 
interviewees for their views on which of the DSD principles that they thought were the most 
                                                          
22 At 14-15, Table 1.1. 
23 Michael Q Patton Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods (3rd ed, Sage, Thousand Oaks, 2002) at 343. 
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and least important, and to rank the DSD principles in order of importance. The interviewees 
were also asked whether any modifications, additions or deletions to the DSD principles should 
be made. The second part of the interview guide sought feedback on the tax DSD principles in 
the context of tax dispute resolution in NZ. These questions asked the interviewees whether 
they would make any changes to their earlier ranking of the DSD principles in the context of 
the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures. They were also asked whether they would make any 
further changes (modifications, additions and/or deletions) to the DSD principles in the NZ 
context and if they thought that there were any issues in applying the DSD principles to the 
existing NZ tax dispute resolution procedures. The third part of the interview guide contained 
general questions. In this part the interviewees were asked whether the dispute resolution 
system should recognise the different ethnic backgrounds of taxpayers and lastly, to provide 
any general comments that they had. 
 
The same interview guide was used across all stakeholder groups interviewed (see section 3.6.3 
below for the different stakeholder groups). However, the semi-structured form of interview 
utilised enabled the researcher to ask further questions as applicable to the different groups of 
stakeholders. 
 
3.6.3 Sample selection 
Purposive sampling was used in selecting the participants for the interview component of this 
study. Unlike quantitative research which seeks statistical significance through investigating 
randomly selected large samples, qualitative research usually investigates a purposive and 
information rich, small sample size that focuses on the context surrounding the knowledge the 
participants possess.24 The aim of qualitative research is to gain rich and in-depth information 
from the participants. The focus is on “how the sample or small selection of cases, units or 
activities illuminates social life.”25 Accordingly, for the purposes of this study, stakeholders 
were purposively selected from the following groups of interest: 
 
(1) Tax practitioners;  
(2) Tax academics; 
(3) ADR practitioners;26  
(4) ADR academics; 
                                                          
24 Neuman, above n 15, at 196. 
25 At 196. 
26 As noted in chapter 2, section 2.4 of this thesis, DSD is an area of professional practice that is not currently 
identified with a single profession. Rogers, Bordone, Sander and McEwen note that dispute system designers are 
“typically individuals who have some background in conflict resolution and who also possess … group facilitation 
skills”: Nancy H Rogers, Robert C Bordone, Frank EA Sander and Craig A McEwen Designing Systems and 
Processes for Managing Disputes (Wolters Kluwer, New York, 2013) at 5. Therefore, for the purposes of this 
study, the views of ADR practitioners (for example, mediators, arbitrators and adjudicators) will be treated as 
representing the views of dispute system designers. 
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(5) Inland Revenue representatives; and 
(6) Members of the judiciary.  
 
The tax practitioners (consisting of tax lawyers and tax accountants) were firstly selected with 
the assistance of the New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) and Chartered Accountants Australia 
and New Zealand (CA-ANZ) as the two main professional bodies in NZ that act for taxpayers 
and regularly deal with the tax dispute procedures.27 A notice was sent on behalf of the 
researcher by NZLS to their NZ members, with a repeat notice sent after two weeks.28 A sample 
of the notice is contained in Appendix 7 of this thesis. The notices briefly outlined the 
researcher’s study and invited those members with experience and/or knowledge of the tax 
dispute resolution procedures in NZ who were interested in participating in an interview, to 
contact the researcher at the email address provided. However, the total number of responses 
received to the notices was low (n  6).29 A notice was unable to be sent out by CA-ANZ to 
their NZ members due to there being no electronic newsletter for CA-ANZ in place at that 
time. Instead, at the researcher’s request, the NZ Tax Leader of CA-ANZ emailed a list of 12 
prominent NZ tax accountants with experience and/or knowledge of the NZ tax dispute 
resolution procedures which he thought would be interested in participating in an interview. 
The email additionally suggested that the tax accountants could also recommend a colleague 
for participation. Four of the 12 tax accountants emailed by the CA-ANZ NZ Tax Leader 
subsequently participated in an interview. 
 
Similar to the selection of the tax practitioners, the ADR practitioners were initially selected 
with the assistance of the Arbitrators’ and Mediators’ Institute of New Zealand (AMINZ) and 
the Association of Dispute Resolvers and the Institute of Arbitrators and Mediators Australia 
(LEADR & IAMA).30 In NZ the education and training of ADR practitioners can lead to 
accreditation primarily through AMINZ, LEADR & IAMA and/or NZLS. The accreditation 
schemes for ADR practitioners in NZ are voluntary and there is no legal impediment to anyone 
practising as an ADR practitioner that does not satisfy the accreditation requirements. 
However, for the purposes of this study, only those ADR practitioners with AMINZ, LEADR 
& IAMA and/or NZLS accreditation were selected given their recognition as the main ADR 
                                                          
27 Other professional bodies such as CPA Australia and the Accountants and Tax Agents Institute of New Zealand 
(ATAINZ) were not approached for the main reason that they have only a small proportion of members that act 
for taxpayers and regularly deal with the tax dispute procedures in NZ. 
28 The notice to NZLS members appeared in Issue 255 of their electronic Lawpoints newsletter on 12 February 
2015 and the repeat notice appeared in Issue 257 of Lawpoints on 26 February 2015. 
29 Of the 6 responses received, 4 participants subsequently agreed to participate in an interview (consisting of 3 
tax lawyers and 1 Inland Revenue representative). 
30 On 1 January 2015, the former Association of Dispute Resolvers (LEADR) and the Institute of Arbitrators and 
Mediators Australia (IAMA) integrated together as one ADR organisation, adopting the interim name of LEADR 
& IAMA. On 4 September 2015, LEADR & IAMA adopted a new name: Resolution Institute. However, the 
relevant interview participants in this study have been referred to as being accredited members of LEADR & 
IAMA (where applicable), as this was the name of the body at the time that the interviews were conducted.  
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professional bodies in NZ.31 Accordingly, notices were sent on behalf of the researcher by 
AMINZ and LEADR & IAMA to all of their NZ members.32 Samples of the notices issued by 
AMINZ and LEADR & IAMA are provided in Appendix 7 of this thesis. The notices briefly 
outlined the researcher’s study and invited any accredited members who were interested in 
participating in an interview, to contact the researcher at the email address provided. No 
responses were received to the AMINZ notice and only 4 responses were received to the 
LEADR & IAMA notices.33  
 
Due to the low number of responses received to the notices put out by the professional bodies 
above, in order to obtain further participants, the researcher contacted a number of tax 
practitioners and ADR practitioners who had participated in previous research conducted by 
the researcher on tax disputes mediation. In addition, the researcher conducted a search on 
Google using key words such as ‘tax practitioner New Zealand’, ‘tax accountant New Zealand’, 
‘tax lawyer New Zealand’, ‘tax barrister New Zealand’, ‘dispute resolution practitioner New 
Zealand’, ‘ADR practitioner New Zealand’ and ‘mediator New Zealand’ in order to identify a 
number of prominent NZ tax practitioners and ADR practitioners who the researcher thought 
might be interested in participating in an interview. These additional practitioners were 
contacted by the researcher through individual emails inviting them to participate. A sample of 
the email is provided in Appendix 7 of this thesis. This more targeted approach proved to be 
more effective in obtaining interview participants than the notices put out by the professional 
bodies (which essentially facilitated a form of participant self-selection). 
 
The tax academics and ADR academics were selected by the researcher conducting searches 
on the websites of the eight universities in NZ (Auckland University of Technology, Lincoln 
University, Massey University, University of Auckland, University of Canterbury, University 
of Otago, University of Waikato and Victoria University of Wellington)34 for academics 
specialising in the areas of tax dispute resolution, dispute resolution and/or ADR. In addition, 
a search on Google using key words such as ‘tax lecturer New Zealand, ‘tax disputes lecturer 
New Zealand’, ‘dispute resolution lecturer New Zealand’, ‘mediation lecturer New Zealand’ 
and ‘ADR lecturer New Zealand’ was conducted by the researcher in order to identify other 
relevant academics that may have been missed in the search of the university websites. Some 
                                                          
31 Non-accredited members of AMINZ and LEADR & IAMA (that is, AMINZ affiliate, AMINZ student, LEADR 
& IAMA associate and LEADR & IAMA student members) were excluded from the sample selection. 
32 A separate notice was not sent by NZLS given that the notices issued by NZLS were to all its members and 
thus, included the NZLS accredited ADR practitioners. The notice to AMINZ members appeared in the February 
2015 issue of the electronic AMINZ Newsletter on 9 February 2015. The notice to LEADR & IAMA members 
was sent as an email to all NZ members on 9 February 2015 and a repeat notice on 23 February 2015. The notice 
also appeared in the February 2015 edition of LEADR & IAMA Pulse electronic newsletter on 27 February 2015. 
33 Of the 4 responses received, 2 participants subsequently agreed to participate in an interview. 
34 These eight institutions meet the definition of a university as defined under section 162 of the Education Act 
1989. Given the specialist nature of the thesis topic, other tertiary institutions in NZ were not included in the 
searches on Google for academics conducted by the researcher. 
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academics in the area of tax dispute resolution were also recommended by the researcher’s 
supervisors. The selected academics were sent individual emails inviting them to participate in 
an interview (see Appendix 7 of this thesis for a sample of the email). 
 
A member of Inland Revenue was recruited as an interview participant as a result of being a 
respondent to one of the NZLS notices. A subsequent Inland Revenue member was recruited 
on the recommendation of the first Inland Revenue member. This effectively was a form of 
snowball sampling.35  
 
The members of the judiciary were selected by a search conducted by the researcher on the 
Westlaw NZ database using the key words ‘tax disputes’ in the free text field box. The search 
was filtered by ‘Judgement Date’ with the years 2011 to 2015 inclusive selected in order to 
ensure that the members of the judiciary selected would have current knowledge on the tax 
dispute resolution system in NZ. The search was then filtered by ‘Judge Name’ in order to 
identify members of the judiciary who had heard the highest number of tax cases. This was to 
ensure that the members of the judiciary most experienced in tax dispute resolution could be 
selected. The researcher then contacted the relevant courts in order to obtain the email 
addresses for the selected judges. However, responses were received from the courts, on behalf 
of the selected judges, stating that “judges do not generally take part in such interviews.” 
However, two judges who had additionally been directly emailed a letter by the researcher, 
both agreed to participate. A sample of the letter to the two judges is contained in Appendix 3 
of this thesis.  
 
In determining the appropriate sample size in qualitative inquiry, Patton argues that:36  
 
There are no rules for sample size in qualitative inquiry. Sample size depends on what you 
want to know, the purpose of the inquiry, what’s at stake, what will be useful, what will 
have credibility, and what can be done with available time and resources.  
 
The above argument implies that there are no specific guidelines to determine sample size in 
qualitative studies and several factors such as richness of information, available time and 
resources, guide researchers in deciding the appropriate sample size. However, one approach 
in determining the appropriate sample size in a qualitative study suggested in the literature is 
the concept of data saturation (developed originally for grounded theory studies but applicable 
to all qualitative research that employs interviews as a data source). Data saturation:37  
                                                          
35 An email was also sent to the Minister of (Inland) Revenue (who was holding the position at the time that the 
interviews for this study were conducted) inviting him to participate in an interview. However, a response was 
received from his secretary stating that he was not available to participate. 
36 Patton, above n 23, at 244. 




… entails bringing new participants continually into the study until the data set is complete, 
as indicated by data replication or redundancy. In other words, saturation is reached when 
the researcher gathers data to the point of diminishing returns, when nothing new is being 
added. 
 
However, “data saturation is an elusive concept and standard in qualitative research since few 
concrete guidelines exist.”38 Morse also states: “Saturation is the key to excellent qualitative 
work … [but] there are no published guidelines or tests of adequacy for estimating the sample 
size required to reach saturation.”39 Rather the signals of saturation seem to be determined by 
“investigator proclamation and by evaluating the adequacy and comprehensiveness of the 
results.”40 In this present study, saturation was unable to be practically operationalised in the 
following stakeholder groups: tax academics, ADR academics, Inland Revenue representatives 
and members of the judiciary. This was due to the small number of available and willing 
participants in these groups. However, for the tax practitioner and ADR practitioner groups, 
the researcher felt that some data redundancy started to occur after the fifth or sixth interviews 
in each of these groups.41 Consequently, in total 30 participants were interviewed, consisting 
of 13 tax practitioners (made up of 7 tax lawyers and 6 tax accountants),42 3 tax academics, 7 
ADR practitioners, 3 ADR academics,43 2 Inland Revenue representatives and 2 members of 
the judiciary. 
 
3.6.4 Data collection procedures 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill outline that interviews can be conducted on a one-to-one basis 
or as a focus group.44 The interviews in this study were conducted with the selected participants 
on a one-to-one basis. Focus groups were not considered feasible for this study given the 
difficulties in collaborating together a sufficient number of willing participants. Furthermore, 
interviews can be conducted with participants face-to-face, over the telephone or electronically 
via the Internet.45 Telephone interviews were considered as a time and cost-effective method 
for conducting the interviews in this study as the interview participants were from different 
                                                          
38 Bryan Marshall, Peter Cardon, Amit Poddar and Renee Fontenot “Does Sample Size Matter in Qualitative 
Research?: A Review of Qualitative Interviews in IS Research” (2013) 54 J Computer Info Sys 11 at 11. 
39 Janice M Morse “The Significance of Saturation” (1995) 5 Qualitative Health Res 147 at 147. 
40 At 147. 
41 This finding is consistent with Guest, Bunce and Johnson who suggest a minimum sample of six where the 
sample is highly homogeneous: Greg Guest, Arwen Bunce and Laura Johnson “How Many Interviews Are 
Enough?: An Experiment with Data Saturation and Variability” 18 Field Methods (2006) 59 at 78.  
42 The researcher observed no discernible difference in the views of the tax lawyers and tax accountants. 
43 Two of the three ADR academics also held roles as ADR practitioners. 
44 Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, above n 19, at 321. 
45 At 321. 
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geographic locations in New Zealand.46 Moreover, given the nature of their work, the interview 
participants were typically time-pressured and therefore, compared to face-to-face interviews, 
telephone interviews were viewed as more convenient for them to partake in. Nevertheless, the 
researcher acknowledges some of the drawbacks associated with conducting telephone 
interviews. These include missing the opportunity to witness the nonverbal reactions (body 
language) of the interview participants which could be important in interpreting the interview 
findings and the limited time to conduct the telephone interview.47 However, the fact that the 
participants were provided with the interview questions in advance of the interview arguably 
prepared them for what was going to be asked and therefore, nonverbal reactions may not have 
been as obvious in this study. 
 
The participants from the six stakeholder groups outlined in section 3.6.3 above, who had 
expressed an interest in participating in an interview were provided with an information sheet 
and asked to complete and return (by email) a consent form. Copies of the information sheets 
and consent forms are provided in Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 of this thesis, respectively. The 
information sheet explained the objectives of the study and the interview process. Both the 
information sheet and the consent form requested the participants’ consent to audio-record the 
interview and also outlined that participants would be given the opportunity to review the 
interview transcripts. The aspects pertaining to the participants’ consent to the audio-recording 
of the interview and the provision of the opportunity to review the interview transcripts were 
also verbally re-emphasised by the researcher at the start of each interview. 
 
In addition to the information sheet and consent form, a supplementary information document 
was provided to the participants as reading material in advance of the interview (see Appendix 
5 of this thesis). This document contained a brief description of DSD and outlined the 
researcher’s 14 tax DSD principles. The supplementary information document provided to the 
ADR practitioners and ADR academics also contained a short description of the current NZ 
tax dispute resolution procedures. This was in order to provide the ADR participants with a 
background to the NZ tax dispute resolution process so that they could evaluate the tax DSD 
principles in the context of tax dispute resolution in NZ (for part two of the interview guide) as 
it was assumed that these participants, in particular, had no (or little) prior knowledge on the 
current NZ tax dispute resolution procedures. In addition, as noted above, a list of the interview 
questions (replicating the interview guide) was provided to all of the interview participants 
prior to the interviews. An additional set of questions focusing specifically on Inland Revenue’s 
dispute resolution procedures was also provided to the two interview participants from Inland 
Revenue (see Appendix 8 of this thesis). Similarly, an additional set of questions on the tax 
                                                          
46 Two face-to-face interviews were conducted. One was with a tax academic from the same university as the 
researcher and the other was with a tax academic who was visiting the researcher’s university during the period 
in which the interviews were being conducted.  
47 Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, above n 19, at 349; Neuman, above n 15, at 272. 
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dispute resolution procedures in NZ was provided to the two members of the judiciary 
interviewed (see Appendix 9 of this thesis). 
 
On the return of the consent forms, the interviewees were contacted by the researcher by email 
to arrange a suitable date and time for the interview. The interviews with the practitioners, 
academics and the Inland Revenue representatives took place between 14 February 2015 and 
17 April 2015 and the interviews with the members of the judiciary were conducted on 21 and 
22 July 2015. The interviews took between 11 to 42 minutes to conduct. The average interview 
time was 28 minutes. 
 
3.6.5 Ethical considerations 
All University of Canterbury researchers and research students dealing with human subjects 
are required to obtain prior approval from the Human Ethics Committee before proceeding 
with their research (see Appendix 2 of this thesis for the letter of approval). This is to ensure 
that researchers will conduct their research with appropriate regard to ethical principles and 
cultural values. An application was lodged with the Human Ethics Committee outlining, inter 
alia, that the informed consent of the interview participants would be obtained through a signed 
consent form and the identities of the interview participants would be disguised in any 
subsequent publications. The measures taken to ensure the secure storage of the interview 
recordings and transcripts were also outlined. The information sheet and the interview consent 
form provided to the interview participants informed the participants that ethical clearance had 
been given by the Human Ethics Committee to undertake the research (see Appendix 3 and 
Appendix 4 of this thesis). Participants were also able to indicate on the consent form whether 
they wished to receive a copy of the research results at the end of the project.  
 
3.6.6 Data analysis  
Data gathered from the interviews was analysed using thematic analysis, a method which 
identifies, analyses, and reports the patterns within data. Despite thematic analysis being one 
of the most common approaches to qualitative analysis, it has been argued that it lacks a clear 
set of specified procedures or an identifiable approach.48 McKerchar also states that “there is 
no set way of going about theme identification other than for the researcher to review the data 
and reflect on its meaning.”49 Nevertheless, Braun and Clarke consider thematic analysis as a 
“foundational” method for qualitative analysis due to, inter alia, its flexibility, relative ease of 
                                                          
48 Alan Bryman Social Research Methods (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008); Virginia Braun and 
Victoria Clarke “Using thematic analysis in psychology” (2006) 3(2) Qualitative Res Psychol 77; Richard E 
Boyatzis Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code Development (Sage, California, 
1998). 
49 Margaret McKerchar Design and Conduct of Research in Tax, Law and Accounting (Thomson Reuters, 
Pyrmont, 2010) at 232. 
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application, usefulness in summarising key features of a large body of data and/or providing a 
“thick description” of the data set, ability to capture similarities and differences across data 
sets, and ability to generate unanticipated insights.50 The thematic analysis in this study was 
conducted following Braun and Clarke’s six phase guide to performing thematic analysis. The 
details of the phases are reproduced in Table 3.3.  
 
Table 3.3: Phases of Thematic Analysis51 
 Phase Description of the Process 
1  
 




Initial code generation Code interesting features of the data in a systematic fashion 
across the entire data set; collate data relevant to each code. 
3  
 
Search for themes Collate codes into potential themes; gather all data relevant to 
each potential theme. 
4  
 
Review of themes Check if the themes work in relation to the coded extracts 
(Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2); generate a thematic 
‘map’ of the analysis. 
5  
 
Defining and naming themes Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, and 
the overall story the analysis tells; generate clear definitions 
and names for each theme. 
6  
 
Producing the report The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, 
compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected 
extracts; relate back the analysis to the research question and 
literature; produce a scholarly report of the analysis. 
 
All six phases of analysis outlined in Table 3.3 were manually conducted by the researcher, 
including a complete transcription of the interview sessions. Complete transcriptions were 
utilised following Bertrand, Brown and Ward’s recommendations that utilising the complete 
transcription approach is appropriate when: 52 
  
(a) the necessary financial and human resources are available;  
(b) the transcriptions can be produced in a reasonable amount of time; and  
(c) the purpose is to obtain accurate, detailed information.  
 
The transcription process took place shortly after each interview and involved the researcher 
listening to the recordings and writing a verbatim record of everything that was said.53 This 
                                                          
50 Braun and Clarke, above n 48, at 97. 
51 Adapted from Braun and Clarke, above n 48, at 87, Table 1. 
52 Jane T Bertrand, Judith E Brown and Victoria M Ward “Techniques for Analyzing Focus Group Data” (1992) 
16 Evaluation Rev 198 at 201. 
53 At 200. 
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was undertaken in conjunction with the notes written by the researcher during the interviews. 
The full transcripts were then reviewed for accuracy and completeness by the researcher 
checking the transcripts back against the recordings.54 The average time for transcribing (and 
reviewing) each interview took the researcher between 6 to 8 hours, with a total time spent of 
over 200 hours. 
 
The transcribed data was divided into relevant codes and the main interview themes were then 
captured, named and analysed to produce a narrative report of the interview findings. 
Consequently, the findings were used to suggest potential modifications to the general guidance 
in tax DSD principles developed from the case studies and further to consider the suggested 
modifications to the tax DSD principles in the context of the NZ tax dispute resolution process. 
 
3.6.7 Reliability and validity of the interview findings 
In order to increase the reliability and validity of the findings from the interviews, the 
researcher undertook the measures discussed below. LeCompte and Goetz define reliability as 
“the extent to which studies can be replicated.”55 It requires that a researcher using the same 
methods can obtain the same results as those of a prior study. However, Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill argue that in qualitative research, the findings derived from using non-standardised 
research methods such as qualitative interviews, are not necessarily intended to be repeatable 
since they reflect reality at the time they were collected, in a situation which may be subject to 
change.56 As outlined in section 3.6.6 above, in order to increase the reliability of the interview 
findings, the researcher fully transcribed all of the recordings, repeatedly checked the 
transcripts during the transcription process and compared the transcripts back against the 
recordings in order to ensure that there were no obvious mistakes. 
 
Validity or credibility in qualitative research refers to “whether the findings are accurate from 
the standpoint of the researcher, the participants or the readers of an account.”57 One method 
to determine the validity of a qualitative study is to use member checking (or member 
validation).58 This is a procedure where the researcher submits materials relevant to an 
investigation for checking by the people who were the source of those materials.59 Lewis-Beck, 
                                                          
54 Braun and Clarke, above n 48, at 88. 
55 Margaret D LeCompte and Judith P Goetz “Problems of Reliability and Validity in Ethnographic Research” 
(1982) 52 Rev Educ Res 31 at 35. 
56 Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, above n 19, at 327. 
57 John W Creswell Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches (2nd ed, Sage, 
Thousand Oaks, 2003) at 195. 
58 Michael S Lewis-Beck, Alan Bryman, and Tim Futing Liao (eds) The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science 
Research Methods (Sage, Thousand Oaks, 2004) at 634. 
59 At 634. 
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Bryman and Liao state that “probably the most common form of member validation occurs 
when the researcher submits an account of his or her findings (such as a short report or 
interview transcript) for checking.”60 Accordingly, as stated in section 3.6.3 above, all 
interviewees were offered the opportunity to review the interview transcripts to check their 
correctness and to check for any sensitive information that they wished to be excluded. 
Seventeen of the interview participants requested a copy of the transcripts to review. One 
interview participant requested that certain identifying information was removed and one 
participant subsequently made changes to their ranking of the DSD principles after reviewing 
their transcript. 
 
A further strategy identified in the research literature which was used to provide qualitative 
validity was to use “rich, thick descriptions”, involving the extensive use of quotes, to convey 
the interview findings.61 Thick descriptions may add to the validity of the findings because 




This chapter provides justification for the pragmatism research paradigm and the resulting 
methodological approaches employed in this study. The pragmatism research paradigm is 
regarded as appropriate for this study given that it allows the researcher to choose the methods, 
techniques and procedures which best meet the objectives of the research. Accordingly, 
through conducting case studies of the tax dispute resolution systems of the four selected 
jurisdictions, this study employs doctrinal legal analysis and comparative analysis in order to 
evaluate and compare the effectiveness of the designs of the selected tax dispute resolution 
systems and subsequently derive guidance in best practice tax DSD principles. The case studies 
utilise documentary evidence, including material obtained from revenue authorities’ websites 
and other sources of primary and secondary information, as the most appropriate form of 
evidence for describing, evaluating and comparing the four selected tax dispute resolution 
systems. 
 
In addition, this study employs semi-structured interviews in order to obtain feedback on the 
best practice tax DSD guidance developed and to adapt the DSD guidance in the context of the 
NZ tax dispute resolution procedures. The interviews are conducted with a total of 30 
purposively selected NZ stakeholders from the following groups of interest: tax practitioners, 
tax academics, ADR practitioners, ADR academics, Inland Revenue representatives and 
                                                          
60 At 634. 
61 John W Creswell Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches (4th ed, Sage, 
Thousand Oaks, 2012) at 202. 
62 At 202. 
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members of the judiciary. Hence, this chapter has discussed various aspects pertaining to the 
semi-structured interviews employed, including the development of the interview guide, 
sample selection, ethical considerations, the data collection and analysis procedures, and the 
measures taken to increase the reliability and validity of the interview findings. 
 
Against the background of the research framework and methodological approaches provided 
in this current chapter, chapters 4, 5 and 6 will present the findings from the case studies, and 




Chapter 4: Case Study Findings: New Zealand and Australia1 
4.1 Introduction 
For manageability of chapter size, the case studies of the four jurisdictions have been divided 
into two chapters. New Zealand (NZ) and Australia are grouped together in this chapter as the 
two Australasian jurisdictions. The United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) are 
grouped together in chapter 5 as the two other (non-Australasian) jurisdictions in this study. As 
detailed earlier in chapter 3, section 3.5.4, each of the case studies will consist of a brief outline 
of the jurisdiction’s tax dispute resolution procedures which will then be evaluated using the 
dispute systems design (DSD) principles derived from the prior DSD literature in chapter 2.2 
Accordingly, section 4.2 of this chapter outlines and evaluates the NZ tax dispute resolution 
system, section 4.3 outlines and evaluates the Australian tax dispute resolution system, and 
section 4.4 summarises and compares the two jurisdictions.  
 
Also as outlined in chapter 3, section 3.5.4 of this thesis, the descriptions of the four 
jurisdictions’ tax dispute resolution procedures contained in this chapter and in chapter 5 are 
intended to provide an outline of the basic elements of the dispute resolution procedures only. 
This is because the main focus of the case studies is on the DSD evaluations of the tax dispute 
resolution systems of the four jurisdictions. However, more detailed descriptions of the 
jurisdictions’ tax dispute resolution procedures and their associated alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) processes are provided in Appendix 1 of this thesis as a supplementary source 
of information and references for the reader. The DSD evaluations are conducted on the tax 
dispute resolution systems generally in place in the four jurisdictions up until 30 November 
2016. 
 
4.2 New Zealand 
4.2.1 The tax dispute resolution procedures 
Tax disputes in NZ typically arise when a taxpayer and Inland Revenue have not reached 
agreement on an issue following an Inland Revenue investigation or audit. The dispute 
procedures involve a number of statutorily prescribed and administrative steps as shown in 
Figure 4.1.3 Part IVA (disputes procedures) of the Tax Administration Act 1994 (TAA 1994) 
                                                          
1 Material covered in chapter 4 has previously been published in Melinda Jone “Evaluating Australia’s Tax 
Dispute Resolution System: A Dispute System Design Perspective” (2015) 13 EJTR 552 at 559-576 and Melinda 
Jone “Evaluating New Zealand’s Tax Dispute Resolution System: A Dispute Systems Design Perspective” (2016) 
22 NZJTLP 228 at 238-250. 
2 To avoid duplication, the full descriptions of each of the 14 DSD principles, outlined in chapter 2, section 2.7, 
table 2.2 of this thesis, have not been reproduced in this chapter or in chapter 5. 
3 A description of the statutory provisions and the administrative steps in the current tax dispute resolution 
procedures are set out in Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05: Disputes resolution process commenced by the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue” (2016) 28(11) Tax Information Bulletin 14 [“SPS 16/05”] and Inland Revenue 
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prescribes the procedure to be followed in the event of a tax dispute concerning an assessment 
or other disputable decision.4 The main elements of the dispute resolution procedure are:5 
 
 A Notice of Proposed Adjustment (NOPA (NZ)) is issued by either the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue (NZ Commissioner) or the taxpayer, notifying 
the other that an adjustment is sought in relation to the taxpayer’s assessment, the 
NZ Commissioner’s assessment or other disputable decision;6 
 A Notice of Response (NOR) rejecting the adjustment in the NOPA (NZ) is issued 
by the other party; 
 The parties voluntarily participate in an Inland Revenue conference to discuss the 
issues with a view to resolving the dispute; 
 A Disclosure Notice is issued by the NZ Commissioner; 
 A Statement of Position (SOP) is issued by each party which restates or clarifies 
the facts, issues and legal arguments relied upon by each party; 
 The dispute is referred to Inland Revenue’s Disputes Review Unit (DRU (NZ)) for 
adjudication; and 
 If the dispute is decided by the DRU (NZ) in the taxpayer’s favour, Inland Revenue 
have no right of appeal against the decision and the dispute comes to an end. If the 
dispute is decided in favour of the NZ Commissioner, the taxpayer may challenge 
the decision in the Taxation Review Authority (TRA) or the High Court. 
 
As indicated in Figure 4.1, Inland Revenue conferences7 and adjudication by Inland Revenue’s 
DRU (NZ),8 constitute the two administrative phases in the NZ tax dispute resolution 
procedures. ADR features in the NZ dispute resolution system through the availability of 
conference facilitation as an option for all taxpayers in the conference phase. ADR processes 
such as judicial settlement conferences, mediation or other forms of ADR agreed to by the 
parties, are also potentially available in the TRA and the High Court during the litigation stage.9 
Also, as shown in Figure 4.1, after the conference phase, in certain limited circumstances, 
taxpayers can request to opt out of the dispute process and proceed to the High Court or the 
                                                          
“SPS 16/06: Disputes resolution process commenced by a taxpayer” (2016) 28(11) Tax Information Bulletin 50 
[“SPS 16/06”]. 
4 A “disputable decision” covers “an assessment; or a decision of the Commissioner under a tax law”, except for 
decisions specifically excluded by the definition in s 3(1) TAA 1994. 
5 Mark Keating Tax Disputes in New Zealand: A Practical Guide (CCH, Auckland, 2012) at 11-12.  
6 While the NOPA (NZ) can be issued (initiated) by either party, it is most commonly issued by the NZ 
Commissioner. The tax dispute resolution procedures are generally similar for both NZ Commissioner-initiated 
and taxpayer-initiated disputes, with some minor differences. For further details, see section 1.1.1 of Appendix 
1.1 of this thesis. Figure 4.1 shows the procedure for NZ Commissioner-initiated disputes.  
7 For further details, see section 1.1.2.1 of Appendix 1.1 of this thesis.  
8 For further details, see section 1.1.2.2 of Appendix 1.1 of this thesis. 
9 For further details, see section 1.1.3 of Appendix 1.1 of this thesis. 
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TRA. A more detailed description of the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures and its related 




Figure 4.1: The New Zealand Tax Dispute Resolution Procedures 
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4.2.2 Evaluation using dispute systems design principles 
(1) Stakeholders are included in the design process  
Stakeholders are included in the design process through reviews of and submissions sought on 
the tax dispute resolution process. Inland Revenue’s Policy and Strategy group (formerly the 
Policy Advice Division) has released issues papers on proposed legislative and administrative 
changes to the dispute process and on draft Standard Practice Statements (SPSs). Submissions 
on these have been sought from stakeholders, through the Policy and Strategy group’s website. 
Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (CA-ANZ)10 and the New Zealand Law 
Society (NZLS) are two professional bodies in NZ that regularly deal with the dispute 
resolution process and who represent taxpayers.11 In particular, they have made a number of 
prominent joint submissions, including to the Minister of Revenue and the NZ Commissioner, 
summarising their members’ concerns about the dispute process.12 
 
With respect to legislative changes to the tax dispute resolution procedures, tax policy in NZ 
is developed in accordance with the Generic Tax Policy Process (GTPP).13 A key feature of 
the process is that it builds external consultation and feedback into the policy development 
process, providing opportunities for public comment at several stages. Thus, in developing tax 
policy in relation to the NZ tax dispute resolution process and its design, Inland Revenue and 
the NZ Treasury consult with a range of external stakeholders including taxpayers, tax 
practitioners, professional bodies, tax academics and other parties with an interest in the NZ 
tax dispute resolution process. 
 
  
                                                          
10 As noted in chapter 1, section 1.5 of this thesis, from 1 July 2014 Chartered Accountants Australia and New 
Zealand (CA-ANZ) was launched as the new trading name merging the former Institute of Chartered Accountants 
Australia (ICAA) and New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants (NZICA). 
11 As noted in chapter 3, section 3.6.3 of this thesis, other professional bodies in NZ whose members deal with 
the tax dispute resolution process include CPA Australia and the Accountants and Tax Agents Institute of New 
Zealand (ATAINZ). However, their members’ dealings with the NZ tax dispute resolution process are arguably 
on a less frequent basis. 
12 See, for example, Taxation Committee of the New Zealand Law Society and National Tax Committee of the 
New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants The Disputes Resolution Procedures in Part IVA of the Tax 
Administration Act 1994 and the Challenge Procedures in Part VIIIA of the Tax Administration Act 1994 
(Wellington, August 2008); Taxation Committee of the New Zealand Law Society and National Tax Committee 
of the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants Disputes: A Review, July 2010 (Wellington, September 
2010); Taxation Committee of the New Zealand Law Society and National Tax Committee of the New Zealand 
Institute of Chartered Accountants “Submission to the Finance and Expenditure Committee on the Taxation (Tax 
Administration and Remedial Matters) Bill” (21 February 2011). 
13 For a further discussion on the operation of the GTPP see Adrian J Sawyer “Broadening the Scope of 
Consultation and Strategic Focus in Tax Policy Formulation: Some Recent Developments” (1996) 2 NZJTLP 17; 
Adrian J Sawyer “Reviewing tax policy development in New Zealand: Lessons from a delicate balancing of ‘law 
and politics’” (2013) 28(2) ATF 401; Struan Little, Geof D Nightingale and Ainslie Fenwick “Development of 
Tax Policy in New Zealand: The Generic Tax Policy Process” (2013) 61 Can Tax J 1043. 
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(2) The system has multiple options for addressing conflict including interests, 
rights and power-based processes  
The NZ tax dispute resolution system has multiple options for addressing conflict. These are 
outlined below. There is early opportunity for disputes to be resolved through discussion and 
negotiation with Inland Revenue officers at the investigation stage. As noted in section 4.2.1 
above, the formal dispute procedures which follow include the prescribed exchange of 
documents at certain stages of the procedures as well as administrative steps. Thus, if a dispute 
cannot be resolved through negotiation, either party may issue a NOPA (NZ) and the 
responding party will issue a NOR. If the NOR is not accepted in full, an (administrative) 
conference is called to discuss and, if possible, resolve outstanding issues. A taxpayer may 
choose for the conference to be facilitated. The facilitated conference option constitutes the 
sole interests-based ADR process available to all taxpayers in the dispute resolution process 
prior to the litigation stage. If the dispute remains unresolved following the conference phase, 
the NZ Commissioner generally issues a disclosure notice and SOPs are exchanged between 
the parties. Unresolved disputes are then usually referred to Inland Revenue’s DRU (NZ), 
which essentially performs the revenue authority’s (administrative) internal review function. 
In the event that the taxpayer is dissatisfied with the DRU’s (NZ) decision, rights-based 
litigation processes (judicial determination) in the TRA or the High Court may then follow. In 
addition, interests and rights-based ADR processes are also potentially available as an option 
for disputes reaching the TRA and the High Court. These ADR processes can include judicial 
settlement conferences,14 mediation or another form of ADR agreed to by the parties.15 
 
(3) The system provides for loops backward and forward  
The potential availability of ADR at the litigation stage in the TRA or the High Court may 
provide a loop-back mechanism from rights-based litigation processes to interests-based 
processes.16 Although, the use of ADR in tax disputes in the TRA and the High Court is limited 
in the respect that, among other things, it requires both parties consent.17 In practice, in the 
particular context of tax dispute cases in both the TRA and High Court, anecdotal evidence 
indicates that judicial settlement conferences appear to have been utilised in some cases.18 
                                                          
14 High Court Rules 2016, rr 7.79(1), (3); District Court Rules 2014, r 7.3. 
15 High Court Rules 2016, r 7.79(5); District Court Rules 2014, r 7.2. 
16 If an adjournment of a hearing is sought in order for parties to undertake ADR, the loop-back would be subject 
to the court’s consent. 
17 The option of judicial settlement conferences in the TRA is further restricted by the fact that there is only one 
TRA judge. Thus, both parties must agree to have the same TRA judge also hearing the dispute. 
18 Email from [redacted] (Tax Barrister, [redacted], Wellington) to Melinda Jone regarding ADR in the TRA and 
the High Court (7 December 2014). However, the Ministry of Justice’s Case Management System (CMS) shows 
no records of “completed” judicial settlement conferences for tax dispute cases in the High Court after 1 January 
2013. Correspondence from General Manager, Higher Courts, Ministry of Justice (22 January 2015) (Obtained 
under Official Information Act 1982 Request to the Ministry of Justice).  
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However, private mediation (or other forms of ADR) performed away from the court 
apparently have not.19  
 
Loop-forward mechanisms are provided in the form of the opt-out, whereby following the 
conference phase, the taxpayer may request to opt-out of the remainder of the dispute process 
and proceed to the TRA or the High Court if certain criteria are met and the NZ Commissioner 
agrees to the taxpayer’s opt-out request.20 Further (limited) loop-forward mechanisms are 
provided by s 89N(1) TAA 1994 which outlines a number of exceptions where the NZ 
Commissioner may truncate the full dispute process which must usually be followed, for 
example, where the NZ Commissioner believes that the taxpayer has committed an offence 
under an Inland Revenue Act that has the effect of causing delay in the dispute process or where 
the NZ Commissioner perceives a likelihood of flight by the taxpayer. Parties may also loop-
forward under s 89N(3) TAA 1994 if the NZ Commissioner makes an application to the High 
Court to not complete the full dispute process. The above loop-forward mechanisms are only 
at the option of the Commissioner, generally where it is perceived that the taxpayer has 
committed some form of offence and/or there is a risk to the collection of revenue. Hence, these 
loop-forward mechanisms are not specifically aimed at the efficient resolution of disputes in 
both parties’ interests per se. 
 
(4) There is notification before and feedback after the resolution process  
Notification of disputes is implied through Inland Revenue’s Charter which sets out how Inland 
Revenue will work with taxpayers and also outlines that they will inform taxpayers of the 
options available where a taxpayer disagrees with them.21 Inland Revenue’s annual compliance 
programme, Compliance Focus, which informs taxpayers of Inland Revenue’s areas of focus 
and what they are doing to address significant issues and behaviours which impact on 
compliance, also acts as a form of notification.22 It may notify taxpayers of potential risk areas 
for disputes. Inland Revenue case notes which provide brief summaries of tax decisions made 
by the TRA, the High Court, Court of Appeal, Privy Council and the Supreme Court and outline 
                                                          
19 Email from [redacted] (Tax Barrister, [redacted], Wellington), above n 18; Correspondence from General 
Manager, Higher Courts, Ministry of Justice, above n 18.  
20 The former option for taxpayers to elect for matters to be heard in the small claims jurisdiction of the TRA, 
which was available if the amount of tax in dispute was less than $30,000 and the taxpayer had made such an 
election in the NOPA (NZ) or NOR, would have constituted a loop-forward in the procedures (from the point of 
election to litigation in the TRA). However, the small claims jurisdiction was removed with effect from 29 August 
2011 by section 167 of the Taxation (Tax Administration and Remedial Matters) Act 2011. 
21 Inland Revenue Inland Revenue’s Charter (IR 614, March 2009) at 1. 
22 See Inland Revenue “Our compliance focus” (26 November 2014) 
<http://www.ird.govt.nz/taxagents/compliance/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). Inland Revenue has 
historically published its annual compliance programme. However, Inland Revenue now provide “tailored 
information for specific customer groups” as part of its new approach to compliance. 
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the principal facts and grounds for the decisions may also serve as a form of notification.23 
While Inland Revenue state that these case reviews are purely brief factual reviews of decisions 
and “do not set out Inland Revenue policy, nor do they represent [Inland Revenue’s] attitude 
to the decision”,24 arguably they may still provide some indication of Inland Revenue’s view 
on a tax decision. Notwithstanding the above forms of notification, Inland Revenue does not 
permit the publication of redacted adjudication reports issued by the DRU (NZ). Adjudication 
reports represent the NZ Commissioner’s considered view of the law on particular issues and 
therefore, would be of considerable guidance to taxpayers and their advisers in the conduct of 
subsequent disputes.25 
 
Feedback occurs at a systemic level through the publication, on Inland Revenue’s website, of 
a limited range of general statistics which may be relevant to the dispute process, such as 
outcomes of cases decided by the DRU (NZ) over time and the length of time of cases in 
dispute.26 Generally limited feedback on tax disputes, in the form of statistics and/or 
commentaries, appears to occur in Inland Revenue’s annual reports.27 Provision for obtaining 
feedback at the micro-level on Inland Revenue’s facilitated conferences apparently occurs 
through a survey form provided to participants at the end of Inland Revenue’s facilitated 
conference meetings.28  
  
(5) The system has a person or persons who function as internal independent 
confidential neutral(s)  
There is no internal independent confidential neutral that taxpayers can go to for coaching, 
referring and problem-solving within Inland Revenue. Taxpayers can, however, seek advice 
and support in relation to dispute resolution externally from professional advisors at their own 
expense. This would be similar to taxpayers seeking advice and assistance from professional 
advisors on tax technical matters. If Inland Revenue staff require advice and support in dispute 
resolution-related matters, they can approach their team leader in the first instance and 
                                                          
23 Case notes are published in Inland Revenue’s Tax Information Bulletins and are also listed by calendar year on 
Inland Revenue’s website: Inland Revenue “Legal decisions – case notes” (17 July 2006) 
<http://www.ird.govt.nz/technical-tax/case-notes/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
24 Inland Revenue, above n 23. 
25 Mark Keating and Michael Lennard “Developments in tax disputes – Another step backwards?” (paper 
presented to the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants Annual Tax Conference, Auckland, 11-12 
November 2011) at 26-27. 
26 Inland Revenue “Tax data – audits and legal issues” (3 December 2015) <http://www.ird.govt.nz/aboutir/audit-
and-legal-issues/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
27 See Inland Revenue’s annual reports, available at: Inland Revenue “Annual report” (5 October 2004) 
<http://www.ird.govt.nz/aboutir/reports/annual-report/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). Contrast with the 
Australian Taxation Office’s (ATO’s) annual report which typically includes a separate section reporting on 
“Resolving disputes”. See, for example, Australian Taxation Office Commissioner of Taxation Annual Report 
2015-16 (Canberra, October 2016) at 46-48. 
28 Email from [redacted] (Case Director, [redacted], Inland Revenue, Auckland) to Melinda Jone regarding Inland 
Revenue facilitated conferences (13 January 2015). 
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managerial assistance is also available if required.29 In addition, the Legal and Technical 
Services (LTS) and Specialist Advice business units (which are part of Investigations and 
Advice, which sits within Inland Revenue’s Service Delivery group) are also available to 
provide technical advice and support on dispute resolution-related matters to Inland Revenue 
staff.30 Accordingly, the above options would constitute the closest equivalents to a person or 
persons which function(s) as an internal independent confidential neutral for Inland Revenue 
officers.  
 
(6) Procedures are ordered from low to high cost 
The formal NZ tax dispute resolution procedures are technically not ordered in a low to high 
cost sequence. This is due to the fact that the procedures are made up of various stages 
involving the prescribed exchange of documents as well as two administrative phases. The 
prescribed documents and the administrative phases each have different levels of costs 
associated with them. Anecdotally, the preparation and lodgement of documents including the 
NOPA (NZ), NOR and SOPs impose high costs on taxpayers. Two prominent NZ tax 
barristers31 generally order the costs of the stages in the current NZ tax dispute procedures from 
highest to lowest, for taxpayers, as follows: (1) SOPs; (2) NOPA (NZ)/NOR; (3) Inland 
Revenue conferences; (4) adjudication by the DRU (NZ). 
 
Furthermore, in the context of tax dispute resolution it is usually necessary for taxpayers to 
have their position worked out from the beginning and for some taxpayers, professional advice 
may be required from the outset of the dispute. This suggests that in the context of the NZ 
dispute resolution procedures, the upfront costs incurred by many taxpayers may not greatly 
differ with the stage of the formal dispute resolution process at which the dispute is ultimately 
resolved at. 
 
Moreover, commentators and professional bodies have submitted that the current pre-litigation 
tax dispute resolution process in NZ “has many stages and creates the potential for disputes to 
go on for long periods of time at significant cost.”32 This has resulted in taxpayers (particularly 
small taxpayers),33 being “burnt off” by the high costs of pursuing the dispute resolution 
                                                          
29 Correspondence from Group Manager, Investigations and Advice, Inland Revenue (18 August 2014) (Obtained 
under Official Information Act 1982 Request to Inland Revenue). 
30 Correspondence from Group Manager, Investigations and Advice, Inland Revenue, above n 29. See also, Inland 
Revenue “Legal and Technical Services: Our services and contact details” (31 October 2013) 
<http://www.ird.govt.nz/aboutir/who-we-are/structure/tlsg/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
31 Email from [redacted] (Tax Barrister, [redacted], Auckland) to Melinda Jone regarding costs of the tax dispute 
process in NZ (12 November 2014); Email from [redacted] (Tax Barrister, [redacted], Wellington) to Melinda 
Jone regarding costs of the tax dispute process in NZ (12 November 2014). 
32 Greg Blanchard “The case for a simplified tax disputes process” (2005) 11 NZJTLP 417 at 417. 
33 There is no official definition for a small taxpayer in NZ (or internationally). However, the Taxation Committee 
of the New Zealand Law Society and National Tax Committee of the New Zealand Institute of Chartered 
Accountants The Disputes Resolution Procedures in Part IVA of the Tax Administration Act 1994 and the 
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process.34 Thus, the number of steps in the dispute resolution process and the costs associated 
with pursuing the full process to the litigation stage arguably act as a deterrent to taxpayers and 
a barrier to social justice.  
 
(7) The system has multiple access points  
The formal dispute process is initiated by either the NZ Commissioner or the taxpayer through 
the issuance of a NOPA (NZ) to the other party. In each of these instances there is only one 
structural entry point to the formal dispute process for the taxpayer (or the NZ Commissioner). 
In a dispute initiated by the taxpayer, the taxpayer can only enter the dispute process by issuing 
a NOPA (NZ) (disputing either their own assessment or an assessment issued by the NZ 
Commissioner). The NZ Commissioner can therefore, only enter by issuing a NOR rejecting 
the taxpayer’s NOPA (NZ). Similarly, in a dispute initiated by the NZ Commissioner, the NZ 
Commissioner can only enter the dispute process by issuing a NOPA (NZ) and the taxpayer 
can only enter by issuing a NOR rejecting a NOPA (NZ) by the NZ Commissioner.  
 
In the procedural respect, a NOPA (NZ) issued by either the NZ Commissioner or the taxpayer 
must be made using the prescribed form, Notice of Proposed Adjustment (IR 770).35 While 
there is no prescribed form that must be used for a NOR, Inland Revenue provides a template 
form on its website that may be downloaded and used by taxpayers. There are, however, 
different ways in which notification of a dispute (that is, a NOPA (NZ) or NOR) may be given 
by the NZ Commissioner or the taxpayer, including by: personal delivery; post; fax; or 
electronic means of communication.36 Multiple procedural forms of access to the system for 
certain taxpayers are also provided in the respect that some Inland Revenue forms and guides 
(including some which may be relevant to the dispute procedures) are available on Inland 
Revenue’s website in both English and Te Reo Maori.37  
 
With respect to the provision of a choice of access persons to whom system users may approach 
in the first instance, for taxpayers requiring language support, Language Line, a free phone-
                                                          
Challenge Procedures in Part VIIIA of the Tax Administration Act 1994, above n 12, at Appendix A, noted: “There 
are a large number of New Zealand businesses and individuals that are ‘small’ in tax terms. In New Zealand, 89% 
of New Zealand enterprises employ five or fewer staff.” To date, this percentage has largely remained unchanged. 
See Statistics New Zealand “Business demography tables” (27 October 2016) 
<http://www.stats.govt.nz/tools_and_services/nzdotstat/tables-by-subject/business-demography-tables.aspx> 
(last accessed 7 November 2016). 
34 Taxation Committee of the New Zealand Law Society and National Tax Committee of the New Zealand Institute 
of Chartered Accountants The Disputes Resolution Procedures in Part IVA of the Tax Administration Act 1994 
and the Challenge Procedures in Part VIIIA of the Tax Administration Act 1994, above n 12, at [2.1(d)]. See also, 
William Young “Tax disputes in New Zealand” (2009) 4(1) JATTA 1 at 15. 
35 Inland Revenue Notice of Proposed Adjustment (IR 770, November 2009). 
36 TAA 1994, ss 14-14G. 




based interpreter service can be used for communicating with Inland Revenue.38 Deaf, hearing-
impaired or speech-impaired taxpayer can contact Inland Revenue by using the New Zealand 
Relay Service.39 Additionally, deaf and hearing-impaired taxpayers can also request for a face-
to-face meeting with Inland Revenue staff with a New Zealand Sign Language interpreter 
present. While the above services provide a choice of persons for certain taxpayers to make 
contact with Inland Revenue generally, they arguably also may serve to provide a choice of 
access persons for certain taxpayers to approach for the purpose of acquiring information about 
the dispute resolution system in the first instance. 
 
(8) The system includes training and education for stakeholders  
Taxpayers and their advisors are provided with information about the NZ tax dispute resolution 
procedures through Inland Revenue’s website40 and through various guides such as Disputing 
an assessment,41 Disputing a notice of proposed adjustment (NOPA)42 and If you disagree with 
an assessment.43 In addition, Inland Revenue’s SPSs on dispute resolution, SPS 16/05 and SPS 
16/06, set out how the NZ tax dispute resolution process operates including the key actions and 
administrative timeframes for both Inland Revenue staff and taxpayers.44 However, Inland 
Revenue makes it clear that the SPSs are intended only as “a reference guide for taxpayers and 
Inland Revenue officers.”45 Moreover, only “where possible” Inland Revenue officers must 
follow the practices outlined in the SPSs.46 
 
Training in dispute resolution is available to Inland Revenue staff where it is identified as part 
of their development plans.47 The training can be delivered by internal and external providers 
depending on the needs of the individual.48 Inland Revenue facilitators currently receive an 
initial two days of training from the Arbitrators’ and Mediators’ Institute of New Zealand 
(AMINZ) with “ongoing refreshers and sessions to compare experiences.”49 In addition, from 
                                                          
38 Inland Revenue “Contact us” (31 March 2014) <http://www.ird.govt.nz/contact-us/> (last accessed 7 November 
2016). 
39 Inland Revenue, above n 38. 
40 See Inland Revenue “Disputing an assessment: The disputes resolution process” (3 April 2014) 
<http://www.ird.govt.nz/how-to/disputes/changes-disputes.html> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
41 Inland Revenue Disputing an assessment: What to do if you dispute an assessment (IR 776, April 2012). 
42 Inland Revenue Disputing a notice of proposed adjustment: What to do if Inland Revenue disputes your 
assessment (IR 777, January 2012). 
43 Inland Revenue If you disagree with an assessment (IR 778, December 2011). 
44 See Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05, above n 3; Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06”, above n 3. 
45 Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 3, at 14; Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06”, above n 3, at 50. 
46 Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 3, at 14; Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06”, above n 3, at 50. 
47 Correspondence from Group Manager, Investigations and Advice, Inland Revenue, above n 29. 
48 Correspondence from Group Manager, Investigations and Advice, Inland Revenue, above n 29. 
49 Email from [redacted] (Director, [redacted], Inland Revenue, Wellington) to Melinda Jone regarding Inland 
Revenue facilitated conferences (12 May 2015). 
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the latter half of 2015, Inland Revenue commenced accrediting its facilitators with AMINZ 
Associate membership.50 However, accredited Inland Revenue facilitators are not AMINZ 
panel members (who are listed on the AMINZ website). 
 
Given that adjudication decisions are generally solely made “on the papers”,51 the adjudication 
team in the DRU (NZ) do not receive any specific training in dispute resolution techniques. 
However, they have legal and/or accounting qualifications and have experience in researching 
and analysing tax issues which are necessary to perform their adjudication role.  
 
(9) Assistance is offered for choosing the best process 
Inland Revenue’s SPS 16/05 and SPS 16/06 provide administrative guidelines and timeframes 
which can assist Inland Revenue officers and taxpayers as to the appropriate use of processes.52 
There are no dedicated process advisors per se available within Inland Revenue for the purpose 
of providing advice on the dispute resolution procedures for Inland Revenue officers and/or 
taxpayers in a particular dispute.53 This is partly due to the fact that the dispute procedures in 
Part IVA of the TAA 1994 provides a compulsory code for tax dispute resolution in NZ and 
thus, prescribes the only process that can be followed. Moreover, the NZ tax dispute procedures 
does not offer taxpayers optional ADR programs alongside the formal tax dispute resolution 
process such that taxpayers are able to choose between dispute resolution options. 
Notwithstanding that there are no specific process advisors, Inland Revenue’s Investigations 
and Advice group has general oversight of all tax disputes and the Specialist Advice team, 
sitting within the Investigations and Advice group, administers the facilitated conferences.54 
 
(10) Disputants have the right to choose a preferred process 
As stated above, the dispute procedures in Part IVA TAA 1994 provides a compulsory code 
for settling tax disputes. Section 109 TAA 1994 provides that the disputes and subsequent 
challenge proceedings are the sole methods for contesting the correctness (and arguably the 
validity) of an assessment. Accordingly, attempts by taxpayers to contest either their 
assessment or the subsequent tax liability in any other forum is not permitted. Section 89N 
TAA 1994 further provides that, with limited exceptions, the full dispute process must be 
completed (that is, it cannot be truncated). Accordingly, there is generally a limited ability for 
taxpayers (except for the opt-out and certain other instances discussed below) to choose a 
preferred path in the NZ dispute resolution process. However, it is worth noting that the 
                                                          
50 Email from [redacted] (Director, [redacted], Inland Revenue, Wellington) to Melinda Jone regarding Inland 
Revenue facilitator accreditation (22 January 2016). 
51 See Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 3, at [263]; Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06”, above n 3, at [289]. 
52 Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 3; Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06”, above n 3. 
53 Correspondence from Group Manager, Investigations and Advice, Inland Revenue, above n 29. 
54 Correspondence from Group Manager, Investigations and Advice, Inland Revenue, above n 29. 
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conference and adjudication phases are “administratively mandated.”55 That is, they are not 
mandated in legislation and are not compulsory. Although, it is Inland Revenue’s invariable 
practice that these phases are offered as part of the dispute process and it is “unusual for a 
taxpayer to refuse to attend.”56  
 
The opt-out provides a limited option for taxpayers meeting certain criteria to opt-out of the 
full dispute process after the conference phase and proceed to the TRA or the High Court. The 
criteria to opt-out include: where the total amount of tax in dispute is $75,000 or less; the 
dispute turns on issues of fact only; the dispute concerns facts and issues that are waiting to be 
resolved by a court; or the dispute concerns facts or issues that are similar to those that have 
already been considered by the DRU (NZ) in a past dispute.57 The opt-out may arguably also 
be viewed as a limited means of providing the option to choose a preferred process for small 
taxpayers (that is, where the core tax in dispute is under $75,000).58 Nevertheless, in practice 
the opt-out is restricted by the fact that, in addition to meeting the narrow criteria for opting-
out, taxpayers must seek the NZ Commissioner’s agreement to opt-out.59 
 
In addition to the opt-out, there are some other instances in the NZ tax dispute resolution 
procedures where taxpayers are provided with the option to choose a preferred process. These 
instances relate to the option to utilise ADR. For example, taxpayers may choose for a 
conference to be held with or without a facilitator.60 In addition, at the litigation stage in the 
TRA or the High Court, parties can potentially choose to utilise ADR in the respect that they 
may consent to the convening of a judicial settlement conference at any time during the hearing 
of a proceeding,61 or consent to being directed to private mediation (or another form of ADR 
agreed to by the parties) at any time before or during the hearing of a proceeding.62 However, 
as the use of ADR in the TRA and the High Court requires the consent of both parties, among 
                                                          
55 Keating, above n 5, at 14. 
56 At 165. 
57 Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 3, at [167] and Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06” above n 3, at [196]. 
58 See Inland Revenue “Taxation (Tax Administration and Remedial Matters) Act 2011: Disputes Process” (5 
December 2011) <http://www.ird.govt.nz/technical-tax/legislation/2011/2011-63/2011-63-disputes-process/> 
(last accessed 7 November 2016). 
59 Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 3, at [163] and Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06” above n 3, at [192]. 
60 Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 3, at [137] and Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06”, above n 3, at [166]. As at 
24 March 2015, approximately 68 per cent of all cases at the conference stage have elected to have conferences 
facilitated: Telephone correspondence from [redacted] (Director, [redacted], Inland Revenue, Wellington) to 
Melinda Jone regarding Inland Revenue facilitated conferences (24 March 2015). 
61 High Court Rules 2016, rr 7.79 (3); District Court Rules 2014, r 7.3 
62 High Court Rules 2016, r 7.79(5); District Court Rules 2014, r 7.2. 
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other things, the NZ Commissioner’s general reluctance to settle in practice limits the choice 
of taxpayers to utilise ADR in the TRA and the High Court.63 
 
(11) The system is fair and perceived as fair 
As highlighted in chapter 1, section 1.5 of this thesis, despite a number of reviews and 
amendments to the current NZ tax dispute resolution procedures since their enactment under 
Part IVA TAA 1994 in 1996, commentators and professional organisations in NZ have raised 
various concerns with respect to their operation.64 In particular, as noted in DSD Principle 6 
above, concerns have been raised that the dispute procedures are too lengthy and costly. As a 
result taxpayers (particularly small taxpayers) are being “burnt off” and are choosing not to 
pursue their disputes.65 In turn this is arguably adversely impacting on taxpayers’ perceptions 
of the fairness of the procedures and potentially negatively impacting on the tax system and on 
taxpayer voluntary compliance.66 Despite various (largely administrative) changes to the 
procedures, to date it appears that these views of the NZ dispute resolution procedures have 
largely remained unchanged.67 
 
Various commentators have called for the simplification of the dispute procedures in a number 
of ways. Virtually all reform proposals recommend abandoning (or making optional) the SOP 
and adjudication phases of the current procedure.68 The desire has been “to free taxpayers from 
                                                          
63 See Michael Lennard “Peace in Our Time: Part 1” (2008) 4 Tax’n Today 29; Michael Lennard “Peace in Our 
Time: Part 2” (2008) 5 Tax’n Today 16. 
64 See Keating, above n 5, at 16-20. 
65 Taxation Committee of the New Zealand Law Society and National Tax Committee of the New Zealand Institute 
of Chartered Accountants The Disputes Resolution Procedures in Part IVA of the Tax Administration Act 1994 
and the Challenge Procedures in Part VIIIA of the Tax Administration Act 1994, above n 12, at [2.1(d)]. 
66 At [2.1(d)]. 
67 See, for example, Keating and Lennard, above n 25; Shelley Griffiths “Resolving New Zealand Tax Disputes: 
Finding the Balance Between Judicial Determination and Administrative Process” (paper presented to the 
Australasian Tax Teachers Association Conference, Sydney, 17 January 2012); Susan Glazebrook “Taxation 
Disputes in New Zealand” (paper presented to the Australasian Tax Teachers Association Conference, Auckland, 
22 January 2013); Lindsey Ng and Chris Cunniff “Inland Revenue service – are you satisfied?” (2013) 92(1) 
Chartered Acct J 78; Denham Martin “Honest Taxpayers Need Advocates and Real Rights” (2013) 212 NZLawyer 
22; Fred Ward “Changes to the Disputes Resolution Process – A Practitioner’s Perspective” (paper presented to 
the New Zealand Law Society Tax Conference, Auckland, September 2013) 165; Sarah Miles “The Price we Pay 
for a Specialised Society: Do Tax Disputes Require Greater Judicial Specialisation?” (2015) 46 VUWLR 361; 
Colmar Brunton Satisfaction with Inland Revenue: November 2015 (4 November 2015); Alison Pavlovich “The 
Tax Disputes Process and Taxpayer Rights: Are the Inconsistencies Proportional?” (2016) 22 NZJTLP 70; Geoff 
Clews and Ele Duncan “Audits and Disputes: The Myths, The Realities and The Lessons to be Learnt” (paper 
presented to the New Zealand Law Society Tax Conference, Auckland, 13 October 2016) 85. 
68 See, for example, Blanchard, above n 32; Mark Keating “Comment: New Zealand’s tax dispute procedure: 
Time for a change” (2008) 14 NZJTLP 425; Joanne Dunne “Re-solving Tax Disputes” (2008) 101 NZLawyer 18; 
James Peck and Andrew J Maples “Comment: The Tax Disputes Resolution Process in New Zealand: What about 
the Little Fellas?” (2010) 16 NZJTLP 348; Melinda Jone and Andrew J Maples “Mediation as an Alternative 
Option in New Zealand's Tax Dispute Resolution Procedures” (2012) 18 NZJTLP 412; Melinda Jone and Andrew 
J Maples “Mediation as an Alternative Option in New Zealand's Tax Disputes Resolution Procedures: Refining a 
Proposed Regime” (2013) 19 NZJTLP 301; Martin, above n 67. 
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a lengthy and expensive system which appears to be almost entirely controlled by the IRD.”69 
Commentators have thus called for more direct access to the courts for taxpayers wishing to 
contest an assessment or proposed reassessment:70 
 
[T]he time and cost of the disputes resolution process appear to have a chilling effect on 
litigation … taxpayers ought to be able to elect to go the challenge process, which takes 
the matter to the TRA or High Court, without being forced to engage in the disputes 
resolution procedure.  
 
Nevertheless, the NZ Commissioner appears unwilling to modify the current procedures, 
rejecting calls for reform on the following grounds:71 
 
Although many concerns have been raised about the administration of the disputes process 
and how much of the process should be explicitly legislated for there have previously been 
no serious suggestions that the fundamentals of the process should be revised. 
 
However, as indicated above, taxpayers and practitioners have remained sceptical of Inland 
Revenue’s “tinkering” with the administration of the procedures:72 
 
The concern with administrative changes is that the Commissioner has argued 
(successfully) before the Courts that he is not required to follow his own policies and 
administrative practices, with the consequence that taxpayers no longer have confidence 
that the Commissioner will adhere to his policies and practices. 
 
With respect to perceptions of fairness of Inland Revenue’s conference facilitation process, 
there are mixed findings. Inland Revenue indicate that “the initiative has been very successful, 
with positive feedback from practitioners who have been involved.”73 Campbell and 
Hendriksen additionally note that “anecdotal evidence suggests that taxpayers have become 
more comfortable with the way in which Inland Revenue facilitators have generally conducted 
                                                          
69 Keating, above n 5, at 20. 
70 Shelley Griffiths “Tax as Public Law” in Andrew Maples and Adrian Sawyer (eds) Taxation Issues: Existing 
and Emerging (Canterbury Education Printing Services, Christchurch, 2011) 215 at 225.  
71 Inland Revenue Taxation (Tax Administration and Remedial Matters) Bill – Officials Report to the Finance and 
Expenditure Select Committee on Submissions on the Bill (April 2011) at 55. 
72 Russell McVeagh “Latest Tax Bill proposes changes to the tax disputes procedure and repeal of gift duty” (8 
December 2010) 
<http://www.russellmcveagh.com/Portals/1/Documents/Tax%20Update%20archive/TaxDecember2010_358.ht
ml> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
73 Graham Tubb “Tax Disputes Procedures: A Current Snapshot” (paper presented to New Zealand Law Society 
Tax Conference, Auckland, September 2013) 149 at 154.  
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themselves.”74 Nevertheless, it has also been put forward that “the facilitator, as a senior officer 
of the Department, may have a natural bias towards the Commissioner.”75 Furthermore, it has 
been observed that the facilitator has generally: 76 
 
[A]dopted more of a passive role in relation to the dispute than that intended by … the 
SPSs … which place more emphasis on the facilitation role; seeking to find points of 
agreement and exploring options for settlement. 
 
Hence, various practitioners have suggested that a more pro-active role could be taken by 
Inland Revenue facilitators to “critically test the position of each side and actively encourage 
compromises by both parties in attempt to obtain resolution of the dispute” rather than the 
parties “simply feeling as if they had ‘gone through the motions.’”77 
 
(12) The system is supported by top managers  
There appears to be limited visible evidence of the ‘sincere and visible championship’ of the 
tax dispute procedures by the senior management of Inland Revenue (including the NZ 
Commissioner), in the form of published speeches, presentations or other media releases.78 
However, internally Inland Revenue has a National Tax Disputes Process Committee which 
was established in 2007 to monitor and oversee the dispute process and make strategic 
decisions as necessary.79 The committee is mainly comprised of second and third tier managers 
from a number of areas who are involved in different parts of the dispute process in Inland 
Revenue including: the Office of the Chief Tax Counsel (OCTC); Service Delivery; 
Investigations and Advice; Investigations; and Policy and Strategy. Nevertheless, while Inland 
Revenue have been encouraged by various commentators and professional bodies to use ADR 
methods such as mediation in the dispute procedures, Inland Revenue “remains committed to 
facilitated conferences and the benefits that they can provide.”80 Furthermore, they are 
apparently currently not prepared to entertain the further use of ADR (over and above the 
existing conference facilitation process) in the dispute procedures.81 
 
                                                          
74 Niels Campbell and Michael Hendriksen “The conference phase of the tax disputes process – what you need to 
know” (paper presented to the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants Annual Tax Conference, 
Wellington, 26-27 October 2012) at [5.7]. 
75 Ward, above n 67, at 173. 
76 At 173. 
77 Keating, above n 5, at 172. See also, Clews and Duncan, above n 67, at 110. 
78 See Inland Revenue “Recent media releases” <http://www.ird.govt.nz/aboutir/media-centre/media-releases/> 
(last accessed 7 November 2016). 
79 Email from [redacted] (Director, [redacted], Inland Revenue, Wellington) to Melinda Jone regarding Inland 
Revenue’s National Tax Disputes Process Committee (6 May 2015). 
80 Karen Whitiskie “Five years on for facilitated conferences” (2015) 873 LawTalk 19 at 19. 
81 Tubb, above n 73, at 154. 
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(13) The system is aligned with the mission, vision and values of the organisation  
The dispute resolution system is integrated into the organisation through Inland Revenue’s 
Charter in which Inland Revenue aspire to, inter alia, “inform you about options available if 
you disagree with us, and we will work with you to reach an outcome quickly and simply.”82 
With respect to this aspiration, the dispute resolution process provides the (only) means for 
taxpayers to file a formal dispute with Inland Revenue.  
 
The dispute resolution system must also align with the NZ Commissioner’s care and 
management responsibilities under s 6A of the TAA 1994. Section 6A indicates that the NZ 
Commissioner may be able to reach a compromise in some cases. However, settlement 
negotiations with taxpayers must take into account: the resources available to the NZ 
Commissioner; the importance of promoting compliance, especially voluntary compliance, by 
all taxpayers with the Inland Revenue Acts; and the compliance costs incurred by taxpayers.83 
Although the courts have not specifically considered whether the NZ Commissioner can settle 
tax disputes before litigation or the formal dispute process has started, the NZ Commissioner 
considers that, in principle, there is no impediment to this being done.84 
 
The current NZ tax dispute resolution procedures were introduced in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Richardson Committee in the Organisational Review of the Inland 
Revenue Department.85 The dispute resolution process was designed to encourage an “all cards 
on the table” approach and the resolution of issues without the need for litigation.86 The purpose 
of the dispute procedures in Part IVA of the TAA 1994 is set out in s 89A as: 
 
 improving the accuracy of disputable decisions made by the Commissioner under 
the Inland Revenue Acts; 
 reducing the likelihood of disputes arising between the Commissioner and 
taxpayers by encouraging open and full communication between the two parties; 
 promoting the early identification of the basis for any dispute concerning a 
disputable decision; and 
 promoting the prompt and efficient resolution of any dispute concerning a 
disputable decision by requiring the issues and evidence to be considered by the 
Commissioner and a disputant before proceedings are commenced. 
                                                          
82 Inland Revenue, above n 21, at 1. 
83 TAA 1994, s 6A. 
84 Inland Revenue “IS 10/07: Care and management of the taxes covered by the Inland Revenue Acts – section 
6A(2) and (3) of the Tax Administration Act 1994” (2010) 22(10) Tax Information Bulletin 17 [“IS 10/07”] at 
[156]. 
85 Organisational Review Committee Organisational Review of the Inland Revenue Department Report to the 
Minister of Revenue (and on tax policy, also to the Minister of Finance) (Wellington, 1994). 
86 At [10.11]. 
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The Richardson Committee aimed for the procedures to be as quick, straightforward and fair 
as possible. They further noted that “the way tax disputes are resolved is critical to taxpayer 
perceptions of fairness and has wider impacts for the tax administration.”87 While bearing in 
mind the purpose of the dispute procedures as well as the above remarks of the Richardson 
Committee, we can now turn to Inland Revenue’s overall organisational mission, vision, 
culture and values which are stated in Figure 4.2. 
  
                                                          
87 At [10]. 
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Figure 4.2: Inland Revenue’s Mission, Vision, Culture and Values88 
Our Mission 
 
 We contribute to the economic and social wellbeing of all New Zealand by collecting and 
distributing money. 
 
We achieve our mission when we deliver our outcomes: 
 
 Revenue is available to fund government programmes through people meeting payment 
obligations of their own accord. 
 People receive payments they are entitled to, enabling them to participate in society. 
 New Zealanders benefit economically and socially through Inland Revenue working 




 A world-class revenue organisation recognised for service and excellence. 
 
As a world-class revenue organisation we will deliver our outcomes and live our culture and values. 
 
Our Culture  
 








These values underpin the culture that will enable IR to be customer-centric, intelligence-led, and 
agile: 
 
 Trust and integrity 
 Valuing people 
 Innovating to make a difference 
 Working together 
 
Arguably the purpose of the procedures outlined in s 89A TAA 1994, prima facie, does not 
appear to have a clear alignment with the overall mission, vision and values of Inland Revenue. 
However, an underlying connection between the dispute resolution procedures and the wider 
NZ tax system may arguably be found in the Richardson Committee’s recognition that the 
                                                          
88 See Inland Revenue IR for the future – Te Pae Tawhiti (August 2016). 
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taxpayers’ compliance is affected by their perceptions of tax dispute resolution.89 As noted 
above, under s 6A of the TAA 1994, in the collection of taxes, the NZ Commissioner is required 
to have regard to, inter alia, the importance of promoting compliance, especially voluntary 
compliance, by all taxpayers with the Inland Revenue Acts. This perhaps suggests that there 
may be some recognition, albeit through legislation, that a well-functioning dispute resolution 
system (as envisaged by the Richardson Committee), can potentially contribute towards 
enhancing voluntary taxpayer compliance.  
 
Nevertheless, the development of the dispute resolution system is not an aspect which is 
specifically addressed in Inland Revenue’s current Statement of Intent, 90 which sets out Inland 
Revenue’s strategic intentions for the next four years. However, the tax dispute resolution 
system is mentioned in Inland Revenue’s current Business Transformation programme which 
forms part of the NZ Government’s current tax policy work programme.91 The Business 
Transformation programme is a multi-year, multi-stage change programme seeking to 
“modernise New Zealand's tax service to make it simpler and faster for New Zealanders to pay 
their taxes and give more certainty that they'll receive their entitlements.”92 The programme 
involves changes that “will simplify and streamline [Inland Revenue’s] business processes, 
policies and customer services as well as upgrade [Inland Revenue’s] technology platform.”93 
Inland Revenue acknowledge that “a quicker and more efficient tax administration requires a 
look at some of the tax system’s key regimes and underpinning rules in the Tax Administration 
Act.”94 Thus, the avenues for taxpayers to seek advice from Inland Revenue and procedures 
for resolving disputes “will necessitate some change … but the degree of change is still to be 
determined.”95 
 
However, with respect to the integration of ADR within the organisation, as noted under DSD 
Principle 12, Inland Revenue appear to be reluctant in considering the use of any further forms 
of ADR (other than the current conference facilitation process) within the NZ tax dispute 
resolution procedures.96 
 
                                                          
89 Organisational Review Committee, above n 85, at [10]. 
90 Inland Revenue Statement of Intent 2016-20 (B-23 SOI, July 2016). 
91 The NZ Government’s current tax policy work programme is available on Inland Revenue’s Policy and Strategy 
group’s website at: <http://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
92 Inland Revenue “Business transformation: About Business transformation” (6 September 2016) 
<http://www.ird.govt.nz/transformation/about-business-transformation/about-business-transformation-
index.html> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
93 Inland Revenue, above n 92. 
94 Inland Revenue Making Tax Simpler – Towards a New Tax Administration Act: A Government Discussion 
Document (November 2015) at 66. 
95 At 66. 
96 See Tubb, above n 73, at 154. 
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(14) There is evaluation of the system 
Taxpayers can provide general feedback (for the potential evaluation of the system) on Inland 
Revenue’s “products and services” (which theoretically encompasses feedback on the dispute 
resolution procedures) through the completion of an online form on Inland Revenue’s 
website.97 Also, as noted under DSD Principle 4, there is a mechanism for taxpayers to provide 
feedback (for evaluation) specifically on their experiences with Inland Revenue’s facilitated 
conferences through a survey form provided to participants at the end of facilitated conference 
meetings. 
 
External evaluation and scrutiny of the system is provided by commentators, practitioners and 
professional bodies such as CA-ANZ (or the former NZICA) and NZLS through their various 
submissions made to Inland Revenue and the NZ Treasury on the operation of the tax dispute 
resolution process.98 External evaluation of the dispute resolution system can also potentially 
occur through performance audits conducted by the Controller and Auditor-General.99 In 
addition, evaluation of the dispute resolution system is provided by the annual IR Satisfaction 
Survey administered by CA-ANZ and Tax Management New Zealand (TMNZ) to CA-ANZ 
members in NZ. Since 2012 a section on members’ experiences with the tax dispute resolution 
process has been included in this survey. However, the findings from these surveys are 
arguably somewhat limited as the percentage of members surveyed which have been involved 
in the dispute resolution process in the 12-month period prior to the surveys has typically been 
low.100 
 
Evaluation of the dispute resolution procedures is also included as part of various 
comprehensive reviews conducted on the NZ tax administration system. Examples of such 
reviews include the Organisational Review of the Inland Revenue Department in 1994101 and 
                                                          
97 Inland Revenue, “Get it done online: Comments and feedback” <https://www.ird.govt.nz/online-
services/service-name/services-c/online-provide-comment.html?id=righttabs> (last accessed 7 November 2016).  
98 See, for example, Taxation Committee of the New Zealand Law Society and National Tax Committee of the 
New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants The Disputes Resolution Procedures in Part IVA of the Tax 
Administration Act 1994 and the Challenge Procedures in Part VIIIA of the Tax Administration Act 1994, above 
n 12; Taxation Committee of the New Zealand Law Society and National Tax Committee of the New Zealand 
Institute of Chartered Accountants Disputes: A Review, July 2010, above n 12; Taxation Committee of the New 
Zealand Law Society and National Tax Committee of the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants 
“Submission to the Finance and Expenditure Committee on the Taxation (Tax Administration and Remedial 
Matters) Bill”, above n 12. 
99 To date, the Controller and Auditor-General has not evaluated the NZ tax dispute resolution system in its 
entirety. 
100 For example, in the 12-month period prior to the 2015 survey, only 13 per cent of the members surveyed had 
been involved in the dispute resolution process. See Colmar Brunton, above n 67. 
101 Organisational Review Committee, above n 85. 
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the Report to the Treasurer and Minister of Revenue - By a Committee of Experts on Tax 
Compliance in 1998.102 
 
4.3 Australia 
4.3.1 The tax dispute resolution procedures 
As indicated in Figure 4.3, tax disputes in Australia can arise when a taxpayer disagrees with 
an amended assessment issued by the ATO following an audit or post-assessment review of a 
taxpayer’s affairs. The steps in the tax dispute resolution procedures which then follow include: 
 
 An objection lodged by the taxpayer; 
 The ATO’s internal objection decision either allowing or disallowing the 
taxpayer’s objection; and 
 If the objection is disallowed the taxpayer may file an application for appeal or 
review in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT)103 or the Federal Court of 
Australia. 
 
In addition, as shown in Figure 4.3, ADR may be utilised by the parties as a means of resolving 
disputes generally at any stage of the dispute process.104 Parties can also be referred to ADR in 
the AAT or the Federal Court of Australia.105 Furthermore, as indicated in Figure 4.3, the ATO 
offers in-house facilitation (a specifically-developed ATO ADR program for smaller and less 
complex disputes)106 at the audit and objection stages of the dispute procedures and an 
independent review process for large business taxpayers (an ATO early dispute resolution 
process for taxpayers with an annual turnover of more than $A250 million)107 at the audit stage. 
A more detailed description of the Australian dispute resolution procedures and its related 
features is contained in Appendix 1.2 of this thesis.  
                                                          
102 Committee of Tax Experts A Report to the Treasurer and Minister of Revenue – By a Committee of Experts on 
Tax Compliance (Wellington, 1998). 
103 All applications in the AAT about tax decisions are managed in the Taxation and Commercial Division. 
104 For further details, see section 1.2.2.1 of Appendix 1.2 of this thesis. 
105 For further details, see section 1.2.3 of Appendix 1.2 of this thesis. 
106 For further details, see section 1.2.2.2 of Appendix 1.2 of this thesis. 
107 For further details, see section 1.2.4.2 of Appendix 1.2 of this thesis. 
120 
 




Dissatisfied taxpayer may file for review or 










on a question 
of law 
The ATO is committed to using 
Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR) at any stage, where 
appropriate, to resolve disputes 
ADR in the 
AAT 
ADR in the 
Federal Court of 
Australia 
ATO In-House Facilitation Process 
Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 
Independent Review Process 
 
ATO In-House Facilitation Process 
Key: 
Formal dispute resolution process 




4.3.2 Evaluation using dispute systems design principles 
(1) Stakeholders are included in the design process 
The ATO involves stakeholders in the design process in various ways such as in the pilot testing 
of ATO ADR processes (for example, the ATO’s in-house ADR facilitation pilot) and through 
seeking stakeholders’ views on their experiences with ADR in tax disputes with the ATO (for 
example, the Australian Centre for Justice Innovation’s (ACJI) Evaluating Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in Taxation Disputes user experience survey).1 Both of the above design-related 
initiatives involving stakeholders are examples of one-off fixed-life ATO initiatives which 
originated from recommendations made by the Inspector-General of Taxation (IGT) in his 
Review into the Australian Taxation Office’s Use of Early and Alternative Dispute Resolution 
in 2012.2 
 
The ATO also involves stakeholders in the design process through consultation with groups 
such as the Dispute Resolution Working Group which was formed in December 2013 to consult 
on specific strategies around dispute prevention and early resolution of disputes. The 
membership of this consultative group includes representatives from the main tax professional 
associations, the Law Council of Australia, the Federal Court of Australia, the AAT, 
academics, industry, the Attorney-General’s Department and senior ATO officers. The 
National Tax Liaison Group (NTLG), the ATO’s peak consultative forum for tax practitioners 
and other intermediaries, is also involved in the design process. The NTLG comprises of 
representatives of the major tax, law, superannuation and accounting professional associations 
and senior members of the ATO. Among other things, the NTLG was consulted with during 
the implementation of the ATO’s independent review process and in the revision and updating 
of Practice Statement Law Administration 2013/3 (PS LA 2013/3).3 There is also ATO 
consultation with the Legal Practitioner’s Round Table which has representatives from the Law 
Council of Australia, all State and Territory law societies and bar associations, law firms and 
the Australian Corporate Lawyers Association. 
 
In addition, a range of stakeholders are included in the design process through inquiries on the 
tax dispute resolution process conducted by parliamentary committees and through reviews of 
and submissions sought on the tax dispute resolution process by independent statutory bodies. 
For example, various reviews conducted by the IGT have drawn submissions from a wide range 
                                                          
1 See Tania Sourdin and Alan Shanks Evaluating Alternative Dispute Resolution in Taxation Disputes: Final 
Report (Australian Centre for Justice Innovation, Monash University, 23 February 2015). 
2 Inspector-General of Taxation, Review into the Australian Taxation Office’s Use of Early and Alternative 
Dispute Resolution: A report to the Assistant Treasurer (Sydney, May 2012) at 44, [3.99] and 95, [5.93]. 
3 Australian Taxation Office “Practice Statement Law Administration 2013/3: Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR) in ATO Disputes” (2013) <http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?locid='PSR/PS20133/NAT/ATO'> (last 
accessed 7 November 2016) [“PS LA 2013/3”]. 
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of stakeholders including taxpayers, tax practitioners and their representative bodies, dispute 
resolution experts and members of the judiciary.4 The IGT has also consulted with ATO 
representatives and met with interested taxpayers, tax practitioners and their respective 
representative bodies as well as legal experts and dispute resolution practitioners as part of 
these reviews.  
 
(2) The system has multiple options for addressing conflict including interests, 
rights and power-based processes 
The Australian tax dispute resolution system has multiple options for addressing conflict. These 
are generally as follows. The ATO encourage disputes to be resolved through direct negotiation 
with the ATO officer involved in the dispute in the first instance. If the dispute cannot be 
resolved through negotiation, the taxpayer may lodge a formal objection with the ATO where 
the decision is internally reviewed by a different ATO officer. If the taxpayer is dissatisfied 
with the internal review outcome they may then utilise rights-based processes through 
proceeding to litigation in either the AAT or the Federal Court of Australia. As provided by PS 
LA 2013/3, ADR processes are generally available at any stage of the dispute process 
including: “after the ATO issues a position paper during an audit; during a review at the 
objection stage before a final decision is made by an ATO officer; or during the litigation 
stage.”5 These ADR processes include both interest-based procedures (for example, facilitation 
and mediation) and rights-based procedures (for example, early neutral evaluation (ENE)). The 
system also offers certain taxpayers the option to resolve disputes using ATO dispute resolution 
programs available at specific points of the dispute process. These include: ATO in-house 
facilitation, an interests-based ADR process available at the audit and objection stages for 
indirect tax, small business and individual market disputes; and a rights-based ATO 
independent review process available at the audit stage for large business taxpayers. Interests 
and rights-based ADR processes (for example, conferencing, conciliation, mediation and ENE) 
are further available for disputes reaching the AAT and the Federal Court of Australia.6  
 
(3) The system provides for loops backward and forward 
Loop-backs in the dispute process are provided for in the respect that ADR options are 
theoretically available at all stages of the Australian dispute resolution process. In this regard, 
the ADR processes available at the litigation stage before a hearing in the AAT or the Federal 
Court of Australia provide examples of loop-backs from rights-based to interests-based 
processes. A loop-back may also occur following the lodgment of an objection by a taxpayer 
                                                          
4 See Inspector-General of Taxation, above n 2; Inspector-General of Taxation Review into the Underlying Causes 
and the Management of Objections to Tax Office Decisions (Sydney, April 2009); Inspector-General of Taxation 
The Management of Tax Disputes: A Report to the Assistant Treasurer (Sydney, January 2015).  
5 Australian Taxation Office “PS LA 2013/3”, above n 3, at [17]. 
6 The review process for cases in the AAT ordinarily includes conferencing and further forms of ADR such as 
mediation, conciliation, case appraisal and neutral evaluation. 
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where the parties might agree to participate in ENE before the ATO’s objection decision is 
issued. In this process the ADR practitioner gives advice to the parties about the likely outcome 
if the matter were to proceed to the AAT or the Federal Court of Australia and as a result, the 
parties may negotiate an agreement based on the advice received.  
 
The early assessment and resolution (EAR) process applied to all cases in the AAT also 
constitutes a loop-back mechanism in the respect that the focus of the process is to identify 
cases in the AAT which can be preferably be resolved through direct negotiation (without the 
need for an AAT hearing).7 Given that taxpayers must go through the ATO’s internal review 
process before appealing an ATO decision externally to the AAT or the Federal Court of 
Australia, taxpayers are unable to loop-forward in the formal Australian tax dispute resolution 
process.8 
 
(4) There is notification before and feedback after the resolution process 
Notification is built into the dispute resolution process through the ATO’s Taxpayer’s Charter 
which requires the ATO to clearly stipulate its decision to the taxpayer, provide an explanation 
of its reasons for the decision and inform the taxpayer of their rights and obligations in relation 
to the decision.9 Other ATO initiatives such as its compliance strategy, which is outlined in 
“Building Confidence”, also provide a form of notification.10 This web-based resource delivers 
messages to the community about the emerging risks and issues which the ATO see in the tax 
and superannuation system and what the ATO intend to do about them. Hence, this acts to 
highlight recent developments in ATO compliance activities and risk areas where potential 
disputes may arise. ATO Decision Impact Statements, which are succinct statements of the 
Australian Commissioner of Taxation’s (the Australian Commissioner’s) response to 
significant cases decided by the courts or tribunal, provide a further example of notification in 
the dispute resolution process. They serve to advise the community of the ATO’s view on the 
implications of a particular court or tribunal decision.11 
 
                                                          
7 Australian Taxation Office “Early assessment and resolution” (26 May 2014) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Dispute-or-object-to-an-ATO-decision/In-detail/Avoiding-and-resolving-
disputes/Litigation/Early-assessment-and-resolution/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). For further details see 
also, section 1.2.4.3 of Appendix 1.2 of this thesis. 
8 As defined in chapter 2, section 2.5.3 of this thesis, a loop-forward mechanism allows parties to move directly 
to a rights or power-based procedure without having to go through all of the earlier processes. However, as 
indicated above, this is not a feature of the Australian system (but loop-back procedures are). 
9 Australian Taxation Office Taxpayer’s Charter – What you need to know (Canberra, June 2010) at 14. 
10 Australian Taxation Office “Building confidence” (29 October 2015) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Building-confidence/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). Building Confidence 
is the new name for what was known as Compliance in Focus, and before that, the Compliance Program. 
11 ATO Decision Impact Statements, listed by calendar year, are available from the ATO’s Legal Database on the 
ATO’s website: Australian Taxation Office “Legal database” <https://www.ato.gov.au/law/#Law> (last accessed 
7 November 2016). 
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Systemic feedback occurs through general statistics provided on the ATO’s website with 
respect to “Resolving disputes”, “Compliance activity and objections”, and “Litigation 
statistics”.12 Feedback and analysis at the systemic level is also evident in the ATO annual 
report which typically includes a separate section that reports on “Resolving disputes.”13  
 
Feedback at the micro-level on specific ATO dispute resolution programs is provided in the 
respect that following the completion of ATO dispute resolution programs such as in-house 
facilitation and ATO independent review, taxpayers are invited to complete a feedback form 
on the process and at the end of an ATO independent review, a thorough debrief involving all 
participants is conducted. The feedback received is used to improve processes. Internal 
feedback on ADR also occurs through maintenance of the ATO’s internal ADR register in 
which ATO staff are required to record details of all matters in which an externally facilitated 
ADR process is undertaken. 
 
(5) The system has a person or persons who function as internal independent 
confidential neutral(s) 
There is no internal independent confidential neutral in the ATO whom taxpayers can go to for 
coaching, referring and problem-solving. However, taxpayers can seek advice externally on 
dispute resolution from professional advisors at their own expense. This would be similar to 
taxpayers having to engage professional advisors on tax technical matters in relation to tax 
disputes. The ATO has established an ADR Network which consists of senior ATO officers 
who have knowledge and experience of working with ADR matters. The ADR Network are 
available to provide guidance and mentoring support to ATO case officers on the use of ADR 
techniques and strategies and would thus function as internal independent confidential neutrals 
for ATO case officers. The names of the network’s members are published on the ATO’s 
intranet.14 
 
(6) Procedures are ordered from low to high cost 
The formal dispute procedures are ordered in a low to high cost sequence in the respect that 
there is the opportunity for direct negotiation in the first instance, followed by the ATO’s 
internal review process and then external review or appeal to the AAT or the Federal Court of 
                                                          
12 See Australian Taxation Office “Resolving disputes” (31 August 2015) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Dispute-or-object-to-an-ATO-decision/In-detail/Statistics/Resolving-
disputes/> (last accessed 7 November 2016); Australian Taxation Office “Compliance activity and objections” 
(19 May 2014) <https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Dispute-or-object-to-an-ATO-decision/In-
detail/Statistics/Compliance-activity-and-objections/> (last accessed 7 November 2016); and Australian Taxation 
Office “Litigation statistics” (27 May 2014) <https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Dispute-or-object-to-an-ATO-
decision/In-detail/Statistics/Litigation-statistics/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
13 See, for example, Australian Taxation Office Commissioner of Taxation Annual Report 2014-15 (Canberra, 
October 2015) at 59-62; Australian Taxation Office Commissioner of Taxation Annual Report 2015-16 (Canberra, 
October 2016) at 46-48. 
14 Inspector-General of Taxation, above n 2, at 15, [2.28]. 
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Australia respectively. This sequence generally implies an increase in costs at each level, 
particularly when the dispute is escalated to a tribunal or court. However, the option to employ 
ADR potentially at any stage of the dispute process adds further costs at the stage at which 
ADR is utilised in the dispute process. Although, if the dispute is settled at that stage, then 
parties do not subsequently have to move further up the sequence to higher cost processes.  
 
While the DSD literature suggests that there should be an increase in costs at each level in order 
to increase the pressure for a negotiated outcome at an early stage,15 it is worth noting that in 
the context of the Australian tax dispute resolution procedures, the low to high cost sequence 
impacts differently on different types of taxpayers. For small taxpayers there may be a 
noticeable increase in costs at each level, particularly if they pursue informal processes and/or 
recourse to the AAT or the Federal Court of Australia.16 However, it has been observed that 
rather than increasing the pressure for a negotiated outcome at an early stage, the increasing 
incremental costs may in fact form a deterrent for small taxpayers in pursuing tax disputes at 
all and therefore, a barrier to social justice.17 Whereas for large taxpayers, whatever the 
minimal difference in costs to them between the levels is unlikely to increase the pressure for 
a negotiated outcome and deciding which recourse to pursue is likely to be a strategic-based 
and commercial decision rather than costs-based.18  
 
Furthermore, similar to the NZ tax dispute resolution process (discussed in section 4.2.2 
above), notwithstanding the apparent low to high cost sequence of the formal dispute 
procedures, the Australian tax dispute resolution process can require substantial upfront costs 
from the taxpayer (for example, the time spent by the taxpayer in preparing for, and 
participating in negotiations as well as the cost of professional advisors). Professional advice 
and assistance costs, if incurred, generally represent the bulk of the monetary costs to 
taxpayers.19 This may serve as a further barrier, particularly for small taxpayers, as it is usually 
necessary for taxpayers in tax disputes to have their positions worked out from the beginning. 
 
(7) The system has multiple access points  
The formal dispute process commences when a taxpayer lodges an objection with the ATO. 
Thus, structurally the formal dispute process has only one entry point to the system. An 
objection must be lodged in writing and procedurally, taxpayers can either use the form 
                                                          
15 William L Ury, Jeanne M Brett and Stephen B Goldberg Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut 
the Costs of Conflict (Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, first published 1988, 
1993 ed) at 62-63. 
16 Sheena Mookhey “Tax disputes system design” (2013) 11 EJTR 79 at 91. 
17 At 91. 
18 At 91.  
19 Binh Tran-Nam and Michael Walpole “Independent tax dispute resolution and social justice in Australia” (2012) 
35(2) UNSWLJ 470 at 488. 
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provided by the ATO or write a letter. There are further multiple procedural ways in which 
taxpayers can enter the system in the respect that objections can be lodged by fax, post, hand 
delivered to an ATO shopfront or lodged online.  
 
The Australian dispute resolution procedures offer a choice of access persons to whom certain 
system users can approach in the first instance in the respect that the ATO offer a range of 
support services to help people from non-English speaking backgrounds, Indigenous 
Australians and people with disabilities. For example, people from non-English speaking 
backgrounds can phone the Translating and Interpreting Service for help with their calls or if 
they want to speak to an ATO officer in their preferred language, Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people can ring the ATO’s Indigenous Helpline which specialises in helping 
indigenous clients with a range of matters, and people who are deaf or have a hearing or speech 
impairment can contact the ATO through the National Relay Service.20 While these services 
provide a choice of persons for certain taxpayers to contact the ATO generally, they arguably 
also may serve to provide a choice of access persons to approach for certain taxpayers to 
acquire information about the disputes system in the first instance. 
 
Multiple forms of access to the system for certain taxpayers are further provided in the respect 
that certain information to help people from non-English speaking backgrounds is available on 
the ATO’s website in a range of different languages.21 Some of this information may be 
relevant to the disputes system and how to access it. 
 
(8) The system includes training and education for stakeholders 
The ATO’s webpage “Dispute or object to an ATO decision” provides information on the 
options available to taxpayers where they disagree with a decision that the ATO have made 
about their tax affairs.22 Links are provided to further pages that provide information on, inter 
alia, how to object to an ATO decision, seek an external review of an ATO decision and other 
options for resolving disputes, including ADR, in-house facilitation, litigation and settlement.  
 
The ATO further provides a range of information concerning ADR. PS LA 2013/3 provides 
guidance and instructions for ATO personnel on what policies and guidelines must be followed 
when attempting to resolve or limit disputes by means of ADR.23 It also explains the ATO’s 
                                                          
20 See Australian Taxation Office “Phone us” (1 November 2016) <https://www.ato.gov.au/about-ato/about-
us/contact-us/phone-us/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
21 See Australian Taxation Office “Other languages” (3 August 2016) <https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Other-
languages/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
22 See Australian Taxation Office “Dispute or object to an ATO decision” (27 January 2016) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Dispute-or-object-to-an-ATO-decision/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
23 Australian Taxation Office “PS LA 2013/3”, above n 3. See also, Australian Taxation Office “Practice 
Statement Law Administration 2009/9: Conduct of ATO litigation and engagement of ATO Dispute Resolution” 
(2009) <http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?DocID=PSR/PS20099/NAT/ATO/00001> (last accessed 7 
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obligations and approach with respect to ADR. PS LA 2013/3 is made publically available for 
other interested stakeholders, including taxpayers and their advisors, on the ATO’s website. 
The ATO plain English guide to alternative dispute resolution on the ATO’s website is a guide 
which explains in simple language, dispute resolution, ADR and the types of ADR processes 
that are used in tax and superannuation disputes, and also provides links to other ADR 
resources internal and external to the ATO.24 In addition, other documents such as the ATO’s 
Disputes Policy,25 Dispute Management Plan26 and Code of Settlement27 provide information 
on the ATO’s approach towards dispute resolution and the settlement of tax disputes. 
 
In relation to the training in ADR of various ATO staff involved in dispute resolution, the ATO 
state that ATO case officers may, but do not always, have training in negotiation from an in-
house training provider.28 Nevertheless, as part of the ATO’s current “Reinventing the ATO” 
project, which aims to transform the ATO into a “contemporary and service-orientated 
organisation”,29 a number of ATO frontline staff are now “undergoing training on how to better 
communicate with taxpayers during disputes.”30 ATO in-house facilitators have the equivalent 
of five days of mediation training, externally provided by either Resolution Institute or the 
Australian Disputes Centre (ADC).31 The ATO state that their facilitators are not required to 
be accredited mediators as this would entail a registration cost and an ongoing continuing 
professional development (CPD) requirement.32  
                                                          
November 2016) [“PS LA 2009/9”] which includes ATO policies and guidelines on ADR when matters are in 
litigation. 
24 See Australian Taxation Office “ATO plain English guide to alternative dispute resolution” (1 June 2015) 
<http://www.ato.gov.au/About-ATO/About-us/In-detail/Key-documents/ATO-plain-English-guide-to-
alternative-dispute-resolution/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
25 See Australian Taxation Office “Disputes policy” (7 September 2015) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Dispute-or-object-to-an-ATO-decision/In-detail/Avoiding-and-resolving-
disputes/Resolving-disputes/Disputes-policy/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). For further details see also, 
section 1.4.2.1 of Appendix 1.2 of this thesis. 
26 Australian Taxation Office Dispute management plan 2013-14 (Canberra, January 2014). For further details 
see also, section 1.4.2.1 of Appendix 1.2 of this thesis. 
27 Australian Taxation Office “Code of settlement” (18 August 2015) <https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Dispute-
or-object-to-an-ATO-decision/In-detail/Avoiding-and-resolving-disputes/Settlement/Code-of-settlement/> (last 
accessed 7 November 2016) and Australian Taxation Office “Practice Statement Law Administration 2015/1: 
Code of settlement” (2015) 
<http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?docid=%22PSR%2FPS20151%2FNAT%2FATO%2F00001%22> (last 
accessed 7 November 2016) [“PS LA 2015/1”]. 
28 Email from [redacted] (Senior Principal Lawyer, [redacted], Australian Taxation Office) to Melinda Jone 
regarding ATO ADR staff training (9 June 2014).  
29 See Australian Taxation Office “Reinventing the ATO” (16 September 2016) <https://www.ato.gov.au/About-
ATO/About-us/Reinventing-the-ATO/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
30 Nassim Khadem “ATO seeks to make tax disputes resolution more cordial” Sydney Morning Herald (online ed, 
Sydney, 20 July 2015). 
31 Email from [redacted] (Director, [redacted], Australian Taxation Office) to Melinda Jone regarding ATO 
facilitator training and accreditation (24 March 2016). 
32 Email from [redacted] (Senior Principal Lawyer, [redacted], Australian Taxation Office), above n 28. 
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The IGT’s Review into the Australian Taxation Office’s Use of Early and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in 2012 recommended that the ATO should develop a targeted suite of training 
products (focusing on early identification of potential issues in dispute, and negotiation and 
conflict management skills) with the relevant ATO staff being required to complete the above 
targeted training as part of their performance development agreements.33 Consequently, the 
ATO Learning and Development team have developed a Dispute Management curriculum 
which “supports managers in ensuring that staff members are provided the necessary training 
identified through the personal development agreement process.”34 The curriculum was 
implemented in August 2014 and is supported by a number of supplementary resources 
including articles, videos, books, journals and web-based material.35  
 
(9) Assistance is offered for choosing the best process 
The ATO provide various forms of guidance and assistance with respect to choosing ADR 
processes. PS LA 2013/3 provides guidelines on the use of ADR and describes circumstances 
when ADR may or may not be appropriate.36 The disputes system includes process advisors in 
the respect that ATO’s Review and Dispute Resolution (RDR) business line is responsible for 
administering ADR processes and policies, and providing advice on ADR and its availability.37 
Furthermore, requests for ADR by either the ATO officer involved in the dispute or the 
taxpayer, must be reviewed as to their appropriateness for ADR by the relevant ATO 
manager(s) and ATO technical staff (including RDR officers).38 
 
The early engagement process for large business taxpayers assists in the selection of processes 
prior to the commencement of the formal dispute process (that is, prior to the lodgement of any 
objection).39 The early engagement process provides an opportunity for taxpayers to meet with 
ATO staff in order to discuss the best way to deal with a correction or change to a large business 
tax return. The process assists large business taxpayers in deciding whether to request an 
amendment (use the amendment process) or lodge an objection (use the dispute resolution 
process).  
                                                          
33 Inspector-General of Taxation, above n 2, at 47. 
34 Australian Taxation Office “Review into the ATO’s use of ADR: Recommendation 3.7” (13 November 2014) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/About-ATO/Access,-accountability-and-reporting/In-detail/Inspector-General-of-
Taxation/Review-into-the-ATO-s-use-of-ADR/?anchor=Recommendation37#Recommendation37> (last 
accessed 7 November 2016). 
35 Australian Taxation Office, above n 34. 
36 Australian Taxation Office “PS LA 2013/3”, above n 3, at [7]-[9]. 
37 Email from [redacted] (Senior Principal Lawyer, [redacted], Australian Taxation Office) to Melinda Jone 
regarding ATO ADR (21 July 2014). 
38 Australian Taxation Office “PS LA 2013/3”, above n 3, at [20]-[21]. 
39 See Australian Taxation Office “Early engagement – what to expect” (5 October 2016). 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/Business/Large-business/Objections-and-amendments/Early-engagement---what-to-




(10) Disputants have the right to choose a preferred process 
As noted above, taxpayers must go through the ATO’s internal review process before appealing 
externally to the AAT or the Federal Court of Australia. Therefore, taxpayers are unable to 
choose a preferred process at the very outset of a dispute. However, disputants are able to 
choose a preferred process in the respect that ADR is generally available at any stage of the 
dispute process. This feature means that the Australian dispute process is multi-option in the 
regard that disputants are able to select between the formal dispute process and ADR processes 
at any stage where appropriate. Furthermore, if an ADR process is unable to resolve a dispute 
in whole or in part, taxpayers’ review and appeal rights in the formal dispute process are 
unaffected by their participation in ADR, subject to the terms of any settlement reached and 
compliance with the legislative timeframes. In the Federal Court of Australia parties also have 
the option of requesting that a matter be referred to mediation, either court-annexed (through a 
registrar) or a private mediation, prior to commencing formal court proceedings.40 
 
In addition, there was formerly the option for certain taxpayers to choose a preferred process 
in the AAT in the respect that where the amount of tax in dispute was under $5,000, qualifying 
taxpayers could elect to have disputes dealt with (less formally) in the Small Taxation Claims 
Tribunal (STCT) instead of the Taxation Appeals Division (TAD) of the AAT.41 However, 
pursuant to the Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015 (Cth), from 1 July 2015, the concept of the 
STCT no longer exists and all applications to the AAT about tax decisions are now managed 
in the new Taxation and Commercial Division.42 
 
(11) The system is fair and perceived as fair 
Perceptions of fairness of the operation of the Australian tax dispute resolution system has been 
an ongoing topic of concern highlighted in various reviews and inquiries on dispute resolution 
in the ATO. The IGT’s Review into the Australian Taxation Office’s Use of Early and 
Alternative Dispute Resolution43 in 2012 highlighted mixed views on the operation of the tax 
dispute resolution system and the ATO’s use of ADR. The IGT’s report found that in some 
instances, the ATO’s dispute resolution processes were seen as working well, with senior staff 
appropriately engaged, issues identified and ADR processes employed to address and resolve 
specific cases.44 However, in other cases, some taxpayers’ experiences appeared to be varied 
with officers appearing uncertain of their ability or authority to engage in discussions with 
taxpayers to address concerns and resolve disputes early in the process.45  
                                                          
40 Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 28.02. 
41 For further details on the former STCT, see section 1.2.1 of Appendix 1.2 of this thesis. 
42 Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015 (Cth), s 27. 
43 Inspector-General of Taxation, above n 2. 
44 At v. 
45 At v. 
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More recently, on 2 June 2014, the then Acting Assistant Treasurer, Senator the Hon Mathias 
Cormann, referred an Inquiry into Tax Disputes (the Inquiry) to the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Tax and Revenue (the Committee).46 The Inquiry was initiated because 
stakeholders and taxpayers had expressed concern that the ATO did not always use its powers 
in a judicious manner and did not always treat taxpayers fairly and with respect.47 The 
Committee’s Inquiry focused on small taxpayers and individuals with annual turnovers of up 
to $A250 million. The Committee requested the IGT to conduct a similar inquiry concerning 
large taxpayers and high wealth individuals.48 
 
The Committee found that adverse outcomes in some ATO disputes arose from a combination 
of factors. These included that the ATO has strong powers, it does not always engage with 
taxpayers (or demonstrate that it is listening to taxpayers’ arguments), and there has not been 
clear separation between the investigative and review functions within the ATO.49 
Accordingly, the risk was that a taxpayer may not have a fair hearing, or at least perceive that 
this had been the case, until their matter proceeded to the AAT.50 Such a course involved 
substantial time and expense. Moreover, the Committee received evidence that “once the ATO 
decides a taxpayer has an outstanding liability, the balance of power in SME disputes is very 
much in favour of the ATO.”51 This balance of power exists at the legal, commercial, and 
emotional levels and raised the question of whether these taxpayers withdraw from disputes 
due to attrition.52  
 
Among other things, the Committee supported the recommendation made in a report by the 
IGT53 for the creation of a separate Appeals Group within the ATO, led by a new independent 
Second Commissioner responsible for managing tax disputes for all taxpayers.54 Hence, partly 
in response to the findings from the Inquiry, effective from 1 July 2015, all objections to the 
ATO now come under the purview of the ATO’s RDR business line (headed by the Deputy 
Commissioner) which is separate from the Client Engagement (formerly known as 
Compliance) and Tax Counsel areas of the ATO. 
                                                          
46 For the Committee’s report, see House of Representatives Standing Committee on Tax and Revenue Tax 
Disputes (Canberra, March 2015). 
47 At vii. 
48 For the IGT’s report, see Inspector-General of Taxation The Management of Tax Disputes: A Report to the 
Assistant Treasurer, above n 4. 
49 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Tax and Revenue, above n 46, at vii. 
50 At vii. 
51 At 7, [1.25]. 
52 At 7-8, [1.25].  
53 Inspector-General of Taxation The Management of Tax Disputes: A Report to the Assistant Treasurer, above n 
4, at viii. 
54 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Tax and Revenue, above n 46, at 18, [6.128]. 
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With respect to stakeholder perceptions of fairness of particular ATO dispute resolution 
processes, there appear to be mixed findings. The ATO’s ADR facilitation pilot found that 
taxpayers were “generally comfortable” with having an ATO officer as a facilitator and only 
one case in the pilot expressed concerns over the lack of independence of the facilitator.55 
However, current anecdotal evidence suggests that stakeholders (both within the ATO and in 
the taxpayer community) are still reluctant to try the ATO’s internal ADR program.56 In 
relation to fairness perceptions of the ATO’s independent review process, the ATO state that 
“feedback has been consistently positive about the level of independence, the service provided, 
and the process and the professionalism of the reviewers.”57 Yet, on the other hand 
commentators have observed that “while the Tax Office thinks it is working beautifully, tax 
advisers don’t think it is independent enough.”58 
 
The ACJI’s Evaluating Alternative Dispute Resolution in Taxation Disputes user experience 
survey, which primarily examined ADR processes such as mediation and conciliation in the 
AAT, reported that in terms of participants’ perceptions of the impartiality of the ADR process, 
over 90 per cent of those surveyed considered that both sides in the ADR process had been 
treated “equally.”59 However, a small number of negative comments were made by survey 
respondents about participation and these were mainly linked to “behaviours within the ADR 
process.”60 That is, on a few occasions it was noted that “the ATO was critical of the taxpayer 
(or their representatives) or the taxpayer or their representative was concerned about ATO … 
behaviour.”61 This observation arguably appears to align with the above findings of the 
Committee in the Inquiry. 
 
(12) The system is supported by top managers 
Support and championship of a dispute resolution culture and an emphasis on the use of ADR 
have featured as recurring topics in various speeches made by current the Australian 
Commissioner, Chris Jordan.62 Since his appointment in 2013, the Australian Commissioner 
                                                          
55 Australian Taxation Office, GST Administration Annual Performance Report 2012-13 (Canberra, November 
2013) at 52. 
56 Email from [redacted] (A/g Assistant Commissioner, [redacted], Australian Taxation Office) to Melinda Jone 
regarding ATO dispute resolution (7 May 2015). See also, Nassim Khadem “ATO ‘cowboys’ culture ruined lives, 
inquiry told” Sydney Morning Herald (online ed, Sydney, 29 November 2014). 
57 Damien Browne and Ashley King “The latest on the ATO’s Management of Tax Audits and Disputes” (paper 
presented to The Tax Institute’s 30th National Convention, Gold Coast, 18-20 March 2015) at 21-22, [3.2.1]. 
58 Nassim Khadem, above n 56. 
59 Sourdin and Shanks, above n 1, at 50-51, [3.26]. 
60 At 46, [3.16]. 
61 At 46, [3.16]. 
62 The speeches of the current Australian Commissioner are available at the Media Centre on ATO’s website at: 
Australian Taxation Office “Media centre” <https://www.ato.gov.au/Media-centre/?sorttype=SortByType> (last 
accessed 7 November 2016). 
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has embarked on a project of “Reinventing the ATO” (as noted under DSD Principle 8).63 The 
way in which the ATO manages tax disputes has been one of his key focus areas.64 Hence, over 
recent years under his direction, the ATO has focused on dispute prevention, early resolution, 
and alternative methods for resolving matters including: early face-to-face or telephone 
engagement; the increased use of ADR, including the use of in-house facilitators; independent 
review for large business taxpayers; and sensible settlement guidelines.65 
 
Changes to the organisational structure of the ATO have also been made to give effect to the 
ATO’s aim of the earlier resolution of disputes, including through using ADR. A restructure 
of the ATO in 2013 reshaped the role of Second Commissioner Law to be responsible for the 
Law Design and Practice Group, which comprised of Integrated Tax Design, Tax Counsel 
Network and RDR.66 RDR, led by the Deputy Commissioner, has a particular focus on 
delivering new ways of undertaking specific activities which have included ATO wide 
responsibility for: resolving disputes earlier; championing the use of ADR to resolve disputes; 
establishing an independent review process for large business; and managing and improving 
the objections function.67 It follows that the Second Commissioner Law Design and Practice 
and the Deputy Commissioner, RDR, have also made a number of speeches and conference 
presentations on dispute resolution and ADR in the ATO.68  
 
(13) The system is aligned with the mission, vision and values of the organisation 
The disputes system is integrated into the organisation through various mechanisms including 
the Taxpayers’ Charter which outlines what taxpayers can expect when they deal with the ATO. 
The Taxpayers’ Charter provides that taxpayers have a right request a review of an ATO 
decision and also a right to make a complaint where they are not satisfied with the decisions 
services or actions of the ATO.69 
 
                                                          
63 See Australian Taxation Office, above n 29. 
64 Debbie Hastings “Reinventing the way we manage tax disputes” (speech to the Tax Institute of Australia 
Financial Services Conference 2015, Surfers Paradise, 20 February 2015). 
65 Chris Jordan “Reinventing the ATO” (speech to the Tax Institute’s 30th National Convention, Gold Coast, 18-
20 March 2015). 
66 The Law Design and Practice Group currently comprises of Policy, Analysis and Legislation, Tax Counsel 
Network and RDR. 
67 Australian Taxation Office “Submission on the Productivity Commission Inquiry: Access to Justice 
Arrangements” (12 February 2014) at 4, [11]. 
68 The speeches of the current Second Commissioner Law Design and Practice, Andrew Mills and the Deputy 
Commissioner, RDR, Debbie Hastings, are available at the Media Centre on ATO’s website at: Australian 
Taxation Office, above n 62. 
69 Australian Taxation Office, above n 9, at 11-12. 
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The ATO’s Dispute Management Plan70 outlines the ATO’s high-level framework for 
managing and resolving disputes. The ATO’s Disputes Policy71 is the supporting document 
that complements and provides the underpinning framework for the Dispute Management Plan. 
It also sets out the ATO’s principles for managing disputes. Together these documents are 
intended to provide a coordinated and consistent approach to dispute management within the 
ATO. The ATO’s objectives in managing its disputes with taxpayers, as outlined in its Disputes 
Policy and Dispute Management Plan, are:72  
 
 Faster and earlier resolution of disputes 
 Reduce the number of disputes 
 Lower your costs and our costs 
 Enhance our relationship with the community 
 Make your interactions with us easier. 
 
The ATO’s overall organisational mission, vision, values and goals are outlined in Figure 4.4: 
 
  
                                                          
70 Australian Taxation Office Dispute management plan 2013-14, above n 26. 
71 Australian Taxation Office, above n 25. 




Figure 4.4: The Australian Taxation Office’s Mission, Vision, Values and Goals73 
Mission 
 
We contribute to the economic and social wellbeing of Australians by fostering willing participation 




We are a leading tax and superannuation administration, known for our contemporary service, 








 Easy for people to participate 
 Contemporary and tailored service 
 Purposeful and respectful relationships 
 Professional and productive organisation. 
 
On comparing the ATO’s objectives for managing and resolving disputes with its mission, 
vision, values and goals, it appears that the dispute resolution objectives are generally 
consistent with the aspirations espoused by the ATO’s overall organisational mission, vision, 
values and goals. Promoting the earlier resolution of disputes is recognised as an important 
objective for the ATO. Resolving tax disputes earlier saves time and costs for taxpayers and 
the ATO, and also provides certainty for taxpayers. Early dispute resolution thus contributes to 
the ATO Mission, to “contribute to the economic and social wellbeing of Australians by 
fostering willing participation in our tax and superannuation systems.”74 The ATO uses a 
number of strategies and approaches to achieve this, including being “committed to using ADR 
where appropriate.”75  
 
The ATO’s obligations with respect to ADR also come from a further number of sources. The 
ATO’s model litigant obligations under the Attorney-General’s Legal Services Directions 2005 
(Cth) require the ATO to avoid, prevent and limit the scope of legal proceedings, including by 
                                                          
73 Australian Taxation Office “Vision, mission and values statement” (4 September 2014) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/About-ATO/About-us/In-detail/Strategic-direction/ATO-vision,-mission-and-values-
statement/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
74 Australian Taxation Office, above n 73. 
75 Australian Taxation Office “PS LA 2013/3”, above n 3, at [5]. 
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giving consideration to ADR before initiating legal proceedings.76 The Civil Disputes 
Resolution Act 2011 (Cth) also requires the ATO, as a party to a dispute, to take “genuine 
steps” to resolve a dispute before commencing proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia.77 
Genuine steps can include considering whether a dispute can be resolved using ADR.78 Under 
the ATO’s Code of Settlement, resolution of disputes by ADR may be appropriate as part of 
the “good management” of the tax system, overall fairness and best use of ATO resources.79 
 
The disputes system is further aligned with the mission, vision and values of the ATO in the 
respect that “resolving disputes” was first included as a focus area in the ATO’s Corporate Plan 
for 2014-1880 and there has been further inclusion of the topic in subsequent ATO Corporate 
Plans.81 The annually reviewed Corporate Plan sets out the ATO’s priorities for the years ahead 
in line with its mission, vision and values, with a specific focus on the next 12 months. In 
addition, as outlined under DSD Principle 12, the dispute resolution system, including the use 
of ADR, has been included within the organisation’s “Reinventing the ATO” project. 
 
(14) There is evaluation of the system 
There is provision for evaluation of the system in the respect that taxpayers can provide general 
feedback (compliments, complaints and suggestions) to the ATO through various means 
including online, by phone, fax or mail. In addition, following the completion of certain dispute 
resolution processes such as the ATO’s facilitation and independent review processes, 
participants are invited to complete a feedback form to capture their views on the process and 
to identify areas for improvement.  
 
The ATO regularly engage external market research companies to conduct surveys to monitor 
perceptions in the community generally, in the business community and among tax 
professionals about the way they administer the tax system and to gauge satisfaction levels 
with the way the ATO operate. Accordingly, evaluation of the dispute system is provided by 
those surveys which relate to stakeholder perceptions on, and satisfaction with, the tax dispute 
resolution system. For example, a quarterly survey is currently conducted to measure individual 
and small business taxpayers’ perceptions of fairness following the finalisation of their 
                                                          
76 Legal Services Directions 2005 (Cth), Appendix B, ss 5.1 and 2(e)(iii).  
77 Civil Disputes Resolution Act 2011 (Cth), ss 6 and 7 
78 Civil Disputes Resolution Act 2011 (Cth) s 4(1)(d). 
79 Australian Taxation Office “Code of settlement”, above n 27, at [3]; Australian Taxation Office “PS LA 
2015/1”, above n 27, at [3]. 
80 Australian Taxation Office Corporate plan 2014-18 (Canberra, June 2014) at 37-40. 
81 Australian Taxation Office Corporate plan 2015-19 (Canberra, July 2015) at 5; Australian Taxation Office 
Corporate plan 2016-17 (Canberra, August 2016) at 5. 
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objections.82 Evaluation of the system also occurs through one-off surveys or research projects 
commissioned by the ATO, such as the ACJI’s Evaluating Alternative Dispute Resolution in 
Taxation Disputes83 user experience survey conducted by an independent team of ADR experts 
at Monash University. 
 
Evaluation can further occur through reports issued on inquiries on tax disputes and the tax 
dispute resolution system conducted by parliamentary committees.84 In addition, evaluation of 
the dispute resolution system is provided by a number of government-appointed entities that 
examine various aspects relating to how the ATO administer Australia's tax and superannuation 
systems. These entities include the IGT,85 the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO)86 and 
formerly, the Commonwealth Ombudsman.87  
 
4.4 Summary of the Author’s Evaluations of New Zealand and Australia 
Utilising a case study methodology, this chapter has outlined, and then evaluated using DSD 
principles, the tax dispute resolution procedures of NZ and Australia. From a DSD perspective, 
the tax dispute resolution systems of NZ and Australia are similar in a number of respects. In 
both jurisdictions stakeholders are involved in the design process, there is notification before 
and feedback after the dispute resolution process, forms of training and education are provided 
to various stakeholders of the system, guidance or assistance is available for choosing 
appropriate processes and there are various mechanisms for evaluating the dispute resolution 
system. In addition, both systems have persons available to mentor and provide advice to 
revenue authority staff on dispute resolution or ADR techniques. However, the two systems do 
not provide equivalent persons which are available to mentor and provide advice on dispute 
resolution or ADR techniques for taxpayers. 
 
Both systems are deficient in the respect that they lack multiple structural access points. 
Taxpayers in both jurisdictions are not provided with the option of choosing between entering 
the system at the level of internal review and at the level of external appeal. As there is only 
one structural access point to the procedures, at the outset of a dispute taxpayers do not have 
                                                          
82 Australian Taxation Office “Taxpayer perceptions of fairness research” (30 September 2016) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/About-ATO/Research-and-statistics/In-detail/Annual-research/Perceptions-of-
Fairness-in-Disputes-survey/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
83 Sourdin and Shanks, above n 1. 
84 See, for example, House of Representatives Standing Committee on Tax and Revenue, above n 46. 
85 The IGT reviews potential systemic issues in tax administration and makes recommendations to Government 
for improvement. 
86 The ANAO conducts performance audits that examine the efficiency and effectiveness of ATO administration. 
87 The Commonwealth Ombudsman investigated complaints regarding the fairness of ATO actions and procedures 
and could independently review any aspect of ATO administration and make recommendations for improvement. 
However, from 1 May 2015, the tax complaint handling role of the Commonwealth Ombudsman was transferred 
to the IGT. 
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the option of by-passing the internal review process and entering the system at the external 
appeal level. 
 
The systems both provide multiple options in the procedures for addressing conflict, including 
direct negotiation, internal review, ADR processes and litigation. However, the NZ system 
differs in the respect that the procedures include the prescribed exchange of documents at 
certain stages before internal review is conducted by Inland Revenue’s DRU (NZ). The NZ 
system also differs in the respect that ADR is available as an option to taxpayers only through 
the choice of facilitation at the conference stage of the dispute procedures and potentially, in 
various forms, in the TRA and the High Court at the litigation stage. In comparison, in Australia 
taxpayers have the option of choosing to utilise ADR generally at any stage of the dispute 
procedures, including at the audit, objection and litigation stages.  
 
Notably, in both jurisdictions there was formerly the option for qualifying taxpayers with 
smaller value disputes to choose to have their disputes dealt with in small claims jurisdictions 
of the relevant review authority or tribunal. However, this option was abolished in NZ in 2011 
and in Australia in 2015. Although, in NZ, the opt-out for disputes meeting certain criteria 
(including where the total amount in dispute is $75,000 or less) arguably provides a limited 
option for certain (small) taxpayers to choose a truncated path in the dispute procedures. 
 
In both jurisdictions taxpayers typically incur high upfront costs in pursuing the dispute 
procedures as it is generally necessary for taxpayers in tax disputes to have their positions 
worked out from the outset of the dispute. Notwithstanding the abovementioned high upfront 
costs, the Australian procedures are arguably ordered in a low to high cost sequence. However, 
due to the relatively high costs associated with the prescribed exchange of documents occurring 
at certain stages during the procedures, the NZ procedures are not ordered in a low to high cost 
sequence.  
 
The Australian system provides loop-back mechanisms through ADR processes being 
theoretically available at all stages of the dispute process. However, the system does not 
provide taxpayers with the ability to loop-forward in the procedures. The potential availability 
to parties of certain forms of ADR in the TRA and the High Court at the litigation stage provide 
a form of loop-back mechanism in the NZ system. The NZ system also provides a limited loop-
forward mechanism through the potential availability of the taxpayer opt-out, from the full 
dispute process, after the conference phase.  
 
In both jurisdictions there are concerns from stakeholders with respect to the fairness of the 
dispute procedures as a whole, particularly in relation to the effect of the time and cost of the 
procedures on small taxpayers. In addition, in the two jurisdictions there are apparent mixed 
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findings regarding stakeholder perceptions of fairness of revenue authority staff acting as 
facilitators in the facilitation programs of the revenue authorities.  
 
In Australia, the championship of a dispute resolution culture and a commitment to the use of 
ADR are recurrent themes in the Australian Commissioner’s speeches. The ATO’s approach 
to dispute resolution (including ADR), outlined in its Disputes Policy and Dispute Management 
Plan, also generally aligns with the ATO’s overall mission, vision, values and goals. In contrast, 
in NZ there is limited evidence of championship of the dispute resolution system by the NZ 
Commissioner. Moreover, Inland Revenue currently appears reluctant to entertain the further 
use of ADR over and above its conference facilitation process. In addition, prima facie, there 
is no clear alignment between the purpose of the procedures outlined in s 89A of the TAA 1994 
and the overall vision, mission and values of Inland Revenue. However, when the current 
procedures were first introduced in 1996, there was some recognition by the Richardson 
Committee that a well-functioning tax dispute resolution system may potentially contribute 
towards enhancing voluntary compliance. 
 
Both jurisdictions offer training in dispute resolution to relevant revenue authority staff where 
it is identified as part of their development plans. Inland Revenue, in the latter half of 2015, 
commenced the additional AMINZ accreditation of its conference facilitators. Nevertheless, 
the training initiatives in the Australian system arguably appear to be more comprehensive than 
in the NZ system. In recent times the ATO has introduced a Dispute Management curriculum 
and as part of its “Reinventing the ATO” project, the ATO has apparently made efforts to train 
staff at various levels to better communicate with taxpayers during disputes.  
 
In summary, in comparison to the NZ system, the Australian system meets a greater number of 
the DSD principles of best practice. Moreover, the Australian system provides a greater number 
of ways in which taxpayers are able to choose a preferred process with respect to opportunities 
to use ADR. However, most notably, the Australian system appears stronger than the NZ 
system in terms of fulfilling certain DSD principles which are primarily related to the support 
and championship of the system. These include aspects such as the championship of the system 
by senior management and alignment of the system with the overall mission of the organisation. 
Having evaluated the tax dispute resolution systems of NZ and Australia in this chapter, the 





Chapter 5: Case Study Findings: The United Kingdom and the United States1 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the case studies of the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) 
respectively. Section 5.2 outlines and evaluates the UK tax dispute resolution system, section 
5.3 outlines and evaluates the US tax dispute resolution system and section 5.4 summarises and 
compares the two jurisdictions. 
 
5.2 The United Kingdom 
5.2.1 The tax dispute resolution procedures 
As illustrated in Figure 5.1, tax disputes in the UK can occur when a taxpayer disagrees with a 
HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) decision, such as an amended assessment, usually 
following a HMRC compliance check. The steps in the UK tax dispute resolution procedures 
generally involve the following aspects: 
 
 For HMRC decisions involving direct taxes, an appeal is notified in writing by the 
taxpayer to HMRC (for indirect tax decisions there is no appeal as HMRC offer a 
review at the same time as the decision is issued). 
 The taxpayer can accept HMRC’s offer of (or request) a review of the decision 
(carried out by a HMRC officer who was not involved in making the HMRC 
decision). 
 The taxpayer may (following the outcome of any such review) notify the appeal to 
the tribunal. 
 
However, it should be noted that a review by HMRC is not a pre-requisite to appealing to the 
tribunal. Thus, taxpayers can take their dispute to the tribunal whether or not HMRC has carried 
out a review (but not while a review is in process). In addition, as indicated in Figure 5.1, 
taxpayers may also request to use alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to resolve a tax dispute 
at any stage of the dispute procedures (either before or after a HMRC decision has been issued). 
The two HMRC ADR programs available are the large or complex cases program (involving 
facilitation, joint facilitation or mediation) and the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises and 
individuals (SMEi) program (involving facilitation).2 A more detailed description of the UK 
tax dispute resolution procedures and its related features is provided in Appendix 1.3 of this 
thesis. 
                                                          
1 Material covered in chapter 5 has previously been published in Melinda Jone “What can the United Kingdom’s 
Tax Dispute Resolution System Learn from Australia? – An Evaluation and Recommendations from a Dispute 
Systems Design Perspective” (2017) 32(1) ATF 59. 
2 For further details, see section 1.3.2 of Appendix 1.3 of this thesis. 
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Figure 5.1: The United Kingdom’s Tax Dispute Resolution Procedure 
  
Compliance check 
* For indirect tax decisions, there is no appeal to HMRC by the taxpayer, as HMRC offer a review at the same time the decision is issued.  
^ For direct tax decisions, if HMRC have not offered the taxpayer a review, the taxpayer may request a review by HMRC at any time 
after they have sent their appeal to HMRC. 
 
HMRC decision 
(for example, an amended 
assessment) 
Appeal to HMRC 
(for direct tax decisions only)* 
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Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR) program  
 
-HMRC Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises and individuals (SMEi)  
ADR program 
 
Appeal to First-tier Tribunal 
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Key: 
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5.2.2 Evaluation using dispute systems design principles 
(1) Stakeholders are included in the design process 
HMRC have included taxpayers in the design process by inviting eligible taxpayers to 
participate in a number of ADR pilot programs used to test the effectiveness of ADR in 
resolving tax disputes. HMRC have also involved other external stakeholders, including 
representatives from the voluntary sector, the legal and accountancy professions and both large 
and smaller accountancy firms, in the project management of the ADR pilots. In addition, 
HMRC have included stakeholders in the design process through inviting them to submit 
comments on draft versions of documents such as the Litigation and Settlement (LSS) 
commentary3 and ADR practical guidance for HMRC staff.4 Tax agents and their 
representative bodies have typically participated in the design process in this regard. 
 
(2) The system has multiple options for addressing conflict including interests, 
rights and power-based processes 
The UK tax dispute resolution system has multiple options for addressing conflict. The tax 
dispute resolution system envisages that in most cases tax disputes will be resolved by 
agreement through discussions between HMRC and the taxpayer in the first instance. If the 
dispute cannot be resolved through discussions with HMRC the taxpayer can choose to either 
have a review of the HMRC decision conducted by a HMRC officer not previously involved 
in the dispute, or they may choose to utilise rights-based litigation processes by appealing to 
an independent tax tribunal. If the taxpayer chooses to have a review by HMRC, they may still 
appeal to the tribunal if they disagree with the review outcome. In addition, optional interests-
based ADR processes are available at any stage of the formal dispute resolution process 
(including during the compliance check stage and when an appeal has been lodged with a 
tribunal). The ADR processes available for taxpayers with large or complex cases are 
facilitation (including the option for joint facilitation) and mediation, and for SMEi taxpayers, 
facilitation is available.  
 
(3) The system provides for loops backward and forward 
The potential ability to utilise a HMRC ADR program once an appeal has been lodged with the 
HM Courts and Tribunals Service (the Tribunals Service) (but before the commencement of a 
tribunal hearing), provides a loop-back from a rights-based option (litigation) back to interests-
based processes. The system also provides for loops forward in the respect that a taxpayer may 
effectively choose to by-pass HMRC’s internal review process by choosing not to request a 
review or by declining HMRC’s offer for a review (if one has been made) and appealing 
                                                          
3 HM Revenue and Customs Resolving tax disputes: Commentary on the litigation and settlement strategy 
(November 2013). For further details on the LSS see also, section 1.3.4.1 of Appendix 1.3 of this thesis. 
4 HM Revenue and Customs Resolving Tax Disputes: Practical Guidance for HMRC Staff on the use of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in Large or Complex Cases (April 2012). 
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directly to the First-tier Tribunal. This means that taxpayers can move directly to a rights-based 
option without having to first go through all of the earlier options in the formal dispute process.  
 
The ability, in appropriate cases, during the course of a compliance check under s 28ZA of the 
Taxes Management Act 1970 (UK), for the taxpayer and HMRC to jointly apply to the tribunal 
for a binding determination of “any question arising in connection with the subject matter of [a 
compliance check]” also provides a loop-forward mechanism with respect to the specific matter 
of the compliance check which the joint application is submitted.  
 
(4) There is notification before and feedback after the resolution process 
Notification of disputes is implied through HMRC’s Your Charter in which HMRC make a 
general commitment to “Provide a helpful, efficient and effective service.”5 Under this 
commitment, HMRC undertake to, inter alia, “help you understand what you have to do and 
when you have to do it” and “put any mistakes right as soon as we can.”6 Notification also 
occurs through HMRC’s announcements of campaigns and taskforces which are targeted at 
tackling tax evasion and avoidance. HMRC campaigns are aimed at specific topics or areas 
where HMRC believes individuals and businesses are not fully compliant. The campaigns 
encourage taxpayers to come forward and disclose the irregularities and then enter into a 
voluntary disclosure arrangement to regularise matters.7 Taskforces are specialist teams that 
focus intensive activity on specific high-risk trade sectors and locations in the UK. The teams 
visit traders to examine their records and carry out other investigations.8 Thus, HMRC’s 
announcements of the specific areas of focus for its campaigns and taskforces may serve as 
notification of potential areas where disputes may ultimately arise. 
 
HMRC’s Revenue and Customs Briefs are bulletins which announce changes in policy or set 
out the legal background to an issue and have a six month lifespan.9 Revenue and Customs 
Briefs may be used by HMRC to outline their position following a court decision. 
Notwithstanding their limited lifespan, applicable Revenue and Customs Briefs may provide a 
form of notification to taxpayers and other stakeholders as to HMRC’s view on the implications 
of a particular court decision. 
                                                          
5 HM Revenue and Customs “Your Charter” (12 January 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/your-charter/your-charter#A2> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
6 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 5. 
7 See, for example, HM Revenue and Customs “Credit Card Sales Campaign” 
<https://www.gov.uk/creditcardsales> (last accessed 7 November 2016); HM Revenue and Customs “Let 
Property Campaign” <https://www.gov.uk/let-property-campaign> (last accessed 7 November 2016); and HM 
Revenue and Customs “Second Incomes Campaign” <https://www.gov.uk/secondincomes> (last accessed 7 
November 2016). 
8 See HM Revenue and Customs Our approach to tax compliance (September 2012) at 2. 
9 Revenue and Customs Briefs are available on HMRC’s website at: HM Revenue and Customs “Revenue and 




Feedback on disputes at the systemic level occurs through the publication of HMRC’s Tax 
Assurance Commissioner’s annual report which outlines HMRC’s performance in resolving 
disputes with taxpayers.10 The Tax Assurance Commissioner’s annual report also includes 
statistics on the number of reviews and appeals received against tax decisions of HMRC and 
the number of ADR referrals. In relation to feedback at the micro-level on HMRC’s ADR 
programs, this is collected directly by the relevant operational teams which operate ADR in 
HMRC.11 The feedback collected is used to inform the development of the ADR programs and 
provide metrics information.  
 
(5) The system has a person or persons who function as internal independent 
confidential neutral(s) 
The relevant HMRC operational teams which operate ADR in HMRC function as HMRC’s 
equivalent of internal independent confidential neutrals within the system which HMRC staff 
can go to for coaching, referring and problem-solving. The operational teams are separate from 
the case teams involved in disputes and include “impartial independent full-time mediators.”12 
The operational teams provide support to HMRC case owners and Customer Relationship 
Managers (CRMs) through preparing anonymised case studies as well as feeding back lessons 
learned to leadership teams and case teams, and reporting on broad trends.13 Given that HMRC 
operational mediators “never … act as advocates for a party in a dispute”,14 arguably there are 
no internal independent confidential neutrals in the system for taxpayers. Although, taxpayers 
do have the option of seeking advice and support on dispute resolution matters externally from 
professional advisors at their own expense. This would be similar to taxpayers seeking the 
assistance of professional advisors on tax technical matters in relation to tax disputes. 
 
(6) Procedures are ordered from low to high cost 
The formal dispute procedures can be viewed as being ordered in a low to high cost sequence 
in the respect that there is the opportunity for direct negotiation in the first instance, followed 
by HMRC’s internal review process and then the potential to appeal to an independent tribunal. 
This sequence generally implies an increase in costs at each level, particularly when the dispute 
is escalated to the tribunal level. Nevertheless, the option to use HMRC’s ADR programs where 
                                                          
10 The Tax Assurance Commissioner’s annual reports are available at: HM Revenue and Customs “How we 
resolve tax disputes” <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/how-we-resolve-tax-disputes> (last accessed 
7 November 2016).  
11 Email from [redacted] (Executive Director, [redacted], London) to Melinda Jone regarding HMRC Tax 
Assurance and Resolution Policy and HMRC ADR (3 August 2016). 
12 Email from [redacted] (Technical Manager and Editor, [redacted], London) to Melinda Jone regarding HMRC 
ADR (3 August 2016). 
13 Email from [redacted] (Assistant Director, [redacted], HM Revenue and Customs) to Melinda Jone regarding 
HMRC Tax Assurance and Resolution Policy (5 August 2016). 
14 Email from [redacted] (Assistant Director, [redacted], HM Revenue and Customs) to Melinda Jone regarding 
HMRC Tax Assurance and Resolution Policy (17 August 2016). 
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appropriate, at any stage of the procedures, can add further costs at the stage of the dispute 
process at which ADR is utilised. While taxpayers are generally not charged a fee for using 
HMRC facilitators,15 costs may nevertheless be incurred by taxpayers in preparing for and 
participating in ADR as well as for any professional representation and advice sought. 
However, if the dispute is resolved through ADR at this stage of the dispute process, then the 
parties will not subsequently have to move further up the system to higher cost processes. 
 
Similar to the tax dispute resolution processes of the other jurisdictions in this study, the tax 
dispute resolution process in the UK can require substantial upfront costs from the taxpayer 
(for example, the time spent by the taxpayer in preparing for, and participating in negotiations 
as well as the cost of professional advisors). This suggests that, notwithstanding the apparent 
low to high cost sequence of the formal dispute procedures identified above, the initial upfront 
costs for the taxpayer may not greatly differ in relation to the stage of the dispute process that 
the dispute is ultimately resolved at.  
 
(7) The system has multiple access points 
The formal disputes system has multiple structural entry points for certain taxpayers only. For 
taxpayers with disputes involving direct taxes, taxpayers must make an appeal to HMRC in the 
first instance. Thus, there is only one structural entry point to the disputes system for these 
taxpayers. However, at any time after sending their appeal to HMRC, the taxpayer may request 
for an internal review by HMRC or appeal externally to the tribunal. For disputes involving 
indirect taxes, taxpayers do not need to make an appeal to HMRC. Thus, there are multiple 
entry points for these taxpayers as they may enter the disputes system at either the HMRC 
internal review level or at the level of external appeal to the tribunal.  
 
Procedurally, the means by which taxpayers can enter the system at each of the above structural 
entry points are as follows. Appeals to HMRC (for direct tax disputes) must be sent to HMRC 
in writing using either the appeal form provided by HMRC or by letter. Requests for (or 
acceptances of) HMRC reviews must be sent in writing to HMRC. Appeals to the tribunal must 
be made by completing a tribunal application form (Notice of Appeal) and sent to the Tribunals 
Service by post or email.16 
 
                                                          
15 There is no cost for utilising HMRC facilitators for the facilitation processes in both the large or complex cases 
and SMEi ADR programs. However, where joint facilitation is utilised the in large or complex cases program, the 
taxpayer’s facilitator is paid for by the taxpayer. 
16 In November 2016 the UK Ministry of Justice announced plans to trial (and then subsequently launch) a new 
digital service which will allow taxpayers to submit an appeal to an independent tax tribunal online. The service 
will be made available for all types of tax disputes with HMRC as an alternative option to using the current paper-
based application form (which will still remain available). For further details, see section 1.3.1 of Appendix 1.3 




The system also offers a choice of access persons to whom certain system users can approach 
in the first instance in the respect that, for taxpayers who do not speak English as their first 
language, HMRC offer a free language translation service (or alternatively, a taxpayer may 
choose to have a friend or family member interpret on their behalf).17 In addition, taxpayers 
who are deaf, hard of hearing or have a speech impairment can contact HMRC by text relay or 
by a textphone service.18 While these methods provide a choice of persons for certain taxpayers 
to contact HMRC generally, they arguably may also act to provide a choice of persons for 
whom certain taxpayers can access to acquire knowledge of or information on the dispute 
resolution system in the first instance. 
 
For taxpayers who are blind, partially sighted or require written information in alternative 
formats, HMRC produce most paper forms, leaflets and information (including those relating 
to reviews and appeals) in alternative formats such as Braille, large print, audio on CD, text on 
CD and email.19 These options arguably provide multiple forms of access points to the system 
for the applicable taxpayers. 
 
Under the Welsh Language Act 1993 (UK), in the conduct of its business with the public, 
HMRC treat the English and Welsh languages on a basis of equality.20 The public are offered 
a choice of English or Welsh by HMRC at all points of contact in Wales. Welsh language 
publications, forms and correspondence, a Welsh language helpline and Welsh language 
website are available. Thus, the choice between English and Welsh arguably may constitute 
the provision of multiple forms of accessing the dispute system for certain taxpayers.  
 
(8) The system includes training and education for stakeholders  
HMRC’s website (which is part of the UK government website) contains a number of 
webpages that provide information for taxpayers on how to appeal against HMRC decisions,21 
appeal to the tax tribunal22 and ways to resolve disputes using ADR.23 Also available on 
HMRC’s website is a series of factsheets on topics including: HMRC compliance checks; what 
                                                          
17 HM Revenue and Customs “Dealing with HMRC if you have additional needs” (1 July 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/dealing-hmrc-additional-needs> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
18 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 17. 
19 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 17. 
20 HM Revenue and Customs “HMRC internal manual – Self Assessment Manual: Manage work: customer 
service: welsh language service” <https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/self-assessment-
manual/sam70160> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
21 HM Revenue and Customs “Disagree with a tax decision” (25 October 2016) <https://www.gov.uk/tax-
appeals/overview> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
22 HM Revenue and Customs “Appeal to the tax tribunal” (25 October 2016) <https://www.gov.uk/tax-tribunal> 
(last accessed 7 November 2016). 
23 HM Revenue and Customs “Tax disputes: Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)” (8 December 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/tax-disputes-alternative-dispute-resolution-adr> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
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you can do if you disagree with an HMRC decision; and ADR.24 These factsheets provide 
general guidance for taxpayers on the relevant topics. 
 
HMRC further provide education on the dispute system and how to access it for tax agents and 
advisors. This includes the “Appeals and tribunals: an overview for agents and advisers” 
webpage that provides guidance for tax agents and advisors on appeals and tribunals.25 In 
addition, HMRC’s Learning Together training material and resources for tax agents and 
advisors includes an online learning module for these stakeholders on HMRC’s reviews and 
appeals process.26 
 
For HMRC staff, the Appeals Reviews and Tribunal Guidance (ARTG) manual is an HMRC 
internal manual which provides technical guidance for all instances where a customer disagrees 
with a HMRC tax decision.27 The ARTG is updated regularly to reflect new processes and how 
they will be applied. Other HMRC publications which provide guidance and information in 
relation to dispute resolution for HMRC staff (and taxpayers) include: Resolving Tax Disputes: 
Practical Guidance for HMRC Staff on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Large or 
Complex Cases;28 Resolving tax disputes: Commentary on the litigation and settlement 
strategy;29 and the Code of governance for resolving tax disputes (Code of Governance).30  
 
In line with HMRC’s collaborative working approach (discussed further under DSD Principle 
13 below), HMRC officers are trained to work “collaboratively where possible” as part of their 
                                                          
24 See HM Revenue and Customs General information about compliance checks (CC/FS1a, November 2015); 
HM Revenue and Customs HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) decisions – what you can do if you disagree 
(HMRC1, February 2016); HM Revenue and Customs Alternative Dispute Resolution (CC/FS21, October 2015). 
These factsheets are available at: HM Revenue and Customs “HM Revenue and Customs: leaflets, factsheets and 
booklets” (20 October 2014) <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/hm-revenue-and-customs-leaflets-
factsheets-and-booklets> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
25 HM Revenue and Customs “Appeals and tribunals: an overview for agents and advisers (1 January 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/appeals-and-tribunals-an-overview-for-agents-and-advisers> (last accessed 7 November 
2016). 
26 Available at: HM Revenue and Customs “Webinars, e-learning and videos if you’re a tax agent or adviser” (16 
December 2014) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/webinars-e-learning-and-videos-if-youre-a-tax-agent-
or-adviser> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
27 In accordance with the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (UK), the ARTG manual is also made available by 
HMRC on the internet for taxpayers and their advisors at: HM Revenue and Customs “HMRC internal manual – 
Appeals reviews and tribunals guidance” <https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/appeals-reviews-and-
tribunals-guidance> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
28 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 4.  
29 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 3. 
30 HM Revenue and Customs Code of governance for resolving tax disputes (July 2014). This document sets out 
HMRC’s internal governance arrangements for decisions on how tax disputes should be resolved. For further 
details see also, section 1.3.4.2 of Appendix 1.3 of this thesis. 
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compliance training.31 Interpersonal skills are also highlighted as part of this training.32 In 
relation to the training of the facilitators utilised in HMRC’s ADR programs, the HMRC 
facilitators in the large or complex cases ADR program are externally trained and accredited 
by the Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR) in mediation techniques. While the 
HMRC facilitators utilised in the SMEi ADR program receive in-house training in dispute 
resolution skills from HMRC instructors. 
 
(9) Assistance is offered for choosing the best process 
The ARTG manual provides guidelines for the review and appeal processes for both direct and 
indirect taxes to ensure the most appropriate use of processes in the dispute resolution 
procedures. In relation to guidance on the appropriate use of ADR, Resolving Tax Disputes: 
Practical Guidance for HMRC Staff on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Large or 
Complex Cases outlines the types of cases where ADR is likely to be appropriate and the sorts 
of cases where ADR is unlikely to be suitable.33  
 
Process advisors are included in the system in a number of ways. Large business taxpayers 
considering ADR must generally contact their HMRC CRM or case owner to discuss ADR in 
the first instance. In 2015-16 operational responsibility for ADR passed from HMRC’s former 
Dispute Resolution Unit (DRU (UK))34 to operational teams within HMRC.35 The operational 
teams have processes in place to consider and evaluate all the requests HMRC receives for 
ADR, and experienced facilitators are integral to considering the suitability of ADR. Where 
they are of the view that a case is not suitable for ADR, it is referred to a governance panel for 
consideration.36 Taxpayers can also email the relevant HMRC operational teams to ask for 
additional information on HMRC ADR or if they have questions on whether ADR is suitable 
for their dispute. 
 
(10) Disputants have the right to choose a preferred process 
Taxpayers have the right to choose a preferred process in the respect that they can choose to 
pursue the dispute process by either requesting (or accepting HMRC’s offer of) a review or 
notifying their appeal to the tribunal. Thus, the system is multi-option in the respect that 
taxpayers can choose to have a review of HMRC’s decision or notify their appeal to the tribunal 
                                                          
31 Email from [redacted] (Senior Policy Advisor, [redacted], HM Revenue and Customs) to Melinda Jone 
regarding HMRC ADR (8 July 2014). 
32 Email from [redacted] (Senior Policy Advisor, [redacted], HM Revenue and Customs), above n 31. 
33 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 4, at 7-12. 
34 The DRU (UK) merged with other areas in HMRC in January 2016 and is now known as Tax Assurance and 
Resolution Policy (TARP). 
35 HM Revenue and Customs How we Resolve Tax Disputes: The Tax Assurance Commissioner’s Annual Report 
2015-16 (July 2016) at 6. 
36 At 6. 
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or do both. However, as noted earlier, if a taxpayer chooses to have a review of HMRC’s 
decision, they may only notify their appeal to the tribunal once the review has finished and 
they are dissatisfied with the review outcome.  
 
Taxpayers also have the right to choose a preferred process in the respect that ADR is available 
as an option alongside taxpayers’ existing rights for a review by HMRC or to appeal to an 
independent tax tribunal. In addition, entering into ADR does not affect the taxpayer’s review 
or appeal rights if the dispute remains unresolved following ADR. Although, if ADR is entered 
into after a HMRC decision is issued, it is important that the taxpayer separately considers (and 
actions, where appropriate) any appeal of the HMRC decision within the relevant time limit. 
 
Also worth noting is that when an appeal is notified to the tribunal, the tribunal will allocate 
the case to one of the following categories: default paper cases, basic cases, standard cases or 
complex cases.37 However, as the initial allocation is made by the tribunal, the disputants 
themselves cannot select a preferred process in this regard.38 
 
(11) The system is fair and perceived as fair 
Perceptions of fairness of the UK dispute resolution system in recent times have been centered 
on issues relating to HMRC’s governance processes for settling large tax disputes. These issues 
arguably consequently impact upon “foster[ing] a culture that welcomes good faith dissent” in 
the dispute resolution system.39  
 
The National Audit Office (NAO)40 reported in 2011 on HMRC’s handling of tax disputes with 
large businesses and concluded that HMRC’s governance processes for resolving tax disputes 
were sound and that these were followed in a substantial majority of the 27 cases examined.41 
However, it noted five cases in which the normal governance processes had not been followed 
and one case in which an error had been made in calculating liabilities. The Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC)42 followed up these issues in hearings held during October and November 
2011. In its report on these hearings, released in December 2011, the PAC made a number of 
                                                          
37 For further details, see section 1.3.1 of Appendix 1.3 of this thesis. 
38 Although, either on its own initiative or upon the application of HMRC or a taxpayer, the tribunal may re-
allocate a case to a different category: Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (UK), 
r 23(3). 
39 Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution Designing Integrated Conflict Management Systems: Guidelines 
for Practitioners and Decision Makers in Organizations (Washington DC, 2001) at 10. 
40 The NAO is an independent Parliamentary body in the UK responsible for auditing central government 
departments, government agencies and non-departmental bodies. The audit and inspection rights are vested in the 
head of the NAO, the Comptroller and Auditor General. 
41 National Audit Office Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General on HM Revenue and Customs 2010-
2011 Accounts (The Stationery Office, 7 July 2011) HC 981. 
42 The PAC is a select committee of the British House of Commons responsible for overseeing government 
expenditures to ensure they are effective and honest. 
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critical findings and recommendations for change in HMRC’s handling of large tax disputes.43 
A further report was issued by the NAO in June 2012 following an in-depth review of the five 
cases highlighted in the NAO’s 2011 report.44 The NAO’s 2012 report concluded that those 
cases had all led to reasonable outcomes for the Exchequer. However, the NAO noted that:45 
 
There is a strong case for improving the processes for reaching these settlements, 
particularly separation of roles in negotiating and authorising settlements. It is not 
appropriate to set up specific governance arrangements, or to fail to apply processes 
correctly and there is a need for stronger assurance that the Department has applied its 
processes correctly. 
 
The above findings consequently led to allegations of “cosiness” by HMRC with big business 
and the perception – promoted by sections of the media – that large corporates were receiving 
“generous tax concessions not available to ordinary taxpayers.”46 As a result, accepting that 
there was a need to restore public confidence and perceptions of fairness in the way HMRC 
handled tax disputes, HMRC implemented a number of changes to strengthen HMRC’s 
governance of significant tax disputes and improve its transparency and accountability. To 
improve the governance of tax disputes, HMRC has:47 
 
 mandated a clear separation of powers between those working on a settlement case 
and those responsible for approving it; 
 appointed a Tax Assurance Commissioner to oversee large tax settlements; 
 introduced risk-based arrangements to scrutinise and approve tax settlements, in 
each part of its business. HMRC refers major disputed points or issues affecting 
multiple cases to cross-HMRC panels to promote consistency; and 
 established independent scrutiny by internal audit of completed settlements. 
 
To improve transparency and accountability:48 
 
 The Tax Assurance Commissioner has published annual reports describing 
HMRC’s work, its progress in resolving major disputes, and how its new 
governance arrangements are working.  
                                                          
43 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts HM Revenue & Customs 2010-11 Accounts: Tax Disputes: 
Sixty-First Report of Session 2010-12 (The Stationery Office, 20 December 2011) HC 1531. 
44 National Audit Office HM Revenue and Customs: Settling Large Tax Disputes: Report by the Comptroller and 
Auditor General (The Stationery Office, 12 June 2012) HC 188. 
45 At 9. 
46 Jason Collins and Ian Hyde “Tax Disputes: HMRC’s code of governance” (2012) 14 PM-Tax 12 at 12. 
47 National Audit Office Increasing the Effectiveness of Tax Collection: A Stocktake of Progress Since 2010 (The 
Stationery Office, 6 February 2015) HC 1029-1 at 17, [3.7] 
48 At 17, [3.8]. 
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 HMRC has published and revised its Code of Governance. It has also updated and 
clarified its LSS and published a detailed commentary to support it. 
 
In 2015, the NAO issued a report on the progress made by HMRC since 2010 in tax 
collection.49 The report focused in particular on how HMRC had responded to 
recommendations in key areas of focus by the NAO and PAC, including the settlement of large 
tax disputes. The NAO concluded that:50 
 
The appointment of a tax assurance commissioner and the publication of his annual reports 
are welcome changes that have significantly improved public confidence in how HMRC 
deals with large companies.  
 
Nevertheless, issues with respect to the robustness, and resulting fairness perceptions, of 
HMRC’s approach towards corporate tax settlements have continued. In January 2016 Google 
announced that it had reached agreement with HMRC to pay an additional amount of £130 
million in corporation tax and interest following a HMRC investigation which started in 2010.51 
The PAC subsequently published a report on corporate tax settlements which stated: “The small 
amount of tax paid in proportion to the scale of Google’s UK activities means that there are 
legitimate questions about this settlement.”52 The PAC concluded that the “lack of transparency 
about tax settlements makes it impossible to judge whether HMRC has settled this case for the 
right amount of tax.”53 They further noted that:54 
 
The public is highly sceptical about whether large businesses pay the corporation tax they 
should in the UK, and HMRC must address this if it is to protect the integrity of the tax 
system. 
 
With respect to the fairness of HMRC’s ADR programs, there appears to be mixed findings on 
the perceptions of fairness of the HMRC facilitators utilised. HMRC maintain that “HMRC 
facilitators have proven to be objective and even handed for all types of customer.”55 Personal 
correspondence by the researcher with a number of UK practitioners indicates generally 
                                                          
49 National Audit Office, above n 47. 
50 At 18, [3.9]. 
51 See Kevin Rawlinson “Google agrees to pay British authorities £130 in back taxes” The Guardian (online ed, 
London, 23 January 2016). 
52 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts Corporate Tax Settlements: Twenty-Fifth Report of Session 
2015-16 (The Stationery Office, 23 February 2016) HC 788 at 5. 
53 At 5. 
54 At 5. 
55 HM Revenue and Customs Alternative Dispute Resolution in Large or Complex Cases: Pilot Evaluation 
Summary (September 2013) at 8 and HM Revenue and Customs Alternative Dispute Resolution for SMEs and 
Individuals: Project Evaluation Summary (April 2013) at 8. 
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positive perceptions of fairness of HMRC facilitators.56 Although, some taxpayers have 
concerns about the independence of the facilitator because they are a member of HMRC staff. 
They are concerned about the facilitator’s “ability to ‘move’ or be strong with the HMRC team 
on a mediation day.”57 However, “in larger cases the issue tends to be avoided by using co-
facilitators, one from HMRC and another for the taxpayer side.”58 Anecdotal evidence 
additionally suggests that a general lack of awareness about how and when to use ADR could 
lead to scepticism in some practitioners and taxpayers about HMRC’s ADR programs and “in 
general, many practitioners had not yet grasped the significance of ADR in tax disputes going 
forward.”59 
 
(12) The system is supported by top managers 
There appears to be limited visible evidence of the championship of the UK tax dispute 
resolution system in the form of published speeches and other media releases by certain 
members of HMRC senior management, such as the Executive Chair and Permanent Secretary, 
and the Chief Executive and Permanent Secretary.60 Although, arguably there is some evidence 
of support for the dispute resolution system resulting from the creation of the role of the Tax 
Assurance Commissioner in July 2012. The Tax Assurance Commissioner reports directly to 
the Executive Chair and is responsible for: seeing that tax disputes are resolved efficiently and 
on a basis that determines the correct tax in accordance with the LSS and achieves outcomes 
that are even-handed across different customer groups; ensuring that HMRC have appropriate 
governance arrangements in place to meet those objectives; ensuring that those arrangements 
are observed in practice in individual cases; and monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness 
of HMRC’s processes for resolving tax disputes and its governance arrangements, and 
implementing improvements.61 In addition, as noted earlier, the Tax Assurance 
Commissioner’s responsibilities includes the publication of an annual report on HMRC’s tax 
settlement work. Thus, it would be expected that some degree of championship of the dispute 
resolution system would accompany the above responsibilities of the Tax Assurance 
Commissioner. 
                                                          
56 Email from [redacted] (Barrister and Mediator, [redacted], London) to Melinda Jone regarding HMRC 
facilitation (4 May 2015); Email from [redacted] (Partner in Tax Dispute Resolution, [redacted], London) to 
Melinda Jone regarding HMRC facilitation (7 May 2015); Email from [redacted] (Director, [redacted], London) 
to Melinda Jone regarding HMRC facilitation (27 May 2015). 
57 Email from [redacted] (Partner in Tax Dispute Resolution, [redacted], London), above n 56. 
58 Email from [redacted] (Director, [redacted], London), above n 56. 
59 Rachael Power “ADR proving more relevant for smaller cases” (13 February 2014) AccountingWEB.co.uk 
<http://www.accountingweb.co.uk/blog-post/adr-more-successful-small-medium-size-cases> (last accessed 7 
November 2016). 
60 See HM Revenue and Customs “Announcements” 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/announcements?departments%5B%5D=hm-revenue-customs> (last accessed 
7 November 2016). 
61 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 30, at 4. 
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However, notwithstanding the extensive pilot testing of ADR by HMRC, there appears to have 
been limited visible championship by HMRC of its ADR programs since the announcements 
made by HMRC, in September 2013, of their decisions to move ADR for both large or complex 
cases and SMEi’s into “business as usual.” Personal correspondence with a HMRC senior 
policy advisor by the researcher additionally indicates that, notwithstanding a number of 
“HMRC supported” articles in the UK press highlighting the role of ADR in HMRC,62 there 
has been no formal publicity campaign for HMRC ADR.63  
 
(13) The system is aligned with the mission, vision and values of the organisation 
The disputes system is integrated into the organisation in various ways, including through 
HMRC’s Your Charter which contains a commitment by HMRC to “deal with your complaints 
or appeals as quickly as we can.”64 In practice, the options for taxpayers if they wish to appeal 
against a HMRC decision are those summarised under DSD Principle 2 of this section. The tax 
dispute resolution system is also integrated into the organisation through the LSS.65 The LSS 
sets out HMRC’s overall approach to resolving tax disputes through civil procedures, subject 
to the over-riding authority of the Commissioners of HMRC as defined in legislation66 and set 
out in the Code of Governance.67 It outlines that HMRC seeks to resolve tax disputes through 
civil procedures:68  
 
(a) consistently with the law, whether by agreement with the customer or through 
litigation; and  
(b) consistently with HMRC’s customer-centric business strategy objectives of 
maximising revenue flows, whilst at the same time reducing costs and improving 
customer experience. 
 
The LSS also provides that HMRC are committed to using a collaborative dispute resolution 
approach wherever possible in order to handle and resolve disputes as efficiently as 
practicable.69 A collaborative approach “requires both HMRC and the customer (and any agent, 
                                                          
62 See, for example, Adam Palin “Taxman starts talking to resolve tax disputes” Financial Times (online ed, 
London, 11 December 2015). 
63 Email from [redacted] (Senior Policy Advisor, [redacted], HM Revenue and Customs) to Melinda Jone 
regarding HMRC ADR (31 December 2015).  
64 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 5. 
65 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 3, at Annex 1.  
66 The collection and management powers of the UK Commissioner set out in s 5 of the Commissioners for 
Revenue and Customs Act 2005 (UK) confer discretion on the UK Commissioner on whether to litigate to resolve 
a tax dispute that arises with a taxpayer or whether to settle. 
67 HM Revenue and Revenue and Customs, above n 30.  
68 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 3, at Annex 1, [1]. 
69 At Annex 1, [9].  
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where relevant) to work together on a cooperative, non-adversarial basis in order to resolve a 
dispute.”70 
 
The overall mission, vision and values of HMRC are articulated through its Mission Statement 
and Strategic Objectives as updated in 2016 (see Figure 5.2): 
 
Figure 5.2: HM Revenue and Customs’ Mission Statement and Strategic Objectives71 
Our Mission Statement: 
 
We are the UK’s tax, payments and customs authority, and we have a vital purpose: we collect the 
money that pays for the UK’s public services and help families and individuals with targeted 
financial support.  
 
We do this by being impartial and increasingly effective and efficient in our administration. We help 





 Maximise revenues due and bear down on avoidance and evasion 
 Transform tax and payments for our customers 
 Design and deliver a professional, efficient and engaged organisation. 
 
Thus, it appears that the LSS generally aligns with HMRC’s strategic objectives in the respect 
that it considers: the overall effectiveness of disputes handling to maximise revenue flows; how 
to reduce the scope for disputes arising and settle those that do arise as quickly and efficiently 
as possible to improve customer experience; and the efficiency of disputes handling to reduce 
costs.72 Notwithstanding the above, the LSS arguably restricts the use of ADR as a means of 
resolving disputes as the LSS “binds HMRC to litigate where the perceived chance of success 
at tribunal is better than evens, unless the taxpayer settles in full first.”73 Additionally, HMRC 
guidance for staff on the use of ADR sets out that, under the LSS:74 
 
HMRC will seek to handle disputes non-confrontationally and by working collaboratively 
with the customer wherever possible. In the vast majority of cases, this will involve 
                                                          
70 At 18. For further details on the collaborative working approach, see section 1.3.4.1 of Appendix 1.3 of this 
thesis. 
71 See HM Revenue and Customs “About us” <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-revenue-
customs/about> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
72 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 3, at 6. 
73 Adam Palin “Keeping disputes out of the courtroom” Financial Times (online ed, London, 24 April 2015). 
74 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 4, at 4. 
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disputes being settled through bilateral discussion/agreement between the parties or 
litigation, without recourse to ADR. 
 
While acknowledging that “ADR also presupposes a collaborative working approach”, the 
HMRC guidance states that “ADR is a toolkit to be used sparingly within [HMRC’s] normal 
way of working.”75 Furthermore, as noted under DSD Principle 12, the apparent lack of visible 
promotion of HMRC’s ADR programs in practice, arguably also questions the degree of 
emphasis placed on the use of ADR within HMRC. 
 
The current HMRC Your Charter Annual Report, an annual report covering HMRC’s delivery 
against Your Charter including progress and priorities for further improvement, contains brief 
mention of “a new e-learning product about the litigation and settlement strategy and 
alternative dispute resolution skills” for HMRC staff.76 This forms part of HMRC’s aim to 
“continue to develop our people and services to meet Charter commitments.”77 Nonetheless, 
the dispute resolution system and ADR are not aspects that feature in HMRC’s Single 
Departmental Plan 2015 to 2020,78 which describes HMRC’s priority objectives for 2015 to 
2020 as agreed with the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury. Furthermore, similar to the revenue 
authorities in the other three jurisdictions in this study (see chapter 1, section 1.2.1 of this 
thesis), HMRC is currently undertaking a “ten-year modernisation programme to create a tax 
authority fit for the future.”79 To “provide customers with better services” is at the heart of the 
modernisation programme.80 However, to date, no plans specifically regarding the dispute 




                                                          
75 At 6. Contrast with the approach of the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), as outlined in chapter 4, section 
4.3.2 of this thesis: “When disputes cannot be resolved by early engagement and direct negotiation, the ATO is 
committed to using ADR where appropriate to resolve disputes.” See Australian Taxation Office “Practice 
Statement Law Administration 2013/3: Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in ATO Disputes” (2013) 
<http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?locid='PSR/PS20133/NAT/ATO'> (last accessed 7 November 2016) at 
[5]. 
76 HM Revenue and Customs Your Charter Annual Report: April 2015-March 2016 (July 2016) at 17. 
77 At 17. 
78 HM Revenue and Customs “Single departmental plan 2015 to 2020” (24 May 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hmrc-single-departmental-plan-2015-to-2020/single-
departmental-plan-2015-to-2020> (last accessed 7 November 2016). The single departmental plan replaces 
HMRC’s former Business Plan.  
79 HM Revenue and Customs “HMRC announces next step in its ten-year modernisation programme” (23 
November 2015) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/issue-briefing-hmrc-announces-next-step-in-its-
ten-year-modernisation-programme/hmrc-announces-next-step-in-its-ten-year-modernisation-programme-to-
become-a-tax-authority-for-the-future> (last accessed 7 November 2016). See also, HM Revenue and Customs 
Making tax digital (December 2015). 




(14) There is evaluation of the system 
There is evaluation of the system at the ADR policy level in the respect that HMRC’s TARP 
team “evaluate ADR services and outcomes in its governance role and in its reporting of ADR 
in the Tax Assurance Commissioner’s Annual Report.”81 In addition, evaluation of the system 
is provided for in relation to HMRC’s ADR programs in that, as noted under DSD Principle 4, 
following the conclusion of a facilitation or mediation process, HMRC’s ADR operational 
teams contact the parties to obtain confidential feedback on the ADR process. This feedback is 
used to improve processes in the future. Evaluation of HMRC’s ADR programs has also 
occurred through the project evaluation summaries published by HMRC following the 
conclusion of the large or complex cases and the SMEi ADR pilot programs.82  
 
Further evaluation of the system occurs through regular and one-off survey research 
commissioned by HMRC. For example, between 2010 and 2014 HMRC ran an annual Large 
Business Panel Survey.83 Conducted for HMRC by an independent research agency, the survey 
looked at, inter alia, large business customers’ experiences of dealing with HMRC including 
their experiences of dispute resolution with HMRC. A one-off research project, Statutory 
Review Process, was also commissioned by HMRC in 2014 to understand customers’ 
experiences and perceptions of the current HMRC internal review process.84 
 
As indicated above, HMRC’s Tax Assurance Commissioner’s annual reports provide a form 
of evaluation of HMRC’s performance in resolving disputes with taxpayers and also make 
suggestions for improvements to the system. External evaluation of the disputes system (and 
its governance arrangements) is provided in the respect that the disputes system subject to a 
high level of scrutiny by the NAO and parliamentary committees, such as the PAC and the 
Treasury Select Committee.85 
 
  
                                                          
81 Email from [redacted] (Senior Policy Advisor, [redacted], HM Revenue and Customs) to Melinda Jone 
regarding HMRC Tax Assurance and Resolution Policy (6 August 2016). 
82 HM Revenue and Customs Alternative Dispute Resolution in Large or Complex Cases: Pilot Evaluation 
Summary, above n 55; and HM Revenue and Customs Alternative Dispute Resolution for SMEs and Individuals: 
Project Evaluation Summary, above n 55. 
83 See, for example, IFF Research Large Business Panel Survey 2014 (HM Revenue and Customs Research Report 
354, July 2015). In 2016, the Large Business Survey replaced the Large Business Panel Survey. However, the 
Large Business Survey does not look at large businesses’ experiences with dispute resolution. 
84 HM Revenue and Customs Research Report: Statutory Review Process (August 2014). 
85 See, for example, National Audit Office, above n 41; House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, above 
n 43; National Audit Office, above n 44; National Audit Office, above n 47; and House of Commons Committee 
of Public Accounts, above n 52. 
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5.3 The United States 
5.3.1 The tax dispute resolution procedures 
Tax disputes in the US generally arise through the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS’s) 
examination (audit) process. Tax disputes can also arise when a taxpayer disagrees with a 
proposed or taken IRS collection action.86 In instances where the taxpayer does not agree with 
any or all of the IRS findings in an examination procedure, they may request a meeting or a 
telephone conference with the IRS examiner and/or the examiner’s supervisor. If no agreement 
is reached at the meeting, the US tax dispute resolution procedures generally involve the 
following steps: 
 
 A 30-day letter is issued by the IRS notifying the taxpayer of their rights to appeal 
to the IRS Appeals Office within 30 days. 
 If the taxpayer makes an appeal, the IRS Appeals Office will review the issues of 
the case and schedule a conference (the Appeals conference) between the parties 
so that they can attempt to settle the differences between them. 
 If the taxpayer and the IRS do not agree on some or all of the issues after the 
Appeals conference, or if the taxpayer does not respond to the 30-day letter (that 
is, chooses to by-pass the IRS Appeals system), a 90-day letter is issued by the IRS. 
 The taxpayer has 90 days (150 days if it is addressed to a taxpayer outside the US) 
from the date of the 90-day letter to file a petition with the US Tax Court, the US 
District Court or the US Court of Federal Claims. 
 
In addition, as shown in Figure 5.3,87 the IRS Appeals Office offers a number of ADR 
programs88 for certain types of taxpayers to resolve tax disputes during the examination (for 
example, Fast Track Settlement (FTS) and Early Referral (ER)), collection (for example, Fast 
Track Mediation – Collection (FTMC))89 and appeals stages of the dispute process (for 
                                                          
86 As indicated in Figure 5.3, the tax dispute resolution procedures for disputes arising from IRS examination and 
IRS collection differ. The DSD evaluation conducted in section 5.3.2 of this chapter generally focuses on the tax 
dispute resolution procedure initiated through the IRS examination process given that, as outlined in chapter 2, 
section 2.2.1 of this thesis, this study focuses on tax disputes concerning disagreements over taxpayers’ tax 
liabilities or entitlements rather than disputes over the collection efforts of the revenue authority. Accordingly, an 
evaluation of the dispute resolution procedure initiated through the IRS collection process is beyond the scope of 
this study. 
87 Figure 5.3 represents a simplified version of the US tax disputes resolution procedures. Figure 5.3 was 
developed by the researcher and was subsequently reviewed by [redacted] (Principal, Co-leader, [redacted], 
Washington DC) and [redacted] (Principal, [redacted], Washington DC) on 30 November 2016. The researcher is 
grateful for their feedback. 
88 For further details, see section 1.4.2 of Appendix 1.4 of this thesis. 
89 Effective from 18 November 2016, FTMC replaced the Fast Track Mediation (FTM) program formerly offered 
by the IRS. FTM was available for certain disputes arising from either the IRS examination or collection processes, 
whereas FTMC now applies only to certain disputes arising from IRS collection. For further details, see Internal 
Revenue Service Rev. Proc. 2016-57, 2016-49 I.R.B. 786 [“Rev. Proc. 2016-57”] at [2.0]. See also, section 1.4.2 
of Appendix 1.4 of this thesis. It should be noted that the tax DSD principles developed in this thesis were 
developed based, inter alia, on an evaluation of the US tax dispute resolution system that included the former 
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example, Post Appeals Mediation (PAM) and the Rapid Appeals Process (RAP)).90 For 
disputes reaching the US Tax Court, arbitration or mediation processes are also potentially 
available.91 The Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) provides an additional avenue for taxpayers 
to resolve problems with the IRS which they have been unable to resolve themselves.92 As 
indicated in Figure 5.3, the TAS is available alongside the traditional dispute resolution 
process. A more detailed description of the US tax dispute resolution process and its related 
features is contained in Appendix 1.4 of this thesis.  
                                                          
FTM. Following the replacement of FTM by FTMC, the description and DSD evaluation of the US system have 
been updated to reflect the replacement program. The updated DSD evaluation, however, makes no changes to 
the tax DSD principles developed.     
90 The Appeals Arbitration program was also available as an IRS ADR program up until 21 September 2015 when 
it was eliminated by the IRS. For further details on the IRS Appeals Arbitration program, see section 1.4.2.5 of 
Appendix 1.4 of this thesis.  
91 For further details, see section 1.4.4 of Appendix 1.4 of this thesis. 
92 For further details, see section 1.4.5 of Appendix 1.4 of this thesis. 
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5.3.2 Evaluation using dispute systems design principles  
(1) Stakeholders are included in the design process 
The IRS involves taxpayers and other stakeholders in the design process through its pilot 
programs of various IRS ADR programs. Stakeholders are also involved in the design process 
when the IRS requests stakeholder submissions on proposed or revised versions of IRS revenue 
procedures and other forms of IRS guidance. The Taxpayer Advocacy Panel (TAP), a Federal 
Advisory Committee to the IRS which listens to taxpayers, identifies taxpayers’ issues and 
makes suggestions for improving IRS service and customer satisfaction, may also provide a 
means for taxpayers to submit suggestions to the IRS in relation to the dispute process and its 
design.1 However, the TAP is limited to recommending changes that do not require legislative 
action.  
 
The IRS Oversight Board engages with a wide variety of stakeholders to understand their views 
on tax administration and its impact on taxpayers. The Oversight Board is an independent nine-
member board created by Congress under the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and 
Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998),2 whose responsibility is to oversee the IRS in its 
administration, management, conduct, direction, and supervision of the execution and 
application of the internal revenue laws. The Oversight Board holds public meetings and 
regularly interacts with external groups, including tax professionals, taxpayer advocacy groups, 
representatives of state tax departments, IRS advisory committees, IRS employees, the 
National Treasury Employees Union, and other groups that have an interest in tax 
administration. Thus, these groups can potentially provide input in the design process of the 
system through these interactions.  
 
(2) The system has multiple options for addressing conflict including interests, 
rights and power-based processes 
The US tax dispute resolution system has multiple options for addressing conflict. The 
procedures provide for initial negotiations between the taxpayer and the IRS examiner and/or 
the examiner’s supervisor at the conclusion of an IRS examination. If the dispute remains 
unresolved, the taxpayer may appeal their case to the IRS Appeals Office (the IRS’s internal 
review forum) where a conference may be scheduled so that the taxpayer and the IRS can 
attempt to negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement. However, unlike at the examination 
level, IRS Appeals officers are able to consider the hazards of litigation in negotiating a 
                                                          
1 For further details, see section 1.4.6 of Appendix 1.4 of this thesis. 
2 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 1101, 112 Stat. 685, 
691 (1998). Effective from 1 January 2015, there are six open seats on the Oversight Board. Hence, the Oversight 
Board currently does not have enough members confirmed by the US Senate to make up a quorum and as a result 
has suspended operations. The Board will reconvene once it has a quorum: IRS Oversight Board “Home – IRS 
Oversight Board” <https://www.treasury.gov/irsob/Pages/default.aspx> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
160 
 
settlement. If the dispute cannot be resolved at the IRS Appeals Office level (or the taxpayer 
chooses to by-pass the IRS Appeals Office), taxpayers may pursue rights-based litigation 
processes by filing a petition in either the US Tax Court, US District Court or the US Court of 
Federal Claims. 
 
In addition to the formal dispute process, the IRS Appeals Office offer a number of post-filing 
ADR programs which may be utilised by different types of taxpayers to manage or resolve 
disputes during the examination and appeals stages.3 The main post-filing ADR programs 
available in these stages currently include: FTS; ER; PAM and RAP, and primarily constitute 
interests-based processes. ADR procedures (mediation and arbitration) are also potentially 
available before trial for disputes which reach the US Tax Court.  
 
Also, the TAS provides an additional option for taxpayers for resolving problems with the IRS 
which they have been unable to resolve themselves through normal IRS channels. The TAS 
may be able to help a taxpayer if: the taxpayer’s problem is causing financial difficulties for 
the taxpayer, their family, or their business; the taxpayer faces (or their business is facing) an 
immediate threat of adverse action; or the taxpayer has tried repeatedly to contact the IRS but 
no one has responded, or the IRS has not responded by the date promised.4 The TAS is not a 
substitute for the established administrative or judicial review procedures. Rather it is a 
possible mechanism that can be used to supplement existing procedures generally if a taxpayer 
is about to suffer or is suffering a significant hardship. 
 
(3) The system provides for loops backward and forward 
The potential availability of ADR processes, such as mediation, before a trial in the US Tax 
Court can provide a loop-back mechanism in the system from a rights-based option back to 
interests-based processes. The US system also provides for loops forward in the respect that a 
taxpayer may choose to by-pass the IRS Appeals process and file a court petition upon the 
receipt of a 90-day letter. Loops forward in the system are further potentially provided for 
through various additional IRS dispute resolution programs such as the Accelerated Issues 
Resolution (AIR) program, Delegation Order 4-24 and Delegation Order 4-25.5 Such programs 
can, for example, give the IRS the authority in certain circumstances, to apply the settlement 
of an issue with respect to the same taxpayer (or another taxpayer who is directly involved in 
the transaction or taxable event), to other tax periods under examination where the same issue 
                                                          
3 The IRS also offer a number of pre-filing ADR programs including, but not limited to, the Pre-Filing Agreement 
(PFA) program, Private Letter Ruling, Industry Issue Resolution (IIR) program, Advance Pricing Agreement 
(APA) program and the Compliance Assurance Process (CAP). However, as outlined in section 1.4.3.1 of 
Appendix 1.4 of this thesis, as these pre-filing programs are aimed at resolving disputes prior to the filing of a 
taxpayer’s tax return, they are beyond the scope of this study. 
4 Internal Revenue Service Taxpayer Advocate Service: We are Here to Help You (IRS Pub. No. 1546, June 2016). 
5 For further details on these programs, see section 1.4.3.2 of Appendix 1.4 of this thesis. 
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is under examination for the other tax periods.6 Taxpayers can thus, loop-forward with respect 
to resolution of the issue in the other tax periods under examination.  
  
(4) There is notification before and feedback after the resolution process 
Notification is built into the dispute resolution process through the IRS’s Taxpayer Bill of 
Rights which provides that taxpayers have “the right to be informed about IRS decisions about 
their tax accounts and to receive clear explanations of the outcomes.”7 Taxpayers also have the 
right to know the maximum amount of time they have to challenge the IRS’s position.8 In 
addition, notification may be provided through the IRS’s webpage, “Compliance & 
Enforcement News”, which contains a collection of recent news releases, statements and other 
items related to IRS compliance and enforcement efforts.9 This information may highlight 
potential areas where disputes may arise.  
 
IRS Actions on Decisions (AODs) may also serve as a form of notification. It is IRS policy to 
announce at an early date whether it will follow the findings in certain cases and an AOD is 
the document issued by the IRS Office of Chief Counsel making such an announcement.10 
AODs are issued at the discretion of the IRS and only on unappealed issues decided adverse to 
the government. Counsel attorneys are required to follow the litigating positions announced in 
AODs in future litigation or dispute resolution.11 While AODs are not affirmative statements 
of IRS position, they can serve to alert IRS personnel and the public to the current litigating 
position of the IRS Office of the Chief Counsel with respect to the court decisions addressed 
by the AODs. 
 
A limited form of systemic feedback occurs through certain Appeals statistics provided on the 
IRS’s website.12 These statistics are very general in nature, providing data such as the number 
of cases received, pending and closed in IRS Appeals. Feedback is also provided through the 
National Taxpayer Advocate’s (NTA’s) annual reports to congress which, among other things, 
include a summary of the 20 most serious problems encountered by taxpayers and an 
                                                          
6 IRM 1.2.43.22. 
7 Internal Revenue Service Your Rights as a Taxpayer (IRS Pub. No. 1, December 2014) at 1. 
8 At 1. 
9 Internal Revenue Service “Compliance & Enforcement News” <http://www.irs.gov/uac/Compliance-&-
Enforcement-News> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
10 IRS AODs are published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin (I.R.B.) and are also electronically available, listed 
by calendar year, in the IRS’s Electronic Reading Room on the IRS website at: Internal Revenue Service “Actions 
on Decisions (AOD)” <http://apps.irs.gov/app/picklist/list/actionsOnDecisions.html> (last accessed 7 November 
2016). 
11 IRM 36.3.1.1. 




examination of the year’s 10 most frequently litigated tax issues.13 The dispute system provides 
for micro-level feedback from taxpayers in the respect that at the conclusion of certain IRS 
ADR programs IRS Appeals officials are directed to “provide a Customer Satisfaction Survey 
to the taxpayer along with a return envelope.”14 While the survey is voluntary, its completion 
is strongly encouraged so that the survey can be used to capture feedback and improve 
processes. Notwithstanding this feedback procedure, it has been observed that the IRS does not 
routinely make available statistics regarding its ADR programs.15 
 
(5) The system has a person or persons who function as internal independent 
confidential neutral(s) 
With respect to an internal independent confidential neutral within the IRS that employees can 
go to for coaching, referring and problem-solving, in cases worked in IRS Appeals, an Appeals 
Team Case Leader (ATCL) in each region leads a team of Appeals officers, technicians, and 
other support personnel. Part of the role of the ATCL is to “provide feedback to team members 
and his/her immediate manager, and serve as a mentor and coach to team members to enhance 
their performance and settlement skills.”16 Thus, for relevant IRS Appeals employees, ATCLs 
may be viewed as the closest equivalent to internal independent confidential neutrals in the 
system for IRS staff. Although, by virtue of the team approach in IRS Appeals, arguably 
ATCLs are not strictly independent per se. 
 
As stated earlier, the TAS is an independent organisation within the IRS which provides free 
help to qualifying taxpayers where they have been unable to resolve a problem with the IRS 
themselves or believe that an IRS system or procedure is not working as it should. The TAS 
can give taxpayers advice on how to approach IRS disputes at a very high level including 
discussing options for resolution, pointing taxpayers to the Taxpayer Bill of Rights provisions, 
providing fact sheets and FAQ’s on their website and referring taxpayers to Low Income 
Taxpayer Clinics17 (LITCs).18 Thus, in the context of the US tax dispute resolution system, the 
TAS can be viewed as the taxpayers’ equivalent of an independent confidential neutral in the 
system.  
                                                          
13 Under I.R.C. § 7803(c)(2)(B), the NTA is required to submit two reports to Congress each year. The first report 
(Objectives Report) is delivered each June and contains the goals and activities planned by the NTA for the coming 
year. The second report, the Annual Report to Congress, is delivered at the end of each December. The NTA’s 
reports to Congress are available at: Internal Revenue Service “National Taxpayer Advocate Reports to Congress 
and Research” <https://www.irs.gov/Advocate/Reports-to-Congress> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
14 IRM 8.26.2.16 and IRM 8.26.7.11. 
15 Ken Jones “Appeals Arbitration: Not a Compelling Litigation Alternative” (2014) 143 Tax Notes 1059 at 1062, 
1064. 
16 IRM 8.1.3.5. 
17 For further details see, section 1.4.7 of Appendix 1.4 of this thesis. 
18 Email from [redacted] (Principal, Co-leader, [redacted], Washington DC) to Melinda Jone regarding IRS tax 
disputes (9 July 2014). 
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(6) Procedures are ordered from low to high cost 
The formal dispute procedures can be viewed as being ordered in a low to high cost sequence 
in the respect that there is the opportunity for negotiation with the IRS examiner and/or the 
examiner’s supervisor in the first instance, followed by the IRS’s administrative Appeals 
process and then potential proceedings in court. This sequence generally implies an increase in 
costs at each level. However, there is also the option for taxpayers to utilise the IRS’s Appeals 
ADR programs during the examination and appeals stages of the dispute process. These 
programs potentially create additional costs at the stage of the dispute procedures at which they 
are utilised. Although, the expenses associated with each of the IRS Appeals ADR programs 
vary. For example, in FTS and PAM, the expense of the IRS Appeals mediator is met by the 
IRS.19 However, in PAM, if a taxpayer elects to additionally utilise a non-IRS co-mediator, 
they must cover all the expenses associated with the co-mediator.20 Thus, the additional costs 
incurred by the taxpayer may vary according to the number and type of additional processes 
utilised in the dispute procedures.  
 
Furthermore, as noted in the tax dispute resolution processes of the other jurisdictions in this 
study, the tax dispute resolution process in the US can require substantial upfront costs 
(including the time spent by the taxpayer in preparing for, and participating in negotiations as 
well as the cost of professional advisors) from the taxpayer. This suggests that, notwithstanding 
the apparent low to high cost sequence identified above, the initial upfront costs for the taxpayer 
may not greatly differ with the stage of the formal dispute process that the dispute is ultimately 
resolved at. 
 
(7) The system has multiple access points 
The dispute process has two structural access points which taxpayers can enter the dispute 
process at – either at the IRS Appeals Office level or at the level of the US Tax Court. If the 
taxpayer cannot reach an agreement at the meeting with the IRS examiner and/or their 
supervisor at the end of an IRS examination, in most instances they will enter the formal dispute 
process through appealing the decision to the IRS Appeals Office (following the receipt of a 
30-day letter). However, in some instances a taxpayer may choose not to respond to the 30-day 
letter. In which case they will receive a 90-day letter whereby they may instead choose to enter 
the dispute process at the stage where they file a petition in the US Tax Court.  
 
In addition, if certain criteria are met, there may be multiple access points to the system 
available for small cases. Generally, to appeal an IRS decision, a taxpayer must send a formal 
written protest to their local IRS Appeals Office. However, if the total amount of the dispute is 
                                                          
19 Internal Revenue Service Rev. Proc. 2003-40, 2003-25 I.R.B. 1044 [“Rev. Proc. 2003-40”] at [5.01] and Internal 
Revenue Service Rev. Proc. 2014-63, 2014-53 I.R.B. 1014 [“Rev. Proc. 2014-63”] at [9.01]. 
20 Internal Revenue Service “Rev. Proc. 2014-63”, above n 19, at [9.01]. 
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not more than $US25,000 for each tax period, the taxpayer has the option of making a small 
case request by sending a letter instead of filing a formal written protest. Also, if a case is 
petitioned to the US Tax Court and the amount is $US50,000 or less for any one tax year or 
period, (albeit that the same petition form is used), the taxpayer has the option to request in 
their petition form that their case be handled under the small tax case procedures rather than 
through the regular procedures. 
 
Procedurally, there are relatively limited means by which to deliver notification of entry to the 
disputes system at each of the structural entry points. That is, written protests or small case 
requests to the IRS Appeals Office must be sent by mail and petitions to the US Tax Court may 
either be sent by mail or hand-delivered. 
 
The system offers a choice of access persons for whom certain system users can approach in 
the first instance in the regard that the IRS offer a number of forms of assistance for “Limited 
English Proficient” (LEP) persons.21 For example, language assistance is available through the 
Over-the-Phone Interpreter (OPI) service, bilingual assisters and telephone help lines.22 
Multiple access persons are also available in the respect that telephone assistance for the deaf 
and hard of hearing is available for individuals with teletypewriter (TTY) equipment. These 
individuals may also be able to access the IRS through the federal or state relay services.23 As 
noted in the other jurisdictions in this study, while these services offer certain taxpayers with a 
choice of persons in contacting the IRS generally, they arguably may also act to provide a 
choice of access persons to approach for certain taxpayers to acquire information about dispute 
resolution system in the first instance. 
 
Multiple forms of access to the dispute system for certain taxpayers are also provided in the 
respect that a number of translated forms and publications are made available, including, for 
example, those relating to taxpayer appeal rights. The IRS also provides a Spanish-language 
internet website on “the Español Web Site” and websites in four additional languages (Chinese, 
Korean, Vietnamese and Russian) on the “Multilingual Gateway”.24 In addition, most IRS 
forms and publications are available in alternative formats such as Braille, large print, HTML, 
ASCI text, and accessible PDF forms.25 Thus, the above provision of material in alternative 
formats serves to provide multiple forms of access to the dispute system for taxpayers from 
different backgrounds or with specific needs. 
                                                          
21 IRM 22.31.1.2.1. 
22 IRM 22.31.1.1. 
23 Internal Revenue Service “Topic 102 - Tax Assistance for Individuals with Disabilities” (10 August 2016) 
<https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc102.html> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
24 IRM 23.31.1.10. 
25 See Internal Revenue Service “Accessible Forms & Publications” (1 November 2016) 
<https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/accessible-products> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
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(8) The system includes training and education for stakeholders 
The IRS’s webpage, “Appeals … Resolving Tax Disputes”, contains information on the IRS 
Appeals Office, what taxpayers can expect from the IRS Appeals Office and on how to prepare 
an IRS Appeals request.26 The webpage also contains links to online videos and podcasts of 
the Appeals process, Appeals Online Self-Help Tools, and forms and publications on 
taxpayers’ Appeal rights.27 The IRS further have a webpage, “Appeals Mediation Programs: 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)”, which provides education and guidance for taxpayers 
and other stakeholders on the Appeals mediation programs.28 Links are provided to the Appeals 
mediation programs currently available and to an Appeals Mediation Online Self-Help Tool. 
In addition, the TAS has a separate dedicated website which provides information for 
individuals, businesses and tax professionals on its services and programs, and on the Taxpayer 
Bill of Rights.29  
 
The IRS Internal Revenue Manual (IRM),30 revenue procedures,31 notices32 and 
announcements,33 which are publically available on the IRS’s website, provide official 
guidance and public pronouncements for IRS employees, taxpayers and other stakeholders on 
aspects of the US dispute resolution system, including the IRS Appeals Office and the IRS 
Appeals ADR programs.  
                                                          
26 Internal Revenue Service “Appeals … Resolving Tax Disputes” (6 October 2016) 
<https://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Appeals-Resolving-Tax-Disputes> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
27 Examples of these publications include: Internal Revenue Service Your Appeal Rights and How To Prepare a 
Protest If You Don’t Agree (IRS Pub. No. 5, January 1999); Internal Revenue Service Appeals: Introduction to 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (IRS Pub. No. 4167, July 2012); Internal Revenue Service Appeals (IRS Pub. No. 
4227, October 2013); and Internal Revenue Service, above n 7. These publications are available at: Internal 
Revenue Service “Forms and Publications about your Appeal Rights” (7 June 2016) 
<http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Forms-and-Publications-About-Your-Appeal-Rights> (last accessed 7 
November 2016). 
28 Internal Revenue Service “Appeals Mediation Programs: Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)” (19 April 
2016) <http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Appeals-Mediation-Programs> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
29 See Taxpayer Advocate Service “Taxpayer Advocate Service” <http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/> (last 
accessed 7 November 2016). 
30 The IRM is the primary, official compilation of “instructions to staff” that relate to the administration and 
operation of the IRS: IRM 1.11.2.2. 
31 A revenue procedure is an official statement of a procedure that affects the rights or duties of taxpayers or other 
members of the public under the I.R.C., related statutes, tax treaties and regulations and that should be a matter of 
public knowledge. Revenue Procedures are also published in the I.R.B.: Internal Revenue Service “Understanding 
IRS Guidance - A Brief Primer” (6 July 2016) <http://www.irs.gov/uac/Understanding-IRS-Guidance-A-Brief-
Primer> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
32 A notice is a public pronouncement that may contain guidance that involves substantive interpretations of the 
I.R.C. or other provisions of the law. For example, notices can be used to relate what regulations will say in 
situations where the regulations may not be published in the immediate future: Internal Revenue Service, above 
n 31. 
33 An announcement is a public pronouncement that has only immediate or short-term value. For example, 
announcements can be used to summarise the law or regulations without making any substantive interpretation or 
to state what regulations will say when they are certain to be published in the immediate future: Internal Revenue 
Service, above n 31. 
166 
 
The IRS holds annual IRS Nationwide Tax Forums for tax professionals which are three-day 
events that provide professionals with current information on federal and state tax issues 
presented by experts from the IRS and its partner organisations through various training 
seminars and workshops. The seminars and workshops cover a range of topics including 
taxpayers’ rights, the IRS Appeals process and the IRS’s ADR programs. In addition, the IRS 
Nationwide Tax Forums Online provides self-study seminars for tax professionals based on 
taped seminars from previous years IRS Nationwide Tax Forums.34 Both the IRS Nationwide 
Tax Forums and the IRS Nationwide Tax Forums Online may contribute towards continuing 
professional education (CPE) credits for certain tax professionals. The IRS Video Portal also 
contains video and audio presentations of various tax topics and archived versions of live panel 
discussions and webinars for tax professionals.35  
 
LITCs, administered by the TAS, can represent low income individuals in disputes with the 
IRS.36 In addition to providing taxpayer representation, they can also provide education and 
outreach to low income taxpayers and taxpayers who speak English as a second language about 
their taxpayer rights and responsibilities. 
 
IRS Appeals employees are generally trained in-house by IRS Appeals instructors. Special 
courses may also be provided by contract instructors. IRS Appeals employees acting as 
mediators in the IRS’s ADR programs are trained in mediation. While the actual training is 
conducted in-house by IRS Appeals, the training regime is designed by an independent (non-
governmental) contractor, currently the National Mediators Association.37 
 
(9) Assistance is offered for choosing the best process 
There are process advisors for the IRS Appeals process available for taxpayers. This is 
indicated on the IRS website which outlines that taxpayers can contact the IRS employee that 
they have been dealing with or call the Taxpayer Service number for assistance in identifying 
whether their case meets the requirements for entering into the IRS Appeals system.38 The IRS 
also provides a number of self-help tools to assist taxpayers in choosing the best process.39 The 
Appeals Online Self-Help Tools can be used by taxpayers to help them focus in on their area 
of dispute and help them determine if they would benefit from filing an appeal. The Appeals 
                                                          
34 Internal Revenue Service “IRS Nationwide Tax Forums Online” <http://www.irstaxforumsonline.com/> (last 
accessed 7 November 2016). 
35 Internal Revenue Service “IRS Video Portal” <http://www.irsvideos.gov/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
36 For further details, see section 1.4.7 of Appendix 1.4 of this thesis. 
37 Email from [redacted] (Principal, Co-leader, [redacted], Washington DC) to Melinda Jone regarding IRS ADR 
staff training (7 June 2014). 
38 Internal Revenue Service “Is Appeals the Place for You?” (11 May 2016) <https://www.irs.gov/individuals/is-
appeals-the-place-for-you-1> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
39 The online self-help tools are available at: Internal Revenue Service “Appeals Online Self-Help Tools” (23 May 
2016) <http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Appeals-Online-Self-Help-Tools> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
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Mediation Online Self-Help Tool can be used to determine whether there is an appropriate IRS 
ADR program that may be utilised by taxpayers to help resolve their disputes. There is also a 
toll-free hot-line to help taxpayers and tax practitioners with questions on the Small Business/ 
Self-Employed (SB/SE) FTS ADR program. 
 
IRS revenue procedures on the IRS ADR programs and the IRM provide guidance for IRS 
officers and taxpayers on, inter alia, case eligibility and case exclusions from the ADR 
programs.40 The IRS’s ADR programs may be requested by either the taxpayer or the IRS after 
consulting with the other party. IRS Appeals Managers generally act as process advisors to 
ensure the appropriate use of the ADR programs.41 In addition, requests for ADR usually 
require the approval of an IRS Appeals Manager before their acceptance into the requested 
ADR program.42 
 
(10) Disputants have the right to choose a preferred process 
As indicated under DSD Principle 7, taxpayers have the right to choose a preferred process in 
the respect that they can choose to enter the dispute process at either the IRS Appeals Office 
level or at the level of the US Tax Court. Also, as noted under DSD Principle 7, for taxpayers 
with small tax cases there are further opportunities to choose a preferred process in the respect 
that if certain criteria are met, qualifying taxpayers may choose to file a small case request 
(thus, following simplified filing requirements) instead of filing a formal protest with the IRS 
Appeals Office. In addition, at the level of the US Tax Court, taxpayers with qualifying small 
tax cases may request that their case be handled by the simpler, less formal small case 
procedures instead of the regular US Tax Court procedures. 
 
Taxpayers also have the right to choose a preferred process in the respect that they are able to 
select between the formal dispute process and various IRS ADR programs available at the 
examination and appeals stages of the dispute process. In the FTS program, which may be 
utilised at the examination (pre-Appeals) stage of the formal dispute process, if an agreement 
(in whole or in part) is unable to be reached through ADR, the taxpayer retains all of their 
otherwise applicable appeal rights to request traditional IRS Appeals consideration of 
unresolved issues.43 Taxpayers with cases that cannot be resolved (in whole or in part) through 
RAP, which takes place in the Appeals stage, are also entitled to traditional IRS Appeals 
consideration on all remaining unagreed issues.44 
                                                          
40 See, for example, Internal Revenue Service “Rev. Proc. 2003-40”, above n 19, at [3.02]-[3.03] and Internal 
Revenue Service “Rev. Proc. 2014-63”, above n 19, at [4.03]-[4.04] 
41 Internal Revenue Service “Rev. Proc. 2003-40”, above n 19, at [4.01]. 
42 Internal Revenue Service “Rev. Proc. 2003-40”, above n 19, at [4.02] and Internal Revenue Service “Rev. Proc. 
2014-63”, above n 19, at [7.03]. 
43 Internal Revenue Service “Rev. Proc. 2003-40”, above n 19, at [2.02] 
44 IRM 8.26.11.2. 
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At the level of the US Tax Court taxpayers can choose a preferred process in the respect that 
before commencing any formal court proceedings, parties may choose to utilise US Tax Court 
arbitration or mediation where appropriate. If arbitration is entered into, the arbitrator’s 
decision is binding on the parties. However, if the parties are unable to reach an agreement 
through mediation, the parties may prepare for trial as normal. 
 
In addition, provided that the taxpayer meets the criteria for assistance, the option of the TAS 
may technically be used in parallel with the formal tax dispute resolution process. This is 
because, as stated under DSD Principle 2, the TAS is not intended to be a substitute dispute 
process for the formal dispute process. Rather, it is intended to supplement the existing process 
if a taxpayer is about to suffer or is suffering significant hardship and have not been able to 
solve their problems on their own.  
 
(11) The system is fair and perceived as fair 
The mission of the IRS Appeals Office is to “resolve tax controversies, without litigation on a 
basis which is fair and impartial to both the government and the taxpayer.”45 Independence 
from other IRS offices is critical for the IRS Appeals Office to accomplish this mission. Section 
1001(a) of the RRA 1998 directed the IRS Commissioner to develop and implement a plan to 
reorganise the IRS and, inter alia:  
 
[E]nsure an independent Appeals function within the Internal Revenue Service, including the 
prohibition … of ex parte communications between appeals officers and other Internal Revenue 
Service employees to the extent that such communications appear to compromise the 
independence of the appeals officers. 
 
An ex parte communication is a communication that takes place between any IRS Appeals 
employee and employees of other IRS functions, without the taxpayer or representative being 
given an opportunity to participate in the communication.46 Notwithstanding Appeals’ 
constitution as a separate function within the IRS and the issuance of IRS administrative 
guidance prohibiting certain communications between IRS Appeals officers and officers from 
originating functions,47 “criticism has persisted that Appeals personnel are improperly 
influenced by other staff.”48 Furthermore, one of the main drawbacks for taxpayers of IRS 
Appeals as an avenue for issue resolution “is some taxpayers’ belief that the [Appeals] office 
has too much of an exam mentality to offer an impartial review.”49  
                                                          
45 IRM 1.1.7.1. 
46 Internal Revenue Service Rev. Proc. 2012-18, 2012-10 I.R.B. 455 [“Rev. Proc. 2012-18”] at [2.01].  
47 See Internal Revenue Service “Rev. Proc. 2012-18”, above n 46. 
48 Jeremiah Coder “Overcoming Appeals’ Bad Rap” (2011) 132 Tax Notes 1196 at 1197.  
49 At 1201. See also, American Bar Association Section of Taxation Survey Report on the Independence of IRS 
Appeals (11 August 2007) at 31-36. 
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Notwithstanding the prohibition against certain ex parte communications, there are no 
legislative remedies or sanctions for breaches of the rule. Although, where a breach has 
occurred, the IRS does require the Appeals Office to “cure” the breach by promptly notifying 
the taxpayer of the communication, sharing the contents of the communication and affording 
the taxpayer an opportunity to respond.50 In applicable instances, the case may be assigned to 
another IRS Appeals officer.51 However, the specific administrative remedy that will be made 
available “is within the sole discretion of Appeals and will be based on the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case.”52 Thus, the absence of enforceable remedies for ex parte 
breaches within either administrative procedures or legislation, “presents another challenge to 
the perception of Appeals’ independence.”53 
 
Nevertheless, personal correspondence by the researcher with a number of US tax practitioners 
indicates the existence of generally positive perceptions of the IRS Appeals Office in 
effectively resolving disputes.54 Historically, IRS Appeals have settled 90 to 95 per cent of all 
cases coming to the Appeals Office in all of their dispute resolution processes.55 Furthermore, 
evidence given by a former IRS First Commissioner purports that:56 
 
Appeals officials take a great deal of pride regarding their independence. Rarely have there 
been complaints about their independence. In general, Appeals officers are recruited from 
experienced IRS agents, and they have an intense training program in ADR tools and 
independence. 
 
Yet, in February 2012, IRS Appeals initiated the Appeals Judicial Approach and Culture 
(AJAC) project in response to concerns by internal and external stakeholders, including IRS 
Appeals employees, that its determinations did not appear to be independent and impartial. The 
project was aimed at “reinforcing Appeals’ quasi-judicial approach to the way it handles cases, 
                                                          
50 I.R.M. 8.1.10.5.6. 
51 I.R.M. 8.1.10.5.7. 
52 I.R.M. 8.1.10.5.8. 
53 Gerald A Kafka, Rita A Cavanagh and Sean M Akins “Do IRS Appeals’ Office Ex Parte Prohibitions Need 
Strengthening?” (2009) 122 Tax Notes 1591 at 1598. 
54 Email from [redacted] (Tax Partner, [redacted], Palo Alto, California) to Melinda Jone regarding the IRS 
Appeals Office and IRS Appeals ADR programs (9 May 2015); Telephone correspondence from [redacted] 
(Principal, Co-leader, [redacted], Washington DC) and [redacted] (Principal, [redacted], Washington DC) to 
Melinda Jone regarding the IRS Appeals Office and IRS Appeals ADR programs (7 May 2015). This appears to 
be consistent with an audit of the independence of the IRS Appeals Office by the Treasury Inspector General for 
Tax Administration (TIGTA) in 2005 which found that members of tax professional organisations believed the 
independence of the IRS Appeals Office was “generally very high.” See Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration The Overall Independence of the Office of Appeals to Be Sufficient (September 2005) at 4. 
55 Telephone correspondence from [redacted] (Principal, Co-leader, [redacted], Washington DC) and [redacted] 
(Principal, [redacted], Washington DC), above n 54. 
56 Email from [redacted] (Tax Partner, [redacted], Palo Alto, California), above n 54. See also, similar comments 
made by various practitioners in Coder, above n 48, at 1197. 
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with the goal of enhancing internal and external customer perceptions of a fair, impartial and 
independent Office of Appeals.”57 As part of the AJAC project, IRS procedures have been 
modified to emphasise the following features of the Appeals system: 
 
 IRS Appeals will not raise new issues nor reopen any issues on which the taxpayer 
and IRS are in agreement.58 
 The IRS Appeals process is not a continuation or an extension of the examination 
process.59 
 IRS Appeals should receive cases from the examination function that are fully 
developed and documented, such that IRS Appeals will not refer the case back to 
the examination function for further development, but will attempt to settle the case 
as submitted taking into account factual hazards.60 
 Where the taxpayer raises new issues, information, or evidence, IRS Appeals will 
forward these to the examination function for their consideration.61 
 
In general, the above policies are intended to clarify and separate the negotiation and decision-
making role of IRS Appeals from the factual investigations and case development allocated to 
the examination function.62 However, concerns have been raised that, in practice AJAC is being 
used “to limit taxpayer’s access to Appeals, causing cases to be bounced back and forth 
between Appeals and Compliance, and resulting in curtailed review by Hearing Officers.”63 
This outcome of AJAC implementation “is diminishing the timeliness, quality and fairness of 
case reviews.”64 
 
A number of issues have also been raised in the literature with respect to perceptions of fairness 
of the IRS Appeals ADR programs. One of the main concerns is in relation to the impartiality 
of the mediator. Given that the likely mediator of the IRS’s tax mediation regimes is an 
employee of the IRS Appeals Office, questions have been raised regarding the mediator’s 
neutrality and potential bias in favour of the IRS.65 This is of importance given that “perceived 
                                                          
57 Internal Revenue Service Memorandum for Appeals Employees AP-08-0714-0004 (2 July 2014). 
58 IRM 8.6.1.6.2. 
59 IRM 8.6.1.6.2. 
60 IRM 8.2.1.4.3. 
61 IRM 8.2.1.5.2. 
62 Nina E Olson National Taxpayer Advocate 2015 Annual Report to Congress (Internal Revenue Service, 
December 2015) at 82. 
63 At 89. 
64 Nina E Olson National Taxpayer Advocate Fiscal Year 2017 Objectives Report to Congress – Volume 2 
(Internal Revenue Service, August 2016) at 48. 
65 Leonora Meyercord “Avoiding state bankruptcy: Mediation as an alternative to resolving state tax disputes” 
(2010) 29 Rev Litig 925 at 938.  
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bias creates mistrust in the process.”66 In addition, it is possible for taxpayers in the PAM 
program, with the approval of IRS Appeals, to engage a third party co-mediator who is not 
employed by the IRS. However, as the taxpayer is responsible for paying for the co-mediator, 
this makes it “an unprofitable and highly discouraging option” for most taxpayers.67 
 
Another concern with IRS ADR, particularly in respect of the FTS program, is that of 
confidentiality and the lack of restriction on ex parte communications.68 As a requirement for 
participation in FTS, the parties must agree to a waiver of ex parte communications so that IRS 
Appeals officials can act as mediators while the case is still in the examination process. 
Taxpayers fear that IRS Appeals officials will abuse the waiver of ex parte communications in 
FTS either through communications with other IRS employees at the examination level, or 
later if that IRS Appeals official is involved in the case during the IRS Appeals process.69 Thus, 
ex parte communications run the risk that:70  
 
… in addition to the necessary administrative contacts, appeals is overstepping the intent 
of the waivers by discussing substantive issues with IRS employees in a manner that could 
bias, or appear to bias, the appeals employees toward the positions of the IRS compliance 
functions. 
 
Hence, various commentators have argued that the above concerns, as well as other issues, 
have in part contributed towards a noted underutilisation of the IRS’s Appeals ADR 
programs.71 
 
(12) The system is supported by top managers 
There appears to be limited visible evidence of the championship of the IRS Appeals Office 
and/or of the IRS Appeals ADR programs by the IRS Commissioner in the form of published 
speeches or other media releases.72 However, there appears to be some degree of evidence of 
the support and championship of the IRS Appeals process and of the IRS Appeals ADR 
programs in presentations given by the current Chief of IRS Appeals (who reports directly to 
                                                          
66 At 938. 
67 Stephen Folan “Even ADR Must Pay Its Dues: An Analysis of the Internal Revenue Service’s ADR Programs 
and Where They Still Need to Grow” (2013) 13 Pepp Disp Resol LJ 281 at 288. 
68 David Parsly “The Internal Revenue Service and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Moving from Infancy to 
Legitimacy” (2007) 8 Cardozo J Conflict Resol 677 at 702. 
69 Folan, above n 67, at 288; Parsly, above n 68, at 702. 
70 Parsly, above n 68, at 703. 
71 Folan, above n 67; Parsly, above n 68; Gregory P Mathews “Using Negotiation, Mediation and Arbitration to 
Resolve IRS-Taxpayer Disputes” (2004) 19 Ohio St J on Disp Resol 709. 
72 See the published speeches and statements made by the IRS Commissioner, available at: Internal Revenue 
Service “Commissioner’s Comments, Statements and Remarks” <http://www.irs.gov/uac/Commissioner's-
Comments,-Statements-and-Remarks> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
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the IRS Commissioner).73 In addition, personal correspondence by the researcher with a US 
tax practitioner suggests a belief that IRS officials do regularly speak at various conferences 
on the IRS Appeals process and ADR.74 
 
(13) The system is aligned with the mission, vision and values of the organisation 
The disputes system is structurally integrated into the organisation through the IRS Appeals 
Office. Organisationally located in the Office of the Commissioner, the IRS Appeals Office 
operates independently from IRS functions such as the examination division, which performs 
audits to determine the correct tax liability, and the Office of Chief Counsel, which litigates 
US Tax Court cases for the IRS. As stated under DSD Principle 11 in this section, since its 
establishment in 1927, the mission of the IRS Appeals Office has been to:75 
 
[R]esolve tax controversies, without litigation, on a basis which is fair and impartial to 
both the Government and the taxpayer and in a manner that will enhance voluntary 
compliance and public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the Service. 
 
The overall Mission, Vision and Values of the IRS are as outlined in Figure 5.4: 
 
  
                                                          
73 See, for example, various presentations by Kirsten Wielobob, the Chief of IRS Appeals as at 30 November 
2016: Kirsten Wielobob “IRS Appeals and Litigation Strategies and Process Updates” (paper presented to the Tax 
Executives Institute 64th Midyear Conference, Washington DC, 23-26 March 2014); Kirsten Wielobob 
“Resolving Cases in Today’s Appeals” (paper presented to the Federal Bar Association Tax Law Conference 
2015, Washington DC, 6 March 2015); Kirsten Wielobob “What’s New in IRS Exam and Appeals” (panelist in 
the ABA Section of Taxation 2015 May Meeting, Washington DC, 7-9 May 2015); Kirsten Wielobob “Recent 
Developments at Appeals” (paper presented to the Federal Bar Association Tax Law Conference 2016, 
Washington DC, 4 March 2016). 
74 Email from [redacted] (Managing Director, [redacted], Houston) to Melinda Jone regarding tax dispute 
resolution in the IRS (5 August 2014). 
75 IRM 1.1.7.1. 
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Figure 5.4: The Internal Revenue Service’s Mission, Vision and Values76 
Mission: 
 
Provide America’s taxpayers top-quality service by helping them understand and meet their tax 




We will uphold the integrity of our nation’s tax system and preserve the public trust through our 




 Honesty and Integrity  
 Respect 
 Continuous Improvement  
 Inclusion 
 Openness and Collaboration  
 Personal Accountability 
 
It follows that the mission of the IRS Appeals Office of enhancing voluntary compliance and 
overall confidence in the fairness of the tax system through providing an efficient and 
independent administrative appeals system for taxpayers, generally appears to align with the 
overall mission of the IRS to “[p]rovide America’s taxpayers top quality service by helping 
them understand and meet their tax responsibilities and enforce the law with integrity and 
fairness to all”77 (insofar as the dispute resolution system constitutes one of the service 
offerings provided by the IRS in achieving its mission). The dispute process provided by the 
IRS Appeals Office also serves to fulfil the right in the IRS’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights which 
states that “taxpayers are entitled to a fair and impartial administrative appeal of most IRS 
decisions.”78 
 
In providing the central direction for the attainment of the overall mission of the IRS, the IRS 
Strategic Plan (which sets out the IRS’s primary goals and objectives for the next four years) 
outlines that one of the current strategic goals of the IRS is “to deliver high quality and timely 
service to reduce taxpayer burden and encourage voluntary compliance.”79 Notwithstanding 
this goal, the IRS Appeals Office presently does not appear to feature in the IRS’s planned 
initiatives for achieving the strategic goals outlined in the current 2014-2017 Strategic Plan.  
                                                          
76 Internal Revenue Service Strategic Plan FY 2014-2017 (IRS Pub. No. 3744, June 2014) at 14-15. 
77 At 14. 
78 Internal Revenue Service, above n 7, at 1. 
79 Internal Revenue Service, above n 76, at 16. 
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In addition, there is an apparent lack of integration of the tax dispute resolution system in the 
“IRS Future State” initiative, a comprehensive plan developed by the IRS since 2014 which 
envisions how it will operate in five years and beyond.80 The plan includes a stated goal of 
creating online taxpayer accounts through which taxpayers will be able to obtain information 
and interact with the IRS.81 Further implicit in the plan is an intention on the part of the IRS to 
substantially reduce telephone and face-to-face interaction with taxpayers.82 A reduced ability 
for taxpayers to personally contact the IRS may have an adverse impact on the ability for certain 
taxpayers to resolve the issues underlying these contacts.83 As a consequence, confidence in 
the fairness of the tax system may erode and may over time lead to a lower rate of voluntary 
compliance.84 
 
With regard to the integration of ADR within the system, in order to achieve its mission, the 
IRS Appeals Office provides taxpayers with “a variety of alternative dispute resolution forums 
to resolve taxpayer disputes without litigation.”85 However, IRS efforts to incorporate ADR 
within the disputes system have primarily been driven by the RRA 1998 (enacting I.R.C. § 
7123), which directed the IRS to implement procedures to allow a broader use of early appeals 
programs and to establish procedures that allow for ADR processes such as mediation and 
arbitration. Moreover, whether ADR has in fact been sufficiently integrated into the disputes 
system in practice, can arguably be questioned given the observation that the IRS has been 
reluctant to fully embrace ADR due to, inter alia, the “well-established” negotiation procedures 
of the IRS Appeals Office.86 The extant literature suggests that the IRS have designed its ADR 
programs “with a purposely narrow scope and application so that they can supplement, rather 
than replace, the existing negotiation process.”87 Furthermore, the limited available statistics 
on the IRS’s ADR programs suggest that the ADR programs “are not being fully used and must 
be improved to help Appeals achieve its mission.”88 
 
  
                                                          
80 See Internal Revenue Service “IRS Future State” (4 March 2016) <https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/irs-
future-state> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
81 Internal Revenue Service, above n 80. 
82 Olson, above n 62, at 3.  
83 At 4. For further information, see Taxpayer Advocate Service “National Taxpayer Advocate Public Forums” 
(22 June 2016) <https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/news/national-taxpayer-advocate-public-forums?category=Tax 
News&taxissue=2556> (last accessed 7 November 2016), which provides full transcripts of a series of public 
forums held by the NTA in 2016 on the IRS Future State Plan and taxpayers’ needs and preferences when dealing 
with the IRS. 
84 Olson, above n 62, at 4.  
85 IRM 1.1.7.1. 
86 Folan, above n 67, at 299. 
87 At 289.  
88 Jones, above n 15, at 1064. 
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(14) There is evaluation of the system 
Ongoing evaluation of the system occurs through the IRS Appeals Customer Satisfaction 
Survey which is conducted for the IRS by an independent vendor. The objective of the survey 
is to identify what IRS Appeals staff and managers can do to improve customer service and to 
track customer satisfaction with the Appeals process over time. While these surveys have been 
conducted annually since 1997, the results of the surveys are apparently not routinely made 
publically available.89 
 
As noted under DSD Principle 4 in this section, there is also provision for the evaluation of 
certain IRS Appeals ADR programs in the respect that taxpayers are requested to participate in 
a Customer Satisfaction Survey at the conclusion of the ADR program so that information can 
be gathered for evaluating and improving the relevant ADR process. However, similar to the 
IRS Appeals Customer Satisfaction Survey, the IRS Appeals Office apparently do not routinely 
publish the results of these surveys.90 In addition, in 2012, the IRS Appeals Office engaged the 
Harvard Negotiation and Mediation Clinical Program (HNMCP) to evaluate the IRS’s existing 
ADR tools. This was a one-off evaluation conducted on the IRS Appeals Office’s ADR 
programs to identify potential opportunities for improvement.91 
 
The TAP may also provide a means through which evaluation of the dispute resolution system 
can occur in the respect that they conduct outreach to solicit suggestions or ideas from citizens, 
and serve on project committees working with IRS program owners on topics important to 
taxpayers and the IRS. The TAP identifies tax issues of importance to taxpayers and provides 
taxpayers’ perspectives to the IRS on key programs, products, and services (which may include 
the dispute resolution system). It also serves as a focus group that makes recommendations to 
the IRS and the NTA. 
 
The NTA’s annual reports to Congress may provide a form of evaluation of the system to the 
extent that problems relating to the IRS Appeals Office and its processes are identified and 
consequent legislative and/or administrative changes may be recommended. The IRS 
Oversight Board may additionally provide an evaluation of aspects of the dispute resolution 
system through its annual reports to Congress and other special reports issued.  
 
Federal oversight organisations such as the US Government Accountability Office (US GAO) 
and the TIGTA have also provided reports on the IRS Appeals Office and its processes. The 
                                                          
89 Email from [redacted] (Economist, [redacted], Internal Revenue Service) to Melinda Jone regarding the Appeals 
Customer Satisfaction Survey results (19 June 2014). 
90 Email from [redacted] (Practice Administrator, [redacted], New York) to Melinda Jone regarding IRS Appeals 
statistics (30 July 2014).  
91 However, the majority of the HNMCP report (including the findings and recommendations) is exempt from 
disclosure as privileged information: Email from [redacted] (Appeals Senior Program Analyst, [redacted], Internal 
Revenue Service) to Melinda Jone regarding the HNMCP survey of IRS ADR programs (7 February 2015). 
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US GAO is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress. One of the ways in 
which the US GAO supports congressional oversight is by reporting on how well government 
programs and policies are meeting their objectives.92 The TIGTA was established by Congress 
under the RRA 199893 and provides audit and investigative services that promote economy, 
efficiency and integrity in the administration of the internal revenue laws. The TIGTA’s audit 
reports review and recommend improvements on all aspects of the IRS’s administration of the 
tax system including, for example, the IRS Appeals Office.94 
 
5.4 Summary of the Author’s Evaluations of the United Kingdom and the United States 
This chapter has outlined, and then evaluated using DSD principles, the tax dispute resolution 
procedures of the UK and the US. From a DSD perspective, the tax dispute resolution systems 
in the two jurisdictions are similar in many respects. The systems in both jurisdictions meet 
many of the DSD principles of best practice including: involving stakeholders in the design 
process; providing multiple options for addressing conflict (including direct negotiation, 
internal review, litigation and ADR processes); the presence of loop-back and loop-forward 
mechanisms; notification and feedback on disputes is provided to taxpayers; an internal unit or 
person is available to mentor and provide advice on dispute resolution; the procedures in the 
system are ordered in a low to high cost sequence (notwithstanding high upfront costs to 
taxpayers in both jurisdictions); training and education for stakeholders of the system; 
providing assistance for choosing a preferred process and mechanisms for evaluating the 
system. 
 
Both systems generally provide multiple structural access points. Taxpayers are thus, provided 
with the ability to choose between entering the system at the level of internal review or at the 
level of external appeal. Both systems also offer taxpayers the ability to choose a preferred 
process in the respect that ADR options are able to be utilised throughout the dispute process 
(including at the audit and litigation stages). However, the US system offers a wider range of 
ADR (and other dispute resolution) programs. This partly reflects the need for the IRS to cater 
for a larger taxpayer base as well as the relative complexity of the US tax laws and tax system. 
The US system offers a further dispute resolution option with the provision of the TAS, which 
is available generally if a taxpayer is about to suffer or is suffering significant hardship and 
have not been able to solve their problems on their own. As the TAS may technically be used 
in parallel with the formal dispute process, this option also constitutes another way in the US 
system in which taxpayers are provided with the ability to choose a preferred process. A further 
                                                          
92 See, for example, United States General Accounting Office IRS Initiatives to Resolve Disputes Over Tax 
Liabilities (Washington DC, May 1997). 
93 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 1103(a), 112 Stat. 
685, 707 (1998). 
94 See, for example, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, above n 54. 
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opportunity for certain taxpayers to choose a preferred process in the US system is provided 
where small tax cases meeting certain criteria are able to choose between utilising the small 
case procedures and the regular procedures for filing a protest with the IRS Appeals Office or 
a petition to the US Tax Court. The provision of these options also serves to provide multiple 
access points for qualifying taxpayers. In the UK there is a limited form of provision for small 
tax cases in the respect that on applications made to the tribunal, tax cases are categorised based 
on their complexity as either default paper cases, basic cases, standard cases or complex cases. 
However, taxpayers (or HMRC) are unable to select the categorisation as it is made by the 
tribunal. 
 
In both jurisdictions there have been some indications of negative perceptions of fairness of 
the tax dispute resolution systems evident. Although, in recent times the revenue authorities in 
both jurisdictions have taken various measures in attempt to improve taxpayers’ perceptions of 
fairness. Nevertheless, there appears to be limited visible evidence of the support and 
championship of the dispute resolution systems overall, by certain members of top management 
of the revenue authorities in both jurisdictions (that is, the IRS Commissioner and HMRC’s 
Executive Chair and Chief Executive). With respect to the support and championship of ADR, 
in the US there is some evidence of the promotion of the IRS Appeals ADR programs in 
presentations given by IRS Appeals officials. However, in the UK there appears to be limited 
evidence of the promotion of HMRC’s ADR programs since their incorporation into “business 
as usual” by HMRC. Although, arguably this may partly reflect the comparatively shorter 
timeframe since their implementation. 
 
In both systems, the revenue authority’s stated approach toward dispute resolution (through 
HMRC’s LSS in the UK and the IRS Appeals mission statement in the US) appear to generally 
align with the organisational mission (or strategic objectives). Nevertheless, in both 
jurisdictions there is an apparent current lack of integration of the tax dispute resolution 
systems within HMRC’s modernisation programme and the IRS’s Future State initiative, 
respectively. In addition, in both jurisdictions there is an apparent reluctance to fully integrate 
the use of ADR into the dispute resolution system. In the UK this is evident in the fact that the 
LSS envisages that ADR is to be used sparingly within HMRC’s normal way of working. While 
in the US, the IRS has been reluctant to fully embrace ADR due to the relative success of the 
well-established procedures of the IRS Appeals Office.  
 
Feedback on disputes in both systems occurs through the publication of general statistics on 
disputes and in the annual reports of the revenue authority. In addition, both jurisdictions 
collect feedback from disputants on the processes in the dispute procedures which they have 
been involved in. Although, despite the presence of mechanisms for the collection of feedback, 
a notable deficiency in the US system appears to be the limited publication of the findings from 
the feedback collected.  
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In summary, notwithstanding that the US system offers a more comprehensive range of dispute 
resolution options, both the tax dispute resolution systems in the UK and the US broadly meet 
similar DSD principles of best practice. The design strengths in both systems include meeting 
certain DSD aspects that are largely related to the structure of the system, such as multiple 
structural access points to the system, providing taxpayers with multiple options to choose from 
and, loop-back and loop-forward mechanisms. In addition, the two systems are similar in 
respect of design deficiencies. The deficiencies in both jurisdictions generally relate to the 
support and championship of the system. These include aspects such as the visible evidence of 
support for the system by certain members of senior management, the promotion of the use of 
ADR and the perceived fairness of the system. Accordingly, while both jurisdictions meet a 
number of the DSD principles relating to the structure of the dispute resolution system, 
improvements could be made with respect to the support and championship of both systems. 
 
Having outlined and evaluated the tax dispute resolution systems of the UK and the US in this 
chapter, and NZ and Australia in chapter 4, the next chapter (chapter 6) will compare the 
similarities and differences in the DSD evaluations of the four jurisdictions. Consequently, a 
set of best practice tax DSD principles to be utilised by tax authorities in improving their 




Chapter 6: Research Results: Case Study Comparisons and the Derivation of the 
Tax Dispute Systems Design Principles 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the dispute systems design (DSD) evaluations of the 
four jurisdictions’ tax dispute resolution procedures conducted in chapters 4 and 5, and based 
on the similarities and differences identified, derive a set of best practice tax DSD principles. 
Accordingly, section 6.2 of this chapter provides a comparison of the DSD evaluations of the 
tax dispute resolution systems of the four jurisdictions, including an outline in tabular form of 
the similarities and differences in the DSD evaluations. Section 6.3 then derives the tax DSD 
principles and discusses the reasons behind the modifications made to the set of general DSD 
principles in developing the tax DSD principles. Section 6.4 provides a chapter summary. 
 
6.2 Comparison of the Dispute Systems Design Evaluations of the Four Jurisdictions 
The following subsections summarise the DSD evaluations conducted on the tax dispute 
resolution systems in New Zealand (NZ) (section 6.2.1), Australia (section 6.2.2), the United 
Kingdom (UK) (section 6.2.3) and the United States (US) (section 6.2.4). A comparison of the 
four jurisdictions’ DSD evaluations is then provided in section 6.2.5. 
 
6.2.1 New Zealand 
The NZ tax dispute resolution system1 does not meet a number of the DSD principles of best 
practice. This is in part due to the fact that the procedures require the prescribed exchange of 
documents at certain points of the procedure before a dispute reaches internal review by Inland 
Revenue’s Disputes Review Unit (DRU (NZ)). While the system has interests and rights-based 
processes for addressing conflict, the inclusion of the prescribed exchange of documents at 
certain stages means that the procedures are not ordered in a low to high cost sequence. There 
is only one structural entry point to the procedures and in comparison to the three other 
jurisdictions in this study, excepting the opt-out, generally there is limited ability for taxpayers 
to choose a preferred path in the procedures. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is only 
available as an option during the conference phase of the dispute procedures and potentially in 
the Taxation Review Authority (TRA) and the High Court during the litigation stage. Evidence 
of negative stakeholder perceptions of fairness of the system exist, inter alia, due to concerns 
with respect to the time and cost of pursuing the procedures. Furthermore, the purpose of the 
dispute procedures under s 89A of the Tax Administration Act 1994 (TAA 1994), prima facie, 
does not appear to align clearly with the overall mission, vision and values of Inland Revenue. 
Although, it has been recognised that the way tax disputes are resolved is critical to taxpayer 
                                                          




perceptions of fairness and has wider impacts for the NZ tax administration. The disputes 
system also does not appear to be visibly championed by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
(the NZ Commissioner) in the form of speeches and other presentations. 
 
6.2.2 Australia 
The Australian tax dispute resolution system2 meets many of the DSD best practice principles. 
The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) in recent years has been pro-active in introducing a 
number of ADR and early resolution initiatives including in-house facilitation and independent 
review processes. Furthermore, the system provides the ability for parties to utilise ADR 
processes, if appropriate, generally at any stage of the formal dispute process (including at the 
audit and litigation stages). A primary strength of the system is that it is visibly supported by 
ATO senior management, including the Australian Commissioner of Taxation (the Australian 
Commissioner), Second Commissioner Law Design and Practice and the Deputy 
Commissioner, RDR. In addition, the ATO’s dispute resolution approach, as outlined in its 
Disputes Policy and Dispute Management Plan, is aligned with the overall mission, vision and 
values of the organisation. There are also various mechanisms employed both internally and 
externally to evaluate the system and foster continuous improvement. Nevertheless, there are 
some deficiencies in the system. Like NZ, the system has only one structural entry point. 
Accordingly, there is no option for taxpayers to choose a preferred process (that is, internal 
review or external appeal) at the outset of a tax dispute. Consequently, there is no loop-forward 
mechanism which allows parties to by-pass the internal review process and proceed directly to 
a tribunal or court. 
 
6.2.3 The United Kingdom 
The tax dispute resolution system3 in the UK meets most of the DSD principles of best practice. 
A notable feature of the system is that it is multi-option in nature. That is, there is the ability 
for taxpayers to choose to have an internal review, appeal to an independent tax tribunal or do 
both. In addition, alongside taxpayers’ existing review and appeal rights, optional ADR 
programs for large or complex cases and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises and individuals 
(SMEi’s) are available at any stage of the dispute process (including during a HM Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC) compliance check and once an appeal has been lodged with the HM Courts 
and Tribunals Service (the Tribunals Service)). Notwithstanding that the above aspects provide 
multiple structural entry points to the system (for indirect tax disputes), the ability to loop-
forward in the dispute procedures and provide taxpayers with the right to choose a preferred 
                                                          
2 For further details on the Australian tax dispute resolution system and its related features, see Appendix 1.2 of 
this thesis. 




process, there appears to have been limited visible championship by senior revenue authority 
members of HMRC’s ADR programs since their introduction in 2013. Moreover, the 
integration of ADR within the system is questionable given that HMRC’s approach towards 
dispute resolution outlined in its Litigation and Settlement Strategy (LSS) envisages that 
disputes will be resolved either through agreement with the taxpayer or litigation (and ADR is 
to be used sparingly within this approach). This approach towards ADR as well as its apparent 
absence from HMRC’s current Single Departmental Plan and modernisation programme, 
arguably appears to contrast with the effort put in by HMRC in the pilot testing of the ADR 
programs, and their subsequent evaluations, prior to the programs being formally introduced.  
 
6.2.4 The United States 
The US tax dispute resolution system4 also meets most of the DSD principles of best practice. 
Similar to the system in the UK, the US system provides multiple structural entry points, the 
ability to loop forward in the dispute process and a number of ways for taxpayers to choose a 
preferred path. Distinct from the other three jurisdictions in this study, alongside the formal 
dispute process, the Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS), an independent organisation within the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), provides an additional option for taxpayers to resolve 
problems with the IRS which they have been unable to resolve themselves through normal IRS 
channels. The US tax dispute resolution system also offers qualifying taxpayers the option to 
choose between utilising small tax case and regular procedures at both the IRS Appeals level 
and in the US Tax Court. The system offers a number of optional ADR programs for certain 
types of taxpayers during the examination and appeals stages of the dispute process. However, 
the literature indicates that there are a number of concerns in relation to the IRS’s ADR 
programs. These include that there are some perceptions of bias and lack of impartiality in 
relation to the use of IRS employees as mediators, and issues with respect to confidentiality 
and the lack of restriction on ex parte communications in certain ADR programs.  
 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that the IRS’s ADR programs are underutilised. While the IRS 
does gather feedback on the Appeals process and ADR through the IRS Appeals Customer 
Satisfaction Survey and by inviting the participants in its ADR programs to complete a 
Customer Satisfaction Survey following the conclusion of the ADR program, the results of 
these surveys are apparently not routinely made publically available. The lack of transparency 
regarding the use (or non-use) of the IRS ADR programs, in part, arguably reinforces the noted 
reluctance of the IRS to fully embrace ADR due to the well-established negotiation procedures 
of the IRS Appeals Office. Furthermore, ideally it would be expected that the feedback from 
these surveys could be used in a more pro-active manner by the IRS Appeals Office in 
evaluating its ADR programs and considering possible ways to improve them. 
                                                          




6.2.5 The four jurisdictions compared 
Upon comparing the four jurisdictions, it is apparent that the tax dispute resolution systems of 
the UK and the US both lead the way in terms of meeting most of the DSD principles of best 
practice identified in the DSD literature. Key features of the two systems include that they 
generally have multiple structural access points and accordingly offer taxpayers the option to 
choose a preferred process from the outset. They also provide the ability for taxpayers to loop-
forward to litigation and therefore by-pass the revenue authority’s internal review process. Both 
systems offer taxpayers the opportunity to utilise ADR programs throughout the course of the 
dispute procedures, including during the audit and litigation stages. Although, the US system 
features a broader range of ADR programs, in part to cater for its larger base of taxpayers. 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned features, it appears that the revenue authorities in the UK 
and the US both illustrate some reluctance in promoting and encouraging the use of their ADR 
programs in resolving tax disputes.  
 
On the other hand, in Australia there is a high level of support by various senior members of 
the ATO for the use of ADR, where appropriate, generally at any stage of the Australian tax 
dispute resolution procedures. The system also features a number of initiatives promoting early 
engagement and resolution of disputes such as the independent review process and the early 
assessment and resolution process (EAR) in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). 
While the Australian system meets many of the other DSD principles of best practice such as: 
involving stakeholders in the design process; providing multiple options for addressing 
conflict; the presence of loop-back procedures; notification before and feedback after the 
resolution process; training and education for relevant stakeholders; offering assistance for 
choosing the best process; alignment of the system with the overall mission of the organisation; 
and evaluation mechanisms, the current system could potentially be improved with the 
provision of multiple structural entry points to the system. 
 
The NZ tax dispute resolution system appears as the worst placed of the four jurisdictions in 
terms of the number of DSD principles met. The prescribed system does not offer multiple 
structural entry points and there are generally limited opportunities available for taxpayers to 
choose a preferred path in the procedures. Conference facilitation during the administratively 
mandated conference phase and the potential availability of certain forms of ADR in the TRA 
and the High Court during the litigation stage, are the only times at which ADR is offered in 
the dispute resolution procedures. Furthermore, unlike the tax dispute resolution procedures of 
the other jurisdictions in this study, the NZ procedures require the prescribed exchange of 
documents at certain stages of the disputes process. As a consequence, the amount of 
duplication, time and cost associated with the dispute process have partly contributed towards 
negative perceptions of fairness of the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures being formed. 
Despite this, Inland Revenue apparently are not currently prepared to entertain the further use 
of ADR in the dispute resolution procedures.  
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As indicated above, the strengths of the dispute resolution systems of the UK and the US 
predominantly lie in certain aspects of DSD which are more related to the structure of the 
dispute resolution system, such as multiple structural access points, options for taxpayers to 
choose a preferred process and loop-forward procedures. The strengths of the Australian 
system mainly lie in the aspects of DSD which appear to be more related to the support and 
championship of the system, such as support of the system by top management and the 
alignment of the system (and ADR) with the mission, vision and values of the organisation. 
The NZ system appears to display some deficiencies both in terms of the structure of the system 
and the support and championship of the system.  
 
In addition, across the four jurisdictions generally, some indications of negative perceptions of 
fairness of the operation of the jurisdictions’ tax dispute resolution procedures are evident. 
Arguably this may be unavoidable in the particular context of tax dispute resolution due to the 
nature of the fundamental relationship between the tax authority and the taxpayer in tax 
disputes being a legal one rather than a relationship concerned with the underlying needs and 
concerns (interests) of the parties. Furthermore, the imbalance between the revenue authority 
and the taxpayer in dispute in terms of resources and knowledge may also contribute towards 
the existence of negative perceptions of fairness of the dispute resolution system and of the 
revenue authority. The effect of this imbalance and the consequent “burning off” of small 
taxpayers has been noted as a particular concern in the systems in NZ and Australia.  
 
Table 6.1, which follows, provides a summary of the DSD evaluations of the four jurisdictions’ 
tax dispute resolution systems and identifies similarities and differences in DSD evaluations 
for each DSD principle applied. The following points should be noted when reading Table 6.1: 
 
 The DSD principles in the first column of Table 6.1 pertain to the DSD principles 
derived from the DSD literature in chapter 2, section 2.7, at Table 2.2 of this thesis.  
 In most instances, the ‘Similarities’ column refers to DSD features that generally 
occur in the majority of the four jurisdictions’ tax dispute resolution systems, but 
not necessarily in all four jurisdictions.  
 The ‘Differences’ column refers to the DSD features in a particular jurisdiction 
which differ from the DSD features outlined in the Similarities column or where a 




Table 6.1: Comparative Table of the Dispute Systems Design Evaluations of the Four Jurisdictions 






(1) Stakeholders are 
included in the 
design process. 
Stakeholders should 
have an active and 
integral role in 
creating and renewing 
the systems they use. 
 
-Reviews of and 
submissions 
sought on the 
dispute resolution 
process.  
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commissioned a 
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-Reviews of and 
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taxpayers. 
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Tribunals Service. 
 









available in the US 
Tax Court. 
-Independent TAS 
within the IRS is 
available where 
taxpayers have 






















available at the 
audit stage. 










(3) The system provides 
for loops backward 
and forward. The 
system should include 
loop-back 
mechanisms which 
allow disputants to 
return from rights or 
power-based options 
back to interest-based 
options and also loop-
-The potential 
availability of 
ADR in the TRA 
and the High Court 
may provide loop-
back mechanisms 
at the litigation 
stage. 
-Possible opt-out 




available at any 






-The EAR process 
in the AAT 
-ADR once an 
appeal has been 
lodged with the 
Tribunals Service 
can provide a loop-
back mechanism. 
-Possibility of by-




available in the US 
Tax Court at the 




passing the IRS 
Appeals process 
provides a loop-






provided by the 
possibility for 
taxpayers to by-
pass the internal 
review process. 
-NZ (with the 
limited 
exception of the 
opt-out) and 
Australia both 
















disputants to move 
directly to a rights or 
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without first going 















check, by HMRC 
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determination of a 




















 able to by-pass 
the internal 
review process. 
-Australia has an 
EAR process in 
the AAT which 
provides a form 
of loop-back 
mechanism. 
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(4) There is notification 
before and feedback 
after the resolution 
process. Notification 
in advance of taking a 
proposed action 
affecting others can 




and can identify 
points of difference 
early on so that they 
may be negotiated. 
Post-dispute analysis 
and feedback can help 
parties to learn from 
disputes in order to 
prevent similar 
disputes in the future. 
 
-The taxpayer’s 
right to receive 
notification of a 
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the revenue 
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ADR register. 






taxpayers at the 
conclusion of 






participants at the 
conclusion of 
ADR programs.  
(5) The system has a 
person or persons 




should have access to 
an independent 
confidential neutral to 
whom they can go to 
for coaching, referring 
and problem-solving. 






Revenue are able 
to provide 
technical advice 
and support to 
Inland Revenue 
staff on dispute 
resolution. 
-The ATO’s ADR 
Network is able to 
provide guidance 
and mentoring 
support to ATO 




ADR in HMRC 
are able to provide 
support and 
feedback to 





can mentor and 
coach IRS Appeals 
officers on dispute 
resolution and 
settlement skills.  
-The independent 
TAS within the 
IRS can provide 
free help and 
advice to taxpayers 
with IRS problems 
that they have been 
unable to resolve 
on their own. 
-There is an 
internal unit or 
person which is 
available to 
mentor and 
provide advice to 
revenue authority 
staff on ADR 
techniques. 
 
-In the US the 
TAS can provide 




that they have 
been unable to 











(6) Procedures are 
ordered from low to 
high cost. In order to 
reduce the costs of 
handling disputes, the 
procedures in the 
system should be 
arranged in graduated 




procedures are not 
ordered from low 
to high cost. 
-Generally high 





ordered from low 
to high cost. 
-Generally high 
upfront costs are 
incurred by 
taxpayers. 
-The use of ADR 
adds additional 
costs at the stage 
of the dispute 
procedures at 
which it is utilised. 
However, if the 
dispute is resolved 
at this stage, then 
parties do not have 
to subsequently 
move further up 





ordered from low 
to high cost. 
-Generally high 
upfront costs are 
incurred by 
taxpayers. 
-The use of ADR 
adds additional 
costs at the stage 
of the dispute 
procedures at 
which it is utilised. 
However, if the 
dispute is resolved 
at this stage, then 
parties do not have 
to subsequently 
move further up 






ordered from low 
to high cost. 
-Generally high 
upfront costs are 
incurred by 
taxpayers. 
-The use of ADR 
adds additional 
costs at the stage 
of the dispute 
procedures at 
which it is utilised. 
However, if the 
dispute is resolved 
at this stage, then 
parties do not have 
to subsequently 
move further up 






ordered from low 
to high cost. 
-Generally high 
upfront costs are 
incurred by 
taxpayers. 
-The use of ADR 
adds additional 
costs at the stage 
of the dispute 
procedures at 
which it is 
utilised. 
However, if the 
dispute is 
resolved at this 
stage, then 
parties do not 
have to 
subsequently 
move further up 
the sequence to 
higher cost 
processes. 
-In NZ the 
formal 
procedures are 
not ordered from 










(7) The system has 
multiple access 
points. The system 
should allow 
disputants to enter the 
system through many 
access points and 
offer a choice of 
persons to whom 
system users may 
approach in the first 
instance. 
 
-The system does 
not have multiple 
structural entry 
points. 
-There are a range 
of different 
methods to deliver 
a Notice of 
Proposed 
Adjustment 
(NOPA (NZ)) or 
Notice of 
Response (NOR) 
to the other party. 
-The system offers 
a choice of persons 
to approach for 
non-English 
speaking taxpayers 
and for deaf, 
hearing-impaired 
or speech impaired 
taxpayers. 
-Multiple forms of 
access are 
provided by 
certain forms and 
guides available in 
English and Te 
Reo Maori. 
-The system does 
not have multiple 
structural entry 
points. 
-There are a range 
of different 
methods to deliver 
an objection to the 
ATO. 
-The system offers 








impaired or speech 
impaired 
taxpayers. 
-Multiple forms of 
access is provided 








-The system has 
multiple structural 
entry points for 
certain taxpayers. 
-The system offers 
a choice of persons 
to approach for 
non-English 
speaking taxpayers 
and for deaf, 
hearing-impaired 




available for blind 
or partially-sighted 
taxpayers through 
the provision of 
forms and 
information in 




-Multiple forms of 
access are 
provided by forms 
and guides 
available in 
-The system has 
multiple structural 
entry points. 
-Tax cases meeting 
certain criteria 
may enter the 
system using the 
small case 
procedures instead 
of the regular 
procedures 
available for filing 
an appeal with the 
IRS Appeals 
Office or a petition 
to the US Tax 
Court, 
respectively. 
-The system offers 
a choice of persons 
to approach for 
non-English 
speaking taxpayers 
and for deaf, 
hearing-impaired 




available for blind 
or partially-sighted 
-The systems in 
the UK and the 















of access are 
provided by 


















-In NZ and 
Australia there 
are a range of 
different 
methods through 
which the initial 
notification of a 
dispute may be 
delivered to the 
other party. 
-In the US there 
are separate 
entry procedures 
to the system 
available for 
small tax cases. 
-In the UK and 
the US multiple 
forms of access 
are provided by 
the availability 

















-Multiple forms of 
access are 
provided by the 
availability of the 
HMRC website in 
English and Welsh 
versions. 
taxpayers through 
the provision of 
forms and 
information in 




-Multiple forms of 
access are 





-Multiple forms of 
access are 
provided by 













(8) The system includes 
training and 
education. Training 
of stakeholders in 
conflict management 
as well as education 
about the dispute 














provided on the 
ATO’s website. 
-Publication of 





provided on the 
HMRC’s website. 
-Publication of 
guides on dispute 
-Information about 
the IRS Appeals 




provided on the 
IRS website. 
-Information 
about the dispute 
resolution 
procedures is 




-In the UK and 
US, online 
learning 
modules for tax 
agents are 
































is available to 
Inland Revenue 
staff where it is 
identified as part 
of their 
development 
plans. It may be 
delivered by 











2013/3 (PS LA 
2013/3) provides 
policies and 
guidelines to be 
followed by ATO 
staff in using 
ADR. 
-Documents such 




and Code of 
Settlement provide 





officers may have 
training in 
negotiation skills 













guidance on the 




documents such as 
practical guidance 
on ADR for 
HMRC staff, 
commentary on the 
LSS and the Code 




HMRC’s use of 








-Self-help tools for 
the IRS Appeals 
process and for 
ADR are provided 
on the IRS 
website. 
-Publication of 
guides on the IRS 
Appeals system 
and IRS ADR. 







































house training of 
revenue authority 


























of training in 
mediation from the 
Arbitrators’ and 
Mediators’ 





















curriculum is used 
to provide targeted 
training to ATO 





are trained to work 
“collaboratively 
where possible” as 




facilitators for the 














trained in-house by 
HMRC instructors. 












from in-house IRS 
Appeals instructors 





employees who act 
as mediators are 
trained in-house by 
IRS Appeals 
employees using a 
training regime 





















(9) Assistance is offered 
for choosing the best 
process. This includes 
the use of guidelines 
and/or coordinators 
and process advisors 
to ensure the 




SPS 16/05 and 











Advice group has 
general oversight 
of the dispute 
resolution process 
and its Specialist 
Advice team is 








when ADR may or 
may not be 







provide advice on 
ADR. 
-Requests for 
ADR are reviewed 
for their 
appropriateness by 















HMRC staff and 
taxpayers to ensure 
the appropriate use 
of processes. 
-HMRC’s practical 
guidance on ADR 
for HMRC staff 
provides 
guidelines on 
when ADR may or 
may not be 





or case owners can 
act as process 




can provide advice 
on the suitability 
of ADR. 
-Requests for ADR 
are considered and 
reviewed for their 
-IRS revenue 
procedures provide 
guidelines on the 




contact the IRS 
employee they 
have been dealing 
with or call 
Taxpayer Service 
for process advice 
on the IRS 
Appeals process. 
-IRS online self-
help tools provide 
assistance on 
whether to file an 
appeal and on the 




to help taxpayers 
and tax 
practitioners with 



















and are available 
to provide advice 
on them. 
-Requests for 
ADR must be 
approved by the 
relevant staff 
from the above 
unit. 
 
-In Australia the 
ATO’s EAR 
process can be 














the selection of 
processes. There 
is also a toll-free 
hot-line for 
providing advice 

























managers act as 
process advisors to 
the parties on the 
appropriate use of 
ADR. 
-Requests for ADR 
must be approved 
by an IRS Appeals 
manager.  
(10) Disputants have the 
right to choose a 
preferred process. 













Part IVA TAA 
1994 in full and 






having an internal 
-Taxpayers must 
lodge an objection 
with the ATO (and 
be dissatisfied 
with the ATO’s 
objection 
decision) before 
appealing to the 
AAT or the 









choose to have a 
review of HMRC’s 
decision or notify 
their appeal to the 
tribunal or do both. 
-HMRC ADR is 
available alongside 
taxpayers’ existing 
review and appeal 
rights and their 
usual review and 
appeal rights are 




choose to make an 
appeal to the IRS 
Appeals Office or 
file a petition with 
the US Tax Court 
or do both. 
-Parties can choose 
to use various IRS 
ADR programs 
available at certain 













-The choice for 
taxpayers to use 




and appeal rights, 
and their usual 
review and 






























provides a limited 














choose to consent 
to ADR at the 
litigation stage in 
the TRA or High 
Court.  
-Taxpayers can 
choose to use 
ADR at any stage 
of the formal 
dispute process 
and their usual 
review and appeal 
rights are 
unaffected if the 
dispute remains 
unresolved in 
whole or in part 
following ADR. 
-Parties can 
choose to request 
that a matter be 
referred to 
mediation in the 
Federal Court of 




whole or in part 
following ADR. 
-HMRC ADR is 
available as an 
option for 
taxpayers once an 
appeal has been 
lodged with the 
Tribunals Service.  
an agreement (in 
whole or in part) is 
unable to be 
reached following 
ADR, the taxpayer 
retains all of their 
otherwise 
applicable appeal 





-Parties can choose 
to use arbitration 
or mediation in the 





-In the US Tax 
Court, qualifying 
taxpayers may 
choose to use the 
small case 
procedure or the 
regular procedure. 
-The TAS can be 
used alongside the 
formal dispute 
unaffected if the 
dispute remains 
unresolved (in 
whole or in part) 
following ADR. 
-Parties can 
choose to use 
ADR in the 
tribunal or court 






-In the US 
qualifying 
taxpayers may 
choose to have 
matters dealt 
with in the US 
Tax Court using 
small case 
procedures. 

















where a taxpayer 
has not been able 
to resolve an IRS 
problem on their 
own or believe that 
an IRS procedure 
is not working as it 
should. 
(11) The system is fair 
and perceived as 
fair. The system 
should be fair to 
parties and foster a 
culture that welcomes 
good faith dissent. 
 
-There have been 
concerns that the 
NZ tax dispute 
resolution 
procedures are too 
lengthy and costly 
and in particular, 
small taxpayers 
are being “burnt 
off” by the 











-There have been 
mixed perceptions 
on the operation of 




believe that the 
procedures work 
well with staff 
appropriately 




concerns over the 
ability and 
authority of ATO 








handling large tax 
disputes have had 
a negative impact 
on taxpayers’ 
perceptions of 
fairness of the 
dispute 
procedures. -There 
are mixed findings 
on the perceptions 
of fairness of the 
use of HMRC staff 





respect to the 
fairness, 
independence and 
impartiality of the 
IRS Appeals 




project initiated by 
IRS Appeals in 
2012. 
-There have been 
concerns expressed 
in the literature 
with respect to the 
impartiality of IRS 
mediators utilised 
in IRS ADR 
programs. 
-Across the four 
jurisdictions, 
generally there 














findings on the 
perceptions of 
fairness on the 
use of revenue 
authority staff as 
-In NZ and 
Australia there 
are concerns 
with respect to 






-In Australia and 
the US there are 
concerns with 
respect to the 
independence of 
the review 
function of the 
revenue 
authority from 











-There are mixed 
findings on the 
perceptions of 
fairness of the use 
of Inland Revenue 





-There have been 
concerns with 
respect to the 
imbalance of 
power between the 
ATO and in 
particular small 
taxpayers in tax 
disputes. 
-There have been 
concerns with 








-There are mixed 
findings on the 
perceptions of 
fairness of the use 




-There are mixed 
findings on the 
perceived 
independence of 
-The issue of 
confidentiality and 
lack of restrictions 
on ex parte 
communications 
are particular 








-In the US there 
are additional 
concerns in IRS 
ADR programs 
with respect to 
confidentiality 















(12) The system is 
supported by top 
managers. There 





-There is limited 





and of ADR by 
way of published 
speeches, media 
statements or other 
releases by the NZ 
Commissioner. 
-Inland Revenue 
apparently are not 
currently prepared 
to entertain the 
further use of 






and of ADR are 
recurring themes 
in the Australian 
Commissioner’s 
speeches. 
-Changes in the 
organisational 
structure of the 
ATO have 
included the RDR 
business line, led 
by the Deputy 
Commissioner, 
being responsible 
for, inter alia, 
championing the 
use of ADR.  
-The Second 
Commissioner 
Law Design and 
Practice and the 
Deputy 
Commissioner, 
RDR have made a 
number of 
-There is limited 





and of ADR by 
way of published 
speeches, media 










is evident with the 
creation of the role 
of HMRC’s Tax 
Assurance 
Commissioner. 
-There appears to 
be limited 
evidence of the 
championship of 
-There is limited 





and of ADR by 
way of published 
speeches, media 
statements or other 
releases by the IRS 
Commissioner. 
-There is evidence 
of some degree of 
championship of 
the IRS Appeals 
process and of the 
IRS Appeals ADR 
programs by way 
of presentations 
made by the Chief 
of IRS Appeals. 
-Commentators 
have observed that 
the IRS has been 
reluctant to fully 












and of ADR, by 
way of published 
speeches, media 
statements or 











culture in the 
ATO and of 
ADR are evident 
in the speeches 




Law Design and 




-In the UK there 
is some degree 
of championship 
of the dispute 
resolution 
system with the 
creation of the 




















into “business as 
usual” by HMRC. 
established 
negotiation 




-In the US there 
is some degree 
of championship 
of the IRS 
Appeals process 
and its ADR 
programs in 
presentations 
given by the 
Chief of IRS 
Appeals. 
(13) The system is aligned 
with mission, vision 
and values of the 
organisation. The 
system should be 













-Prima facie, there 
is no clear 
alignment between 
the purpose of the 
dispute procedures 
under s 89A TAA 
1994 and the 
mission, vision 
and values of 
Inland Revenue. 
However, it has 
been recognised 

















with the ATO’s 
overall mission, 

















-However, the LSS 
arguably restricts 
the use of ADR as 




integrated into the 
organisation 
through the IRS’s 
Taxpayer Bill of 
Rights. 
-The mission of 
the IRS Appeal’s 
Office appears to 
generally align 
with the overall 
mission statement 
of the IRS. 
-The dispute 
resolution system 
is not an aspect 
which is included 




















with its overall 
-In NZ there is, 
prima facie, no 
clear alignment 
between the 
purpose of the 
procedures 
outlined in s 
89A of the TAA 
1994 and the 
vision, mission 
and values of 
Inland Revenue. 
-In Australia, the 
dispute 
resolution 
system is an 
aspect which has 













fairness and has 





is not an aspect 







is an aspect which 
has been included 





resolution as a key 
area of focus in 
the “Reinventing 
the ATO” project. 
-The dispute 
resolution system 
is not an aspect 
which is included 
in HMRC’s Single 
Departmental Plan 




and values.  
-In NZ, the UK 
and the US, the 
dispute 
resolution system 
is not an aspect 
which features in 
the Strategic 
Plans (or 






(14) There is evaluation 
of the system. This 
acts to identify 
strengths and 
weaknesses of design 





















feedback to the 
ATO by phone, 
fax, mail or 
completing an 
online form. 







completion of the 
ADR process. 
-Evaluation at the 
ADR policy level 








invited to provide 




completion of the 
ADR process. 
-Evaluation occurs 





certain IRS ADR 
programs are 




the completion of 
the ADR process. 
-Evaluation can 
possibly occur 
















completion of the 
ADR process. 
-In NZ 








-In the US 
evaluation can 
occur through 

















sought on the 
dispute system by 
Inland Revenue’s 
Policy and 
Strategy group and 
the NZ Treasury. 





Australia and New 
Zealand (CA-











conducted by the 
Controller and 
Auditor-General. 
-Evaluation of the 







perceptions of the 
tax dispute 
resolution system. 
-Evaluation of the 
system is provided 
by one-off surveys 







-Evaluation of the 
system is provided 
by government-
appointed entities, 
including the IGT 
and the Australian 
National Audit 
Office (ANAO).  





been published by 
HMRC following 
the completion of 
its ADR pilot 
programs. 












-Evaluation of the 





-Evaluation of the 
system is provided 
by the National 
Audit Office 
(NAO) and 
who may conduct 
outreach to solicit 
suggestions and 
ideas from citizens 
on the disputes 
system. 
-Evaluation can 









Congress and other 
special reports 
produced. 
-Evaluation of the 




as the US 
Government 
Accountability 
Office (US GAO) 




the system can 
occur through 
regular or one-off 
surveys 



































-Evaluation of the 
disputes system 
may be included in 
various reviews of 






can occur in 
various reviews of 















6.3 The Tax Dispute Systems Design Principles 
The purpose of the following subsections is to discuss the modifications made to the general 
DSD principles (section 6.3.1) and on basis of these modifications, derive a set of tax DSD 
principles (section 6.3.2).  
 
6.3.1 Modifications made to the dispute systems design principles 
In deriving the tax DSD principles in Table 6.2 below, some modifications have been made to 
the original set of DSD principles derived from the DSD literature set out in chapter 2, section 
2.7 of this thesis. For most of the DSD principles the provision of examples of the DSD 
principle applied in the context of tax dispute resolution or the provision of a more detailed 
explanation with respect to the application of the DSD principle in the tax context were the 
only changes made. Accordingly, in most cases, substantive changes to the DSD principles 
were not required.  
 
For DSD Principle 1, the provision of examples of stakeholder involvement in the design 
process in the tax dispute resolution context was the only modification made. These include 
stakeholder involvement in pilot ADR programs, and in reviews and consultations on the tax 
dispute resolution system.  
 
In relation to DSD Principle 2, examples of options available for addressing disputes in the tax 
dispute resolution context are also provided. These include direct negotiation, internal review, 
litigation, and interests and rights-based ADR processes. The availability of ADR options at 
the audit and litigation stages is also included given that in all four jurisdictions (except NZ), 
ADR is generally available as an option at both of these stages. While power-based approaches 
have not been explicitly referred to in the DSD evaluations of the four jurisdictions’ tax dispute 
resolution systems under DSD Principle 2, they are nevertheless applicable in the respect that, 
in certain circumstances, revenue authorities have the ability to exercise their powers to impose 
tax, interest and penalties on the taxpayer. Taxpayers arguably, to some extent, can also utilise 
a power-based approach in refusing to pay a tax debt.1 These approaches broadly fall within 
Ury, Brett and Goldberg’s definition of power, “the ability to coerce someone to do something 
he would not otherwise do. Exercising power typically means imposing costs on the other side 
or threatening to do so.”2 However, in the tax dispute context, the abovementioned power-
based procedures are not built into the design of the system by the dispute system designer per 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Hamish Fletcher “Bankruptcy declared for $500m IRD battler” The New Zealand Herald 
(online ed, Auckland, 19 November 2015), concerning the long-running tax battle in NZ between John Russell 
and Inland Revenue. See also, Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2015] NZHC 2353. 
2 William L Ury, Jeanne M Brett and Stephen B Goldberg Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut 
the Costs of Conflict (Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, first published 1988, 
1993 ed) at 7. 
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se. Thus, the power-based approaches in the tax dispute context contrast with power-based 
approaches in the context of workplace disputes where, for example, employees’ legal right to 
strike (a power-based approach) may be incorporated within the system under employment 
law.3 
 
The description of loop-back and loop-forward mechanisms has been retained in tax DSD 
Principle 3 given that ‘loop-back’ and ‘loop-forward’ are DSD terms and system stakeholders 
in the context of tax dispute resolution may not necessarily be familiar with such terms. 
Examples of loop-back and loop-forward mechanisms in the tax dispute resolution context are 
also provided. These include loop-back mechanisms provided by the availability of ADR 
options at the litigation stage and loop-forward mechanisms provided by the ability for 
taxpayers to by-pass the revenue authority’s internal review process and proceed to litigation. 
 
The description of notification before and feedback after the dispute resolution process for 
DSD Principle 4 has also been retained given that stakeholders may not be aware of the 
meaning of notification and feedback in DSD terms.4 In addition, examples of notification and 
feedback are provided in the context of tax dispute resolution. However, it is worth noting that 
the majority of the examples given are forms of notification and feedback which are provided 
by the revenue authority to the body of taxpayers generally rather than notification and 
feedback given with respect to a specific dispute. In the context of organisational disputes, 
notification refers to the giving of “an announcement [by one party to another] in advance of 
the intended action.”5 In the tax disputes context, the primary form of notification of a dispute 
by the revenue authority to a taxpayer involved in a particular dispute is the notification implied 
in the revenue authority’s taxpayers’ charter (or equivalent) which obliges the revenue 
authority to, for example, clearly stipulate its decisions and what actions it is taking in relation 
to a taxpayer’s affairs, and provide an explanation of its reasons. Otherwise, notification of tax 
disputes by the revenue authority is provided to taxpayers generally, such as through the 
revenue authority’s compliance activities and campaigns which provide announcements to the 
general body of taxpayers of potential areas where tax disputes may arise. Publication of 
revenue authority case notes on court decisions can also serve as a form of notification to 
taxpayers generally as they can provide the revenue authority’s view on the implications of a 
particular court or tribunal decision.  
 
Similarly, feedback on tax disputes is provided by the revenue authority to taxpayers in general, 
such as through the publication of general statistics on disputes on the website of the revenue 
                                                          
3 See, for example, in the NZ employment relations context, section 8 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 
which provide for lawful strikes and lockouts in relation to collective bargaining. 
4 This was based on feedback from the pilot test interviews (which included the testing of the supplementary 
information document that interviewees were required to read prior to the interview).  
5 Ury, Brett and Goldberg, above n 2, at 61. 
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authority and through the publication of dispute outcomes in the revenue authority’s annual 
report. In addition, post-dispute feedback at the micro-level is usually collected by revenue 
authorities from participants involved in revenue authority ADR and other dispute resolution 
programs. Although, it appears that in most of the jurisdictions in this study, the post-dispute 
feedback collected on these programs primarily serves as a means for revenue authorities to 
evaluate and improve their processes as opposed to providing a basis for decision making for 
taxpayers in future tax disputes.  
 
Pertaining to DSD Principle 5, internal independent confidential neutrals in the context of 
organisational disputes refers to an individual who has an independent reporting relationship 
to the president or governing body of an organisation who can provide confidential assistance 
to any individual, from hourly workers to board members as well as customers or business 
partners to solve a problem.6 They can provide the following kinds of support to anyone 
seeking assistance: listening, coaching, offering options, informal fact finding and promoting 
systemic change.7 In the context of tax dispute resolution, in practice internal independent 
confidential neutrals serving both the revenue authority and taxpayers in dispute, generally do 
not exist. This is largely due to the fact that tax disputes (as defined earlier in this thesis in 
chapter 2, section 2.2.1) occur between the revenue authority and an external party (the 
taxpayer). Furthermore, the dispute between the parties is generally not focused on the needs 
and concerns of the parties, but rather on resolving disagreements over substantive tax issues. 
 
However, within the revenue authorities of the jurisdictions in this study, an internal person or 
unit that functions as a mentor or advisor to revenue authority staff on dispute resolution and 
ADR techniques is usually present. In the tax dispute resolution context, given that the dispute 
occurs between the revenue authority and the taxpayer as an external party, arguably it would 
not be appropriate for the revenue authority to provide the equivalent assistance in mentoring 
and advising taxpayers on dispute resolution and ADR techniques. Although, it would be 
reasonable to expect taxpayers to seek such assistance externally (for example, from legal 
advisors) in the same way as they would seek professional advice and assistance in relation to 
the technical tax matters pertaining to the dispute. Accordingly, as shown in Table 6.2 below, 
the wording of DSD Principle 5 has been modified to reflect the inclusion of an internal person 
or unit that acts as a mentor and advisor on ADR techniques for revenue authority staff as 
opposed to for both disputants. 
 
With respect to DSD Principle 6, the formal tax dispute resolution procedures of the 
jurisdictions (except NZ) are generally arranged in a low to high cost sequence. However, in 
the tax dispute resolution context, this is subject to the following exceptions. The first exception 
                                                          
6 Karl A Slaikeu and Ralph H Hasson Controlling the Costs of Conflict: How to Design a System for Your 
Organization (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1998) at 136. 
7 At 136. 
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is that, in general, high upfront costs may be incurred by taxpayers in working out their 
positions at the outset of a dispute. These upfront costs may include the time spent by taxpayers 
in preparing for and participating in negotiations, as well as the cost of professional advisors. 
The incurrence of upfront costs by taxpayers may be particular to the context of tax dispute 
resolution given that: “Because of the technical nature of tax law, self-represented [taxpayers] 
are unlikely to be able to do justice to their cases unless they possess considerable tax expertise 
themselves.”8 Hence, the need for professional advice and assistance. The second exception is 
that, in the tax dispute resolution procedures of the jurisdictions in this study (except NZ) 
taxpayers can choose to use ADR potentially at any stage of the formal dispute process.9 
Accordingly, the use of ADR can add additional costs at the stage of the formal dispute 
procedures at which it is utilised. However, if the dispute is resolved at this stage, then parties 
do not have to subsequently move further up the sequence to higher cost processes and thus, 
there may be an overall cost saving to the parties. Consequently, as shown in Table 6.2, 
additional explanation has been provided in DSD Principle 6 to reflect the above exceptions in 
the context of tax dispute resolution. 
 
Multiple access points to the dispute resolution system for DSD Principle 7 can be provided 
both structurally and procedurally. As illustrated by the tax dispute resolution systems in the 
UK and the US, multiple structural access points in the context of tax dispute resolution can be 
characterised by the ability to enter the system at different levels, namely at the internal review 
and the external appeal levels. Whereas multiple access points in the procedural respect may 
be characterised by providing a range of different means for taxpayers to enter the system. For 
example, the initial notification of a dispute by a taxpayer may be provided by methods such 
as by post, fax, personal delivery or electronic means of communication. Multiple procedural 
forms of access to the system can also be provided to certain taxpayers through the provision 
of forms and guides in different languages or in alternative formats such as Braille, large text, 
audio on CD and text on CD.  
 
Furthermore, in the context of organisational disputes, multiple access points are primarily used 
to refer to the provision of a choice of persons to whom system users may approach in the first 
instance. This entails that “people with concerns and problems can find access points of 
different ethnicity and gender, and varied technical backgrounds, to help them.”10 Applying 
                                                          
8 Binh Tran-Nam and Michael Walpole “Independent tax dispute resolution and social justice in Australia” (2012) 
35(2) UNSWLJ 470 at 497. 
9 The ability to choose to use ADR at any stage of the process differs from dispute resolution systems where ADR 
is included as a mandatory step within the system. For example, in the context of NZ employment relations 
disputes, under section 159 of the Employment Relations Act 2000, generally parties must have attempted 
mediation as a step before bringing their dispute to the Employment Relations Authority for determination. 
10 Mary P Rowe “Dispute Resolution in the Non-Union Environment: An Evolution Toward Integrated Systems 
for Conflict Management?” in Sandra Gleason (ed) Frontiers in Dispute Resolution in Labor Relations and 
Human Resources (Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, 1997) 79 at 88. 
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this to the tax dispute resolution systems in this study, it is observed that a choice of persons to 
approach in the first instance for certain taxpayers (for example, non-English speaking 
taxpayers, deaf, hearing-impaired and/or speech-impaired taxpayers) is provided by the tax 
authorities in the four jurisdictions. The choice of persons may include bi-lingual or multi-
lingual persons (provided by the revenue authority or by external providers) and persons from 
national relay services. Notwithstanding that the above examples offer taxpayers in special 
circumstances with a choice of persons in making contact with the revenue authority in general, 
they arguably may also serve to provide a choice of access persons for certain taxpayers to 
approach to acquire information about dispute resolution system in the first instance. 
 
For DSD Principle 8, the provision of examples of forms of training and education of 
stakeholders in the tax dispute resolution context was the only modification made. Examples 
of training and education in the tax context include: the general in-house training received by 
revenue authority staff including a component on conflict management and resolution; revenue 
authority staff acting as facilitators and mediators receiving training in mediation developed by 
external ADR specialists; and education about the dispute resolution system provided on the 
revenue authority’s website, through the publication of forms and guides, revenue authority 
guidelines on the dispute resolution procedures and online learning material for tax agents. 
However, as noted under DSD Principle 5, it would generally not be the responsibility of the 
revenue authority to provide training in dispute resolution skills and techniques to taxpayers 
(as distinct from providing training in dispute resolution to revenue authority staff). 
 
In relation to DSD Principle 9, process advisors in the organisational dispute resolution context 
typically take the form of internal ombudspersons or human resource departments which 
provide internal mechanisms to assist parties in selecting and using available conflict 
management options in the organisation.11 In the tax dispute resolution context, process 
advisors generally take the form of a unit or team within the revenue authority that is 
responsible for administering and overseeing the revenue authority’s ADR programs and which 
is available to provide assistance to parties in relation to the appropriate use of ADR processes. 
In addition, requests for ADR usually must be reviewed and approved for their appropriateness 
by relevant staff from the unit or team.  
 
DSD Principle 10 provides that disputants should have the right to choose a preferred process 
from multiple options, some of which may be available simultaneously. In the context of tax 
dispute resolution, multiple options (primarily relevant to taxpayers) can be provided in a 
number of ways. For example, it may be that taxpayers can choose to have an internal review, 
appeal externally or do both. Multiple options can further be provided in the respect that there 
may be the option to use ADR alongside taxpayers’ existing review and appeal rights and 
                                                          
11 Slaikeu and Hasson, above n 6, at 54. 
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furthermore, taxpayers’ usual review and appeal rights are unaffected if the dispute remains 
unresolved (in whole or in part) following ADR. Multiple options also apply in the tax dispute 
resolution context where parties have the option of using ADR (or requesting that the matter 
be referred to ADR) prior to commencing formal proceedings when a dispute reaches a tribunal 
or court. A further provision for multiple options can occur where qualifying taxpayers are 
provided with the option to have matters dealt with in a tribunal or court using ‘small’ tax case 
procedures instead of the regular procedures.  
 
DSD Principle 11 relates to the fairness and perceived fairness of the system. As noted in 
section 6.2.5 above, across the four jurisdictions, there are some indications of negative 
perceptions of fairness of the tax dispute resolution systems. A particular concern highlighted 
in Australia and the US is the perceived independence of the review function of the revenue 
authority from the audit or compliance function. Furthermore, the DSD evaluations of the four 
jurisdictions indicate that, in addition to the perceived fairness of the dispute resolution system 
as a whole, the fairness and perceived fairness of revenue authority staff acting as facilitators 
or mediators in revenue authority ADR programs is also regarded by stakeholders an important 
factor with regard to fairness in the tax dispute resolution context. The cases studies indicate 
that across the four jurisdictions, there are generally mixed findings with respect to the 
perceived fairness and neutrality of revenue authority staff acting as facilitators or mediators. 
 
In relation to DSD Principle 12, support by top management in the organisational dispute 
context envisages that “at least one senior person must be a visionary who champions the cause 
of creating a conflict-competent culture through developing and maintaining [the] conflict 
management system”12 The champion’s passion inspires others to act. It is this ability to 
connect others to a vision that is said to drive the success of a program.13 In the context of tax 
dispute resolution, championship of the dispute resolution system would generally be provided 
by the Commissioner (or equivalent) and also by senior members of the revenue authority that 
hold responsibility for dispute resolution in the organisation. Furthermore, evidence of the 
championship of tax dispute resolution systems appears to be most visibly provided in the form 
of speeches, media releases and presentations. 
 
For DSD Principle 13, examples of integration of the dispute resolution system in the 
organisation and alignment of the revenue authority’s dispute resolution approach with the 
mission, vision and values of the organisation in the tax dispute resolution context are provided. 
In the context of organisational disputes, Slaikeu and Hasson suggest that conflict management 
systems may be integrated within an organisation through, inter alia, clarifying policy 
pertaining to conflict management, defining roles and responsibilities in relation to the system, 
                                                          
12 Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution Designing Integrated Conflict Management Systems: Guidelines 
for Practitioners and Decision Makers in Organizations (Washington DC, 2001) at 14. 
13 At 14. 
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and creating or revising documentation including contract clauses and employee manuals.14 In 
the context of tax dispute resolution, taxpayers’ charters (or equivalents) of revenue authorities 
can provide a mechanism through which the tax dispute resolution system may be integrated 
into the organisation. They typically contain a commitment by the revenue authority to provide 
taxpayers with a right to appeal against a tax decision that they disagree with. However, it 
should be noted that taxpayers’ charters contain aspirations of the revenue authority only and 
thus, are not legally binding on them. In addition, the revenue authority’s approach toward 
dispute resolution may be documented in the dispute policies of the revenue authority (for 
example, the ATO’s Disputes Policy15 and Dispute Management Plan,16 and HMRC’s LSS17). 
Following Slaikeu and Hasson, written policies should reflect a clear link between the conflict 
management system and the organisational mission.18 Future plans with respect to the dispute 
resolution system may also feature in the Strategic Plans of revenue authorities.  
  
The provision of examples of evaluation of the system in the context of tax dispute resolution 
was the only modification made to DSD Principle 14. Evaluation of the system in the tax 
context can occur through regular or one-off surveys on the system conducted for the revenue 
authority by external agencies and through submissions, reviews and reports from government-
appointed entities, parliamentary committees and other external stakeholders. In addition, 
feedback from taxpayers and other stakeholders (for example, provided through online forms 
or surveys following parties’ participation in ADR programs) can be used to evaluate the 
system. 
 
In summary, for most of the DSD principles, the provision of examples of the DSD principle 
applied in the tax dispute resolution context or the provision of additional explanation with 
respect to the DSD principle applied in the tax context were the only changes made. As shown 
in Table 6.2 below, the provision of examples of the DSD principle applied in the tax dispute 
resolution context was made for the majority of the DSD principles. Additional explanation 
pertaining to the ordering of the procedures from low to high cost in DSD Principle 6 was also 
provided through including the exceptions of the high upfront costs generally likely to be 
incurred by taxpayers and that the additional use of ADR can add additional costs at the stage 
of the formal dispute procedures at which it is utilised. However, the only substantive change 
to the set of original DSD principles was the change in the wording of DSD Principle 5, which 
                                                          
14 Slaikeu and Hasson, above n 6, at 77-79. 
15 Australian Taxation Office “Disputes policy” (7 September 2015) <https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Dispute-
or-object-to-an-ATO-decision/In-detail/Avoiding-and-resolving-disputes/Resolving-disputes/Disputes-policy/> 
(last accessed 7 November 2016). 
16 Australian Taxation Office Dispute management plan 2013-14 (Canberra, January 2014).  
17 HM Revenue and Customs Resolving tax disputes: Commentary of the litigation and settlement strategy 
(November 2013) at Annex 1. 
18 Slaikeu and Hasson, above n 6, at 87. 
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has been modified to reflect the inclusion of an internal person or unit that acts as a mentor and 
advisor on ADR techniques for revenue authority staff as opposed to for both disputants in the 
original context of organisational disputes. Thus, the set of general DSD principles derived 
from the DSD literature can generally be applied in the tax dispute resolution context without 
significant substantive modifications being made to the principles.  
 
6.3.2 Derivation of the tax dispute systems design principles 
Table 6.2 derives the proposed tax DSD principles (stated in column three) based on the 
similarities and differences identified in the DSD evaluations in Table 6.1. The modifications, 
as detailed in section 6.3.1 above, made to the original DSD principles (stated in column one) 
in order to arrive at the corresponding tax DSD principles, are outlined in column two.
212 
 
Table 6.2: Dispute Systems Design Principles and the Corresponding Tax Dispute Systems Design Principles 
DSD Principle Modifications Tax DSD Principle 
(1) Stakeholders are included in the design process. 
Stakeholders should have an active and integral role 
in creating and renewing the systems they use. 
 
-Examples of stakeholder involvement in the 
design process in the tax dispute resolution 
context are provided. 
(1) Stakeholders are included in the 
design process. For example, 
stakeholders may be involved in 
revenue authority ADR program pilots 
and in reviews and consultations on 
the tax dispute resolution system. 
(2) The system has multiple options for addressing 
conflict including interests, rights and power-
based processes. The system should include 
interests-based processes and low-cost rights and 
power-based processes should be offered should 
interests-based processes fail to resolve a dispute. 
 
-Examples of options available for 
addressing disputes in the tax dispute 
resolution context are provided.  
-The availability of interests and rights-based 
ADR options at the audit and litigation stages 
is included. 
(2) The system has multiple options for 
addressing conflict including 
interests, rights and power-based 
processes. For example, the system’s 
options for addressing conflict may 
include: direct negotiation, internal 
review and litigation as well as 
interests and rights-based ADR 
options. In addition, interests and 
rights-based ADR options should also 
be available at the audit and litigation 
stages. 
(3) The system provides for loops backward and 
forward. The system should include loop-back 
mechanisms which allow disputants to return from 
rights or power-based options back to interest-based 
options and also loop-forward mechanisms which 
allow disputants to move directly to a rights or power-
based option without first going through all of the 
earlier interest-based options.  
-Examples of loop-back and loop-forward 
mechanisms in the tax dispute resolution 
context are provided. 
(3) The system provides for loops 
backward and forward. Loop-back 
mechanisms allow parties to return 
from rights or power-based options 
back to interests-based options and 
loop-forward mechanisms allow 
parties to move directly to a rights-
based option without having to go 
through all of the earlier interest-based 
options. For example, ADR options 
available at the litigation stage can 
provide loop-back mechanisms and the 
ability for taxpayers to by-pass the 
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revenue authority’s internal review 
process can provide a loop-forward 
mechanism. 
(4) There is notification before and feedback after the 
resolution process. Notification in advance of taking 
a proposed action affecting others can prevent 
disputes that arise through misunderstanding or 
miscommunication and can identify points of 
difference early on so that they may be negotiated. 
Post-dispute analysis and feedback can help parties to 
learn from disputes in order to prevent similar 
disputes in the future. 
 
-Examples of forms of notification and 
feedback in the tax dispute resolution context 
are provided. 
 
(4) There is notification before and 
feedback after the resolution 
process. Notification in advance of 
taking a proposed action affecting 
others can prevent disputes that arise 
through misunderstanding or 
miscommunication and can identify 
points of difference early on so that 
they may be negotiated. Post-dispute 
analysis and feedback can help parties 
to learn from disputes in order to 
prevent similar disputes in the future. 
For example, in order to prevent 
disputes from arising, general 
notification of potential areas for tax 
disputes can be provided through the 
revenue authority’s compliance 
activities and campaigns, and through 
the publication of case notes on court 
decisions. To prevent similar disputes 
in the future, feedback on disputes can 
be provided through the publication of 
general statistics on dispute matters 
and through post-dispute analysis and 
publication of feedback collected from 





DSD Principle Modifications Tax DSD Principle 
(5) The system has a person or persons who function 
as internal independent confidential neutral(s). 
Disputants should have access to an independent 
confidential neutral to whom they can go to for 
coaching, referring and problem-solving. 
-Replaced: “person or persons who function 
as internal independent confidential 
neutral(s)” with “internal person or unit that 
functions as a mentor or advisor”; 
“disputants” with “revenue authority staff”; 
and “coaching, referring and problem-
solving” with “mentoring and advice on 
ADR techniques” in order to provide greater 
relevance of this DSD principle in the tax 
dispute resolution context.  
(5) The system has an internal person 
or unit that functions as a mentor 
and advisor for revenue authority 
staff. Revenue authority staff should 
have access to an internal person or 
unit to which they can go to for 
mentoring and advice on ADR 
techniques. 
(6) Procedures are ordered from low to high cost. In 
order to reduce the costs of handling disputes, the 
procedures in the system should be arranged in 
graduated steps in a low to high cost sequence. 
 
-Included the exception in the context of tax 
dispute resolution that high upfront costs are 
generally likely to be incurred by taxpayers. 
-Included the qualification that the use of 
additional ADR options can add additional 
costs at the stage of the formal dispute 
procedures at which they are utilised. 
However, if the dispute is resolved at this 
stage, then parties do not have to 
subsequently move further up the sequence 
to higher cost processes.  
(6) Procedures are ordered from low to 
high cost. The steps in the formal 
dispute procedures should be arranged 
in a low to high cost sequence 
(notwithstanding that high upfront 
costs are generally likely to be 
incurred by taxpayers involved in tax 
disputes). The use of additional ADR 
options can also add additional costs at 
the stage of the formal dispute 
procedures at which they are utilised. 
However, if the dispute is resolved at 
this stage, then parties do not have to 
subsequently move further up the 
sequence to higher cost processes. 
(7) The system has multiple access points. The system 
should allow disputants to enter the system through 
many access points and offer a choice of persons 
whom system users may approach in the first 
instance.  
 
-Examples of multiple structural points of 
access in the tax dispute resolution context 
are provided. 
-Examples of different methods of delivering 
notification of entry to the system are 
provided. 
(7) The system has multiple access 
points. The system should allow 
taxpayers to enter the system through 
many access points, structurally. For 
example, entry at the level of internal 
review or entry at the level of external 
appeal. There should also be a range of 
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-Examples of multiple procedural forms of 
access to the system such as the provision of 
forms and guides in different languages and 
formats, and providing a choice of access 
persons for taxpayers in particular 
circumstances to approach, are provided. 
methods to deliver notification of entry 
to the dispute resolution system. For 
example, by personal delivery, by 
electronic means of communication or 
by post. In addition, multiple forms of 
access to the system should be 
provided through the provision of 
forms and guides in different 
languages and in alternative formats, 
and a choice of access persons should 
be available for certain taxpayers to 
approach (including non-English 
speaking taxpayers and deaf, hearing-
impaired or speech-impaired 
taxpayers). 
(8) The system includes training and education for 
stakeholders. Training of stakeholders in conflict 
management as well as education about the dispute 
system and how to access it are necessary. 
 
-Examples of forms of training and education 
in the tax dispute resolution context are 
provided. 
 
(8) The system includes training and 
education for stakeholders. For 
example, the general in-house training 
of revenue authority staff should 
include a specific component on 
conflict management and resolution. 
Revenue authority staff acting as 
facilitators or mediators should receive 
specialised training in mediation 
developed by external ADR 
specialists. Education about the 
dispute system can be provided 
through information about the dispute 
resolution procedures provided on the 
revenue authority’s website, the 
publication of guides on the dispute 
resolution procedures, revenue 
authority guidelines on the dispute 
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procedures and online learning 
material for tax agents. 
(9) Assistance is offered for choosing the best process. 
This includes the use of guidelines and/or 
coordinators and process advisors to ensure the 
appropriate use of processes. 
 
-Examples of forms of assistance in choosing 
the best process in the context of tax dispute 
resolution are provided.  
(9) Assistance is offered for choosing 
the best process. For example, 
revenue authority guidelines on the 
dispute resolution procedures in order 
to assist in the appropriate use of 
processes, and the existence of a unit 
within the revenue authority 
responsible for overseeing (and 
providing advice on) the ADR 
programs available. In addition, 
requests for ADR should be approved 
by relevant staff from the above unit. 
(10) Disputants have the right to choose a preferred 
process. The best systems are multi-option with 
disputants selecting the process. 
 
-Replaced “Disputants” with “Taxpayers” to 
provide greater relevance to the principle in 
the tax dispute resolution context. 
-Examples of choosing a preferred process in 
the context of tax dispute resolution are 
provided. 
(10) Taxpayers have the right to choose a 
preferred process. Choice of a 
preferred process may be offered in a 
number of ways including (but not 
limited to): taxpayers can choose to 
have an internal review, appeal 
externally or do both; the choice for 
taxpayers to use ADR is made 
available alongside their existing 
review and appeal rights; taxpayers 
can choose to use ADR (if it is 
appropriate) once a dispute reaches a 
tribunal or court; and qualifying 
taxpayers can choose to have matters 
dealt with in a tribunal or court using 
small tax case procedures. 
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(11) The system is fair and perceived as fair. The 
system should be fair to parties and foster a culture 
that welcomes good faith dissent. 
 
-Examples of aspects relevant to the fairness 
and perceived fairness of the system in the 
context of tax dispute resolution are 
provided. 
(11) The system is fair and perceived as 
fair. The dispute resolution system as 
a whole should be fair and perceived 
as fair. For example, the internal 
review function of the revenue 
authority should be independent from 
the audit or compliance function. In 
addition, revenue authority staff acting 
as facilitators or mediators in ADR 
programs of the revenue authority 
should be fair and perceived as fair. 
For example, revenue authority 
facilitators or mediators should have 
had no prior involvement in the 
particular dispute.  
(12) The system is supported by top managers. There 
should be sincere and visible championship by senior 
management. 
 
-Replaced “top managers” with “senior 
revenue authority members” to provide 
greater relevance to the principle in the tax 
dispute resolution context. 
-Examples of championship by senior 
management in the tax dispute resolution 
context are provided.  
(12) The system is supported by senior 
revenue authority members. There 
should be visible evidence of sincere 
championship of the dispute resolution 
system and of ADR by senior revenue 
authority members. For example, 
through speeches, presentations, media 
statements or other releases. 
(13) The system is aligned with the mission, vision and 
values of the organisation. The system should be 
integrated into the organisation and reflect the 
organisational mission, vision and values.  
 
-Examples of integration of the dispute 
resolution system in the organisation and 
alignment of the revenue authority’s dispute 
resolution approach with the mission, vision 
and values of the organisation in the tax 
dispute resolution context are provided.  
 
(13) The system is aligned with the 
mission, vision and values of the 
organisation. For example, the dispute 
resolution system should be integrated 
into the organisation through the 
revenue authority’s taxpayers’ charter 
(or equivalent), and the revenue 
authority’s approach towards dispute 
resolution, outlined in its Disputes 
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Policy (or equivalent), should be 
aligned with its overall mission, vision 
and values. In addition, the revenue 
authority’s future plans with respect to 
dispute resolution should feature in its 
Strategic Plan (or equivalent). 
(14) There is evaluation of the system. This acts to 
identify strengths and weaknesses of design and foster 
continuous improvement. 
-Examples of evaluation of the system in the 
context of tax dispute resolution are 
provided. 
(14) There is evaluation of the system. 
For example, evaluation of the tax 
dispute resolution system can occur 
through regular or one-off surveys on 
the system conducted for the revenue 
authority by external agencies; 
evaluation can be provided by 
submissions, reviews and reports from 
government-appointed entities, 
parliamentary committees and other 
external stakeholders; taxpayers can 
provide general feedback on the 
system (for evaluation) to the revenue 
authority, for example, through 
completing online forms and 
participants in ADR programs can be 
invited to provide feedback (for 







This chapter has compared the DSD evaluations of the four jurisdictions’ tax dispute resolution 
systems and consequently derived a set of best practice tax DSD principles. As indicated in 
chapters 4 and 5 earlier, when the four jurisdictions’ tax dispute systems are compared from a 
DSD perspective, it appears that the strengths of the dispute resolution systems of the UK and 
the US lie in particular aspects of DSD relating to the structure of the system. Whereas the 
strengths of the Australian system mainly lie in aspects relating to the support and 
championship of the system. However, the NZ system displays some deficiencies in both areas. 
In addition, common to all four jurisdictions is that there are generally some indications of 
negative perceptions of fairness of the tax dispute resolution systems from various stakeholders 
evident. 
 
In deriving the tax DSD principles, modifications have been made to the general DSD 
principles in order to give them more relevance in the tax dispute resolution context. In most 
instances, the only modifications made were the provision of examples of the DSD principle 
applied in the context of tax dispute resolution or the provision of additional details regarding 
the DSD principle applied in the tax context. Thus, notwithstanding the modifications made to 
the wording of one DSD principle, the set of general DSD principles derived from the prior 
literature in chapter 2 of this thesis, can be applied in the tax context without significant 
substantive modifications. 
 
The only substantive modification made to the set of general DSD principles in the tax dispute 
resolution context was the changes made to DSD Principle 5. The original DSD principle 
provides that disputants should have access to an internal independent confidential neutral to 
whom they can go to for coaching, referring and problem-solving. However, as outlined in 
section 6.3.1 above, in the context of tax dispute resolution, in practice, internal independent 
confidential neutrals serving both the revenue authority and taxpayers in dispute, generally do 
not exist. This is in part due to the fact that tax disputes occur between the revenue authority 
and an external party (the taxpayer) as opposed to between internal employees in the 
organisational disputes context. Thus, the provision of an internal independent confidential 
neutral which disputants can access for coaching, referring and problem-solving in the tax 
context usually takes the form of an internal person or unit within the revenue authority that 
can mentor and provide advice to revenue authority staff on dispute resolution and ADR 
techniques. Generally, (with the exception of the TAS in the IRS), there is no equivalent 
provision of an internal independent confidential neutral for taxpayers to go to within the 
revenue authority. Arguably, in the context of tax dispute resolution, it would be reasonable to 
expect that taxpayers can seek advice on dispute resolution and ADR techniques externally 
(alongside the seeking of advice on the tax technical matters relating to the dispute from tax 
lawyers and/or tax accountants). Therefore, the wording of DSD Principle 5 has been modified 
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to provide that revenue authority staff (as opposed to both parties) should have access to an 
internal person or unit to which they can go to for mentoring and advice on ADR techniques.  
 
Accordingly, this chapter has outlined the modifications made to the general DSD principles 
in order to derive a resulting set of tax DSD principles. Chapters 7 and 8, which follow, will 
report the findings of the feedback sought on the tax DSD principles from the interviews 
conducted with selected NZ stakeholders and consequently suggest possible modifications to 




Chapter 7: Interview Findings: The Tax Dispute Systems Design Principles 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the feedback received from the interviews conducted with the selected 
New Zealand (NZ) stakeholders on the set of tax dispute systems design (DSD) principles in 
the general context. Based on the interview findings, the next chapter will outline the suggested 
changes to the tax DSD principles and then present the interview findings on the tax DSD 
principles in the context of the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures. Accordingly, section 7.2 
of this chapter firstly outlines the characteristics of the interview participants. Section 7.3 
presents the interview findings on the tax DSD principles, including discussion on the most 
important principles, least important principles, ranking of the principles, modifications, 
additions and deletions to the principles, and recognising the different ethnic backgrounds of 
taxpayers in the principles. Section 7.4 then concludes with a chapter summary.  
 
7.2 Participants’ Characteristics 
As explained earlier in chapter 3, section 3.6.3, for the tax practitioner and alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) practitioner stakeholder groups, notices were initially sent out via emails by 
the New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), the Arbitrators’ and Mediators’ Institute of New 
Zealand (AMINZ) and the Association of Dispute Resolvers and the Institute of Arbitrators 
and Mediators Australia (LEADR & IAMA),1 seeking interested interview participants. In 
addition, the NZ Tax Leader of Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (CA-ANZ) 
emailed a list of 12 selected potential interview participants. A total of 6 participants were 
recruited from the notices and 4 participants were recruited from the email sent by the NZ Tax 
Leader of CA-ANZ. Given the low number of responses received to the notices and email sent 
by the above professional bodies, in order to obtain further participants, the researcher 
contacted a number of tax practitioners and ADR practitioners who had participated in previous 
research by the researcher on tax disputes mediation and also conducted searches on the 
internet for NZ tax practitioners, tax academics, ADR practitioners and ADR academics using 
Google. Consequently, the majority of the tax practitioners, tax academics, ADR practitioners 
and ADR academics were recruited by being contacted directly by the researcher.  
 
One Inland Revenue participant was recruited as a result of responding to the notice provided 
through one of the professional bodies and a further Inland Revenue participant was 
subsequently recruited on the referral of the first representative. The 2 members of the judiciary 
were recruited after being emailed directly by the researcher. Ultimately a total of 30 
participants voluntarily took part in an interview, consisting of: 13 tax practitioners (made up 
                                                          
1 As noted in chapter 3, section 3.6.3, at n 30, at the time that the interviews were conducted, LEADR & IAMA 




of 7 tax lawyers and 6 tax accountants); 3 tax academics; 7 ADR practitioners; 3 ADR 
academics; 2 Inland Revenue representatives; and 2 members of the judiciary.  
 
Relevant demographic details of the participants, as at the time at which the interviews were 
conducted, are shown in Table 7.1. The participants comprised of 14 males and 16 females. 
The tax academics and ADR academics were all university lecturers (2 of the ADR academics 
also held roles as ADR practitioners). All of the ADR practitioners practised in mediation (with 
2 also practising in other dispute resolution areas). The tax practitioners held a range of 
positions including associate, principal, solicitor, barristers, partners, managers, directors and 
chief executive officer (CEO). Except for one tax practitioner, all of the tax practitioners and 
tax academics were members of either NZLS or CA-ANZ. In addition, one of the Inland 
Revenue representatives was a member of CA-ANZ. Except for the ADR academic, all of the 
ADR participants were accredited by AMINZ, LEADR & IAMA and/or NZLS.2 
 
Table 7.1: Demographic Details of the Interview Participants 
Reference in the Thesis Gender Occupation/ Position Professional Body/ 
Bodies 
Tax Practitioner 1 (Lawyer) Female Associate NZLS 
Tax Practitioner 2 (Lawyer) Female Principal  NZLS 
Tax Practitioner 3 (Lawyer) Female Senior Solicitor NZLS 
Tax Practitioner 4 (Lawyer) Male Barrister NZLS 
Tax Practitioner 5 (Lawyer) Female Team Manager NZLS 
Tax Practitioner 6 (Lawyer) Male Partner NZLS 
Tax Practitioner 7 (Lawyer) Male Barrister NZLS 
Tax Practitioner 8 
(Accountant) 
Male Director - 
Tax Practitioner 9 
(Accountant) 
Female Partner NZLS 
 
Tax Practitioner 10 
(Accountant) 
Male Partner CA-ANZ 
Tax Practitioner 11 
(Accountant) 
Male CEO CA-ANZ 
Tax Practitioner 12 
(Accountant) 
Female Director NZLS 
Tax Practitioner 13 
(Accountant) 
Male Senior Tax Manager CA-ANZ 
                                                          
2 Many of the practitioners and academics also belonged to other professional bodies in NZ and overseas (for 
example, the International Fiscal Association (IFA)). However, the professional bodies listed in Table 7.1 are 
limited to NZLS, CA-ANZ, AMINZ and LEADR & IAMA, as these were the relevant professional bodies in NZ 
through which the sample of practitioner and academic participants were initially recruited. 
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Reference in the Thesis Gender Occupation/ Position Professional Body/ 
Bodies 
Tax Academic 1  Female Lecturer  CA-ANZ 
Tax Academic 2 Male Lecturer NZLS 
Tax Academic 3 Male Lecturer CA-ANZ 
ADR Practitioner 1 Female Mediator  AMINZ, LEADR & 
IAMA, NZLS 
ADR Practitioner 2 Female Mediator LEADR & IAMA 
ADR Practitioner 3 Female Mediation Advisor LEADR & IAMA 
ADR Practitioner 4 Female Mediator AMINZ 
ADR Practitioner 5 Male Barrister, Arbitrator, 
Mediator and Adjudicator 
AMINZ, LEADR & 
IAMA, NZLS 
ADR Practitioner 6 Male Arbitrator, Mediator and 
Adjudicator 
AMINZ, LEADR & 
IAMA 
ADR Practitioner 7 Female Mediator AMINZ 
ADR Academic 1 Male Lecturer - 
ADR Academic/Practitioner 1 Female Lecturer and Mediator AMINZ 
ADR Academic/Practitioner 2 Female Lecturer, Mediator, 
Barrister and Solicitor 
LEADR & IAMA, NZLS 
Inland Revenue 
Representative 1 
Male Director  CA-ANZ 
Inland Revenue 
Representative 2 
Female Policy Manager - 
Member of the Judiciary 1 Male  Judge - 
Member of the Judiciary 2 Female Judge - 
 
As stated in chapter 3, section 3.6.4 of this thesis, the interview participants who had expressed 
an interest in participating in an interview were contacted by email by the researcher to arrange 
a suitable date and time for the telephone interview. However, due to the nature of the 
participants’ occupations, they were typically time pressured and many of them had to 
reschedule their interviews for a different day and/or time. Despite the time pressures, most of 
the participants appeared willing to participate and provide their views. With the exception of 
three participants, all of the participants had read through the supplementary information 
document and interview guide questions prior to the interview and were thus, relatively 
prepared for the interview.  
 
As outlined in chapter 3, section 3.6.3 (and as indicated in Table 7.1 above), the interview 
participants came from six stakeholder groups of interest: tax practitioners, tax academics, 
ADR practitioners, ADR academics, Inland Revenue representatives and members of the 
judiciary. While there were some areas in the analysis where there was a difference in views, 
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particularly between the tax stakeholder groups and the ADR stakeholder groups, there 
appeared to be no significant differences in the views of the practitioners and the academics 
within these groups. Therefore, in the data analysis and interview findings which follow, unless 
otherwise stated, the tax practitioners and tax academics have been combined together and 
referred to as ‘tax participants’ and the ADR practitioners and ADR academics have been 
combined together and referred to as ‘ADR participants’. In addition, as noted in chapter 3, 
section 3.6.3 of this thesis, within the tax practitioner group of stakeholders, there appeared to 
be no significant difference in views between the tax lawyers and tax accountants. Thus, a 
distinction between them has also not been made in the data analysis and interview findings. 
However, the fact that there were no noticeable differences in the views found between the 
academics and practitioners, and between the tax lawyers and tax accountants, may partly be 
due to the small number of participants that were willing and able to participate in the 
interviews overall. The above observations were noted in the researcher’s own analysis of the 
interview findings as qualitative data analysis software was not utilised in this study. 
 
7.3 Data Analysis and Interview Findings – The Tax Dispute Systems Design Principles 
7.3.1 General comments 
A number of general comments were made by the interview participants in relation to the 
interview questions and the general nature of the tax DSD topic. In particular, some of the tax 
participants and the members of the judiciary were surprised by the structure and nature of the 
questions asked, and also by the overall concept of applying DSD principles within the design 
of tax dispute resolution systems: 
 
I guess I would say for me, rather than thinking in terms of principles I would think it is 
better to think in terms of a specific design … I would find that more tangible. 
(Tax Practitioner 4) 
 
I was a little bit surprised by the nature of the questions that you were asking in terms of, 
like, ranking the principles and very specific questions. I would have thought that this is 
the type of study which would’ve [lent] more to having an open interview. 
(Tax Practitioner 6) 
 
… [C]an I just say as a preface to that, that the questions are at a sort of a general level that 
I find quite difficult to deal with very easily in the terms you’ve asked them. 
(Member of the Judiciary 1) 
 
I’m happy to go through them [but] I must admit I’m not [the] sort of [person] for this sort 
of structured approach. 
(Member of the Judiciary 2) 
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In addition, a number of participants felt that they were unable to answer certain questions due 
to their lack of qualifications and/or experience in either the tax or DSD area. Although, this 
appeared to be most common amongst the ADR participants: 
 
All I need to say really is that I’m coming from outside of experience of the taxation 
system, so that’s limiting what I can say. 
(ADR Practitioner 4) 
 
I hate to be unhelpful, but it is presumptuous of me to say ‘look, I think this is out of place’ 
in the context of a set of disputes I really don’t understand a great deal about. 
 (ADR Practitioner 5) 
 
I’m not really qualified to answer that question. I haven’t studied the DSD principles before 
… so I’m not really qualified to comment on which of those principles require 
modification. It is not my area of specialty. I operate within the practice of tax disputes 
resolution systems as opposed to any design aspects or any knowledge of conflict 
resolution systems. 
(Tax Practitioner 6) 
 
The views of the two members of the judiciary unsurprisingly lent towards a rights-based 
approach to dispute resolution, as indicated by the following comments made by one member:  
 
… [W]hat I didn’t like very much is the suggestions that ADR should involve negotiating 
or settling around interests as opposed to rights … it’s not a sort of hard and fast objection, 
but at least in my professional lifetime the general proposition has been that disputes with 
tax authorities should be decided in accordance with the law. 
(Member of the Judiciary 1) 
 
…[T]he fundamental problem is that by and large, the Department, and I think basically 
rightly, are looking for a rights-based determination process and probably would resist, 
and again I think rightly, procedures that deviate from that. 
(Member of the Judiciary 1) 
 
Furthermore, the current knowledge and experiences of the members of the judiciary with tax 
disputes (and the existing NZ tax dispute resolution system) were largely limited to the small 
subset of disputes which they heard in their particular jurisdiction of the NZ court system. 
Moreover, this particular subset of disputes may not necessarily have comprised of disputes 
deemed appropriate for interests-based resolution: 
 
Because as I say, I just don’t see enough disputes to get a handle on it. I mean, the fact is 
that the cases that have come to the courts in recent times have … in fact almost always 
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have been won by the IRD. So I’m just seeing a particular, a very small, subset of the 
disputes. 
(Member of the Judiciary 1) 
 
Another comment which was made by the majority of the ADR participants was that the 
preferred term for ‘ADR’ was now ‘Dispute Resolution’ or ‘DR’: 
 
There is a general philosophy coming through … with the term ADR and I don’t agree 
with that term, I think that this kind of dispute resolution is the standard approach and other 
systems outside it are the ADR.  
(ADR Practitioner 4) 
 
I tend not to use ADR as an acronym … I mean it’s just dispute resolution. Every process 
has an alternative to another. 
(ADR Practitioner 6) 
 
[W]e really don’t talk about ADR anymore. The word ‘alternative’ really has dropped 
away, so you just need to talk about ‘dispute resolution’ … the people who are in that 
subject area would very rarely talk now about ‘alternative’ because we don’t see it as 
alternative. 
(ADR Academic/Practitioner 1)  
 
However, as noted in chapter 2, section 2.2.3 of this thesis, the term ADR is used in this study 
given that in the tax dispute resolution context, ADR processes currently remain as ‘alternative’ 
dispute resolution processes. 
 
7.3.2 Most important dispute systems design principles 
Table 7.2 shows the frequencies of the tax DSD principles that were regarded as the most 
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12      
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The majority (18) of the interview participants identified DSD Principle 11, the system is fair 
and perceived as fair, as the most important principle. Most of the participants regarded 
Principle 11 as the overarching principle: 
 
I thought that the single most important element is your 11. That is to say that the system 
must be fair and perceived as fair. I think that without that no system would have any 
credibility. 
(ADR Practitioner 5) 
 
If you haven’t got 11 … as your starting point, then there is little or no point in proceeding 
any further. 
(ADR Practitioner 6) 
 
That’s a rather overarching principle, but I think it is the most important. So any system 
regardless of which principles are adopted must be, and be seen to be, fair. 
(Tax Academic 2) 
 
I think fairness is absolutely essential and I know that … some of the principles that you 
have are focused on that fairness. There’s the idea of sufficient knowledge, sufficient 
                                                          
3 Some of the interview participants suggested more than one most important DSD principle. Therefore, the sum 
of the ‘Total’ column is greater than the total number of participants interviewed. 
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training, stakeholder engagement, all of those things coming through which could 
contribute to a fair system. 
(Tax Academic 3) 
 
Many of the interview participants felt that the fairness principle was important in achieving 
buy-in and participation from users of the dispute resolution system in the first instance: 
 
The people who are using it need to feel that the process is fair otherwise they will push 
back against the process and it won’t have the outcome that you want. 
(ADR Practitioner 2)  
 
The reason why I thought this was the most important one is because I kind of consider it 
a necessary condition for any kind or type of dispute resolution system, is that the system 
is perceived as fair. Because if that principle is not achieved you don’t get any buy-in from 
the customers of that system. 
(ADR Academic 1) 
 
[U]nless you have got something that people actually believe in, especially from a 
taxpayer’s perspective, that they actually believe is going to add value and is not biased 
before they start … then there is not going to be any point in entering into any of these 
[procedures]. Equally, if you have got a revenue authority that doesn’t have buy-in as well, 
you are going to have problems with administrating it. 
(Tax Practitioner 12) 
 
The thing is that if people do not perceive fairness in the system they are not going to 
participate in any dispute resolution or actively participate in paying taxes. 
(Tax Academic 1) 
 
Well, I guess fairness I think is going to lead not only to a suitable outcome in any dispute, 
but I think it is going to influence peoples’ interests in participating in the process. Just the 
integrity of the process as a whole and because of peoples’ perceptions … that they believe 
it will work. 
(Inland Revenue Representative 1) 
 
Well, I think unless it is [fair and perceived as fair], there won’t be any buy-in. I mean it’s 
fundamental, it’s a prerequisite. 
(Member of the Judiciary 1) 
 
The tax participants also felt that fairness and perceptions of fairness were vital to the overall 
integrity of the tax system. This is consistent with the sentiment highlighted by NZ tax 
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commentators that “when taxpayers lose faith in the fairness and integrity of [the dispute 
resolution] procedures, the operation of the entire tax regime is called into question”:4 
 
I thought that the system is fair and perceived as fair is the most important aspect and that’s 
probably because we operate within a self-assessment tax system and if the users of the 
dispute resolution system did not perceive that the system would be fair, then I think it 
would have a significant negative effect on tax compliance in the first place. 
(Tax Practitioner 6) 
 
I think because the fair determination of taxpayers’ rights and liabilities is sort of inherent, 
or fundamental to the system, really. 
(Tax Practitioner 7) 
 
Because if [the tax dispute resolution system] is not perceived as fair then it brings the tax 
system into disrepute. 
(Tax Practitioner 10) 
 
The system has not only got to be fair, but be perceived to be fair … there [are] a number 
of quotes which I have seen from other commentators … which basically say that the 
resolution of disputes for tax is vital to the integrity of the tax system because if taxpayers 
don’t believe that there is a fair system to resolve disputes then in effect they are deprived 
of justice … and as a country dedicated to the rule of law, a fair justice system is vital.  
(Tax Academic 2) (emphasis added) 
 
When probed further with respect to whether the interview participants regarded fairness as 
being important in terms of fairness of the substantive outcome of the dispute or fairness of the 
procedure for resolving the dispute, most participants felt that procedural fairness was 
important, as explained in the following comments:  
 
I do think that good process is more important than outcome because different people need 
different things … for some people what happens at the end is far less important than how 
it’s done. 
(ADR Practitioner 2) 
 
Procedural fairness is paramount because you might have an outcome that is perceived as 
unfair by one party, but so long as the process itself that has resulted in that outcome is 
perceived as fair, then I think you will have a higher level of satisfaction. 
(ADR Practitioner 6) 
 
                                                          
4 Mark Keating and Michael Lennard “Developments in tax disputes – Another step backwards?” (paper presented 
to the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants Annual Tax Conference, Auckland, 11-12 November 
2011) at 3. 
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So for me, that first principle [Principle 11] … it isn’t just about the substantive outcome 
… So a lot of stuff that costs no money to people is still really valuable to people, so you 
can come away with the money and still feel like you’ve been trashed … and you could 
come away with very little in the way of a material outcome and still feel better for it. 
(ADR Academic/Practitioner 1) 
 
I just think that it’s probably a fundamental of any system design, but particularly when 
you are talking about a regulator and one where there is generally a power imbalance in 
terms of the regulator often has much greater resources than the taxpayer … so people 
have to perceive the entire tax system as fair, but even when you within that system, when 
you have a dispute, it’s really important that the process by which that dispute will be 
undertaken, it is essential that is perceived as being fair. 
(Tax Practitioner 11) (emphasis added) 
 
As illustrated in Table 7.2, other principles which the interview participants regarded as most 
important included DSD Principles 1, 2 and 10. Similar to the fairness principle, DSD Principle 
1, stakeholders are included in the design process, was considered important in achieving 
stakeholder buy-in to the tax dispute resolution procedures. DSD Principles 2 and 10 (offering 
multiple options and the right to choose a preferred process) were regarded as important in 
providing taxpayers with buy-in as well as choice and flexibility in addressing conflict. This 
was particularly the case for the tax participants given their views that the statutory tax dispute 
resolution procedures in NZ currently provides taxpayers with limited options to choose from 
in resolving a dispute: 
 
Consultation with taxpayers and other stakeholders is the only way to get buy-in to the 
process, to trust it, to participate fully in it. Until that happens, the system will fail. 
(ADR Practitioner 1) 
 
I certainly think number 1 is of high importance … and the reason that I think it is most 
important is that the people who are affected by any process have had an insight into what 
works for them. I also think number 2, [which] is simply about creating choice, because I 
believe in creating choice for people and so that there is flexibility to suit both the people 
and their situation. 
(ADR Practitioner 4) 
 
The first two I think are really important, that stakeholders are included in the pilot 
programs and I guess, the design of the process itself … so when I’m saying that, I mean 
the taxpayer, community and tax advisors, so I think that’s really important just to get their 
buy-in and also it sort of fits in with some of the other principles that you’ve got, [like] the 
perception of fairness of the system … The other one that I thought was important, and its 




probably because I just think one size doesn’t fit all and that’s a difficulty perhaps with the 
system at the moment. 
(Tax Practitioner 5) (emphasis added) 
 
[Principle] 2 would be the most important in that it is important to have various ways of 
addressing conflict as not all conflict is the same. 
(ADR Practitioner 3) 
 
I think that one of the most important things is the taxpayer’s right to choose the preferred 
process. I also think that the loops backwards and forwards is an important point and the 
multiple options … because in my experience the major difficulty we have with tax disputes 
is the lack of flexibility in the process, so at no point other than at the time that a matter 
goes to court [does] the taxpayer [have] the right to consult with an external alternative 
dispute resolution specialist of any kind or some sort of mediator, so I find that that can be 
relatively oppressive in some respects. 
(Tax Practitioner 9) (emphasis added) 
 
The one that I would think would be important is that the taxpayers have the right to choose 
the preferred process, and then again that just really goes into getting the buy-in from the 
taxpayers and into the whole system and making them feel that it has actually been a 
worthwhile process and making sure that it is the right fit for them and for the type of 
dispute that they have. 
(Tax Practitioner 5) (emphasis added) 
 
For one of the members of the judiciary, the DSD principles concerning taxpayer choice and 
control over the process were regarded as the most important. They were particularly regarded 
as important in order to provide taxpayers with the ability to get out of the dispute resolution 
process at any stage and go to the courts: 
 
… [I]n terms of the importance of the principles … I think I just said that the ability to get 
out of the process at any point and get to court, and that runs through a number of them 
… And just the ability for the taxpayer to have some control over the process and deciding 
what it is rather than having it imposed as a one-size-fits-all. 
  (Member of the Judiciary 2) (emphasis added) 
 
Notwithstanding that they did not rank taxpayer choice as the most important principle, the 
other member of the judiciary also reiterated the view that taxpayers should be able to insist 
the immediate resolution of their disputes by the courts: 
 
I agree that taxpayers should have a right to choose a preferred process. I think basically 
the default should be that they can challenge a decision in the courts or the [Taxation] 
Review Authority if they want to. 
(Member of the Judiciary 1) 
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7.3.3 Least important dispute systems design principles 
Table 7.3 shows the frequencies of the tax DSD principles that were regarded as the least 
important by the interview participants. 
 
Table 7.3: Least Important Dispute Systems Design Principles 









1  2  1 3 
2 1    1 
3  1   1 
4  1   1 
5 1 1   2 
6 2 2   4 
7  1   1 
8  1  1 2 
9  1  1 2 
10      
11      
12 3 4   7 
13 3 4 1  8 
14  2   2 
Participant 
unable to specify 
2 1 1  4 
 
As indicated in Table 7.3, the DSD principles most frequently regarded by the interview 
participants as least important were DSD Principles 13 (8 participants) and 12 (7 participants). 
Participants viewed these as principles as ones which only concerned the revenue authority’s 
internal processes. It was thought that the aspects of the alignment of the dispute resolution 
system with the mission, vision and values of the organisation (DSD Principle 13) and support 
for the system by senior revenue authority members (DSD Principle 12) were features that “ran 
independently” of the dispute resolution system as opposed to being deliberate design features 
per se. Moreover, it was generally expected that aspects such as support for the system would 
take place following the implementation of a dispute resolution system, anyways:  
 
The system is being aligned with the mission, vision and values of the organisation … I 
think that is a one-sided concern and it only concerns the revenue authority’s internal 
                                                          
5 Some of the interview participants suggested more than one least important DSD principle. Therefore, the sum 
of the ‘Total’ column is not equal to the total number of participants interviewed. 
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process which … I mean, it depends who would be seeing this. But from the point of view 
of the ADR professional … while it is important, I think it is probably less important than 
some of the other things there. 
(ADR Practitioner 1) (emphasis added) 
 
If a dispute resolution system for tax disputes is installed, this [support for the system] 
should run independently of it. Whether people within the IRD support it or not, it should 
be independent. Whether they like it or not, it should already be there. 
(ADR Academic 1) 
 
I thought generally, and it’s not because it’s not important, but it’s just not the most 
important, is that there needed to be championship by senior revenue authority members 
to the system … I thought that if you had a good system, if it’s designed well, then that 
would follow anyway and I just think that wasn’t the most important thing.  
(Tax Practitioner 1) (emphasis added) 
 
The … ones, I guess, I think I probably had down the bottom of the ranking system were 
12 and 13. Although, those things are important I sort of thought well, that was just a given 
that those things would happen anyway, so that’s the reason why I ranked them lower.  
(Tax Practitioner 5)  
 
DSD Principle 13 was generally regarded as the least important principle (by 8 participants) on 
the basis that, depending on what the mission, vision and values of the organisation were, in 
certain circumstances it may not be appropriate to design the dispute resolution system to align 
with them. The organisation’s mission, vision and values could also potentially change over 
time: 
 
So my number 14 is your number 13, the system is aligned with the mission, values and 
vision of the organisation. But of course if the mission and values of the organisation are 
crap then you don’t really want a dispute resolution system designed in alignment with 
them. 
(ADR Academic/Practitioner 1) 
 
I probably only identified one that I put right at the bottom and that was number 13, linking 
to the mission, vision and values of the organisation. Not because I think they’re going to 
be rubbish or anything like that, but it did kind of trouble me in the sense that there is a lot 
of other things that might get written into the mission of a revenue authority … and disputes 
in theory should only be a tiny proportion of what the revenue authority deals with and so 
to have a direct linkage, I think could distort things a little bit. 




I think that probably 13, it’s an awkward one to say, simply because I think sometimes the 
values and the mission of the organisation change and I would like to think that the values 
around dispute resolution can withstand all of that. 
(ADR Practitioner 4) 
 
Furthermore, in the context of the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures, one interview 
participant was sceptical as to whether the application of DSD Principle 13 would actually 
make any difference to the dispute resolution system: 
 
I thought that probably the least important of those principles was principle number 13, 
that the system is aligned with the mission, vision and values of the organisation … in 
terms of Inland Revenue … I doubt that whether putting something in terms of an internal 
mission statement or charter is actually going to seriously filter through and affect the 
manner in which the people involved in that system at the grassroots level are actually 
going to exercise or how they exercise their various judgement and skills, and discretion 
within that system. I think that’s probably not going to make any difference at all. 
(Tax Practitioner 6) (emphasis added) 
 
As noted above, DSD Principle 12 was regarded as the least important principle (by 7 
participants) as it was expected that support for the disputes system would generally follow 
once the system was in place: 
 
I’m not suggesting it’s not a desirable thing but … once you have created a dispute system, 
the authorities will be stuck with it, they will have to apply it and so I guess I didn’t think 
that was so important because I think that must follow. 
(ADR Practitioner 5) 
 
In addition, against the background of the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures, a number of 
the tax participants indicated that the support of the system by senior revenue authority 
members was not necessarily forthcoming in practice:  
 
I suppose you need the support of senior revenue members. But the fact is that often they 
… you know, they have their own agendas. 
(Tax Practitioner 3) 
 
In terms of senior revenue authority members’ support of the system … if I’ve got a 
criticism of the IRD and their advisors or their litigators, I perceive elements of ‘win at all 
costs’ … and sometimes that is done at the cost to the wider tax system. I’ve seen it done 
where I think the IRD have walked away from their principles and I’ve seen it done where 
they have argued differently to what their stated policy is. 




Four interview participants regarded DSD Principle 6, the procedures are ordered from low to 
high cost, as the least important principle. One ADR participant was of the view that a low cost 
process was not necessarily the most effective process if it was designed solely based on 
achieving the aim of low costs: 
 
Obviously being cost effective is a good thing but if the other stuff isn’t in place and you’ve 
just got a low cost process, then the low cost process is less likely to work. I guess that’s 
why I put it last. 
(ADR Practitioner 2) 
 
Whereas a number of the tax participants regarded DSD Principle 6 as the least important as 
they felt that in practice the resolution of tax disputes was issue-based and all disputes, 
regardless of their value, had to follow through a sequential process:  
 
Well, I’m not saying that it’s not an important factor but I think it would be difficult to 
design a whole process around cost because if you’re in a tax dispute, it tends to be an 
issue-based thing … I mean you can have a legal issue that isn’t worth a lot of money but 
might cost you just as much as a legal issue that is worth a lot of money to actually dispute 
because you got have the same things you have to do. You have got to do your research, 
do your statutory interpretation, you know all that sort of thing. It tends to be an issue-
based thing. 
(Tax Practitioner 9) (emphasis added) 
 
I think probably the procedures are ordered from low to high cost [is the least important] 
… just because I think in the small and medium entity environment that I deal with, that 
once you enter into a dispute with the IRD it is very hard to tell which costs are higher and 
which costs are lower … because it’s just a sequential process that you have to follow 
through. 
(Tax Practitioner 13) (emphasis added) 
 
Although, as noted earlier in chapter 6, section 6.3, included in DSD Principle 6 is the statement 
that generally high upfront costs may be incurred by taxpayers in working out their positions 
at the outset of the dispute. These upfront costs may include the time spent by the taxpayer in 
preparing for and participating in negotiations, as well as the cost of professional advisors. 
Arguably, these upfront costs must necessarily be incurred in order for taxpayers (particularly 
those who are self-represented) to follow through the “sequential process” of the procedures. 
 
Four participants were unable to specify a least important principle on the basis that they either 
preferred not to provide a ranking of the 14 DSD principles or were unable to provide a full 




7.3.4 Ranking of the dispute systems design principles 
Seventeen of the participants were able to fully rank the 14 DSD principles in order of 
importance from highest to lowest. Eleven participants were unable to rank (or fully rank) the 
principles for various reasons, including that they felt that ranking the principles was not 
appropriate as all of them were required in a dispute resolution system. Some participants also 
felt unable to rank them as they regarded many of the principles as equally important. The 
above difficulties in ranking the principles were not confined to any one particular stakeholder 
group (that is, the ADR participants, the tax participants or the Inland Revenue representatives). 
It should be noted that, the two members of the judiciary were not asked to rank the DSD 
principles. 
 
I don’t think you can rank them. Apart from the system has multiple options for addressing 
conflict because that’s your kind of big overview thing where you’re starting to develop 
the system and then under that, when you’ve got the system itself, then the rest of the things 
that you’ve got listed there should be all part of it. 
(ADR Practitioner 3) 
 
Well I don’t think any are least important … and I don’t think you can rank them 1 to 14 
because, at least in my experience, they sit in separate discrete categories and you don’t 
get to the last one if you don’t have the first one. 
(ADR Practitioner 6)  
 
I just in some ways felt that many of the principles I felt were quite important and quite 
good principles so kind of having to rank them all was a little bit arbitrary. 
(ADR Academic 1)  
 
It’s hard for me to rank them and I’d almost prefer not to because I’m not sure it is 
appropriate for some of them to be less important than the others, you know I think one 
should try very hard to make space for all of them. 
(Tax Practitioner 8) 
  
Well it’s very hard to do because I’ve tried to give you the three most important and the 
two that I consider least important. The other ones are really various aspects of or different 
parts to the system and I kind of feel they are all of equal merit … I find it difficult to give 
a numeric 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etcetera to the various options because many of them are equally 
important.  
(Tax Academic 2) 
 
Furthermore, some participants found it difficult to rank the principles as they believed that the 
principles could be separated into two different categories. Broadly, the two categories related 




I think on my reading … they seem to fit into two categories. One is about the principles 
for making the principles about how the system works within it … and then the other sort 
of broad category are things that I think will make the system work … So in terms of which 
are the most important, they all are. It depends on which category you are looking for. 
(ADR Academic/Practitioner 2)  
 
I’m uncertain whether all of these principles are in fact principles or whether they are 
merely implementation issues with other principles … I think 7 and 10 are genuine 
principles, but 8 and 9 are implementing those principles. 
(Tax Academic 2) 
 
Of the 11 participants who were unable to rank (or fully rank) the principles numerically from 
1 to 14, 5 participants provided no ranking at all, 1 participant provided a partially complete 
ranking and 4 participants grouped or “clustered” the principles into various categories or tiers 
of importance, for example, ‘high, medium and low’ or ‘important and less important’ 
principles:  
 
… [T]hat’s what I tried to do and I’m sorry I had to group them. I couldn’t do them 1 to 
14 so I’ve tried to give them a high, middle and lower ranking. 
(ADR Practitioner 4)  
 
Well I’m going to be really unhelpful here and suggest that I had trouble listing them in 
terms of sequence … What I found, and maybe I’m misunderstanding some of them, [was 
that] I tended to put them slightly in clusters. 
(Tax Academic 3)  
 
The remaining participant (of the 11) grouped the principles according to four distinct 
categories: high-level purposive principles, dispute avoidance principles, dispute process 
delivery principles and dispute process administration principles. These categories essentially 
provide an extension of the above categorisation of principles on how the system worked 
(dispute process delivery principles) and principles which made the system work (dispute 
process administration principles). The ADR practitioner further noted that the high-level 
purposive principles were necessary in order for the other principles to follow: 
 
They [the high-level purposive principles] are completely different to the delivery or 
administrative principles that follow. So if you haven’t got those items to start with, if you 
haven’t got 11, 12 and 13 as your starting point, then there is little or no point in proceeding 
any further. 
(ADR Practitioner 6) 
 
Two of the academic participants also suggested that providing some form of categorisation of 
the principles was potentially more helpful than giving a precise ranking of the principles: 
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… [B]ut I did want to make the observation that ranking those principles in the way that 
you’ve suggested felt pretty artificial to me and … I probably would [recommend] looking 
at core functions, core principles and discretionary principles, or essential and non-
essential. Some sort of larger category rather than suggesting that sort of precise ranking. 
(ADR Academic/Practitioner 1) (emphasis added) 
 
I think you may be able to group some of these principles. So rather than ending up with, 
at the moment you’ve got 14, you may end up I think with 5 or 6, with sub-headings 
underneath … So I think maybe they need to be … collated. 
(Tax Academic 3) 
 
Of the participants that fully ranked the 14 DSD principles, a range of different rankings were 
provided. However, by way of general observation across the rankings provided, the principles 
regarding fairness, taxpayer choice and stakeholder involvement in the design process were 
typically ranked highest (for example, DSD Principles, 11, 1, 2, 3 and 10). These were 
generally followed by those principles relating to taxpayer assistance and education (for 
example, DSD Principles 8 and 9) and the principles relating to the revenue authority and its 
staff members were generally ranked as least important (for example, DSD Principles 5, 12 
and 13). Notably, this general pattern was specifically summarised by two of the interview 
participants:  
 
… [A]t the beginning [the] priorities [which] I focused on [were] the users of the processes, 
then the middle bit is focused on the process itself … and now we are getting to the bit that 
really focuses more on the organisation, and so if you can see a pattern in my prioritising, 
it’s in the end to put the user first and the organisation last. 
(ADR Academic/Practitioner 1) 
 
It is more concentrating on the involvement of the taxpayers and those things about 
assistance, fairness, multiple entry points, and then seen as less important overall … the 
system being supported and aligning with the mission. And in the middle, the ‘nuts and 
bolts’ things like evaluation, notification and [having an] internal mentor. 
(ADR Practitioner 1) 
 
With one exception, there appears to be no marked differences in the rankings provided across 
the different stakeholder groups interviewed. The exception being that there was a notable 
difference in the rankings provided by the ADR participants and by the tax and Inland Revenue 
participants with respect to DSD Principle 6, the procedures are ordered from low to high cost. 
The ADR participants ranked DSD Principle 6 as being of low importance (ranked as the 
twelfth, thirteenth or fourteenth principle). In contrast, the rankings provided by the tax and 
Inland Revenue participants were mixed between low (ranked as the twelfth, thirteenth or 
fourteenth principle) and high importance (ranked as the first or second principle). A higher 
ranking may possibly have been given to DSD Principle 6 by some of the tax and Inland 
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Revenue participants due to their knowledge and/or experience with the costs associated with 
the current NZ tax dispute resolution system resulting in the ‘burning off’ taxpayers:  
 
I guess I keep thinking about the process we have at the moment … the process which we 
have at the moment is, to me it is incredibly unfair and it results in really high costs early 
on and ongoing high costs all the way through the process. 
(Tax Practitioner 4) 
 
… [O]ne of the ongoing criticisms that the Department receives about the process is what 
they call ‘burn off’. So you don’t want to have taxpayers in a situation where they believe 
they are correct and that an independent evaluation may even ultimately prove that they 
are correct, but they are burnt off by the system because of high cost. So you want costs to 
be sort of at the much later stages, where it’s sort of a little bit clearer about … which 
decision is sustainable and/or correct. 
(Inland Revenue Representative 2) (emphasis added) 
 
Linking the findings in this section back to the comparisons of the DSD evaluations of the four 
jurisdictions drawn earlier in chapter 6, section 6.2.5, it can be seen that the tax dispute 
resolution systems in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) meet a number of 
the DSD principles which the interview participants ranked as being of higher importance (for 
example, DSD Principles 2, 3 and 10) with multiple options, multiple structural access points 
and loop forward procedures. On the other hand, Australia meets many of the lower ranked 
principles (for example, DSD Principles 12 and 13) with support from senior revenue authority 
members and alignment of the system with the mission, vision and values of the organisation. 
The NZ tax dispute resolution system displays some deficiencies in both the higher and lower 
ranked principles (for example, DSD Principles 10, 12 and 13). In addition, the DSD 
evaluations generally found that the design of the tax dispute resolution systems in all four 
jurisdictions could be improved with respect to the highest ranked principle of fairness. 
7.3.5 Suggested modifications to the dispute systems design principles 
Table 7.4 shows the frequencies for each of the tax DSD principles for which the interview 





Table 7.4: Suggested Modifications to the Dispute Systems Design Principles 









1      
2 1 2  1 3 
3 1 1   2 
4  1   1 
5 1 2   3 
6  3   3 
7 1 2   3 
8 3 3   6 
9  2   2 
10 1 1   2 
11 3 4   7 
12 1 2   3 
13  1   1 
14  1   1 
No 
Modifications 
4 10 2 1 17 
 
7.3.5.1 Suggested modifications to principles 11 and 8 
As indicated in Table 7.4, the majority of the interview participants (17) suggested no 
modifications to the set of DSD principles. The most frequent modifications suggested by the 
interview participants were to DSD Principles 11 and 8, with 7 participants suggesting that 
DSD Principle 11 could be modified and 6 participants suggesting that DSD Principle 8 could 
be modified. The main concern was that DSD Principles 11 and 8 indicated that the facilitator 
or mediator was a revenue authority member of staff: 
 
There’s an assumption there really that revenue authority staff are to act as facilitators or 
mediators. Well they shouldn’t be acting as facilitators or mediators because if they do you 
have immediately lost the perception of fairness. There is no way that 11 can be consistent 
with 8 if you have internal staff performing that task. They must be seen as independent 
… Take out the revenue authority staff acting as anything that purports to be independent 
because you can’t be a facilitator or mediator, ever, if you are employed by one side. 
(ADR Practitioner 1) (emphasis added) 
 
                                                          
6 Some of the interview participants suggested more than one modification. Therefore, the sum of the ‘Total’ 
column is not equal to the total number of participants interviewed. 
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The principles seem to reflect a process that is internal rather than external and … right 
from the outset it is going to be inherently difficult to persuade parties that it is fair … As 
long as you provide them internally you will be hitting your head against a brick wall if 
you think you are going to persuade users of the service that it is fair and independent. 
Yeah, it’s a perception thing. I don’t think consumers could come to any other conclusion 
other than it lacks independence and impartiality. 
(ADR Practitioner 6) (emphasis added) 
 
Principle number 11, about the fairness … my understanding is that currently the facilitator 
is somebody who is from IRD or that the conference is convened by a[n] IRD person and 
that may be a problem for the perceived fairness of the system because of the third party. 
(ADR Academic 1) 
 
In point 11, revenue authority facilitators or mediators should have no prior involvement 
in the particular dispute. I think the question is broader than that. Even if they haven’t been 
involved in that dispute, they have been involved in other disputes arguing from the IRD’s 
point of view … is that Chinese wall sufficient to make them independent and impartial? 
(Tax Academic 3) (emphasis added) 
 
Accordingly, some of the interview participants were asked for their views on whether they 
thought that the facilitator or mediator should be a revenue authority member of staff. All of 
the ADR participants that were asked this thought that the facilitator or mediator should be an 
independent external mediator trained in mediation (who subsequently received some training 
in tax). These findings align with prior studies conducted in NZ and Australia on the use of 
mediation in tax dispute resolution.7  
 
If a dispute comes to a say, facilitation conference, the facilitator should clearly be an 
impartial person. So that person should not have any interest in the dispute itself and the 
facilitator should probably be somebody who is not employed by IRD. Ideally they should 
be a trained mediator and that person should come the process in an impartial way and not 
participate with any of the other parties. 
(ADR Academic 1) (emphasis added) 
 
So, I’ve got some comments about the use of internal mediators in saying that there is over 
time the risk of bias when you have someone who is from the inside out and … so that for 
me supports the idea of considering the use of external panel mediators who do other work 
                                                          
7 See Melinda Jone and Andrew J Maples “Mediation as an Alternative Option in New Zealand's Tax Disputes 
Resolution Procedures: Refining a Proposed Regime” (2013) 19 NZJTLP 301 at 314, which finds that the most 
important aspect of a tax mediation regime for NZ is the inclusion of a mediator who is independent of both parties 
and furthermore, that the mediator is foremostly trained and qualified in mediation as opposed to being a specialist 
in tax law; and Melinda Jone and Andrew J Maples “Mediation as an alternative option in Australia's tax disputes 
resolution process” (2012) 27(3) ATF 527 at 559-560, which similarly makes a recommendation in Australia for 




as well … it would be important for them to get external supervision and I think for them 
to have some variety of work which would avoid that bias and assumptions and kind of 
weariness thing. 
(ADR Practitioner 2) (emphasis added) 
 
Now, I see that you had intended … to have IRD, tax people … subsequently trained in 
ADR, whereas I have always worked in the reverse situation where they use only 
experienced ADR professionals with multiple sources of training and then upskill them in 
the various disciplines that they are required to be working in and I believe that that is the 
best way round … Because the training that I’m talking about, the level of training required 
for an ADR professional is not like a part time job, you know, it’s someone who’s got 
multiple disciplines and multiple trainings. 
(ADR Practitioner 7) (emphasis added) 
 
Most of the tax participants that were asked also thought that the facilitator or mediator should 
be an independent external person who was trained in mediation. However, as indicated by 
some of the responses given below, it is unclear as to whether the tax participants thought that 
the independent external person should be a trained mediator who subsequently received 
training in tax or foremostly a tax specialist who subsequently received training in mediation: 
 
I actually think that if you are going to have mediators, in particular, they should be 
independent and they should be qualified in mediation and they should have no part in the 
disputes process, because the problem that we have currently … is that most of the current 
facilitators are people who have been in the Department for a very long time and they have 
a particular mind set which impacts on their impartiality. 
(Tax Practitioner 2) (emphasis added) 
 
You have got here, number 8, that they have revenue staff acting as facilitators or 
mediators, I think that … in this process it would be good to have like someone that didn’t 
work for Inland Revenue that was a mediator or a facilitator. In fact, I think that it is 
important. I went to a facilitated conference recently and … all the facilitators at the 
conferences for Inland Revenue are Inland Revenue staff and of course, you know, they 
are going to be thinking of the Inland Revenue principles and so they are not as open 
minded. 
(Tax Practitioner 3) (emphasis added) 
 
I think it would be better if it was someone … independent like a mediator. 
(Tax Practitioner 4)  
 
I really, really would like to see the option of external conference facilitators, in other 
words, ones that are not with the Inland Revenue itself. 




… [T]he system has training and education for stakeholders, it has got there ‘revenue 
authority staff acting as facilitators or mediators’. I personally don’t think any revenue 
authority staff should be acting as mediators. I think it should be someone independent. 
(Tax Practitioner 12) 
 
On the other hand, a small number of the tax participants and the two Inland Revenue 
representatives thought that the role of the facilitator or mediator could be performed by an 
internal independent revenue authority member of staff. These participants thought that Inland 
Revenue facilitators potentially could have a more persuasive influence over the Inland 
Revenue staff members involved in the dispute and moreover, they believed that the in-depth 
tax knowledge of the Inland Revenue facilitator was necessary: 
 
I actually think [having Inland Revenue facilitators] is an advantage sometimes because I 
think that quite often they have more influence over the Inland Revenue staff members 
than an external party would have. A more positive influence, so more persuasive 
potentially. 
(Tax Practitioner 8) 
 
I don’t think that [an external facilitator] is necessary, provided that the facilitator is 
independent of the team that’s actually making the assessment. And again, I think it’s that 
distinction between facilitating the process and facilitating the resolution that makes a 
difference … and it seems to me that they should be in a ‘facilitate the resolution role’, not 
a ‘facilitate the conference role’. 
(Tax Practitioner 10) (emphasis added) 
 
Inland Revenue have some views on the qualifications if you like, or the experience of the 
facilitator and that view is that in-depth tax knowledge is really, really helpful. Yes, 
somebody can facilitate a discussion without any tax knowledge, but quite often what we 
are finding from people who have attended these is that one side or the other haven’t really 
understood either the tax issues or the particular weight that has been given to a particular 
point and the facilitator can tease that out, sometimes put it into pretty plain language if 
asked. 
(Inland Revenue Representative 1) (emphasis added) 
 
I think there is a question of whether you could find the right expertise with external 
mediators. You do need to understand the topic, the issues that are involved in a tax dispute 
and sometimes those issues can be a bit more than a general mediator can necessarily take 
on board very easily. There is a question about sort of consistency again … having external 
mediators could end up with the taxpayer being highly dependent on who they get as to 
the sort of outcome they get which is probably less likely with Inland Revenue staff who 
are aware of the other cases that are around the place. 




When asked for their views on whether the facilitator or mediator should be an independent 
external person, both of the members of the judiciary agreed that the facilitator or mediator 
should be external to Inland Revenue: 
 
Well I mean I agree that if you have a mediation or an ADR system of the kind you infer, 
they should be outside the IRD. But I can’t see the IRD accepting that. 
(Member of the Judiciary 1) 
 
I think the important thing is that you do have some review outside or an ability to go 
outside and I think the courts are probably the most logical place for that … I would have 
thought that that’s part of the taxpayer choice. So taxpayers shouldn’t be precluded from 
having external independent mediators. 
(Member of the Judiciary 2) 
 
However, the members of the judiciary appeared to provide differing views on whether the 
facilitator or mediator should firstly be an expert in mediation or firstly be an expert in tax: 
 
Well, because I’m sort of a rights-based person, I think they should be good at tax. 
(Member of the Judiciary 1) 
 
I think they certainly need to be trained. I think the difficulty with people who aren’t expert 
in tax with those small disputes is that you could land up with something not being 
determined in accordance with the law. However, as soon as you have someone who is 
expert in tax it’s likely to be more expensive … which is why a lot of these lay mediation 
things are done at that lower level and maybe it doesn’t matter because at least it means 
that somebody independent has listened to both sides. 
(Member of the Judiciary 2) (emphasis added) 
 
The above findings pertaining to the modification of DSD Principles 11 and 8 indicate that, 
particularly from an ADR perspective, best practice suggests that the facilitator or mediator 
should be an external independent person who is trained in mediation. In order for the system 
to be fair and perceived as fair, the dispute resolution practitioner must be independent and not 
be an employee of either side. This further indicates that the current practice of revenue 
authorities, both in NZ and overseas,8 of primarily utilising revenue authority staff as 
facilitators (or mediators) in their various internal facilitation (or mediation) programs, 
potentially conflicts with the overarching DSD principle of fairness.  
 
The majority of the interview participants provided no view on modifications to DSD 
Principles 11 and 8. Seven and six participants, respectively, suggested that DSD Principles 11 
                                                          
8 For details on the internal facilitation (or mediation) programs in NZ, Australia, the UK and the US, see 
Appendices 1.1-1.4 of this thesis, respectively. 
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and 8 could be modified. Therefore, it is unknown whether the participants who provided no 
view on the modifications suggested by the other participants would have done so had they 
been made aware of them. In addition, given the small number of participants interviewed, the 
findings are based on non-representative data. Thus, on the basis of the interview findings 
obtained, there is insufficient support to make concrete modifications to these principles. At 
best, the interview findings can only suggest the potential modification of DSD Principles 11 
and 8. The modifications suggested would be dependent on future research soliciting the further 
views of major stakeholders which confirmed the suggested modifications. Although beyond 
the scope of this current study, this could be carried out through further interviews, focus 
groups and/or a survey questionnaire conducted with major stakeholder groups (such as those 
interviewed in this study) both in NZ and overseas. 
 
While the interview findings from NZ stakeholders potentially suggest that the dispute 
resolution practitioner should be an external independent party who is trained in mediation, it 
is unclear as to whether the external independent party should firstly be qualified in dispute 
resolution and then trained in tax or a tax expert who subsequently receives some recognised 
training in dispute resolution. The ADR participants interviewed were clearly of the view that 
best practice is that dispute resolution skills and qualifications are foremostly essential. 
However, this is at conflict with the views of the Inland Revenue representatives as well as 
some of the tax practitioners and members of the judiciary interviewed. In addition, it contrasts 
with the current practice of revenue authorities, both in NZ and overseas, whereby the revenue 
authority facilitator is (arguably by default) foremostly a tax specialist. Thus, future research 
is also necessary in ascertaining the particular skills and qualifications required by the dispute 
resolution practitioner. 
 
7.3.5.2 Suggested modifications to other principles 
The interview participants also suggested a range of modifications to principles other than 11 
and 8. These modifications are discussed below. However, as indicated in Table 7.4, only small 
numbers of participants (that is, between 1 and 3 participants) expressed a view on 
modifications for these principles, with the majority of the participants providing no view. As 
stated above in section 7.3.5.1, it is unknown whether the participants who provided no view 
on the modifications suggested by the other participants would have done so had they been 
made aware of them. Thus, given the small numbers, there is insufficient support from the 
interview findings to justify modifications to these principles.  
 
The modifications which were suggested for DSD Principles 2, 3, 7 and 10 were based around 
providing more structure to the system and limiting the number of options available for 




… [T]he right to choose a preferred process … that should be expressed as being subject 
to … agreement, [taxpayers] can express a preference but the IRD or the tax department 
has to also agree, because most of these processes are essentially consensual so both parties 
have to agree to them. 
(ADR Academic/Practitioner 2) 
 
I think if you look at numbers 2, 7 and 10 … it seems to me that the intention there is to 
have as many options available to the parties to resolve their dispute … My only concern 
with that is that will add complexity to the process and sometimes simplicity is best so the 
parties kind of know where they stand, they know where they can go if there are options 
that are fairly compact and not too expansive … I think simplicity should be sought, so a 
more limited number [of options].  
(Tax Practitioner 8) (emphasis added) 
 
So going to number 3, the system provides for loops backward and forward … I think that 
is a very important aspect, but you need to make sure that there is some structure towards 
it just to make sure that you actually are making progress as you go through the process 
rather than going around in circles … I think you’d need to make sure that people aren’t 
exhausting costs and time, and just to try and delay the process rather than getting to the 
solution. 
(Tax Practitioner 12) (emphasis added) 
 
I think that process would need to be very formulaic in the sense that often when you give 
people choices, choices give you greater fairness in certain situations but also create 
complexity … It is almost better with these disputes things to say ‘well this is the kind of 
way that a dispute goes and here are the steps that you will go through.’ 
(Tax Practitioner 13) 
 
Furthermore, one of the members of the judiciary believed that, in particular, the number of 
interests-based options should be limited: 
 
The scope of interests-based resolution should be pretty limited … if an issue is going to 
cost more to resolve than it is worth, then [interests-based resolution] is a sensible thing to 
take into account … but beyond that I’ve got pretty major reservations whether issues 
unrelated to the merits of the case should result in how it is settled. 
(Member of the Judiciary 1) 
 
The modifications to DSD Principles 5 and 9 were generally based around changes to address 
possible perceptions of bias. DSD Principle 5 involved perceptions of bias with respect to 
assistance being offered to revenue authority staff on ADR techniques, and DSD Principle 9 





I also thought that principle number 5, the system has an internal person or unit that 
functions as a mentor and advisor for revenue authority staff … there should be assistance 
for both sides so that the customer and the IRD staff can use it and there should not be like 
a specific department there just to help the IRD staff to help them understand the system 
better because that can be perceived as something unfair if they get help. 
(ADR Academic 1) (emphasis added) 
 
I think I had 9 … so that was assistance is offered for choosing the best process … I just 
thought that would be totally better if that responsibility lies with the taxpayer and the 
taxpayer’s advisors, not necessarily the Revenue … I don’t know whether it would be the 
best thing for the Revenue, I guess, to be influencing taxpayers at that stage.  
(Tax Practitioner 5) (emphasis added) 
 
In 9, it says assistance is offered for choosing the best process. I thought that was important, 
but it says the request for ADR should be approved by relevant staff from the above unit 
and again I wasn’t that sure … as to whether taxpayers can request ADR and the revenue 
authority can deny it, but that didn’t seem to me to be the right outcome. 
(Tax Practitioner 12)  
 
The modifications suggested for DSD Principle 6 (the procedures are ordered from low to high 
cost) generally followed from the concerns raised in section 7.3.3 above, relating to certain tax 
participants’ views that the design of a tax dispute resolution system was more suited to being 
designed based on the issues rather than the costs associated with the dispute: 
 
I’m not sure how you get the procedures ordering from low to high cost. I’d probably 
restate that as being ‘processes are adaptable to meet the needs of the tax at stake, the tax 
and issues at stake.’ 
(Tax Practitioner 10) 
 
Number 6, which is procedures are ordered from low to high cost, the focus is only on costs 
and I don’t think those are the only factors that come into disputes as priorities. So 
sometimes for example, we’ll have Inland Revenue that is particularly focused on getting 
an area of law through the courts and in those types of circumstances it may actually be a 
waste of taxpayers’ time to go through any of the ADR processes. So just focusing on costs 
to me was a little bit narrow. 
(Tax Practitioner 12) (emphasis added) 
 
Some interview participants also suggested that certain changes could be made with a view to 
improving DSD Principles 12 and 13: 
 
… [T]he only [modification] would be when you are playing around sort of that 12 and 13 
area, around the behaviour, so mission, vision, values, but also consistent behaviour and 
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predictability. Actually, that’s probably the word. Predictability of behaviour from Inland 
Revenue. I think that’s important.  
(Tax Practitioner 11) (emphasis added) 
 
The system is supported by senior revenue authority members. That could be seen as 
window dressing. It’s a question of how that’s formulated in such a way, how that it is 
structured in such a way that it is not just a rubber stamp.  
(Tax Academic 3) 
 
7.3.6 Suggested additions to the dispute systems design principles 
Table 7.5 lists the suggested additions to the tax DSD principles and the corresponding 
frequencies of interview participants suggesting each addition. 
 
Table 7.5: Suggested Additions to the Dispute Systems Design Principles 
Additional DSD Principle Frequency9 
Financial accessibility of the system 3 
Timeframes/ timeliness of the procedures 3 
Minimisation of cost and delay 3 
Certainty of outcomes 3 
Flexibility of the system to adapt to different disputes 2 
Provision and/or communication of information about the procedures 2 
Taxpayers’ right to representation and support 1 
Prevention of disputes 1 
Confidentiality of ADR processes 1 
Customisation of the system for ethnic needs 1 
Produce good outcomes 1 
Provide an even playing field 1 
Allow for the full exchange of information between parties 1 
Provision for independent review and determination of disputes 1 
Specification of the skills and knowledge required by the mediator 1 
Relationship between the legal system and the ADR procedures of the system 1 
Ensuring that the law is complied with and having public interpretation of the law 
available 
1 
No addition 8 
 
                                                          
9 Some of the interview participants suggested more than one addition to the DSD principles. Therefore, the total 
of the ‘Frequency’ column is greater than the total number of participants interviewed. 
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As shown in Table 7.5, 8 participants had no additions to make to the set of DSD principles. 
The remaining participants suggested a broad range of additional principles. Many of the 
suggestions put forward by the tax participants appeared to be related to their dissatisfaction 
with respect to various aspects of the current NZ tax dispute resolution procedures: 
 
The system needs to be accessible to all, so financial assistance might be required or 
necessary for some people … So in certain circumstances there should be a suspension of 
interest and penalties where a dispute is not vexatious or frivolous and I think without those 
being principles you are never going to have a system that works for everyone.  
(Tax Practitioner 2) (emphasis added) 
 
… [W]hat I would add in is, does the process produce good outcomes and also does the 
brute process minimise delay and unnecessary cost and does the process provide a sort of 
even playing field, which it doesn’t at the moment. IRD holds all of the cards, IRD can 
delay as much as they like, whereas the poor old taxpayer is stuck with ridiculous drop 
dead deadlines. 
(Tax Practitioner 4) (emphasis added) 
 
The system has a process for ensuring timeliness and final resolution. So in other words 
there should be an element of deadlines and an element of finality to it … Timeframes and, 
I suppose, limits to the number of iterations you can go through. 
(Tax Practitioner 7) (emphasis added) 
 
… [A]nd those forms often encourage more rather than less and they also, through the 
process, encourage duplication. So I would have added in there something around the 
process has some flexibility by encouraging the nut of the argument to be highlighted and 
focused on. 
(Tax Practitioner 10) (emphasis added) 
 
What I thought was lacking in probably all of those, was just some element of certainty 
and it’s great having all of these different ADR means available but it is also quite useful 
to taxpayers to know that if one of those processes are resolved in the taxpayers favour, at 
what stage will the revenue authority walk away from the procedure and not follow on it. 
So it is just getting in some level of certainty I guess. 
(Tax Practitioner 12) (emphasis added) 
 
On the other hand, the suggestions for additional DSD principles suggested by the ADR 
participants tended to focus more on the practical elements of the dispute resolution process 
such as confidentiality, prevention of disputes, specification of the skills required by the 
mediator and flexibility of the system: 
 
I also was thinking of a principle about confidentiality. In particular to those elements of 
the system which are more the ADR-type resolution. I mean things like court proceedings 
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are definitely not confidential but elsewhere like at the facilitation, that should be 
confidential and there should be a principle to that effect … and then I thought that what 
was also missing was a principle that is part of the prevention or avoidance of tax disputes, 
because the system should have a principle which suggests that everything should be done 
to prevent them in the first place. 
(ADR Academic 1) (emphasis added) 
 
There should be a principle about the quality of the service provider. So, what I mean by 
that is that you can have mediation, but if the mediator is not skilled in both the process 
skills of mediation and the substantive information that is relevant to tax disputes, then the 
system will fail. 
(ADR Academic/Practitioner 2) (emphasis added) 
 
I think it is a good idea to add in some stuff. One of them would be flexibility of process 
and process design so that the practitioner, whoever it is who is dealing with it, can adapt 
to the needs of the person and the problem, rather than having to follow a script or you 
know, steps. 
(ADR Practitioner 2) (emphasis added) 
 
The two Inland Revenue representatives suggested additional principles which were largely 
based on the original aims of the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures set out by the Richardson 
Committee: 
 
I thought arguably there were some, but more at a high conceptual level, some of which I 
have sort of taken out of the Richardson aims or as they have been subsequently articulated 
… and I guess they feel attractive just at a high level when we talk about things like any 
such system should be cost effective and efficient and I think there is something about 
timeliness. 
(Inland Revenue Representative 1) 
 
One thing that is not there … is about exchanging information and I think if you look back 
at all of the history of the disputes process, then the exchange of information was really a 
very important principle … I mean, essentially what Sir Ivor Richardson was saying was 
that he thought too many cases were going to court on an uninformed basis where parties 
hadn’t adequately exchanged information and he wanted a process where that could occur. 
(Inland Revenue Representative 2) 
 
One of the members of the judiciary believed that there should be an additional “overriding” 
principle concerning a rule of law in relation to taxation disputes. The member of the judiciary 
noted that taxation disputes are not just disputes between individuals but are disputes between 
an individual and the State. Furthermore, the State is administering an Act which affects 
peoples’ rights and therefore, the interpretation of legislation in taxation disputes affects other 
peoples’ rights as well. Hence, the following suggestion was made: 
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Because what we are actually looking at is a constitutional issue of the role of the court in 
the supervision of executive action and ensuring that the law is complied with and the other 
factor of having that public interpretation of the law available to the public and to other 
taxpayers … So that, I think should be an overriding principle. 
(Member of the Judiciary 2) 
 
Table 7.5 shows that for six of the additional principles suggested, more than one participant 
suggested the addition of that particular principle. However, only small frequencies of 
participants (that is, 2 or 3) expressed views in common for these six principles, with the 
majority of the participants expressing no view. Therefore, notwithstanding the wide range of 
additional principles identified, based on the interview data there is insufficient support from 
the frequencies to justify the addition of any of the additional DSD principles suggested by the 
interview participants. 
 
7.3.7 Suggested deletions to the dispute systems design principles 
Table 7.6 shows the frequencies for each of the tax DSD principles for which the interview 


















1      
2      
3      
4 1    1 
5  1   1 
6 3 2   5 
7      
8      
9  1   1 
10      
11      
12 1 1   2 
13 2 1 1  4 
14      
No Deletions 5 13 1 2 21 
 
As indicated in Table 7.6, the majority (21) of the participants had no deletions to make to the 
set of DSD principles. Five interview participants thought that DSD Principle 6, the procedures 
are ordered from low to high cost, should be deleted. The reasons given for its deletion were 
mostly concerned with the view that the focus of the design of the system should be on the 
effectiveness of the system rather than the cost. In addition, one ADR participant believed that 
litigation was not necessarily always the costliest dispute resolution option:  
 
I didn’t really agree with low to high cost procedure order, I feel it should be the best fit, 
it is a one-off process.  
(ADR Practitioner 7) 
 
My view is that the dispute resolution system should be as effective as possible and if there 
is a trade-off between costs and effectiveness, the latter should be given a higher priority. 
Therefore ‘costs’ shouldn’t be a principle of the dispute resolution system itself.  
(ADR Academic 1)  
 
                                                          
10 Some of the interview participants suggested more than one deletion. Therefore, the sum of the ‘Total’ column 
is not equal to the total number of participants interviewed. 
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I don’t like principle 6. I think it could be deleted … cost is obviously a very important 
factor, my problem with it is that it is not always the case that going to court is more 
expensive than going to mediation.  
(ADR Academic/Practitioner 2) 
 
One tax practitioner also thought that DSD Principle 6 in certain circumstances could 
potentially be redundant:  
 
I just wondered about 6, and this sort of feeds into my understanding of 7, but I sort of 
thought, well if [you had] 7, the system has multiple access points … would you need 6 
then? I think that is a really good idea that procedures are ordered from low to high cost, 
but that is only if you need to follow those steps in that particular order. If you are able to 
come in at different access points or whatever, that would be redundant, you wouldn’t need 
that. 
(Tax Practitioner 5) (emphasis added) 
 
Four interview participants thought that DSD Principle 13, the alignment of the dispute 
resolution system with the mission, vision and values of the organisation, could be deleted. 
Notwithstanding that it was the most frequently suggested principle which was perceived as 
being the least important, as suggested by the comments below, it appeared that participants 
were somewhat ambivalent on its deletion: 
 
The only one that I think should be deleted is probably 13 … They seem to be addressing 
the internal staff, so I can sort of see why it is there … But, you know, I don’t have a strong 
opinion. 
(ADR Practitioner 1) 
 
I wasn’t convinced by the one about how it has to reflect the mission statement of the 
organisation. I think there is a point there, but as I say it is only going to be as valuable as 
the vision and mission of the organisation and if it is a horrible, culturally kind of unsound 
and unpleasant, kind of place to be, then its dispute resolution system, you absolutely don’t 
want reflecting that … I thought that maybe was a principle I might be willing to sacrifice. 
(ADR Academic/Practitioner 1) (emphasis added) 
 
I would say number 13 because it is already implied in the taxpayer charter … they are all 
internal processes of the Inland Revenue, they should have these functions anyway so you 
are just stating the obvious. 
(Tax Academic 1) 
 
Given the small numbers of participants which suggested the deletion of a particular DSD 
principle (with the majority of the participants providing no view), there is insufficient support 
from the interview findings to justify the deletion of any of the DSD principles. The deletion 
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of a DSD principle also needs to be considered in the light of the comments provided earlier in 
section 7.3.4, that some participants were of the view that all of the principles were required in 
a dispute resolution system. In addition, the initial tax DSD principles have been derived from 
the well-established DSD literature and would thus require a strong basis to support their 
deletion. Furthermore, the views of other major stakeholder groups have not been sought 
regarding the deletion of a particular DSD principle. For example, as indicated by the 
comments provided earlier in section 7.3.4, arguably it would be expected that DSD Principle 
6 would be regarded as an important principle for taxpayers in tax disputes as a significant 
stakeholder group whose views have not been sought in this study. 
 
7.3.8 Recognition of the different ethnic backgrounds of taxpayers 
With the exception of 4 interview participants, all of the participants thought that the dispute 
resolution system should recognise the different ethnic backgrounds of taxpayers. Some of the 
participants indicated that there was already a general societal obligation that the different 
ethnic backgrounds of people are recognised:  
 
I don’t think anyone can quarrel with the idea that New Zealand is such a multi-cultural 
community now [and] that in order to be effective one would hope that we are 
communicating with people using the languages that they choose to communicate in. So, 
yeah, I don’t think one could really quarrel with the idea that it is a good thing to recognise 
different ethnic backgrounds. 
(ADR Practitioner 5)  
 
We do it [recognise different ethnic backgrounds] when we have voting … when you go 
into a doctor’s office we do it, there is health information in different languages. You 
know, we have a huge awareness where things are important to people of making sure that 
they can read them and understand them. So, yes, of course we should. 
(ADR Academic/Practitioner 1) 
 
New Zealand is increasingly becoming very culturally diverse … If that is the case, then 
we definitely have to recognise the different ethnic backgrounds of the taxpayers. Ethnic 
backgrounds imply cultural values and cultural values are long lasting values. 
(Tax Academic 1) 
 
It was also suggested that it was an obligation under the Treaty of Waitangi and other NZ 
statutes: 
 
Oh, absolutely it [the recognition of different ethnic backgrounds] should. Absolutely it 
should, and that would be a Treaty obligation anyway.  




I think we have got a statutory requirement to deal with some of this stuff. I mean we have 
a statutory requirement to provide stuff in Maori, we have a statutory requirement to deal 
with disability … you know these things are a matter of New Zealand law and I don’t think 
they are just a matter for dispute resolution. 
(ADR Academic/Practitioner 1) 
 
A number of interview participants thought that the recognition extended beyond differences 
in ethnicity to other issues of diversity including various disabilities and incapacities: 
 
The issue is multi-cultural. Ethnicity, and it is beyond ethnicity, I would just say diversity. 
That is only just scratching the surface of diversity issues to talk about ethnicity. I think 
that is very basic. Then there are all the other cultural, the visible, the invisible, issues of 
gender identification, issues of mental capacity and incapacity, disability, illness. 
(ADR Practitioner 1) (emphasis added) 
 
Yes, I think that is important, but I don’t think that it is sufficient to focus on ethnicity. I 
think there are other issues such as education, but also disability … So I think that it is 
not just ethnicity or culture in the sense that, ‘do you come from a different place?’ But it 
is all kinds of things that impact on people and make them unique and I think that there is 
not enough focus on those differences in the current system … so the principles do have 
to recognise those things. 
(Tax Practitioner 2) (emphasis added) 
 
Well, I think any large government department has to accommodate people who don’t 
speak English, people who are deaf, hearing impaired or speech impaired or to some extent 
anyway, people who don’t have access to computers or the other things which everyone 
else does. 
(Member of the Judiciary 1) 
 
However, most of the interview participants made the distinction that the recognition of the 
different ethnic backgrounds of taxpayers was an important factor in the delivery of the dispute 
resolution system as opposed to being regarded as an individual design principle per se. 
Moreover, it was noted that whilst the dispute resolution system could be delivered in different 
ways, the same dispute resolution system and rules of the system applied to all taxpayers 
regardless of their ethnicity: 
 
[A]ny dispute resolution system should take note of the different ethnic backgrounds of 
people using it. So that is not to say that the outcomes will be any different, but there may 
be things that you do within the provision of the dispute resolution system that meets 
different cultural needs and in fact different disability needs.  




One law affects everyone and that’s just the way it is, but in terms of how you impart the 
resolution of disputes and what adds awareness generally within different cultural groups 
about the law … that can be adapted and in some ways is more efficient if you impart 
things the way people understand then you are obviously going to get, the theory is 
anyway, better compliance. 
(Tax Practitioner 9) 
 
So I think that what you are saying is should we recognise the different ethnic backgrounds 
of taxpayers? Yes. But I don’t think it necessarily needs to be in the design of the tax 
system, I think it needs to be in how the disputes resolution system is carried out. 
(Tax Practitioner 12) 
 
My view is that people can do whatever [ethnic] introduction they like but as far as 
principles and the rules of disputes resolution, then the same rules apply regardless of race, 
ethnic background, religion, sex, whatever and there is not parallel systems or procedures 
regardless of which race you belong to. 
(Tax Academic 2) 
 
I don’t think it is so much a design principle, so much as a decision about a delivery 
mechanism. 
(Inland Revenue Representative 1) 
 
With respect to how the tax dispute resolution system should recognise the different ethnic 
backgrounds of taxpayers, comments provided by interview participants included the 
following: 
 
I do think that … ideally the forms should be provided in different languages and also the 
facilitator ideally should be trained in intercultural communication.  
(ADR Academic 1) 
 
I think that as long as interpreters are a part of the system and there is access to them … 
and there is support people able to come to or be involved in anything, any of the resolution 
processes, then that should cover it. 
(ADR Practitioner 4)  
 
I think there should probably be an acknowledgement on that, in that everybody should 
have the facility to converse in their first language, but I’m not sure that beyond that 
anything is probably required … maybe it’s more of an acknowledgement and then giving 
a specific right to people to converse in their first language which I think is the case 
informally at the moment anyway. 




[T]he taxpayer’s entitled to bring who they want along to those conference phases … so I 
think that can accommodate it. I think the written parts of the process are much harder to 
accommodate it. I can’t see that we can move to allowing NOPAs and NORs etcetera to 
being written in languages other than English. It’s a wee bit harder to move the system that 
far I think. 
(Tax Practitioner 10) 
 
You know, obviously Inland Revenue thinks about allowing translators along or whanau 
support or different things like that. We will always be open to other ideas, but I don’t have 
any brilliant ones myself.  
(Inland Revenue Representative 1) 
 
If you look at Inland Revenue, we have various people that go into ethnic communities 
and you could ensure that you sort of bring that in with the disputes process … I don’t 
actually know how it works there, but I would hope that assistance would be available at 
any point that a non-English speaking taxpayer was involved with Inland Revenue.  
(Inland Revenue Representative 2)  
 
However, the above responses given by the interview participants to the questions regarding 
the recognition of the different ethnic backgrounds of taxpayers reflect the fact that all of the 
interview participants, except for one, were of European ethnicity.11 Hence, the responses 
reflect the mainstream view of the predominantly NZ European participants interviewed. This 
data collection issue therefore, presents a possible limitation to the interview findings. 
Nevertheless, while the spread of ethnic groups of the participants interviewed does not reflect 
the distribution of ethnic groups in the NZ taxpayer population generally, it arguably reflects 
the ethnic distribution of the major stakeholders in the tax dispute resolution system in NZ.  
 
As recognised by the sole non-European interview participant, NZ is becoming increasingly 
more culturally diverse: 
 
Statistics New Zealand has … projected to 2025, that the Western European population is 
falling, the Maori is retaining, but both the Asian and the Pacific groups are increasing and 
not only that, we are now having an increasing number of people from the African nations 
as well, and Middle Eastern. 
(Tax Academic 1) 
 
Thus, the recognition of ethnicity is likely to become a larger issue in the future as the cultural 
demographics of NZ change. This is similarly the case for most Organisation for Economic 
                                                          
11 There were difficulties in obtaining interview participants from non-European ethnic backgrounds who had 
experience and/or knowledge in dispute resolution and/or the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures due to the 
limited numbers of such individuals. Moreover, potential participants from non-European ethnic backgrounds 
which were approached by the researcher were generally unwilling to participate. 
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Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.12 Prior research has shown that cultural 
values impact on taxpayers’ compliance behaviour and the way in which they perceive tax 
authorities.13 This in turn impacts on the way ethnic taxpayers behave and interact with tax 
authorities. Accordingly, this has implications on how revenue authorities interact with ethnic 
taxpayers, particularly with respect to tax dispute resolution. The non-European interview 
participant underscored the importance of this by suggesting that an additional DSD principle 
should be added in relation to ethnic taxpayers: 
 
In terms of additional tax DSD principles, I would like to see an additional one where there 
is an option or there is a process in which to customise to ethnic taxpayers’ needs, the 
needs of migrants who are not customised or who are not accustomed to New Zealand’s 
tax system or the New Zealand dispute resolution process … IRD staff, whoever that is 
involved with the dispute resolution process, must be culturally competent and culturally 
sensitive to the needs of the ethnic taxpayers.  
(Tax Academic 1) 
 
However, no other participants made suggestions for modifications and/or additions to the tax 
DSD principles with respect to recognising ethnic taxpayers. Notwithstanding this, as indicated 
earlier in chapter 6, section 6.3.1, the recognition of the different ethnic backgrounds of 
taxpayers is already incorporated within the tax DSD principles. Principle 7 states that 
“multiple forms of access to the system should be provided through the provision of forms and 
guides in different languages and in alternative formats, and a choice of access persons should 
be available for certain taxpayers to approach (including non-English speaking taxpayers and 
deaf, hearing-impaired or speech-impaired taxpayers).” Thus, recognition of the different 
ethnic backgrounds of taxpayers through providing multiple forms of access to the system 
procedurally to ethnic and certain other types of taxpayers is recognised as a delivery 
mechanism of the tax dispute resolution procedures within the existing set of tax DSD 
principles. This aligns with the views expressed above by the majority of the interview 
participants. 
 
The researcher additionally notes that the recognition of the different ethnic backgrounds of 
taxpayers is generally recognised in the taxpayer charters (or equivalents) of revenue 
authorities.14 For example, in Inland Revenue’s Charter, under the heading “How we will work 
with you”, Inland Revenue state that they “will be responsive to individual and cultural 
                                                          
12 Sue Yong “Tax Compliance and Small and Medium Enterprise Operators: An Intra-Cultural Study in New 
Zealand” (PhD Dissertation, Auckland University of Technology, 2011) at 30. 
13 See, for example, Sue Yong, above n 12 and Sue Yong “Cultural diversity and tax compliance of SME 
entrepreneurs” (paper presented to the Australasian Tax Teachers Association Conference, Sydney, 16-18 January 
2012). 
14 For further information, see Duncan Bentley Taxpayers’ Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation (Kluwer 
Law International, The Netherlands, 2007) at 310-311. 
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needs.”15 Similarly, the ATO’s Taxpayer’s Charter includes a heading “Treating you fairly and 
reasonably”16 under which taxpayers can expect, inter alia, that the ATO will “be sensitive to 
the diversity of the Australian community.”17 Thus, the recognition of culture and diversity in 
the administration of the overall tax system (which also encompasses tax dispute resolution) 
arguably provides further support for the recognition of ethnic taxpayers as part of the delivery 
of the dispute resolution procedures rather than as a separate DSD principle. The general 
recognition of taxpayers with special needs by most tax administrations also aligns with DSD 
Principle 11, the system is fair and perceived as fair. 
 
Nevertheless, the four tax practitioner participants who did not think that the tax dispute 
resolution system should recognise the different ethnic backgrounds of taxpayers generally 
were of the view that professional advisors should assist in the recognition of ethnic issues: 
 
I think inevitably … [a] taxpayer is going to need professional help almost always in 
undertaking a tax dispute and in that case the professional advisor will be the person that 
copes with any particular ethnic issues.  
(Tax Practitioner 7) 
 
I think the time for … acknowledging different ethnicities and having assistance and advice 
in different languages is upfront in terms of explaining the system and people’s obligations 
to them so that you make them compliant … You probably have brochures and things like 
that if you are in dispute [and] have them in a different language. But ultimately if that’s 
the case, people should have advisors involved … that should remove the barrier to 
language. 
(Tax Practitioner 11) (emphasis added) 
 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented the findings from the interviews conducted with 30 selected 
stakeholders in NZ on the tax DSD principles developed. The findings indicate that the majority 
of the interview participants thought that the most important (and overarching) principle was 
DSD Principle 11, that the system is fair and perceived as fair. The administrative-type 
principles such as DSD Principles 13 and 12, relating to the alignment of the system with the 
mission, vision and values of the organisation and support of the system by senior revenue 
                                                          
15 Inland Revenue Inland Revenue’s Charter (IR 614, March 2009) at 1. 
16 Australian Taxation Office Taxpayer’s Charter – What you need to know (Canberra, June 2010) at 2. 
17 At 2. HM Revenue and Customs’ (HMRC’s) Your Charter and the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS’s) Taxpayer 
Bill of Rights do not contain specific statements on culture and diversity per se. However, cultural aspirations are 
arguably implied through some of the general rights of taxpayers that are outlined. See HM Revenue and Customs 
“Your Charter” (12 January 2016) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/your-charter/your-charter#A2> 




authority members, were most frequently regarded by participants as the least important 
principles.  
 
The majority of the interview participants, when asked, were able to provide a numerical 
ranking of the 14 principles in order of importance from highest to lowest. A number of 
participants, however, suggested that providing some form of categorisation of the principles 
was potentially more helpful than giving a precise ranking of the principles. Nevertheless, the 
rankings provided broadly indicated that the principles regarding fairness, taxpayer choice and 
stakeholder involvement in the design process were typically ranked the highest. These were 
generally followed by the principles relating to taxpayer assistance. As stated above, the 
administrative-type principles relating to the revenue authority itself were typically ranked as 
the least important. 
 
From the findings pertaining to the modification, addition or deletion of the tax DSD principles, 
given the small frequencies of participants that suggested particular changes (with the majority 
expressing no view) there is insufficient evidence to justify any concrete changes to the tax 
DSD principles. Hence, a limitation to the interview findings is that it is unknown whether the 
participants who provided no view on the modifications, additions and deletions which were 
suggested by other participants would have done so had they been made aware of them. 
Furthermore, concrete changes to the principles cannot be justified as the small number of 
participants interviewed cannot provide certainty as to being representative of the populations 
they are drawn from. Therefore, the interview findings are limited to providing suggestions for 
changes to the tax DSD principles only. The suggested changes may potentially be confirmed 
or refuted through further research in the future which solicits the views of major stakeholder 
groups, both in NZ and overseas, on the suggested changes.  
 
The findings suggest that, particularly from an ADR perspective, best practice indicates that 
the facilitator or mediator should be an external independent person who is trained in 
mediation. In order for the system to be fair and perceived as fair the dispute resolution 
practitioner must be independent and not be an employee of either side. Accordingly, the 
findings suggest the possible modification of DSD Principles 11 and 8 to take into account the 
inclusion of external independent dispute resolution practitioners (which are trained in 
mediation) in the system as distinct from revenue authority staff acting as facilitators or 
mediators. However, as stated above, the modifications to the tax DSD principles would be 
dependent on further confirmatory research being conducted. Further research is also necessary 
in order to ascertain whether the dispute resolution practitioner should foremostly be an expert 
in mediation or firstly be a specialist in tax. 
 
The interview findings also revealed that the majority of the participants thought that the tax 
dispute resolution system should recognise the different ethnic backgrounds of taxpayers in the 
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delivery of the system as opposed to being recognised as a separate design principle per se. 
However, these findings may also be limited in the respect that they represent the views of the 
predominantly NZ European ethnic group of participants which made up the stakeholders 
interviewed.  
 
Based on the interview findings on the tax DSD principles discussed in this chapter, the next 
chapter will outline the suggested changes to the set of tax DSD principles. The next chapter 
will also discuss the interview findings on the tax DSD principles in the context of NZ and 
consequently make recommendations with respect to the application of the suggested changes 




Chapter 8: Suggested Changes to the Tax Dispute Systems Design Principles and 
Interview Findings: The Tax Dispute Systems Design Principles in the New 
Zealand Context 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the suggested changes to the tax dispute systems design (DSD) principles 
based on the interview findings discussed in chapter 7. The chapter then discusses the interview 
findings on the tax DSD principles in the context of New Zealand (NZ) and makes 
recommendations for the application of the suggested changes to the tax DSD principles in NZ. 
Accordingly, section 8.2 outlines the suggested changes to the set of tax DSD principles. 
Section 8.3 presents the interview findings on the tax DSD principles in the context of NZ and 
section 8.4 subsequently provides recommendations on the application of the suggested 
changes to the tax DSD principles in the current NZ tax dispute resolution procedures. Section 
8.5 provides a chapter summary. 
 
8.2 Suggested Changes to the Tax Dispute Systems Design Principles 
Table 8.1 which follows, illustrates the development of the suggested tax DSD principles. The 
first column shows the general DSD principles, derived from the prior DSD literature in chapter 
2, which have then been modified based on the findings from the cases studies of the four 
jurisdictions to give the tax DSD principles shown in the third column. Hence, the first three 
columns replicate Table 6.2 in chapter 6 and provide the basis for the suggested changes to the 
tax DSD principles. The last column of Table 8.1 shows the suggested tax DSD principles 
based on the suggested modifications (provided in column four) derived from the interview 
findings in chapter 7.  
 
The second column of Table 8.1 (as discussed in detail in chapter 6, section 6.3) shows that the 
main modifications made to the general DSD principles to give the tax DSD principles were 
the provision of examples or additional information with respect to the DSD principles applied 
in the tax context (with only one substantive modification made to the wording of DSD 
Principle 5). The fourth column of Table 8.1 shows that few further changes to the tax DSD 
principles have been suggested from the interview findings. That is, modifications have been 




Table 8.1: Development of the Suggested Tax Dispute Systems Design Principles  
DSD Principle Modifications Tax DSD Principle Suggested 
Modifications 
from Interviews 
Suggested Tax DSD 
Principle 
(1) Stakeholders are 
included in the design 
process. Stakeholders 
should have an active 
and integral role in 
creating and renewing 
the systems they use. 
 
-Examples of stakeholder 
involvement in the design 
process in the tax dispute 
resolution context are 
provided. 
(1) Stakeholders are included 
in the design process. For 
example, stakeholders may 
be involved in revenue 
authority alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) program 
pilots and in reviews and 
consultations on the tax 
dispute resolution system. 
None (1) Stakeholders are 
included in the design 
process. For example, 
stakeholders may be 
involved in revenue 
authority ADR program 
pilots and in reviews and 
consultations on the tax 
dispute resolution system. 
(2) The system has 




based processes. The 
system should include 
interests-based 
processes and low-cost 
rights and power-based 
processes should be 
offered should interests-
based processes fail to 
resolve a dispute. 
 
-Examples of options 
available for addressing 
disputes in the tax dispute 
resolution context are 
provided.  
-The availability of 
interests and rights-based 
ADR options at the audit 
and litigation stages is 
included. 
(2) The system has multiple 
options for addressing 
conflict including 
interests, rights and 
power-based processes. 
For example, the system’s 
options for addressing 
conflict may include: direct 
negotiation, internal review 
and litigation as well as 
interests and rights-based 
ADR options. In addition, 
interests and rights-based 
ADR options should also 
be available at the audit and 
litigation stages. 
None (2) The system has multiple 
options for addressing 
conflict including 
interests, rights and 
power-based processes. 
For example, the system’s 
options for addressing 
conflict may include: 
direct negotiation, internal 
review and litigation as 
well as interests and 
rights-based ADR options. 
In addition, interests and 
rights-based ADR options 
should also be available at 





DSD Principle Modifications Tax DSD Principle Suggested 
Modifications 
from Interviews 
Suggested Tax DSD 
Principle 
(3) The system provides 
for loops backward 
and forward. The 
system should include 
loop-back mechanisms 
which allow disputants 
to return from rights or 
power-based options 
back to interest-based 
options and also loop-
forward mechanisms 
which allow disputants 
to move directly to a 
rights or power-based 
option without first 
going through all of the 
earlier interest-based 
options.  
-Examples of loop-back 
and loop-forward 
mechanisms in the tax 
dispute resolution context 
are provided. 
(3) The system provides for 
loops backward and 
forward. Loop-back 
mechanisms allow parties 
to return from rights or 
power-based options back 
to interests-based options 
and loop-forward 
mechanisms allow parties 
to move directly to a rights-
based option without 
having to go through all of 
the earlier interest-based 
options. For example, ADR 
options available at the 
litigation stage can provide 
loop-back mechanisms and 
the ability for taxpayers to 
by-pass the revenue 
authority’s internal review 
process can provide a loop-
forward mechanism. 
None (3) The system provides for 
loops backward and 
forward. Loop-back 
mechanisms allow parties 
to return from rights or 
power-based options back 
to interests-based options 
and loop-forward 
mechanisms allow parties 
to move directly to a 
rights-based option 
without having to go 
through all of the earlier 
interest-based options. For 
example, ADR options 
available at the litigation 
stage can provide loop-
back mechanisms and the 
ability for taxpayers to by-
pass the revenue 
authority’s internal review 
process can provide a 
loop-forward mechanism. 
(4) There is notification 
before and feedback 
after the resolution 
process. Notification in 
advance of taking a 
proposed action 
affecting others can 
prevent disputes that 
-Examples of forms of 
notification and feedback in 
the tax dispute resolution 
context are provided. 
 
(4) There is notification 
before and feedback after 
the resolution process. 
Notification in advance of 
taking a proposed action 
affecting others can prevent 
disputes that arise through 
misunderstanding or 
None (4) There is notification 
before and feedback 
after the resolution 
process. Notification in 
advance of taking a 
proposed action affecting 
others can prevent 
disputes that arise through 
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DSD Principle Modifications Tax DSD Principle Suggested 
Modifications 
from Interviews 





can identify points of 
difference early on so 
that they may be 
negotiated. Post-dispute 
analysis and feedback 
can help parties to learn 
from disputes in order to 
prevent similar disputes 
in the future. 
 
miscommunication and can 
identify points of difference 
early on so that they may 
be negotiated. Post-dispute 
analysis and feedback can 
help parties to learn from 
disputes in order to prevent 
similar disputes in the 
future. For example, in 
order to prevent disputes 
from arising, general 
notification of potential 
areas for tax disputes can 
be provided through the 
revenue authority’s 
compliance activities and 
campaigns, and through the 
publication of case notes on 
court decisions. To prevent 
similar disputes in the 
future, feedback on 
disputes can be provided 
through the publication of 
general statistics on dispute 
matters and through post-
dispute analysis and 
publication of feedback 
collected from participants 




can identify points of 
difference early on so that 
they may be negotiated. 
Post-dispute analysis and 
feedback can help parties 
to learn from disputes in 
order to prevent similar 
disputes in the future. For 
example, in order to 
prevent disputes from 
arising, general 
notification of potential 
areas for tax disputes can 
be provided through the 
revenue authority’s 
compliance activities and 
campaigns, and through 
the publication of case 
notes on court decisions. 
To prevent similar 
disputes in the future, 
feedback on disputes can 
be provided through the 
publication of general 
statistics on dispute 
matters and through post-
dispute analysis and 
publication of feedback 
collected from participants 
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DSD Principle Modifications Tax DSD Principle Suggested 
Modifications 
from Interviews 
Suggested Tax DSD 
Principle 
in revenue authority ADR 
programs.  
(5) The system has a 
person or persons who 
function as internal 
independent 
confidential neutral(s). 
Disputants should have 
access to an independent 
confidential neutral to 
whom they can go to for 
coaching, referring and 
problem-solving. 
-Replaced: “person or 
persons who function as 
internal independent 
confidential neutral(s)” 
with “internal person or 
unit that functions as a 
mentor or advisor”; 
“disputants” with “revenue 
authority staff”; and 
“coaching, referring and 
problem-solving” with 
“mentoring and advice on 
ADR techniques” in order 
to provide greater relevance 
of this DSD principle in the 
tax dispute resolution 
context.  
(5) The system has an 
internal person or unit 
that functions as a mentor 
and advisor for revenue 
authority staff. Revenue 
authority staff should have 
access to an internal person 
or unit to which they can go 
to for mentoring and advice 
on ADR techniques. 
None (5) The system has an 
internal person or unit 
that functions as a 
mentor and advisor for 
revenue authority staff. 
Revenue authority staff 
should have access to an 
internal person or unit to 
which they can go to for 
mentoring and advice on 
ADR techniques. 
(6) Procedures are 
ordered from low to 
high cost. In order to 
reduce the costs of 
handling disputes, the 
procedures in the system 
should be arranged in 
graduated steps in a low 
to high cost sequence. 
 
-Included the exception in 
the context of tax dispute 
resolution that high upfront 
costs are generally likely to 
be incurred by taxpayers. 
-Included the qualification 
that the use of additional 
ADR options can add 
additional costs at the stage 
of the formal disputes 
procedures at which they 
(6) Procedures are ordered 
from low to high cost. The 
steps in the formal dispute 
procedures should be 
arranged in a low to high 
cost sequence 
(notwithstanding that high 
upfront costs are generally 
likely to be incurred by 
taxpayers involved in tax 
disputes). The use of 
None (6) Procedures are ordered 
from low to high cost. 
The steps in the formal 
dispute procedures should 
be arranged in a low to 
high cost sequence 
(notwithstanding that high 
upfront costs are generally 
likely to be incurred by 
taxpayers involved in tax 
disputes). The use of 
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DSD Principle Modifications Tax DSD Principle Suggested 
Modifications 
from Interviews 
Suggested Tax DSD 
Principle 
are utilised. However, if the 
dispute is resolved at this 
stage, then parties do not 
have to subsequently move 
further up the sequence to 
higher cost processes.  
additional ADR options can 
also add additional costs at 
the stage of the formal 
dispute procedures at which 
they are utilised. However, 
if the dispute is resolved at 
this stage, then parties do 
not have to subsequently 
move further up the 
sequence to higher cost 
processes. 
additional ADR options 
can also add additional 
costs at the stage of the 
formal dispute procedures 
at which they are utilised. 
However, if the dispute is 
resolved at this stage, then 
parties do not have to 
subsequently move further 
up the sequence to higher 
cost processes. 
(7) The system has 
multiple access points. 
The system should 
allow disputants to enter 
the system through 
many access points and 
offer a choice of persons 
whom system users may 
approach in the first 
instance.  
 
-Examples of multiple 
structural points of access 
in the tax dispute resolution 
context are provided. 
-Examples of different 
methods of delivering 
notification of entry to the 
system are provided. 
-Examples of multiple 
procedural forms of access 
to the system such as the 
provision of forms and 
guides in different 
languages and formats, and 
providing a choice of 
access persons for 
taxpayers in particular 
circumstances to approach, 
are provided. 
(7) The system has multiple 
access points. The system 
should allow taxpayers to 
enter the system through 
many access points, 
structurally. For example, 
entry at the level of internal 
review or entry at the level 
of external appeal. There 
should also be a range of 
methods to deliver 
notification of entry to the 
dispute resolution system. 
For example, by personal 
delivery, by electronic 
means of communication or 
by post. In addition, 
multiple forms of access to 
the system should be 
provided through the 
None (7) The system has multiple 
access points. The system 
should allow taxpayers to 
enter the system through 
many access points, 
structurally. For example, 
entry at the level of 
internal review or entry at 
the level of external 
appeal. There should also 
be a range of methods to 
deliver notification of 
entry to the dispute 
resolution system. For 
example, by personal 
delivery, by electronic 
means of communication 
or by post. In addition, 
multiple forms of access 
to the system should be 
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DSD Principle Modifications Tax DSD Principle Suggested 
Modifications 
from Interviews 
Suggested Tax DSD 
Principle 
provision of forms and 
guides in different 
languages and in alternative 
formats, and a choice of 
access persons should be 
available for certain 
taxpayers to approach 
(including non-English 
speaking taxpayers and 
deaf, hearing-impaired or 
speech-impaired 
taxpayers). 
provided through the 
provision of forms and 
guides in different 
languages and in 
alternative formats, and a 
choice of access persons 
should be available for 
certain taxpayers to 
approach (including non-
English speaking 




(8) The system includes 
training and education 
for stakeholders. 
Training of stakeholders 
in conflict management 
as well as education 
about the dispute system 
and how to access it are 
necessary. 
 
-Examples of forms of 
training and education in 
the tax dispute resolution 
context are provided. 
 
(8) The system includes 
training and education for 
stakeholders. For example, 
the general in-house 
training of revenue 
authority staff should 
include a specific 
component on conflict 
management and 
resolution. Revenue 
authority staff acting as 
facilitators or mediators 
should receive specialised 
training in mediation 
developed by external ADR 
specialists. Education about 














practitioners in the 
system should have 
recognised external 
training in dispute 
(8) The system includes 
training and education 
for stakeholders. For 
example, the general in-
house training of revenue 
authority staff should 
include a specific 
component on conflict 
management and 
resolution. Dispute 
resolution practitioners in 
the system should have 
recognised external 
training in dispute 
resolution. Education 
about the dispute system 
can be provided through 
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DSD Principle Modifications Tax DSD Principle Suggested 
Modifications 
from Interviews 
Suggested Tax DSD 
Principle 
provided through 
information about the 
dispute resolution 
procedures provided on the 
revenue authority’s 
website, the publication of 
guides on the dispute 
resolution procedures, 
revenue authority 
guidelines on the dispute 
procedures and online 
learning material for tax 
agents. 
resolution’ in order 





practitioners in the 
dispute resolution 
system who have 
recognised external 
training in dispute 
resolution. 
information about the 
dispute resolution 
procedures provided on 
the revenue authority’s 
website, the publication of 
guides on the dispute 
resolution procedures, 
revenue authority 
guidelines on the dispute 
procedures and online 
learning material for tax 
agents. 
(9) Assistance is offered 
for choosing the best 
process. This includes 
the use of guidelines 
and/or coordinators and 
process advisors to 
ensure the appropriate 
use of processes. 
 
-Examples of forms of 
assistance in choosing the 
best process in the context 
of tax dispute resolution are 
provided.  
(9) Assistance is offered for 
choosing the best process. 
For example, revenue 
authority guidelines on the 
dispute resolution 
procedures in order to assist 
in the appropriate use of 
processes, and the existence 
of a unit within the revenue 
authority responsible for 
overseeing (and providing 
advice on) the ADR 
programs available. In 
addition, requests for ADR 
should be approved by 
relevant staff from the 
above unit. 
None (9) Assistance is offered for 
choosing the best 
process. For example, 
revenue authority 
guidelines on the dispute 
resolution procedures in 
order to assist in the 
appropriate use of 
processes, and the 
existence of a unit within 
the revenue authority 
responsible for overseeing 
(and providing advice on) 
the ADR programs 
available. In addition, 
requests for ADR should 
be approved by relevant 
staff from the above unit. 
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DSD Principle Modifications Tax DSD Principle Suggested 
Modifications 
from Interviews 
Suggested Tax DSD 
Principle 
(10) Disputants have the 
right to choose a 
preferred process. The 
best systems are multi-
option with disputants 
selecting the process. 
 
-Replaced “Disputants” 
with “Taxpayers” to 
provide greater relevance to 
the principle in the tax 
dispute resolution context. 
-Examples of choosing a 
preferred process in the 
context of tax dispute 
resolution are provided. 
(10) Taxpayers have the right 
to choose a preferred 
process. Choice of a 
preferred process may be 
offered in a number of 
ways including (but not 
limited to): taxpayers can 
choose to have an internal 
review, appeal externally or 
do both; the choice for 
taxpayers to use ADR is 
made available alongside 
their existing review and 
appeal rights; taxpayers can 
choose to use ADR (if it is 
appropriate) once a dispute 
reaches a tribunal or court; 
and qualifying taxpayers 
can choose to have matters 
dealt with in a tribunal or 
court using small tax case 
procedures. 
None (10) Taxpayers have the right 
to choose a preferred 
process. Choice of a 
preferred process may be 
offered in a number of 
ways including (but not 
limited to): taxpayers can 
choose to have an internal 
review, appeal externally 
or do both; the choice for 
taxpayers to use ADR is 
made available alongside 
their existing review and 
appeal rights; taxpayers 
can choose to use ADR (if 
it is appropriate) once a 
dispute reaches a tribunal 
or court; and qualifying 
taxpayers can choose to 
have matters dealt with in 
a tribunal or court using 




DSD Principle Modifications Tax DSD Principle Suggested 
Modifications 
from Interviews 
Suggested Tax DSD 
Principle 
(11) The system is fair and 
perceived as fair. The 
system should be fair to 
parties and foster a 
culture that welcomes 
good faith dissent. 
 
-Examples of aspects which 
may affect the fairness and 
perceived fairness of the 
system in the context of tax 
dispute resolution are 
provided. 
(11) The system is fair and 
perceived as fair. The 
dispute resolution system as 
a whole should be fair and 
perceived as fair. For 
example, the internal 
review function of the 
revenue authority should be 
independent from the audit 
or compliance function. In 
addition, revenue authority 
staff acting as facilitators or 
mediators in ADR 
programs of the revenue 
authority should be fair and 
perceived as fair. For 
example, revenue authority 
facilitators or mediators 
should have had no prior 
involvement in the 





mediators in ADR 
programs of the 
revenue authority 
should be fair and 





have had no prior 





utilised in the 
system should be 
fair and perceived 




have had no prior 
involvement in the 
particular dispute’ 
to reflect the 
possible utilisation 
(11) The system is fair and 
perceived as fair. The 
dispute resolution system 
as a whole should be fair 
and perceived as fair. For 
example, the internal 
review function of the 
revenue authority should 
be independent from the 
audit or compliance 
function. In addition, 
dispute resolution 
practitioners utilised in the 
system should be fair and 
perceived as fair. For 
example, dispute 
resolution practitioners 
should have had no prior 
involvement in the 
particular dispute.  
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DSD Principle Modifications Tax DSD Principle Suggested 
Modifications 
from Interviews 





practitioners in the 
system. 
(12) The system is 
supported by top 
managers. There should 
be sincere and visible 
championship by senior 
management. 
 
-Replaced “top managers” 
with “senior revenue 
authority members” to 
provide greater relevance to 
the principle in the tax 
dispute resolution context. 
-Examples of championship 
by senior management in 
the tax dispute resolution 
context are provided.  
 
(12) The system is supported 
by senior revenue 
authority members. There 
should be visible evidence 
of sincere championship of 
the dispute resolution 
system and of ADR by 
senior revenue authority 
members. For example, 
through speeches, 
presentations, media 
statements or other 
releases. 
None (12) The system is supported 
by senior revenue 
authority members. 
There should be visible 
evidence of sincere 
championship of the 
dispute resolution system 
and of ADR by senior 
revenue authority 
members. For example, 
through speeches, 
presentations, media 
statements or other 
releases. 
(13) The system is aligned 
with the mission, vision 
and values of the 
organisation. The 
system should be 
integrated into the 
organisation and reflect 
the organisational 
mission, vision and 
values.  
 
-Examples of integration of 
the dispute resolution 
system in the organisation 
and alignment of the 
revenue authority’s dispute 
resolution approach with 
the mission, vision and 
values of the organisation 
in the tax dispute resolution 
context are provided.  
 
(13) The system is aligned with 
the mission, vision and 
values of the organisation. 
For example, the dispute 
resolution system should be 
integrated into the 
organisation through the 
revenue authority’s 
taxpayers’ charter (or 
equivalent), and the 
revenue authority’s 
None (13) The system is aligned 
with the mission, vision 
and values of the 
organisation. For 
example, the dispute 
resolution system should 
be integrated into the 
organisation through the 
revenue authority’s 
taxpayers’ charter (or 
equivalent), and the 
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DSD Principle Modifications Tax DSD Principle Suggested 
Modifications 
from Interviews 
Suggested Tax DSD 
Principle 
approach towards dispute 
resolution, outlined in its 
Disputes Policy (or 
equivalent), should be 
aligned with its overall 
mission, vision and values. 
In addition, the revenue 
authority’s future plans 
with respect to dispute 
resolution should feature in 
its Strategic Plan (or 
equivalent). 
revenue authority’s 
approach towards dispute 
resolution, outlined in its 
Disputes Policy (or 
equivalent), should be 
aligned with its overall 
mission, vision and 
values. In addition, the 
revenue authority’s future 
plans with respect to 
dispute resolution should 
feature in its Strategic 
Plan (or equivalent). 
(14) There is evaluation of 
the system. This acts to 
identify strengths and 
weaknesses of design 
and foster continuous 
improvement. 
-Examples of evaluation of 
the system in the context of 
tax dispute resolution are 
provided. 
(14) There is evaluation of the 
system. For example, 
evaluation of the tax 
dispute resolution system 
can occur through regular 
or one-off surveys on the 
system conducted for the 
revenue authority by 
external agencies; 
evaluation can be provided 
by submissions, reviews 
and reports from 
government-appointed 
entities, parliamentary 
committees and other 
external stakeholders; 
taxpayers can provide 
general feedback on the 
None (14) There is evaluation of 
the system. For example, 
evaluation of the tax 
dispute resolution system 
can occur through regular 
or one-off surveys on the 
system conducted for the 
revenue authority by 
external agencies; 
evaluation can be 
provided by submissions, 
reviews and reports from 
government-appointed 
entities, parliamentary 
committees and other 
external stakeholders; 
taxpayers can provide 
general feedback on the 
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DSD Principle Modifications Tax DSD Principle Suggested 
Modifications 
from Interviews 
Suggested Tax DSD 
Principle 
system (for evaluation) to 
the revenue authority, for 
example, through 
completing online forms 
and participants in ADR 
programs can be invited to 
provide feedback (for 
evaluation) at the 
conclusion of the ADR 
process. 
system (for evaluation) to 
the revenue authority, for 
example, through 
completing online forms 
and participants in ADR 
programs can be invited to 
provide feedback (for 
evaluation) at the 





As highlighted earlier in chapter 7, sections 7.3.5 – 7.3.7, with respect to modifying, adding or 
deleting any of the tax DSD principles, given the small frequencies of participants suggesting 
particular changes (with the majority expressing no view), there is insufficient evidence from 
the interviews to justify any concrete changes to the tax DSD principles. It is unknown whether 
the participants who provided no view on the modifications, additions and deletions which 
were suggested by other participants would have done so, had they been made aware of them. 
However, this is acknowledged as an unavoidable limitation of the interviews conducted in this 
study, unless follow-up interviews were feasible. In addition, concrete changes to the principles 
cannot be justified as the small number of participants interviewed cannot provide certainty as 
to being representative of the populations they are drawn from. Thus, the interview findings 
are restricted to providing suggestions for changes to the tax DSD principles. These suggested 
changes may potentially be confirmed or refuted through further research in the future which 
solicits the views of major stakeholder groups, both in NZ and overseas, on the suggested 
changes.  
 
In particular, caution must be exercised with respect to the deletion of any of the tax DSD 
principles given that when asked to rank the principles in chapter 7, section 7.3.4 of this thesis, 
many of the participants found the exercise quite “arbitrary” and felt that the principles were 
“all quite important” as part of a dispute resolution system. Moreover, the initial tax DSD 
principles have been derived from the well-established DSD literature and would thus require 
a strong basis to support their deletion. While the interview findings do not provide sufficient 
support for suggested additions or deletions to the tax DSD principles, as shown in column four 
of Table 8.1, the findings suggest the possible modification of DSD Principles 11 and 8 to take 
into account the inclusion of external independent dispute resolution practitioners (who have 
recognised external training in mediation) in the system as distinct from revenue authority staff 
acting as facilitators or mediators. However, as stated above, these modifications would be 
dependent on further confirmatory research being conducted.  
 
The interview findings in chapter 7 do, however, indicate two areas where the majority of the 
participants provided strong levels of support. These are that the majority of the participants 
identified DSD Principle 11, the system is fair and perceived as fair, as the most important 
principle and that the majority of the participants thought that the dispute resolution system 
should recognise the different ethnic backgrounds of taxpayers particularly in the delivery of 
the tax dispute resolution system (that is, how the system is carried out). The latter finding 
supports the existing incorporation of the provision of forms and guides in different languages 
and a choice of access persons for non-English speaking taxpayers within DSD Principle 7. In 
addition, as noted above, the interview findings indicated that some of the interview 
participants found the numerical ranking of the principles in order of importance somewhat 
arbitrary. A number of participants suggested various ways in which to group or categorise the 
principles as a potentially more useful way of arranging the principles. Accordingly, based on 
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the various categorisations put forward by the interview participants, the researcher suggests 
the following categorisation of the tax DSD principles as outlined in Table 8.2:1  
 
Table 8.2: Suggested Categorisation of the Tax Dispute Systems Design Principles 
High-level Purposive Principle: 
-The system is fair and perceived as fair (11) 
Dispute Prevention Principle: 
-There is notification before and feedback after the resolution process (4) 
Dispute Process Delivery Principles: 
-The system has multiple options for addressing conflict including interests, rights and power-based 
processes (2) 
-The system provides for loops backward and forward (3) 
-Procedures are ordered from low to high cost (6) 
-The system has multiple access points (7) 
-Taxpayers have the right to choose a preferred process (10) 
Dispute Process Administration Principles: 
-The system has an internal person or unit that functions as a mentor and advisor for revenue authority 
staff (5) 
-The system includes training and education for stakeholders (8) 
-Assistance is offered for choosing the best process (9) 
-The system is supported by senior revenue authority members (12) 
-The system is aligned with the mission, vision and values of the organisation (13) 
Dispute Process Consultation Principles: 
-Stakeholders are included in the design process (1) 
-There is evaluation of the system (14)  
 
The above categorisation of DSD principles has been suggested on the basis that it reflects the 
aforementioned finding that fairness was viewed as the overarching principle. Hence, DSD 
Principle 11 has been categorised as the High-level Purposive Principle. In addition, the 
suggested categorisation of DSD principles also recognises the different ethnic backgrounds of 
taxpayers as part of the delivery of the tax dispute resolution system in the respect that DSD 
Principle 7, which provides for multiple forms of access to the system for ethnic and other 
types of taxpayers, is categorised as a Dispute Process Delivery Principle.  
 
The suggested categorisation further reflects the general observation in the rankings provided 
by the participants (in chapter 7, section 7.3.4 of this thesis), that the principle of fairness and 
the principles relating to taxpayer choice and to stakeholder involvement in the design process 
were typically ranked or grouped higher than (and distinct from) the principles relating to 
taxpayer assistance and other revenue authority administrative-type principles. Hence, as 
                                                          
1 The original numbers of the tax DSD principles (as they occur in Table 8.1 of this chapter) are given in brackets 
alongside the DSD principles. 
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shown in Table 8.2, the taxpayer assistance and administrative-type principles have been 
grouped together under Dispute Process Administration Principles as a distinct category of 
principles. 
 
8.3 Data Analysis and Interview Findings – The Tax Dispute Systems Design Principles in the 
New Zealand Context 
The following subsections discuss the interview findings on the tax DSD principles in the NZ 
context, namely with regard to changes to the ranking of the tax DSD principles in the NZ 
context (section 8.3.1), modifications, additions and deletions to the principles for NZ (section 
8.3.2) and issues in applying the tax DSD principles in the NZ context (section 8.3.3). 
 
8.3.1 Changes to the ranking of the dispute systems design principles in the New Zealand 
context 
Except for 2 tax participants, the majority (26) of the interview participants made no changes 
to their rankings (or groupings) of the 14 DSD principles in the context of the NZ tax dispute 
resolution procedures.2 This appeared to be because most of the participants had ranked the 
DSD principles with the NZ tax dispute resolution system primarily in mind: 
 
I think I have very much thought about it in the New Zealand context because that is the 
only one I know. 
(ADR Practitioner 1) 
 
I’m sure there are other processes overseas which are better, there’s probably not that many 
that are worse, maybe there aren’t, but the overall principles that you would use shouldn’t 
change, I wouldn’t have thought. 
(Tax Practitioner 4) 
 
I’ve ranked them based on my understanding and knowledge of the New Zealand 
resolution procedures. So I probably wouldn’t change them. 
(Tax Practitioner 5) 
 
My only experience with tax law is with the New Zealand tax system so I don’t have any 
basis for comparison. So my answers for questions one through to four were actually given 
in the background context of the New Zealand tax system because I haven’t … had any 
other experience with any other jurisdiction to be able to answer that question. 
(Tax Practitioner 6) 
 
                                                          
2 As noted in chapter 7, section 7.3.4 of this thesis, the two members of the judiciary were not asked to rank the 
14 DSD principles. Accordingly, the question of whether they would make any changes to their ranking of the 
DSD principles in the NZ context was also not applicable to these two interview participants. 
278 
 
The above responses reflect a limitation in the interview findings arising from the fact that the 
participants interviewed were all NZ stakeholders and thus, had primarily based their responses 
in the NZ context as it was the only one of which they had knowledge. However, even in cases 
where participants did have some knowledge of the tax dispute resolution procedures in other 
jurisdictions, their responses were essentially the same: 
 
I’m relatively familiar with the New Zealand disputes regime and I have an overview of 
overseas regimes, but I am assuming that dispute resolution principles are applicable 
generally across jurisdictions and ideally across different areas of law. 
(Tax Academic 2) 
 
I’ve done some work and looked at the some of the Australian stuff but not in any detail 
… But I probably … ranked them based on my understanding and knowledge of the New 
Zealand resolution procedures. So I probably wouldn’t change them. 
(Tax Practitioner 5) 
 
Thus, it appears that the participants’ ranking of the DSD principles potentially could apply 
universally across different jurisdictions. However, further research on the ranking of the DSD 
principles conducted in overseas jurisdictions would be necessary in order to confirm this. 
Nevertheless, as indicated in chapter 7, section 7.3.1 of this thesis, some of the ADR 
participants, in particular, felt that they did not have enough knowledge and/or experience with 
the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures in order to provide a response:  
 
I’ve got no idea because … I have got no experience of the tax processes and procedures. 
I mean, somebody who has used them would be the best person to answer that question. 
(ADR Practitioner 3) 
 
Looking at [questions] five, six and seven, I do feel that, you see I couldn’t even tell you 
what the process is right now by which a taxpayer takes … I don’t know what the systems 
are so it would be quite wrong for me to engage in that conversation in five, six and seven, 
really. 
(ADR Practitioner 5) 
 
8.3.2 Modifications, additions or deletions to the dispute systems design principles in the New 
Zealand context 
Similar to the responses received with respect to changes to the ranking of the DSD principles 
in the NZ context, the vast majority of the respondents (28) had no additional modifications, 
additions or deletions to make to the DSD principles in the NZ context: 
 
I didn’t think that New Zealand was really any different from other countries in terms of 
tax disputes that arise and that is why I thought they also applied to New Zealand. I 
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couldn’t think of any special reason for New Zealand to have any modification of the 
principles. 
(ADR Academic 1) 
 
I think they are a good set of principles. I mean … there’s no New Zealand specific 
requirements. Some of them exist in our current regime and some of them we would be 
well advised to import, so I think its fine. 
(Tax Practitioner 6) 
 
I think the principles should be pretty universal. I think that ties in with the notion of 
fairness. 
(Tax Academic 3) 
 
I thought pretty hard about that, but I think the principles are probably going to work in 
any country and I didn’t see anything New Zealand specific that would change my views. 
(Inland Revenue Representative 1)  
 
I probably wouldn’t change them … Again, just because of my comments … in respect of 
this for the earlier questions, I probably have been influenced by the New Zealand process 
and so they are sort of focussed at that anyway. So I mean all those issues that I raised 
would perhaps confirm [that] I sort of focussed on looking through a New Zealand lens at 
those principles. 
(Tax Practitioner 5) (emphasis added) 
 
As indicated by the above comment, some of the responses received may have been due to the 
fact that participants had already based their responses to the earlier questions in the NZ 
context. Nevertheless, overall the responses indicate that the participants thought that the set 
of tax DSD principles did not require any NZ-specific modifications. Furthermore, some 
participants specifically noted that in relation to the NZ context, obligations under the Treaty 
of Waitangi were already inherent in the tax DSD principles: 
 
I mean I think that you would pick up things like Treaty [of Waitangi] obligations and the 
like under all of the other headings, so I can’t see anything that stands out. 
(ADR Practitioner 6) 
 
I mean the thing that comes to mind is, you know, oh, where is the Treaty of Waitangi in 
here? Well, I think the Treaty of Waitangi is consistent with all of this. It is one of those 
contextual factors that you would use as you interpret and understand [the principles]. 
(Tax Academic 3) 
 
The 2 participants who suggested changes to the principles in the context of NZ both suggested 




One thing that you could add … I do think that you need to differentiate between SMEs 
and other taxpayers. SMEs and individuals if you like, versus the large corporates. That 
should, in my view, come through a bit more because I do think that this question of being 
burnt off by the system often arises with the small ones. 
(Inland Revenue Representative 2) 
 
I still think the cost of conducting the dispute in some cases outweighs the amount of tax 
at issue and by definition that makes no sense … I think that the options for dispute, or the 
procedures, should be proportionate to the cost of the dispute and at least initially that 
choice should be made by the taxpayer. 
(Tax Academic 2) 
 
Notably, these suggestions link back to the concerns highlighted in chapter 4, section 4.2.2 of 
this thesis, with respect to the effect of the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures burning off 
small taxpayers, mainly due to the length and cost of the procedures. 
 
8.3.3 Issues in applying the tax dispute systems design principles in the New Zealand context 
The interview participants raised a number of issues in applying the DSD principles in the 
context of the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures. Both the ADR and tax participants 
indicated that there would need to be a cultural change within Inland Revenue in order to apply 
the DSD principles. However, it was acknowledged that it would be difficult to persuade Inland 
Revenue to change the existing procedures: 
 
I think that the attitude of the Tax Department is quite kind of dictatorial so there needs to 
be some kind of culture shift at least in the conflict resolution bit. Which isn’t to say that 
they suddenly start giving away money, but it is to say that they might approach the process 
and the conflict differently, which is a culture shift. 
(ADR Practitioner 2) 
 
I would like to make a comment about principle 12 … simply to underscore its importance 
… So I think there would need to be a cultural change to implement the system you’re 
talking about and that system would have to be supported right from the top. 
(ADR Academic/Practitioner 2) 
 
I just think that Inland Revenue, it has the wrong culture to accept something like this. 
Completely the wrong culture … I can’t see the current Inland Revenue accepting it. 
(Tax Practitioner 3) 
 
Yeah, I think the big problem is that the system at the moment works really well for Inland 
Revenue and so why would they change it? … I think it is going to be really hard to 
persuade IRD to change it, because why would they? 
(Tax Practitioner 4) 
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There also seems to be … generally [a] reluctance from the IRD’s perspective to involve 
non-IRD staff in any type of deliberative or facilitative role at any point through the 
disputes resolution process because they just don’t want to let go of that control because 
they have a fear that there may be an outcome which is anti-Revenue at some part of the 
process. 
(Tax Practitioner 6) 
 
The ADR and tax participants also noted that some of the DSD principles which provided for 
the choice of multiple options and multiple entry points were inconsistent with the current 
system and thus, it would be difficult to import the degree of flexibility associated with them 
into the system:  
 
I thought that principle numbers 3, 7 and 10, they require the system to be kind of flexible, 
so that you can move forwards or backwards, or that you can choose specific options with 
respect to resolving the dispute. They require the flexibility of the system and from the way 
it looks at the moment the process is very linear and so that does not offer much choice … 
so I thought that those three principles are inconsistent with the current system.  
 (ADR Academic 1) (emphasis added) 
 
Yeah, I think there will [be issues] because the current regime does not offer the sort of 
flexibility that sort of underlies some of the principles and it doesn’t sort of import the 
element of taxpayer choice that we have here. 
(Tax Practitioner 6) 
 
I think that the key ones are probably 3 and 7. So that’s your loops backward and forward 
and multiple access points. I think where the problem might be … is implementing those 
in a formal sense. Because it would give taxpayers many more options in how they engage 
in the process and I’m not sure the [Inland] Revenue would be comfortable with that. 
 (Tax Practitioner 9) (emphasis added) 
 
Some of the ADR and tax participants further identified potential practical issues in 
implementing the principles with respect to staff training and the resources available: 
 
I guess the big general comment is … that if they were to implement a successful dispute 
resolution system design … it probably would mean a lot of training. It would mean a lot 
of people understanding how it works and why it works. 
(ADR Practitioner 2) 
 
The only issues I can think of is whether there are sufficient trained, qualified staff and 
resourcing of a project for long enough for people for it to become well practised. 




I mean obviously you are looking at something that’s best practice, but it is just whether 
or not from a practical point of view, whether it will work and I guess it’s just purely from 
a resourcing point of view … the costs involved in actually setting it up, I would have 
thought would be costly and having the necessary resources within IR to come to be able 
to implement the system.  
(Tax Practitioner 5) (emphasis added) 
 
Strongly supporting a rights-based approach, one of the members of the judiciary expressed 
concerns in particular with respect to the use of interests-based processes in tax dispute 
resolution: 
 
… [T]he difficulty is that to be fair to one taxpayer, you are meant to be fair to all taxpayers. 
So one of the problems with an interests-based approach is that you detract from that so 
instead of tax being paid as it falls due, you may get tax being paid as it’s negotiated at the 
time between the taxpayer and the Commissioner reflecting interests that aren’t those that 
underpin the tax system. 
(Member of the Judiciary 1) 
 
However, notwithstanding the above concern, as highlighted in the case studies in chapters 4 
and 5 of this thesis, support for the use of interests-based processes in certain circumstances in 
tax dispute resolution can be found in overseas jurisdictions. For example, the Australian 
Taxation Office (ATO) states that, in practice, an interests-based ADR approach may be 
appropriate where it will:3 
 
 achieve a quicker or cheaper resolution particularly when the cost of litigating is 
out of proportion to the possible benefits; 
 narrow or clarify the facts and issues in dispute; 
 minimise risks associated with evidentiary difficulties; 
 facilitate a certain/ earlier payment of tax; or 
 maintain or improve the relationship between the parties in dispute.  
 
The Inland Revenue representatives and some of tax participants further identified that the 
application of ADR in the tax context differed from the application in the context of ordinary 
commercial disputes, given the Commissioner’s care and management duty to collect the 
correct amount of tax, inter alia, having regard to increasing voluntary compliance and the 
consistent treatment of taxpayers: 
 
                                                          
3 Australian Taxation Office “Practice Statement Law Administration 2013/3: Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR) in ATO Disputes” (2013) <http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?locid='PSR/PS20133/NAT/ATO'> (last 
accessed 7 November 2016) [“PS LA 2013/3”] at [8]. See also, HM Revenue and Customs Resolving Tax 
Disputes: Practical Guidance for HMRC Staff on the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Large or Complex 
Cases (3 April 2012) at 7-9. 
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One of the things I grapple with from time to time … is the duty that Inland Revenue 
officers have to get tax correct, technically correct, yet to have care and management 
responsibilities. How does one collect the highest net revenue over time and have regard 
to voluntary compliance of other people and that sort of thing? When you balance, say, 
ADR or settlement options … there is quite a fine line there on the broader impact on other 
people rather than necessarily a focus on a single dispute. 
(Inland Revenue Representative 1) (emphasis added) 
 
I do think that there is a difference between general disputes resolution and resolution 
processes used by government and that sort of need for fairness and treating taxpayers 
consistently so that you can’t end up with an over-abundance of discretion by, say, the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue in our case, as to how to run the process. And that doesn’t 
exist in the commercial setting where people can resolve disputes any way they want to, so 
I definitely think there is a big difference. 
(Inland Revenue Representative 2) (emphasis added) 
 
… [P]articularly if we are talking about any determinative type of alternative dispute 
resolution, the IRD won’t permit that because that’s effectively usurping the 
Commissioner’s primary goal and function which is to assess the correct amount of taxes 
and that is then being pushed to another party. So, I think that those strictures impact on 
applying general DSD principles to dispute resolution in New Zealand … It is not a 
commercial dispute between two contractually equal parties. Rather it’s the taxpayer 
versus the state and the state’s got an agenda here to maximise the tax take. 
(Tax Practitioner 6) (emphasis added) 
 
However, as noted in chapter 1, section 1.1 of this thesis, there would be similar care and 
management issues arising in other jurisdictions such as Australia and the UK. Moreover, the 
Commissioner’s care and management duty governs all methods of tax dispute resolution, not 
just ADR. Nevertheless, in the context of dispute resolution generally, there may be some 
disputes that are not appropriate for resolution through ADR, such as disputes in which there 
may be a public interest in the outcome or there is a precedent value in resolving a certain issue. 
This underscores the importance of having clear guidelines for when ADR may or may not be 
appropriate.4 Also, as highlighted in chapter 4, section 4.2.2 of this thesis, the use of certain 
forms of interests-based ADR processes, including facilitation and mediation, is further limited 
by the fact that both parties must consent to its use.  
 
  
                                                          
4 See, for example, Australian Taxation Office “PS LA 2013/3”, above n 3, at [8]-[9]; HM Revenue and Customs, 
above n 3, at 7-12. 
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8.4 The Suggested Changes to the Tax Dispute Systems Design Principles in the New Zealand 
Context 
As outlined in sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2 above, the interview findings show that the majority of 
the participants made no changes to their ranking of the DSD principles and largely had no 
further modifications, additions or deletions to make to the principles in the context of NZ. 
Overall, these findings potentially indicate that the suggested modified tax DSD principles do 
not require any specific adaptation for the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures. Nonetheless, 
the participants identified a number of issues in applying the tax DSD principles in the context 
of the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures. These include that there would need to be a cultural 
shift in Inland Revenue with respect to dispute resolution and a shift towards allowing for 
greater flexibility in the tax dispute resolution procedures. Furthermore, the application of the 
tax DSD principles would potentially require a significant level of training and resources.  
 
Against this background, the remainder of this section discusses the suggested modifications 
to DSD Principles 11 and 8 in the context of the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures. With 
respect to views on the current NZ tax dispute resolution procedures, in particular regarding 
facilitated conferences, the interview findings reveal that the tax practitioner participants 
thought that the current Inland Revenue facilitated conferences were generally a good feature 
of the procedures. However, it was acknowledged that there was room for improvement. In 
particular, a lack of consistency in the facilitated conferences was observed by some of the tax 
practitioner participants interviewed, as illustrated by the following comments: 
 
I think as a general proposition they are a good thing … I question the degree of training 
that the facilitators are getting by Inland Revenue … and I say this on the fact that there is 
just a huge variation between the performance and the role that facilitators take on 
depending on who they are … So I think the conference is good but I think it needs some 
work in terms of perhaps, the training that these people are getting and clarification of the 
role. 
(Tax Practitioner 9) (emphasis added) 
 
I haven’t had direct experience myself … anecdotally I’ve heard ones which rave, which 
basically say the facilitator was prepared to get involved and was in fact instrumental in 
getting a resolution and I’ve heard other scenarios where the facilitator doesn’t appear to 
have moved things along at all. So I think it is possibly mixed and I suspect that it’s 
personal … as to each facilitator. 
(Tax Practitioner 10) (emphasis added) 
 
My experience has been quite broad with that. I have had some people that do an absolutely 
fantastic job and they do recognise that their role is independent and they do recognise that 




facilitator actually starts to take on Inland Revenue’s views … So it can be really, really 
varied from fantastic to appalling. 
(Tax Practitioner 12) (emphasis added) 
 
An Inland Revenue representative also indicated that the facilitated conference process could 
be improved with respect to the training of facilitators: 
 
… [B]ut if there was anything specific you could do? Possibly something like negotiation 
skills, [that] sort of training. I think that … maybe they need to actually have the certificate 
that shows the general public that they have actually got the skills. 
(Inland Revenue Representative 2) 
 
As noted in chapter 4, section 4.2.2 of this thesis, all Inland Revenue facilitators receive two 
days of initial training from the Arbitrators’ and Mediators’ Institute of New Zealand (AMINZ) 
for the facilitation role. However, effective from the latter half of 2015 (and subsequent to the 
conduct of the interviews with the NZ stakeholders in this study), Inland Revenue commenced 
accreditation of its facilitators with AMINZ Associate membership.5 Accordingly, it remains 
to be seen what effect, if any, the additional AMINZ accreditation of Inland Revenue 
facilitators will have on the consistency in the role and performance of the facilitators.  
 
Nevertheless, Inland Revenue believe that the AMINZ accreditation of its facilitators will 
“provide greater external assurance as to the expertise of the facilitators used.”6 However, in 
the researcher’s view, issues with respect to perceptions of fairness of the facilitators and the 
facilitation process will still exist given that the facilitator remains as an Inland Revenue 
member of staff. In emphasising the overarching DSD principle of fairness, the interview 
findings in chapter 7, section 7.3.5.1 of this thesis suggest that the tax DSD principles could 
potentially be modified to incorporate external independent dispute resolution practitioners 
trained in mediation as distinct from revenue authority members of staff acting as facilitators. 
However, in the NZ context, this would arguably be difficult to implement given the issues 
identified in section 8.3.3 above with respect to Inland Revenue’s reluctance to depart from its 
existing procedures and to solely utilise non-Inland Revenue staff in its conference facilitation 
process. Therefore, the researcher suggests that Inland Revenue could offer taxpayers the 
option of joint facilitation. That is, the option for taxpayers to engage a non-Inland Revenue 
co-facilitator to jointly facilitate alongside the existing Inland Revenue facilitator. The non-
Inland Revenue co-facilitator would be selected by the taxpayer from a panel of accredited 
mediators administered by AMINZ, Resolution Institute and/or the New Zealand Law Society 
(NZLS). The mediators on the panel would have to meet a required level of training and 
                                                          
5 Email from [redacted] (Director, [redacted], Inland Revenue, Wellington) to Melinda Jone regarding Inland 
Revenue facilitator accreditation (22 January 2016). 
6 Karen Whitiskie “Five years on for facilitated conferences (2015) 873 LawTalk 19 at 19. 
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expertise in tax in addition to being trained and accredited in mediation. As with the Inland 
Revenue facilitator, the non-Inland Revenue co-facilitator selected would have had no prior 
involvement in the tax dispute. If the taxpayer chooses the option of joint facilitation, the cost 
of the non-Inland Revenue co-facilitator would be met by the taxpayer. The above model 
generally follows the joint facilitation (or mediation) options currently available in the ADR 
programs of revenue authorities in overseas jurisdictions such as the UK and the US.7 
 
The above recommendation for the option of joint facilitation does not provide for an external 
independent dispute resolution practitioner in replacement of the revenue authority facilitator 
in Inland Revenue’s facilitated conferences as suggested by the interview participants. 
Nevertheless, it goes some way towards providing for the inclusion of an independent external 
party in the process. The limited prior research conducted in the NZ tax mediation context8 has 
shown the importance of an independent external party in enabling parties (in particular, 
taxpayers) to put their cases forward and “feel as if they have been heard.”9 Furthermore, the 
experiences of overseas revenue authorities with joint facilitation suggests that a joint 
facilitation model may help to address some of the concerns with respect to the perceived 
fairness of solely using a revenue authority facilitator.10  
 
The mediation literature also provides that, among other things, a legitimate reason for the use 
of co-mediation11 is to achieve “more stable dynamics” between parties.12 Co-mediation is less 
susceptible to dynamics where the mediator “directly or indirectly favours, or is perceived to 
favour, one party, or where a party tries to manipulate the mediator into supporting him or 
                                                          
7 See HM Revenue and Customs’ (HMRC’s) ADR program for Large or Complex Cases in the UK, documented 
in HM Revenue and Customs, above n 3 and the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS’s) Post Appeals Mediation 
(PAM) program in the US, documented in Internal Revenue Service Rev. Proc. 2014-63, 2014-53 I.R.B. 1014 
[“Rev. Proc. 2014-63”]. These programs are also outlined in section 1.3.2.1 of Appendix 1.3 and section 1.4.2.4 
of Appendix 1.4 of this thesis, respectively. 
8 While a number of studies have proposed the use of mediation in the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures, to 
the researcher’s knowledge, Melinda Jone and Andrew J Maples “Mediation as an Alternative Option in New 
Zealand's Tax Dispute Resolution Procedures” (2012) 18 NZJTLP 412 and Melinda Jone and Andrew J Maples 
“Mediation as an Alternative Option in New Zealand's Tax Disputes Resolution Procedures: Refining a Proposed 
Regime” (2013) 19 NZJTLP 301, are the only studies conducted to date which specifically examine, in-depth, the 
features of a proposed tax mediation regime in NZ. 
9 Jone and Maples “Mediation as an Alternative Option in New Zealand's Tax Disputes Resolution Procedures: 
Refining a Proposed Regime”, above n 8, at 318. 
10 Email from [redacted] (Partner in Tax Dispute Resolution, [redacted], London) to Melinda Jone regarding 
HMRC facilitation (7 May 2015); Email from [redacted] (Director, [redacted], London) to Melinda Jone regarding 
HMRC facilitation (27 May 2015). See also, Rachael Power “ADR: Handling SME v corporate cases” (26 
February 2014) AccountingWEB.co.uk <http://www.accountingweb.co.uk/blog-post/adr-handling-sme-vs-
corporate-cases> (last accessed 7 November 2016).  
11 While co-mediation generally refers to the use of two (or more) mediators, the same reasons for the use of co-
mediation apply to joint facilitation. 
12 Laurence Boulle, Virginia Goldblatt and Phillip Green Mediation: Principles, Process and Practice (2nd ed, 
LexisNexis, Wellington, 2008) at 141 and Laurence Boulle, Virginia Goldblatt and Phillip Green Mediation: Skills 
and Strategies (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2015) at 254. 
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her.”13 It thus follows that achieving more stable dynamics is consistent with enhancing 
perceptions of fairness of the process. In addition, the mediation literature provides that another 
potential benefit of co-mediation is that it can allow for the “balancing of professional 
backgrounds.”14 That is, where a specific professional background or experience may be 
needed for a particular dispute, co-mediation can allow for one mediator to be skilled in the 
mediation process and the other to be experienced in the subject-matter of the dispute.15 Such 
an arrangement may be particularly beneficial in the context of complex tax disputes. 
 
It is not the purpose of this study to make recommendations for a wholesale reform to the NZ 
tax dispute resolution procedures. While it is acknowledged that a shift in the dispute resolution 
culture of Inland Revenue would be both beneficial and desirable (albeit difficult in practice),16 
arguably the introduction of the option of engaging an independent non-Inland Revenue co-
facilitator would not require a radical departure from (or reform to) Inland Revenue’s existing 
procedures in order to gain a potential improvement in perceptions of fairness. In addition, the 
above recommendation is not only broadly in line with the existing ADR programs of revenue 
authorities in overseas jurisdictions, but it also follows on from suggestions by various 
stakeholders in NZ for the involvement of external mediators in the dispute process dating back 
to the joint submission by the NZLS and the former New Zealand Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (NZICA) in 2008.17 It should be noted that, while the suggestion for the use of 
external mediators has been made by various commentators and submitters to Inland Revenue 
(and albeit declined), the joint presence of Inland Revenue facilitators and external independent 
mediators has, to date, never been formally considered by Inland Revenue.18 
 
Nevertheless, the researcher notes that even if the above recommendation was adopted by NZ 
policymakers and Inland Revenue, public and professional confidence in the independence and 
expertise of both Inland Revenue facilitators and non-Inland Revenue external mediators would 
take time to develop and become embedded in the system. Consequently, the public trust 
                                                          
13 Boulle, Goldblatt and Green Mediation: Principles, Process and Practice, above n 12, at 141. 
14 Boulle, Goldblatt and Green Mediation: Principles, Process and Practice, above n 12, at 141 and Boulle, 
Goldblatt and Green Mediation: Skills and Strategies, above n 12, at 254. 
15 Boulle, Goldblatt and Green Mediation: Principles, Process and Practice, above n 12, at 141 and Boulle, 
Goldblatt and Green Mediation: Skills and Strategies, above n 12, at 254. 
16 Contrast with the ATO’s apparent embracement of a dispute resolution culture in particular as part of its “Re-
inventing the ATO” transformation project: see chapter 4, section 4.2.3 of this thesis, referring to DSD Principle 
12. See also, Australian Taxation Office “Reinventing the ATO” (16 September 2016) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/About-ATO/About-us/Reinventing-the-ATO/> (last accessed 7 November 2016).  
17 Taxation Committee of the New Zealand Law Society and National Tax Committee of the New Zealand Institute 
of Chartered Accountants The Disputes Resolution Procedures in Part IVA of the Tax Administration Act 1994 
and the Challenge Procedures in Part VIIIA of the Tax Administration Act 1994 (Wellington, August 2008) at 
[3.14(a)]. 
18 Email from [redacted] (Director, [redacted], Inland Revenue, Wellington) to Melinda Jone regarding Inland 
Revenue facilitation (12 May 2015). 
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needed to foster enhanced voluntary compliance could take some time to emerge following the 
adoption of any such recommendation. 
 
8.5 Summary 
This chapter has outlined the suggested tax DSD principles based on the suggested 
modifications derived from the interview findings in chapter 7 of this thesis. The suggested 
changes to the set of tax DSD principles are the possible modification of DSD Principles 11 
and 8 to take into account the inclusion of external independent dispute resolution practitioners 
(which are qualified in mediation) in the system as distinct from revenue authority staff acting 
as facilitators or mediators. Thus, given the limitations of the interview findings, namely the 
small frequencies of participants suggesting changes to the principles, the set of tax DSD 
principles initially developed (excepting of DSD Principles 11 and 8) has largely remained 
unchanged.  
 
In addition, this chapter has suggested the possible grouping or categorisation of the 14 tax 
DSD principles into the following categories of principles: High-level Purposive, Dispute 
Prevention, Dispute Process Delivery, Dispute Process Administration and Dispute Process 
Consultation. This suggested categorisation emerges from the finding that some of the 
interview participants found the numerical ranking of the 14 DSD principles in order of 
importance somewhat arbitrary and thus, considered that the broad grouping of the principles 
was more meaningful. 
 
The chapter then provided a discussion of the interview findings on the tax DSD principles in 
the NZ context. The majority of the participants made no further suggestions for changes to the 
tax DSD principles, or to their ranking, in the context of the NZ tax dispute resolution process. 
Overall this potentially indicates that the set of suggested tax DSD principles (provided in 
Table 8.1) do not require adaptation specifically for NZ. However, this may in part be due to 
the fact that the sample of participants interviewed was solely from NZ and therefore, had by 
default based their responses to the earlier questions in the context of their knowledge of the 
NZ tax dispute resolution procedures. Thus, future research is necessary in order to ascertain 
whether the tax DSD principles are universally applicable across different jurisdictions without 
the need for any country-specific modifications. Nevertheless, a number of issues were 
identified by participants in applying the tax DSD principles in the NZ context including that 
a shift in the dispute resolution culture of Inland Revenue and in its flexibility in providing 
dispute resolution options, would be necessary. 
 
Applying the suggested modifications to DSD Principles 11 and 8 in the context of the NZ tax 
dispute resolution procedures, the researcher recommends the inclusion of the option within 
the current procedures for taxpayers to engage an external independent co-facilitator to jointly 
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facilitate alongside the existing Inland Revenue facilitator in Inland Revenue’s facilitated 
conferences. In the researcher’s view, this option arguably provides a compromise between the 
importance of enhancing the fairness of the tax dispute resolution procedures and Inland 
Revenue’s apparent hesitance to depart from its existing dispute resolution culture and 
procedures.  
 
The final chapter which follows presents an overview of the research, discusses the key 





Chapter 9: Conclusions, Contributions, Limitations and Future Research 
9.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this final chapter is to provide an overview of the study, summarise the research 
findings, outline the contributions, limitations and areas for future research, as well as provide 
the concluding comments on the study. Accordingly, this chapter is organised as follows. 
Section 9.2 provides an overview of the study, with section 9.3 presenting a summary of the 
research findings. Section 9.4 outlines the contributions of the study to the literature and to the 
fields of tax dispute resolution and dispute systems design (DSD). Limitations of the study and 
potential areas for future research are identified in section 9.5 and section 9.6, respectively. 
Lastly, section 9.7 provides some concluding remarks. 
 
9.2 Overview of the Research 
To date, tax dispute resolution systems have not been evaluated extensively using DSD 
principles. Thus, the purpose of this study has been to develop the application of DSD 
principles in the particular context of tax dispute resolution. This study has been set against the 
background of a number of revenue authorities, including the Australian Taxation Office 
(ATO) and HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), having in recent years implemented various 
interests-based alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes as a means of managing and 
resolving disputes with taxpayers. The incorporation of these interests-based dispute resolution 
processes has formed part of the movement by various revenue authorities towards adopting 
more collaborative working approaches which are aimed at building and maintaining strong 
compliance relationships with taxpayers. This is particularly important in the context of self-
assessment tax systems which are generally built on the cornerstone of voluntary compliance. 
 
A number of models and principles for designing and implementing dispute resolution systems 
have been developed by various DSD practitioners beginning with the work of Ury, Brett and 
Goldberg in 1988.1 However, the DSD literature indicates that to date, there has been limited 
testing of the models proposed and moreover, there have been no DSD frameworks which have 
been developed for the purpose of evaluating (tax) dispute resolution systems. Accordingly, 
through conducting comparative case studies of New Zealand (NZ), Australia, the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), this study has evaluated (utilising 14 DSD 
principles drawn from the literature) and compared the effectiveness of the design of the tax 
dispute resolution systems of these jurisdictions. Based on the findings from the comparative 
case studies, a set of tax DSD principles has been developed.  
 
                                                          
1 William L Ury, Jeanne M Brett and Stephen B Goldberg Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut 




It was intended that the tax DSD principles derived could be adapted by tax administrations 
and used in either developing new or improving existing tax dispute resolution systems from a 
DSD perspective. Hence, external feedback on the tax DSD principles developed was sought 
through 30 semi-structured interviews conducted with stakeholders in NZ including: tax 
practitioners, tax academics, ADR practitioners, ADR academics, Inland Revenue 
representatives and members of the judiciary. The interview findings were used to suggest 
modifications to the set of tax DSD principles developed and also to consider whether 
adaptation of the tax DSD principles was required in the particular context of the NZ tax dispute 
resolution procedures. 
 
9.3 Summary of Findings 
This section provides a summary of the main findings of this study in relation to the three 
research questions outlined in chapter 1, section 1.3 of this thesis.  
 
9.3.1 Research Question 1 
How do the designs of the tax dispute resolution systems of NZ, Australia, the UK and 
the US compare when they are evaluated using DSD principles? 
 
When the four jurisdictions’ tax dispute systems are evaluated and compared from a DSD 
perspective, it appears that the strengths of the dispute resolution systems of the UK and the 
US lie in particular aspects of DSD relating to the structure of the system, while the strengths 
of the Australian system largely lie in certain aspects relating to the support and championship 
of the system. The NZ system displays some deficiencies in both areas. 
 
The case study findings indicate that the UK and the US both lead the four jurisdictions in 
terms of meeting most of the DSD principles of best practice identified in the DSD literature. 
Key structural features of the two systems include that they generally have multiple entry points 
and thus, offer taxpayers the option to choose a preferred process from the outset of disputes. 
They also provide the ability for taxpayers to loop-forward to litigation and therefore, by-pass 
the revenue authority’s internal review process. However, it appears that the tax dispute 
resolution systems in the UK and the US are both deficient in the visible support of the dispute 
resolution system by certain senior revenue authority members, namely HMRC’s Executive 
Chair and Chief Executive, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Commissioner, 
respectively. In addition, the integration and promotion of ADR within the dispute resolution 
systems of both jurisdictions could arguably also be strengthened.  
 
In comparison, in Australia there is a high level of support by senior members of the ATO for 
the use of ADR, where appropriate, generally at any stage in the Australian tax dispute 
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resolution procedures. Furthermore, the approach of the ATO towards dispute resolution and 
ADR, outlined in its Disputes Policy and Dispute Management Plan, aligns with the overall 
mission, vision and values of the organisation. Nevertheless, the Australian dispute resolution 
system has only one structural entry point. Therefore, there is no option for taxpayers to choose 
a preferred process (that is, internal review or external appeal) at the outset of a tax dispute. As 
a result, there is no loop-forward mechanism that allows parties to by-pass the internal review 
process and proceed directly to a tribunal or court. 
 
The NZ tax dispute resolution system is the worst placed of the four jurisdictions in terms of 
the number of DSD principles met. The prescribed system does not offer multiple structural 
entry points and in general, there are limited opportunities available for taxpayers to choose a 
preferred path in the procedures. In addition, there is limited visible support of the system by 
the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (NZ Commissioner). Notwithstanding the recognition by 
the Richardson Committee (which first proposed the current procedures) that the fair and 
expeditious resolution of disputes has wider impacts for the tax administration and on voluntary 
compliance,2 prima facie, there appears to be no clear alignment of the purpose of the dispute 
procedures under s 89A Tax Administration Act 1994 (TAA 1994) with the overall the mission, 
vision and values of Inland Revenue. Furthermore, Inland Revenue are currently apparently 
not prepared to entertain the further use of ADR in the dispute procedures beyond the option 
of conference facilitation. 
 
The case studies also illustrate that the following DSD principles are common to all four 
jurisdictions: stakeholders are included in the design process; there are multiple options for 
addressing conflict; certain loop-back mechanisms are provided; there is notification before 
and feedback after the dispute resolution process; forms of training and education are available 
for stakeholders; assistance is offered for choosing the best process; and there is evaluation of 
the system. There is an internal person or unit that functions as a mentor and advisor on ADR 
for revenue authority staff in all four jurisdictions. However, with the exception of the 
Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) within the IRS, generally there is no equivalent person or 
unit within the revenue authority which functions as a mentor and advisor on ADR for 
taxpayers. Except for NZ, the procedures of the four jurisdictions’ dispute resolution systems 
are ordered from low to high cost (notwithstanding that high upfront costs are generally likely 
to be incurred by taxpayers with tax disputes). 
 
Lastly, in all four jurisdictions some indications of negative perceptions of fairness of the 
operation of the jurisdictions’ tax dispute resolution procedures are generally evident. In part 
this is due to the imbalance between the revenue authority and taxpayers in dispute in terms of 
resources and knowledge. This has resulted in the ‘burning off’ of (small) taxpayers noted, in 
                                                          
2 Organisational Review Committee Organisational Review of the Inland Revenue Department Report to the 
Minister of Revenue (and on tax policy, also to the Minister of Finance) (Wellington, 1994) at [10]. 
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particular, in NZ and Australia. In addition, in all four jurisdictions there are mixed findings 
with respect to perceptions of fairness on the use of revenue authority staff acting as facilitators 
in the ADR programs of the four jurisdictions’ revenue authorities. Nevertheless, as indicated 
in the interviews (see chapter 7, section 7.3.2 of this thesis) and also supported by the literature,3 
the mere presence of negative taxpayer perceptions of fairness is significant given the potential 
impact on the overall integrity of the dispute resolution system (and consequently, the tax 
system as a whole and voluntary compliance). 
 
9.3.2 Research Question 2 
What general guidance in DSD principles in the context of tax dispute resolution can be 
derived from the DSD evaluations conducted in RQ 1 and the feedback from the 
interviews? 
 
The DSD evaluations of the four jurisdictions’ tax dispute resolution systems indicate that the 
set of 14 DSD principles drawn from the DSD literature in chapter 2 (see Table 2.2) can 
generally be applied in the context of tax dispute resolution without significant substantive 
modification. In deriving the set of 14 tax DSD principles in chapter 6 (see Table 6.2), 
modifications were made to the 14 DSD principles in order to give them more relevance in the 
tax dispute resolution context. However, for the majority of the principles the only 
modifications made were the provision of examples of the DSD principle applied in the context 
of tax dispute resolution. Additional explanation pertaining to the ordering of the procedures 
from low to high cost in DSD Principle 6 was also provided through including the exceptions 
that high upfront costs are generally likely to be incurred by taxpayers in tax disputes and that 
the additional use of ADR can add additional costs at the stage of the formal dispute procedures 
at which it is utilised. The only substantive change to the set of original DSD principles was 
the change in the wording of DSD Principle 5, which was modified to reflect the inclusion of 
an internal person or unit that acts as a mentor and advisor on ADR techniques for revenue 
authority staff, rather than for both disputants in the original context of organisational disputes. 
 
The feedback obtained from the interviews conducted with the selected NZ stakeholders (tax 
practitioners, tax academics, ADR practitioners, ADR academics, Inland Revenue 
representatives and members of the judiciary) was unable to provide sufficient evidence to 
justify any concrete changes to the tax DSD principles developed from the case studies. This 
was due to the small frequencies of participants suggesting particular changes to the tax DSD 
principles (with the majority expressing no view). It was unknown whether the participants 
                                                          
3 See, for example, Betty R Jackson and Valerie C Milliron “Tax Compliance Research: Findings, Problems, and 
Prospects” (1986) 5 J Acct Literature 125; Maryann Richardson and Adrian J Sawyer “A Taxonomy of the Tax 
Compliance Literature: Further Findings, Problems and Prospects” (2001) 16(2) ATF 137; and James Peck and 
Andrew J Maples “Comment: The Tax Disputes Resolution Process in New Zealand: What about the Little 
Fellas?” (2010) 16 NZJTLP 348. 
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who provided no view on the changes (that is, modifications, additions or deletions) which 
were suggested by other participants would have done so had they been made aware of them. 
Thus, the interview findings were limited to providing suggestions for changes to the tax DSD 
principles only. As shown in Table 8.1 in chapter 8 of this thesis, the suggested changes to the 
set of tax DSD principles from the interview findings are the possible modification of DSD 
Principles 11 and 8 in order to take into account the inclusion of external independent dispute 
resolution practitioners (which are qualified in mediation) in the system, as distinct from 
revenue authority staff acting as facilitators or mediators. These suggested changes emerge 
from the view put forward by some of the interview participants that, in order for the system 
to be fair and perceived as fair, the dispute resolution practitioner must be independent and not 
be an employee of either side. This view is consistent with the limited prior tax mediation 
research conducted in NZ.4 However, the suggested changes conflict with the current practice 
of revenue authorities, both in NZ and overseas, whereby revenue authority staff are utilised as 
facilitators in their various internal facilitation programs. Accordingly, the suggested changes 
to the tax DSD principles may only be confirmed or refuted through further research being 
undertaken which solicits the views of major stakeholder groups, both in NZ and overseas. 
Furthermore, it was unclear from the interview findings whether the facilitator or mediator 
should firstly be trained and qualified in dispute resolution or in tax given that not all 
participants were asked this. Hence, further research is also necessary in order to ascertain this 
aspect. 
 
The majority of the interview participants regarded DSD Principle 11, the system is fair and 
perceived as fair, as the most important or overarching DSD principle. As indicated in chapter 
7, section 7.3.2 of this thesis, fairness was generally associated with the fairness of the 
procedures rather than, inter alia, fairness of the substantive outcome of the dispute. Moreover, 
the rationale indicated by the different types of participants for regarding fairness as the most 
important principle, reflected their respective backgrounds. The ADR participants generally 
believed fairness was important in achieving buy-in and participation by users of the system. 
The tax and Inland Revenue participants perceived fairness as being vital to the overall integrity 
of the tax system and achieving voluntary compliance. The members of the judiciary associated 
fairness with taxpayers having the ability to have their dispute determined in court at any stage 
of the dispute process. 
 
Furthermore, when asked, the majority of the interview participants, were able to provide a 
numerical ranking of the 14 principles in order of importance from highest to lowest. The 
rankings provided broadly indicated that the principles regarding fairness, taxpayer choice and 
stakeholder involvement in the design process were typically ranked highest. These were 
                                                          
4 See Melinda Jone and Andrew J Maples “Mediation as an Alternative Option in New Zealand's Tax Disputes 
Resolution Procedures: Refining a Proposed Regime” (2013) 19 NZJTLP 301 at 314. 
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generally followed by the principles relating to taxpayer assistance. The administrative-type 
principles relating to the revenue authority and its staff were typically ranked as least important.  
Nevertheless, some of the participants found the ranking exercise arbitrary and felt that all of 
the DSD principles were important for any given dispute resolution system. Hence, a number 
of participants suggested that providing some form of categorisation of the principles was 
potentially more helpful than a precise ranking of the principles. Accordingly, based on the 
categorisations suggested in the interviews, this study suggests the possible categorisation of 
the 14 tax DSD principles into the following categories of principles (as outlined in Table 8.2 
in chapter 8): High-level Purposive, Dispute Prevention, Dispute Process Delivery, Dispute 
Process Administration and Dispute Process Consultation. The above categories (and the DSD 
principles within the categories) are not ranked in any order. However, consistent with the 
interview findings on fairness, the High Level Purposive category (containing DSD Principle 
11) is regarded as overarching.  
 
The interview findings also indicated that the majority of the participants thought that the tax 
dispute resolution system should recognise the different ethnic backgrounds of taxpayers in the 
delivery of the system as opposed to being recognised as a separate design principle per se. 
Although, these findings may possibly be limited in the respect that they represent the views 
of the predominantly NZ European ethnic group of participants which made up the stakeholders 
interviewed.  
 
In summary, the case study findings indicate that the DSD principles drawn from the literature 
can generally be applied in the tax dispute resolution context with only one substantive 
modification being made to the set of principles. The interview findings suggest the potential 
modification of two of the tax DSD principles developed. However, further research is 
necessary in order to confirm or refute the modifications suggested to these principles.  
 
9.3.3 Research Question 3 
How can the general guidance in DSD principles in the context of tax dispute resolution 
(derived in RQ 2) be adapted in the context of the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures? 
 
The interview findings show that the majority of the participants made no changes to their 
ranking of the tax DSD principles and largely had no further modifications, additions or 
deletions to make to the principles in the context of the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures. 
Overall this potentially indicates that the set of suggested tax DSD principles (derived in 
Research Question 2) do not require adaptation specifically for the NZ context. However, this 
may partly be due to the fact that the sample of participants interviewed was solely from NZ 
and therefore, had by default based their responses to the earlier questions in the context of 
their knowledge of the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures. It follows that future research 
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conducted in other jurisdictions would be necessary in order to ascertain whether the suggested 
DSD principles are universally applicable across different jurisdictions (in particular, common 
law jurisdictions) without the need for any country-specific modifications. 
 
Nevertheless, a number of possible issues were identified by the interview participants in 
applying the tax DSD principles in the NZ context. These included that a change in the dispute 
resolution culture of Inland Revenue as well as a shift from the current prescribed linear dispute 
process towards providing more flexibility in dispute resolution options, would be necessary. 
Participants further identified that the implementation of the DSD principles would potentially 
require a significant level of staff training and resources.  
 
Against the background of the above issues identified, the modifications to DSD Principles 11 
and 8 suggested by the interview participants (as outlined above in section 9.3.2) were applied 
in the context of the NZ tax dispute resolution process. Consequently, this study recommends 
the inclusion of the option within the existing procedures for taxpayers to engage a non-Inland 
Revenue co-facilitator to jointly facilitate the current facilitated conference meetings with the 
existing Inland Revenue facilitator. Overseas experience, particularly in the UK, indicates that 
fairness perceptions may potentially be enhanced through the inclusion of the option for 
taxpayers to engage an external independent co-facilitator alongside the revenue authority 
facilitator.5 In addition, prior NZ tax mediation research has shown that the inclusion of an 
external independent party in the process is regarded as an important factor in enabling parties 
to put their cases forward and feel as if they have been heard.6 The above recommendation 
does not completely provide for the interview participants’ suggested optimal solution of the 
utilisation of external independent mediators instead of Inland Revenue facilitators. However, 
in the researcher’s view, it provides a compromise between the importance, as indicated by the 
interview participants, of achieving fairness of the tax dispute resolution procedures and Inland 
Revenue’s current apparent reluctance to depart from its existing dispute resolution culture and 
procedures. Furthermore, the recommendation made provides a pragmatic option in the light 
of the potential cost and resources which would be required in establishing an adequate pool 
of external independent mediators appropriately trained and qualified in tax (to replace the 
current pool of Inland Revenue facilitators).  
 
  
                                                          
5 Email from [redacted] (Partner in Tax Dispute Resolution, [redacted], London) to Melinda Jone regarding 
HMRC facilitation (7 May 2015); Email from [redacted] (Director, [redacted], London) to Melinda Jone regarding 
HMRC facilitation (27 May 2015). 
6 Jone and Maples, above n 4, at 318. 
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9.4 Contributions of the Research 
In the researcher’s view, this research has made a number of contributions to the literature and 
to the fields of taxation and DSD. These contributions are discussed below in sections 9.4.1 
and 9.4.2, respectively. 
 
9.4.1 Contributions to the literature  
This study adds to the limited number of studies which utilise DSD principles in evaluating tax 
dispute resolution systems, namely, the studies conducted by Bentley7 and Mookhey8 which 
evaluate the Australian tax dispute resolution system. This research extends these prior studies 
by examining a larger number of countries outside of Australia and through utilising a more 
comprehensive range of DSD principles in the evaluations conducted. Furthermore, this study 
extends the research methods utilised by both Bentley and Mookhey beyond the use of single 
unit case studies. Through applying the research framework of pragmatism, in addition to 
utilising a multiple unit case study approach, this study employed semi-structured interviews 
in order to seek external feedback on the tax DSD principles derived. Moreover, in adopting 
the pragmatism research framework, the approach taken in this research ventures outside of the 
“dominance of positivist approaches in those areas where tax is accepted as a valid field of 
inquiry.”9 
 
In addition, this study goes some way towards filling the gap identified in the DSD literature 
that further research is necessary in testing the DSD models and principles which have been 
developed by DSD practitioners and furthermore, that a DSD framework for analysing the 
effectiveness of the design of dispute resolution systems is needed.10 To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, this study is one of the first studies which has been conducted in 
developing a framework of tax DSD principles. Therefore, this study provides a basis for 
further potential research (as discussed below in section 9.6) to be conducted in refining the 
framework of tax DSD principles suggested in this study. 
 
This study also contributes to the related literature on tax mediation. In particular, in the NZ 
context, the finding from the interviews conducted with the NZ stakeholders which suggests 
                                                          
7 Duncan Bentley “Problem resolution: Does the ATO approach really work?” (1996) 6(1) Revenue LJ 17, updated 
in Duncan Bentley Taxpayers’ Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation (Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, 2007) ch 5. 
8 Sheena Mookhey “Tax dispute systems design” (2013) 11 EJTR 79. 
9 Lynne Oats “Tax as a social and institutional practice” in Lynne Oats (ed) Taxation: A Fieldwork Research 
Handbook (Routledge, Milton Park, 2012) 3 at 5. 
10 John P Conbere “Theory Building for Conflict Management System Design” (2001) 19 Conflict Resol Q 215; 
Maurits Barendrecht “In Search of Microjustice: Five Basic Elements of a Dispute System” (Tilburg University 
Legal Studies Working Paper No. 002/2009, 29 January 2009); William Roche and Paul Teague “Do Conflict 
Management Systems Matter?” (2012) 51 Hum Resource Mgmt 231. 
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that an external independent dispute resolution practitioner trained in mediation should be 
utilised in the system rather than a facilitator that is a revenue authority member of staff, 
supports the findings of Jone and Maples’ study on a tax mediation regime for NZ.11 In 
addition, given the findings in this study which emphasise the overarching DSD principle, that 
the system must be fair and perceived as fair, this study also contributes to the literature which 
examines the link between the fair treatment of taxpayers and voluntary tax compliance.12 
 
9.4.2 Contributions to the fields of taxation and dispute systems design 
The way tax disputes are resolved has wider impacts on the tax administration and 
consequently on voluntary compliance.13 Accordingly, this study has practical implications in 
the field of taxation in the respect that the suggested set of tax DSD principles could potentially 
be utilised by revenue authorities and tax policymakers around the world in either improving 
existing or developing new tax dispute resolution systems. An ultimate outcome of this 
research would be for the suggested tax DSD principles (following any refinements made) to 
be tested and applied by revenue authorities and policymakers in the real world. In the 
researcher’s view the tax DSD principles suggested in this study could potentially be utilised 
in improving tax dispute resolution systems both in NZ and around the world, particularly as 
part of the movement of various revenue authorities from a core reliance on a “command and 
control” culture towards engaging in more collaborative working approaches with taxpayers.14 
In the NZ context, the tax DSD principles suggested in this study could possibly be utilised in 
improving the tax dispute resolution system15 alongside Inland Revenue’s current Business 
Transformation programme.16 
 
It is not a purpose of this study to make suggestions for a wholesale reform of the NZ tax 
dispute resolution procedures. However, the particular recommendation made in section 8.4, 
chapter 8 of this thesis, for the inclusion of the option for taxpayers to engage an external 
                                                          
11 See Jone and Maples, above n 4.  
12 See, for example, Martina Hartner, Silvia Rechberger, Erich Kirchler, and Alfred Schabmann “Procedural 
Fairness and Tax Compliance” (2008) 38 Econ Analysis & Pol’y 137; Kristina Murphy “The Role of Trust in 
Nurturing Compliance: A Study of Accused Tax Avoiders” (2004) 28 Law & Hum Behav 187; Kristina Murphy 
“Regulating More Effectively: The Relationship between Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Tax Non-
compliance” (2005) 32 J Law & Soc 562. 
13 Organisational Review Committee, above n 2, at [10]. 
14 Bentley Taxpayers’ Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation, above n 7, at 166. See also, Karen Stilwell 
“Mediation of Canadian Tax Disputes” (Master of Laws Thesis, University of Toronto, 2014) at 19. 
15 See, for example, a possible recommendation for the option of mediation in the NZ tax dispute procedures 
(which was made following a DSD evaluation of the procedures) in Melinda Jone “Evaluating New Zealand’s 
Tax Dispute Resolution System: A Dispute Systems Design Perspective” (2016) 22 NZJTLP 228.  
16 For further information, see Inland Revenue “Business transformation: About Business transformation” (6 
September 2016) <http://www.ird.govt.nz/transformation/about-business-transformation/about-business-
transformation-index.html> (last accessed 7 November 2016); Inland Revenue Making Tax Simpler – Towards a 
New Tax Administration Act: A Government Discussion Document (November 2015). 
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independent co-facilitator in Inland Revenue’s current facilitated conference process, could 
potentially be an option which could be considered by Inland Revenue with a view to 
improving the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures and thereby, enhancing taxpayers’ 
perceptions of fairness of the procedures. The recommendation made is not only broadly in 
line with the existing ADR programs of revenue authorities overseas such as HMRC and the 
IRS, but it also follows on from suggestions by various stakeholders in NZ for the involvement 
of external mediators in the NZ tax dispute resolution process dating back to the joint 
submission by the New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) and the former New Zealand Institute of 
Chartered Accountants (NZICA) in 2008.17 Moreover, representatives from Inland Revenue 
have acknowledged that their processes can always be improved.18 However, to date, the idea 
of the joint presence of Inland Revenue facilitators and external independent mediators has 
never been formally considered. 
 
In relation to the field of DSD, given that to the researcher’s knowledge, there have been no 
frameworks of DSD principles developed for evaluating the effectiveness of the design of 
dispute resolution systems generally, this study provides a basis for DSD practitioners to follow 
in building DSD best practice frameworks in other contexts outside of the field of taxation 
where dispute resolution systems are utilised. In particular, the suggested categories of High-
level Purposive, Dispute Prevention, Dispute Process Delivery, Dispute Process 
Administration and Dispute Process Consultation, could possibly be utilised to categorise the 
DSD principles as applied in relevant non-tax contexts. Furthermore, the DSD framework 
developed in this study could be used in the teaching of DSD given that Smith and Martinez 
state: “dispute systems analysis is an essential skill in systems design, and one that we believe 
should be widely taught in law schools.”19 The DSD framework developed in this study could 
potentially help students understand DSD in the following three contexts:20 
  
(1) Analysing a system historically to understand its evolution, functioning, and 
impacts; 
(2) Advising on the best process to create the design, or more likely redesign, 
mechanism for a system; and  
(3) Designing (or redesigning) a system itself.  
 
                                                          
17 Taxation Committee of the New Zealand Law Society and National Tax Committee of the New Zealand Institute 
of Chartered Accountants The Disputes Resolution Procedures in Part IVA of the Tax Administration Act 1994 
and the Challenge Procedures in Part VIIIA of the Tax Administration Act 1994 (Wellington, August 2008). 
18 This was acknowledged in the interviews with Inland Revenue Representative 1 (24 March 2015) and Inland 
Revenue Representative 2 (30 March 2015). 
19 Stephanie Smith and Janet Martinez “An Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems Design” (2009) 14 Harv 
Negot L Rev 123 at 125. 
20 At 124. 
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In addition to being taught in law schools, the DSD framework developed in this study could 
also be incorporated in the training and professional development of dispute resolution 
practitioners by dispute resolution professional bodies. 
 
9.5 Limitations of the Research 
Despite the potential contributions of this study, it also has some limitations which need to be 
considered when interpreting the findings. First, as acknowledged in chapter 1, section 1.1 of 
this thesis, the overall application of the tax DSD guidance developed (and of interests-based 
procedures) may be limited by the fact that in tax disputes the individual interests of the parties 
tend to be subsumed in the argument over legal rights. That is, the fundamental relationship 
between the parties in dispute is a legal one as opposed to one concerning the underlying needs 
and concerns (that is, interests) of the parties. It follows that a further limitation (although not 
unique to tax dispute resolution) is that interests-based processes generally require the consent 
and willingness from both parties in order for such processes to be utilised effectively.  
 
Secondly, the tax DSD principles developed were derived from DSD evaluations conducted on 
four selected jurisdictions. Notwithstanding that the jurisdictions were primarily chosen due to 
the amount of information that was available on their ADR processes, the jurisdictions are all 
western common law countries. Therefore, the extent to which the findings of this study can 
be generalised to other countries, in particular non-western and non-common law countries, is 
unknown. Furthermore, as outlined in chapter 2, section 2.2.1 of this thesis, the four 
jurisdictions evaluated in this study all currently operate on a self-assessment basis for income 
tax which generally relies on voluntary taxpayer compliance. Consequently, the findings may 
not necessarily be generalisable to jurisdictions that do not operate systems and procedures 
based on the principles of self-assessment and voluntary compliance.  
 
Thirdly, the DSD evaluations of the four jurisdictions were conducted on the tax dispute 
resolution procedures in place generally up until 30 November 2016. Therefore, the findings 
of this study reflect the DSD evaluations conducted on the procedures up until that particular 
point in time. Changes to the procedures and the broader legal, cultural and social environments 
within which the procedures operate may inevitably occur. In addition, the current 
modernisation and digitalisation regimes of many tax administrations around the world have 
led to changes to the way in which taxpayers self-assess (including, as noted in chapter 1, 
section 2.2.1 of this thesis, the greater pre-population of tax returns). These changes will 
ultimately transform taxpayers’ interactions with tax authorities and, inter alia, may impact on 
the way in which tax disputes arise and also how they are resolved. Consequently, changes to 
the dispute resolution procedures may be necessary. Therefore, future DSD evaluations 




Fourthly, the initial set of DSD principles utilised in evaluating the dispute resolution systems 
of the four jurisdictions was limited to those drawn from the prior DSD literature as a result of 
a documentary analysis conducted by the researcher in chapter 2 of this thesis. It is possible 
that there may have been some DSD principles which could have been omitted by the 
researcher. However, the external feedback on the DSD principles developed should have 
identified any fundamental DSD principles potentially omitted. 
 
Fifthly, the small sample size and purposive sampling method utilised for the interviews 
conducted in this research do not allow for generalisation to wider populations. However, 
qualitative studies are usually not designed to allow systematic generalisation to some wider 
population.21 Rather, the aim of the interviews was to gain rich and in-depth information from 
the participants on the tax DSD principles developed. The participants interviewed in this study 
were limited to the six stakeholder groups consisting of: tax practitioners, tax academics, ADR 
practitioners, ADR academics, Inland Revenue representatives and members of the judiciary. 
Moreover, the interview participants were limited to individuals who were willing and 
available to participate. The low response rate to the notices seeking interview participants 
issued by the selected professional bodies on behalf of the researcher meant that the majority 
of the ADR and tax practitioners were recruited as a result of being contacted directly by the 
researcher. The members of the judiciary which were ultimately recruited were also limited to 
those members that were personally contacted by the researcher. Furthermore, the views of the 
members of the judiciary were limited to the particular subset of tax disputes which they heard 
in their jurisdiction of the NZ court system. In addition, no policymakers were able to be 
interviewed given that, as noted in chapter 3, section 3.6.3 of this thesis, the relevant NZ 
policymaker contacted by the researcher was unavailable to participate.  
 
Sixthly, the feedback obtained from the interviews reflects the views of stakeholders in NZ 
only. Most of the interview participants based their answers to the questions primarily in the 
context of the NZ tax dispute resolution system as this was the only system they had knowledge 
of. This was reflected in the finding that most of the interview participants made no changes to 
the tax DSD principles, or to their ranking, in the NZ context as they had already based their 
answers to the earlier questions in the context of NZ. Therefore, it is unknown to what extent 
the set of tax DSD principles would be applicable in other jurisdictions with tax dispute 
resolution systems different to NZ’s. 
 
Seventhly, the interview findings with respect to recognising the different ethnic backgrounds 
of taxpayers within the dispute resolution system were limited to the mainstream views of the 
predominantly NZ European participants interviewed. This was due to the limited number of 
                                                          
21 Joseph A Maxwell “Understanding and validity in qualitative research” in Michael Huberman and Matthew B 
Miles (eds) Qualitative Researcher's Companion: Classic and Contemporary Readings (Sage, Thousand Oaks, 
2002) 37 at 52.  
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NZ stakeholders from non-NZ European ethnic backgrounds that were available and willing to 
be interviewed. However, while the ethnic groups of the participants interviewed do not reflect 
the distribution of ethnic groups in the NZ taxpayer population generally, it reflects the ethnic 
distribution of the major stakeholders in the tax dispute resolution system in NZ. Nevertheless, 
against the background of NZ becoming more culturally diverse, the issue of recognising ethnic 
taxpayers in the dispute resolution system could potentially be understated in this study.  
 
Lastly, there are also limitations associated with the interview approach itself. As highlighted 
in the interview findings in chapter 7 and chapter 8 of this thesis, it is unknown whether the 
interview participants who provided no view on the modifications, additions and deletions to 
the tax DSD principles suggested by other participants would have done so had they been made 
aware of them. This limitation primarily arose as the interviews with the participants were 
conducted as single interview sessions with no follow-ups. Accordingly, the limitations 
identified in this section provide the basis for a number of areas for future research which are 
discussed in the next section below. 
 
9.6 Areas for Future Research 
This study sets a basis for future research to be conducted in evaluating and comparing the 
effectiveness of the design of the tax dispute resolution systems of jurisdictions beyond the 
four countries included in this study. However, as indicated in chapter 1, section 1.5 of this 
thesis, further research would be dependent on the amount of information available on the ADR 
processes utilised in the tax dispute resolution systems of other jurisdictions. Future studies 
could potentially be conducted in non-western countries (for example, China, India, Pakistan 
and the Philippines) and also in civil law European countries (for example, Belgium and the 
Netherlands) which utilise ADR processes in their tax dispute resolution systems. In addition, 
future research could be conducted on evaluating the designs of tax dispute resolution systems 
pertaining to types of tax disputes other than disputes arising from disagreements over a 
taxpayer’s tax liabilities or entitlements (which were the type focused on in this study), such 
as disputes over collection actions. 
 
This study has developed a set of tax DSD principles derived from case studies conducted on 
the tax dispute resolution systems in four jurisdictions. Feedback has been sought on the set of 
tax DSD principles developed through interviews with selected stakeholders in NZ. However, 
given the small frequencies of interview participants which suggested particular changes, there 
was insufficient evidence to justify any concrete changes to the tax DSD principles. 
Consequently, the findings of this study could only justify the making of suggestions for certain 
changes to the tax DSD principles. These include the modification of DSD Principles 11 and 8 
to take into account the inclusion of external independent dispute resolution practitioners 
(which are qualified in mediation) in the system rather than revenue authority staff acting as 
303 
 
facilitators or mediators. In order to confirm or refute the suggested modifications, follow-up 
interviews could be conducted with the stakeholders interviewed in this study. However, given 
the small number of participants in each stakeholder group interviewed (as noted in section 9.5 
above), additional research soliciting the views of a further number of participants from each 
of the stakeholder groups may also be required. This could be carried out through further 
interviews, focus groups and/or a survey questionnaire.  
 
In addition, the views of other major stakeholder groups such as taxpayers that have been 
involved in tax disputes, revenue authority officers that have been involved in disputes, revenue 
authority facilitators (or other revenue authority staff which have a dispute resolution 
practitioner role) and relevant tax policymakers could potentially be sought. Moreover, 
feedback could be sought from the above stakeholder groups not only in NZ, but also in 
Australia, the UK and the US. This would also assist in determining whether the suggested 
DSD principles are generally applicable across different jurisdictions without the need for any 
country-specific modifications. As indicated in section 9.3.2 above, associated with the 
suggested modification of DSD Principles 11 and 8, further research could also be conducted 
in soliciting stakeholders’ views on whether the external independent dispute resolution 
practitioner should foremostly be trained and qualified in dispute resolution or principally an 
expert in tax. 
  
Future research could also further explore the issue of recognising the different ethnic 
backgrounds of taxpayers in the tax dispute resolution system given that this is likely to become 
a larger issue with the changing cultural demographics of NZ (and also in most other 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries). This research 
would provide a complement to prior research on ethnic taxpayers which has shown that some 
ethnic groups may have difficulties complying due to their cultural values.22 This requires tax 
authorities to be culturally sensitive and culturally aware, and to have in place targeted 
assistance and monitoring measures.23 Thus, future research could involve attempting to seek 
feedback from stakeholders from a range of ethnic groups, both in NZ and overseas, in order 
to draw clearer conclusions on the particular role of DSD, if in fact any, in recognising ethnic 
taxpayers in the dispute resolution system. 
 
As stated in section 9.4.2 above, an ultimate outcome of this research would be for the 
suggested tax DSD principles (following any further analysis and refinements made) to be 
tested and applied in practice by revenue authorities and policymakers in the real world. Based 
on this objective, albeit ambitious and notwithstanding the cost and resources required, future 
research could involve working with revenue authorities in utilising the tax DSD principles 
                                                          
22 Sue Yong “Tax Compliance and Small and Medium Enterprise Operators: An Intra-Cultural Study in New 
Zealand” (PhD Dissertation, Auckland University of Technology, 2011). 
23 At 171. 
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developed in pilot-testing a proposed tax dispute resolution system. This could initially be run 
alongside the revenue authority’s existing system to enable the effectiveness of the two systems 
to be compared. 
 
9.7 Concluding Remarks 
This research has sought to contribute towards the development and application of DSD 
principles in the particular context of tax dispute resolution through conducting DSD 
evaluations of four jurisdictions’ tax dispute resolution systems and subsequently developing 
guidance in tax DSD principles. While this study represents one of the initial studies in the area 
of tax DSD and is strongly based on a NZ perspective, this research has found that the 
overarching design principle which must be borne in mind in the design of any tax dispute 
resolution system is that the system must be fair and perceived as fair. Given the observation 
made by Richardson and Sawyer that: “favourable taxpayer perceptions of the fairness of the 
tax system are certainly preferable to negative assessments”,24 it is hoped that the findings of 
this study may ultimately be used by tax administrations in either improving their existing or 
developing new dispute resolution systems bearing this sentiment in mind. 
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Appendix 1: Additional Information on the Four Jurisdictions’ Tax Dispute 
Resolution Procedures 
 
This appendix provides supplementary information on the tax dispute resolution systems in 
place generally up until 30 November 2016, in the jurisdictions evaluated in chapter 4 (New 
Zealand (NZ) and Australia) and chapter 5 (the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States 
(US)). As stated in chapter 3, section 3.5.4 of this thesis, this appendix is supplementary in the 
respect that it provides, inter alia, a contextual background as well as evidentiary material for 
the DSD evaluations conducted. It also provides a source of references for readers to obtain 
further information on the selected jurisdictions’ tax dispute resolution systems. The four 
abovementioned jurisdictions are contained in Appendices 1.1 – 1.4, respectively. 
 
Appendix 1.1: The New Zealand Tax Dispute Resolution Procedures 
1.1.1 The New Zealand tax dispute resolution procedures: Overview1 
The current New Zealand (NZ) tax system operates on a self-assessment basis whereby certain 
taxpayers are required to file tax returns and to take tax positions based on a self-assessment 
of their financial affairs. The Commissioner of Inland Revenue (the NZ Commissioner) 
monitors taxpayer compliance by conducting targeted (or to a lesser degree, random) audits 
and/or through conducting further investigation of a taxpayer’s affairs. As a result of these 
audits and/or investigations, the NZ Commissioner may propose adjustments (that may affect 
the tax payable by the taxpayer) to which the taxpayer may agree or disagree with. A tax dispute 
can thus arise.2  
 
Part IVA (disputes procedures) of the Tax Administration Act 1994 (TAA 1994) prescribes the 
dispute resolution procedures. Inland Revenue may not amend a taxpayer’s assessment before 
the dispute resolution process is complete, except in limited circumstances.3 Hence, the dispute 
resolution process occurring prior to an assessment being issued by Inland Revenue is known 
as the pre-assessment phase of the dispute resolution process. 
 
                                                          
1 The material in Appendix 1.1 was reviewed and subsequently discussed with the researcher by Alistair Hodson 
(Lecturer, Department of Accounting and Information Systems, College of Business and Law, University of 
Canterbury) on 24 April 2014 and 22 May 2014, respectively and also reviewed by and discussed with Dr Kerrie 
Sadiq (Professor of Taxation, School of Accountancy, Queensland University of Technology Business School) 
on 21 September 2015 and 5 October 2015, respectively. The researcher is grateful for their feedback. 
2 As a result of discussions and negotiations between the taxpayer and Inland Revenue after the investigation 
stage, an agreed adjustment may be entered into by the parties. Where an agreed adjustment is signed by a taxpayer 
prior to the formal dispute process commencing, the taxpayer may subsequently contest the issues that were 
subject to the final agreement by following the statutory dispute process. See Inland Revenue “SPS 15/01: 
Finalising agreements in tax investigations” (2015) 27(9) Tax Information Bulletin 24 [“SPS15/01”] at [9] and 
[44]. 
3 TAA 1994, s 89N. 
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The dispute resolution process is initiated by the issuing of a Notice of Proposed Adjustment 
(NOPA (NZ)) by one party (the initiating party) to another that states and explains the proposed 
adjustment as compared to the taxpayer’s prior tax position. The NOPA (NZ) may be initiated 
either by the NZ Commissioner (for example, to advise a taxpayer of a proposed adjustment in 
relation to a tax position taken by a taxpayer), or the taxpayer (for example, to advise the NZ 
Commissioner of a proposed adjustment to an assessment issued by the NZ Commissioner, in 
response to some other disputable decision or where the taxpayer has filed conservatively and 
issues a NOPA (NZ) contending a different outcome).4 If the recipient (the responding party) 
disagrees with the NOPA (NZ), the responding party must reject the proposed adjustment by 
issuing a Notice of Response (NOR). Where the NZ Commissioner has issued a NOR in 
response to a taxpayer initiated NOPA (NZ), the taxpayer must reject the NZ Commissioner's 
NOR in writing to ensure the dispute process continues.5  
 
Following the rejection of a NOR, a conference between the parties is usually scheduled (it is 
an administrative practice and not a legislative requirement) to discuss the issues in more depth 
and potentially resolve the dispute or at least some of the issues (see section 1.1.2.1 below). 
The taxpayer will be offered the opportunity to have the conference facilitated. Inland Revenue 
and certain other sources regard conference facilitation as a form of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR).6 
 
After the conference phase, if certain criteria are met,7 the NZ Commissioner and a taxpayer 
can agree in writing to opt out of the dispute resolution process if they are satisfied that it would 
be more efficient to have the dispute heard by a court or the Taxation Review Authority (TRA). 
In addition to meeting the opt-out criteria, the taxpayer must have “participated meaningfully” 
during the conference phase and must also have signed a declaration that all material 
                                                          
4 The majority of disputes are initiated by the NZ Commissioner, for example, when he or she disagrees with a 
taxpayer’s assessment (usually a position taken in the taxpayer’s return). The tax dispute resolution procedures 
are generally similar for both NZ Commissioner-initiated and taxpayer-initiated disputes. However, there are 
some minor differences. For further information on the respective procedures for NZ Commissioner-initiated 
disputes and taxpayer-initiated disputes, see Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05: Disputes resolution process commenced 
by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue” (2016) 28(11) Tax Information Bulletin 14 [“SPS 16/05”] and Inland 
Revenue “SPS 16/06: Disputes resolution process commenced by a taxpayer” (2016) 28(11) Tax Information 
Bulletin 50 [“SPS 16/06”]. 
5 TAA 1994, s 89H(3). 
6 Inspector-General of Taxation Review into the Australian Taxation Office’s Use of Early and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution: A Report to the Assistant Treasurer (Sydney, May 2012) at 8, [1.44]; Graham Tubb “Tax Disputes 
Procedures: A Current Snapshot” (paper presented to the New Zealand Law Society Tax Conference, Auckland, 
5 September 2013) 149 at 154; Karen Whitiskie “Five years on for facilitated conferences” (2015) 873 LawTalk 
19 at 19; Geoff Clews and Ele Duncan “Audits and Disputes: The Myths, The Realities and The Lessons to be 
Learnt” (paper presented to the New Zealand Law Society Tax Conference, Auckland, 13 October 2016) 85 at 
109. 
7 For the criteria, see Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 4, at [167] and Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06”, above 
n 4, at [196]. 
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information has been provided to the NZ Commissioner.8 The NZ Commissioner considers 
that a taxpayer will have participated meaningfully during the conference phase where: (a) the 
taxpayer has provided information as requested by Inland Revenue (if it has not already been 
provided prior to the conference phase); and (b) the taxpayer has discussed the contentious 
facts and issues of the dispute with Inland Revenue.9 
 
The NZ Commissioner is required to issue a Disclosure Notice (except where the 
Commissioner has already issued a notice of disputable decision which includes, or takes 
account of, the adjustment(s) proposed in the NOPA (NZ)) at the time or after either the NZ 
Commissioner or the taxpayer issues the NOPA (NZ).10 Where both parties maintain their 
position they will be required to issue a Statement of Position (SOP) setting out their final 
position on the issues. Each SOP must provide an outline of the facts, evidence, issues and 
propositions of law with sufficient details to support the positions taken.11 The SOPs limit the 
issues and propositions of law that either party can rely on if the case proceeds to court to what 
is included in the SOP (also known as the “issues and propositions of law exclusion rule”).12 
 
In addition, if the initial adjustment has been proposed by the NZ Commissioner, the TAA 
1994 permits the NZ Commissioner to provide additional information in response to any 
additional matters raised in the taxpayer’s SOP.13 This will usually be called an Addendum to 
the NZ Commissioner’s SOP.14  
 
There are response periods set out in s 3 of the TAA 1994. These generally require a response 
within two months of the formal stages during the dispute resolution process discussed above 
(and four months in relation to a taxpayer wishing to propose an adjustment to any assessment 
they receive). Agreement may be reached at any stage in the dispute resolution process, but, if 
the matter remains unresolved, the NZ Commissioner's practice is that generally all matters 
will be referred to the Disputes Review Unit (DRU (NZ)) (formerly the Adjudication Unit) for 
adjudication of the disputed issue(s) (see section 1.1.2.2 below).  
 
                                                          
8 Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 4, at [164] and Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06”, above n 4, at [193]. 
9 Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 4, at [166] and Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06”, above n 4, at [195]. 
10 TAA 1994, s 89M. While the disclosure notice may be issued at any time after the NOPA (NZ), it is usually 
issued at the end of the conference stage. See Inland Revenue Disputing an assessment: What to do if you dispute 
an assessment (IR 776, April 2012) [“IR 776”] at 10 and Inland Revenue Disputing a notice of proposed 
adjustment: What to do if Inland Revenue disputes your assessment (IR 777, January 2012) [“IR 777”] at 8. 
11 TAA 1994, s 89M(4), (6). 
12 TAA 1994, s 138G. 
13 TAA 1994, s 89M(8). 
14 Section 89M(13) of the TAA 1994 also provides that the parties may, at any time, agree to further information 
being added to either of their SOPs. 
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As with the conference phase, the adjudication process is not legislated for and is an 
administrative part of the dispute resolution process. Once a conclusion is reached by the DRU 
(NZ), the Inland Revenue officer in charge of the dispute will implement any of the DRU’s 
(NZ) decisions, including issuing a notice of assessment to the taxpayer where applicable. If 
the DRU (NZ) decides the issue in favour of the taxpayer, Inland Revenue has no right of 
appeal against the decision and the dispute comes to an end. If the decision is in favour of the 
NZ Commissioner, then the taxpayer can refer the matter to the TRA15 or the High Court.16 
Where certain grounds are met, decisions of the TRA may be appealed to the High Court17 and 
decisions of the High Court may be appealed to the Court of Appeal. Finally, an appeal from 
the Appeal Court may be appealed to the Supreme Court only with the Supreme Court’s leave.  
 
1.1.2 Inland Revenue administrative dispute resolution processes 
The two administrative (non-legislated) processes in the New Zealand tax dispute resolution 
procedures, Inland Revenue conferences and adjudication by Inland Revenue’s DRU (NZ), are 
outlined below in sections 1.1.2.1 and 1.1.2.2, respectively.  
 
1.1.2.1 Inland Revenue conferences 
If matters remain in dispute after the filing of the NOPA (NZ) and NOR, parties will generally 
attend a conference (usually with their legal representatives) to discuss, clarify and try to 
resolve the differences in their understanding of the various facts and issues.18 As noted above, 
the conference phase of the dispute process is an administrative practice and is therefore, not 
mandatory. However, it is encouraged as a means for resolving disputes, where possible, 
without the need to proceed to adjudication or court proceedings.  
 
From 1 April 2010 Inland Revenue introduced conference facilitation as a feature in the 
conference stage of the dispute resolution process. Facilitation is optional for all taxpayers in a 
dispute with Inland Revenue and a conference can be held without a facilitator. The 
administration of facilitated conferences is overseen by the Specialist Advice team within 
                                                          
15 Up until 28 August 2011, there was an option for taxpayers to elect for matters to be heard in the small claims 
jurisdiction of the TRA. This option was available if the amount of tax in dispute was less than $30,000 and the 
taxpayer had made such an election in the NOPA (NZ) or NOR. These disputes were not required to complete the 
remainder of the dispute process (from the point of election) and no SOP was required to be issued by either party. 
However, the small claims jurisdiction was removed with effect from 29 August 2011 by section 167 of the 
Taxation (Tax Administration and Remedial Matters) Act 2011. 
16 For the majority of challenges, the TRA is usually the first forum where proceedings are filed. The TRA is less 
formal, the cost of hearings is generally lower than in the High Court, TRA hearings are not open to the public 
and TRA judges are tax specialists. For a further discussion of the differences between the TRA and the High 
Court forums, see Inland Revenue “IR 776”, above n 10, at 21 and Inland Revenue “IR 777”, above n 10, at 20. 
17 A decision of the TRA may be appealed to the High Court if it involves: a question of law; or a question of fact, 
if the amount of disputed tax, duty or tax credit is $2,000 or more, or if the amount of disputed loss is $4,000 or 
more: Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994, s 26. 
18 Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 4, at [130] and Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06”, above n 4, at [159]. 
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Inland Revenue’s Investigations and Advice group. Inland Revenue’s offer to the taxpayer for 
facilitation is made in writing within one month from the date of issue of the taxpayer’s NOR, 
or the taxpayer’s rejection of the NZ Commissioner’s NOR (whichever is applicable).19 
 
Conference facilitation involves an independent Inland Revenue facilitator who promotes and 
encourages structured discussion between Inland Revenue officers and the taxpayer on an 
informed basis and with a bona fide intention of resolving the dispute.20 The facilitator is an 
Inland Revenue officer, with sufficient technical knowledge, who has not been involved in the 
dispute or given advice on the dispute prior to the conference stage.21 Conference facilitators 
are selected from Inland Revenue’s Office of the Chief Tax Counsel (OCTC), Legal and 
Technical Services (LTS), Litigation Management Unit and Investigations at the management 
or senior technical level.22 
 
The conference facilitator is not responsible for making any decision in respect of the dispute 
(or settlement), but rather facilitates the discussion and resolution of differences and ultimately 
determines when the conference phase has come to an end.23 While conference facilitation is 
regarded as a form of ADR, it can be distinguished from mediation in the respect that its 
purpose is not to find a “mediated settlement”,24 but rather to allow for the “exchange of 
material information relating to the dispute.”25 If appropriate, the conference facilitator can 
assist the parties to hold settlement discussions, but this will be separate from any facilitated 
conference.26 The conference phase is generally expected to be completed within three months, 
but this may vary depending on the facts and complexities of the specific case.27 There is no 
charge to the taxpayer for conference facilitation. 
 
  
                                                          
19 Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 4, at [137] and Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06”, above n 4, at [166].  
20 Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 4, at [135] and Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06”, above n 4, at [164]. 
21 Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 4, at [135] and Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06”, above n 4, at [164].  
22 As at October 2016, Inland Revenue had “some 70 senior experienced staff trained and accredited to carry out 
facilitations … the facilitators all underwent training provided by the Arbitrators and Mediators Institute of New 
Zealand Inc (AMINZ). Once facilitators were sufficiently trained and experienced, they were then accredited as 
Associate members of AMINZ.”: Geoff Clews and Ele Duncan, above n 6, at 109.  
23 Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 4, at [136] and Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06”, above n 4, at [165]. 
24 Shelley Griffiths “Resolving New Zealand Tax Disputes: Finding the Balance Between Judicial Determination 
and Administrative Process” (paper presented to Australasian Tax Teachers Association Conference, Sydney, 16-
18 January 2012) at 11. 
25 Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 4, at [130] and Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06”, above n 4, at [159]. 
26 Whitiskie, above n 6, at 19. 
27 Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 4, at [144] and Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06”, above n 4, at [173]. 
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1.1.2.2 Adjudication by the Disputes Review Unit 
The DRU (NZ) is part of the OCTC based in Wellington and is part of Inland Revenue’s 
National Office. The DRU (NZ) is separate to Inland Revenue’s audit/investigation function 
and takes a fresh look at the dispute, providing an independent and impartial decision on the 
issues.28  
 
Each dispute is considered by a team of three people who all have professional legal and/or 
accounting qualifications and have experience in researching and analysing tax issues.29 The 
team members have differing levels of seniority and involvement in the consideration of the 
dispute.30 The final adjudication decision is made by a Disputes Review Manager. The 
adjudication team takes into account all evidence sent through to the DRU (NZ) at the time of 
the referral. This can include the “NOPA, NOR, notice rejecting the NOR, conference notes, 
both parties’ SOP, additional information, material evidence including expert opinions … and 
any recordings of discussions held during the conference.”31 Generally the adjudication team 
considers the dispute based on the materials provided and does not usually conduct further 
investigation into the matter. 
 
A comprehensive adjudication report is produced and provided to the parties.32 In addition to 
providing the adjudication decision and the reasons for that decision, the report also sets out 
the facts of the dispute, the issues that need to be addressed, the analysis of the legal issues 
involved, the application of that legal analysis to the facts of the dispute and the conclusions 
reached on each issue.33 A letter setting out a summary of the report is also sent to both parties. 
Any necessary assessments or amended assessments are made as directed by the Disputes 
Review Manager.34 As stated in section 1.1.1 above, if the DRU (NZ) decides in favour of the 
taxpayer, Inland Revenue has no right of appeal against the DRU’s (NZ) decision. However, if 
the taxpayer is dissatisfied with the DRU’s (NZ) decision, they may start proceedings before 
the TRA or the High Court. Taxpayers have two months from the date of the notice of 
assessment or amended assessment to file proceedings.35  
 
                                                          
28 Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 4, at [252] and Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06”, above n 4, at [275]. 
29 Inland Revenue “The Disputes Review Unit - its role in the dispute resolution process” (14 July 2015) 
<http://www.ird.govt.nz/technical-tax/general-articles/ga-adjudication-unit.html> (last accessed 7 November 
2016). 
30 Inland Revenue, above n 29. 
31 Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 4, at [258] and Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06”, above n 4, at [284]. 
32 While adjudication reports are utilised internally by Inland Revenue as precedents for future matters, the general 
body of taxpayers has no such access to these reports (even in redacted form): Mark Keating Tax Disputes in New 
Zealand: A Practical Guide (CCH, Auckland, 2012) at 234. 
33 Inland Revenue, above n 29. 
34 Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 4, at [271]; Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06”, above n 4, at [295]. 
35 Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 4, at [270] and Inland Revenue “SPS 16/06”, above n 4, at [294]. 
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Unlike conference facilitation, adjudication by the DRU (NZ) does not fall within the definition 
of ADR used in this study, “an umbrella term for processes, other than judicial determination, 
in which an impartial person assists those in a dispute to resolve the issues between them.”36 
This is because, notwithstanding that the adjudicator is an impartial Inland Revenue officer 
who is independent of Inland Revenue’s audit function, the two parties do not appear before 
the adjudicator in person. Thus, the adjudicator’s decision is made solely “on the papers.”37 
Furthermore, the DRU (NZ) does not perform a mediation or arbitration function. 
 
The DRU (NZ) does not have any direct communication with either the Inland Revenue 
officers or the taxpayer involved in the dispute during the course of the adjudication. To 
maintain transparency and independence, the Senior Technical and Liaison Officer (also part 
of the OCTC) handles any necessary correspondence or other communication between the 
adjudication team and either of the parties.38 Thus, the DRU (NZ) operates “impartially and 
independently.”39 There is no charge for the review of a dispute by the DRU (NZ).  
 
1.1.3 Alternative dispute resolution during the litigation stage 
At the litigation stage of tax disputes, ADR is theoretically available to parties in the TRA and 
the High Court. The District Court Rules 201440 and the High Court Rules 2016 both 
contemplate that where the question of settlement is raised in the course of case management, 
the practice is usually to inquire of the parties as to whether they wish to attend a private 
mediation. If they do not, then consideration is given to allocating a judicial settlement 
conference.41 Rule 7.2(3)(d) of the District Court Rules 2014 provides that if a short trial is not 
allocated, a judicial settlement conference must be held unless: (i) the Judge directs otherwise; 
or (ii) the parties agree to participate in ADR. Rule 7.79(5) of the High Court Rules 2016 
provides that a Judge may, with the consent of the parties, make an order at any time directing 
                                                          
36 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council Dispute Resolution Terms: The Use of Terms in 
(Alternative) Dispute Resolution (Barton, 2003) 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/LegalSystem/AlternateDisputeResolution/Pages/NADRACpublications.aspx> (last 
accessed 7 November 2016) at 4. 
37 Keating, above n 32, at 230. See also, Inland Revenue “SPS 16/05”, above n 6, at [263] and Inland Revenue 
“SPS 16/06”, above n 6, at [289]. 
38 Inland Revenue, above n 29.  
39 Inland Revenue, above n 29. 
40 Regulation 4 of the Taxation Review Authorities Regulations 1998 provides that the District Court Rules 2009 
(replaced by the District Court Rules 2014 on 1 July 2014) apply to the commencement, interlocutory steps, and 
conduct of proceedings in the TRA as if those proceedings were civil proceedings in the District Court to the 
extent that they are not inconsistent with the Taxation Review Authorities Regulations 1998, the Taxation Review 
Authorities Act 1994 or the TAA 1994. 
41 Courts of New Zealand Judicial Settlement Conferences: High Court Guidelines (April 2012) at [1.4]. 
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the parties to attempt to settle their dispute by the form of mediation or other ADR (to be 
specified in the order) agreed to by the parties.42  
 
Rule 7.3 of the District Court Rules 2014 and rule 7.79(1) of the High Court Rules 2016 allow 
a Judge to, at any time before the hearing of a proceeding, convene a conference of the parties 
in chambers for the purpose of negotiating for a settlement of the proceeding or of any issue, 
and to assist in those negotiations. However, a Judge who presides at a conference generally 
may not preside at the hearing of the proceeding unless all parties taking part in the conference 
consent and the Judge is satisfied there are no circumstances that would make it inappropriate 
for the Judge to do so.43 Rule 7.79(3) of the High Court Rules 2016 further provides that a 
Judge may, at any time during the hearing of a proceeding, with the consent of the parties, 
convene a conference of the parties for the purpose of negotiating for a settlement of the 
proceeding or of any issue. 
 
Judicial settlement conferences can take various forms.44 With respect to judicial settlement 
conferences in the context of the TRA and the High Court, “the judges’ role is expressly 
provided to be one of assisting the parties in the negotiation of a settlement of the proceeding 
or of any of the issues in the proceeding.”45 The judge does not provide an evaluation or an 
opinion of the successful outcome of the litigation.46 It thus follows that judicial settlement 
conferences in the TRA and the High Court fall within the definition of ADR (stated above in 
section 1.1.2.2) used in this study. 
  
                                                          
42 Arbitration is also potentially available in the High Court under r 7.80 of the High Court Rules 2016. 
43 High Court Rules 2016, r 7.79(2); District Court Rules 2014, r 7.3(6). 
44 For a further discussion on variations in judicial settlement conferencing, see Tania Sourdin “Five Reasons Why 
Judges Should Conduct Settlement Conferences” (2011) 37 Mon LR 145. 
45 Courts of New Zealand, above n 41, at [2.1]. See also, John Faire, Tom Ingram and Helen Rice “Judicial 
Settlement Conferences: A 360 Perspective” (New Zealand Law Society Seminar, Wellington, 10 November 
2008).  
46 Courts of New Zealand, above n 41, at [2.2]. 
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Appendix 1.2: The Australian Tax Dispute Resolution Procedures 
1.2.1 The Australian tax dispute resolution procedures: Overview1 
Under the current self-assessment system in Australia, most Australian taxpayers have an 
obligation to provide the details of their taxable income, in the form of an annual tax return. 
On this basis, the Australian Commissioner of Taxation (the Australian Commissioner) is 
required to raise an assessment under section 161 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
(Cth) (ITAA 1936 (Cth)), and to provide that assessment to the taxpayer. Where there is a tax 
debt, the taxpayer is obliged to pay that debt by the due date. Otherwise, where there is a tax 
refund due, that amount will be repaid by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). 
 
A tax dispute occurring between a taxpayer and the ATO would typically commence at the 
point at which the assessment is under review. There may be an audit of the taxpayer’s affairs 
or a post-assessment review of their affairs. Thus, in the review period following self-
assessment, an informal dispute may be considered as occurring.2 If this dispute cannot be 
resolved, an amended assessment will be issued by the ATO, with the result of amended taxable 
income. At this point, a dissatisfied taxpayer may formally lodge an objection in accordance 
with Part IVC of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (TAA 1953 (Cth)).3 The tax 
dispute is said to have formally commenced at this stage. 
 
An objection must be lodged with the Australian Commissioner within two years of the 
Australian Commissioner’s assessment (or other taxation decision)4 for most individuals and 
very small business taxpayers, within four years for taxpayers with more complex affairs (or 
in the case of companies, superannuation funds, approved deposit funds (ADFs) and pooled 
superannuation trusts (PSTs), four years after the deemed service of the deemed notice of 
assessment) or within 60 days for all other cases.5 Where a valid objection to an assessment or 
other taxation decision has been lodged by the taxpayer, an internal review of the assessment 
                                                          
1 The material in Appendix 1.2 was reviewed by Michael Walpole (Professor and Head of School, School of 
Taxation and Business Law (incorporating Atax), University of New South Wales Business School) on 9 July 
2014. The researcher is grateful for his feedback.  
2 The ATO’s Code of Settlement states that settlement negotiations or offers can be initiated by any party to the 
dispute and they can occur at any stage, including prior to assessments being raised: Australian Taxation Office 
“Practice Statement Law Administration 2015/1: Code of settlement” (2015) 
<http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?docid=%22PSR%2FPS20151%2FNAT%2FATO%2F00001%22> (last 
accessed 7 November 2016) [“PS LA 2015/1”] at [4]. The usual form of the agreement is a Deed of Settlement, 
which includes, inter alia, an obligation of the taxpayer not to object to or appeal against the assessments agreed 
under the settlement: at [8]. 
3 Certain decisions of the Australian Commissioner which do not actually relate to the assessment or calculation 
of tax, such as the exercise of one of the Australian Commissioner’s many discretions, may be reviewed under 
the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). 
4 A “taxation decision” includes an initial assessment issued by the ATO, amended assessment, determination, 
private ruling or other decision of the ATO: TAA 1953 (Cth), s 14ZQ.  
5 TAA 1953 (Cth), s 14ZW. 
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will be conducted by an ATO officer who is a separate from the ATO officer which made the 
initial taxation decision.6 As from 1 July 2015, the objection officer will be from the ATO’s 
Review and Dispute Resolution (RDR) business line.7 Note that the internal review relates to 
matters raised in that objection, and not in respect of the entire assessment.8  
 
Sixty days must pass before the taxpayer can demand a decision to the objection. If no objection 
decision is provided after 60 days, s 14ZYA(2) of the TAA 1953 (Cth) permits the taxpayer to 
make a written request to the Australian Commissioner for an objection decision within a 
further 60 days. If no decision is made within 60 days of the Australian Commissioner 
receiving that notice, the Australian Commissioner is deemed to have disallowed the 
objection.9 A deemed disallowance is subject to review or appeal in the same way as any other 
objection decision. 
 
A taxpayer dissatisfied with the Australian Commissioner’s objection decision, (for example, 
a decision to disallow or only allow in part an objection), has the option of either applying to 
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for a review of the decision or appealing to the 
Federal Court of Australia, within 60 days of being served with a notice of the objection 
decision.10  
 
The AAT was established by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AATA 
1975 (Cth)) and may exercise all the powers and discretions of the Australian Commissioner, 
but only for the purposes of reviewing the Australian Commissioner’s objection decision. The 
AAT may confirm, vary or set aside the Australian Commissioner’s objection decision. 
However, the AAT does not have the power to actually make, amend or set aside an assessment. 
Up until 1 July 2015, if the amount of tax in dispute was under $A5,000, an application for 
review by the AAT could be made to be heard by the Small Taxation Claims Tribunal (STCT) 
rather than the Taxation Appeals Division (TAD)11 of the AAT. The STCT was intended to 
provide a cheaper and less formal means of resolving tax disputes, in particular by encouraging 
                                                          
6 Australian Taxation Office “How we deal with your objection” (1 November 2016) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Dispute-or-object-to-an-ATO-decision/Object-to-an-ATO-decision/How-we-
deal-with-your-objection/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
7 The RDR business line is part of the ATO’s Law Design and Practice group and was established to oversee and 
manage disputes. RDR is led by the Deputy Commissioner: Debbie Hastings “Reinventing the way we manage 
tax disputes” (speech to the Tax Institute of Australia Financial Services Conference 2015, Surfers Paradise, 20 
February 2015). 
8 Binh Tran-Nam and Michael Walpole “Independent tax dispute resolution and social justice in Australia” (2012) 
35(2) UNSWLJ 470 at 481. 
9 TAA 1953 (Cth), s 14ZYA(3). 
10 TAA 1953 (Cth), ss 14ZZC and 14ZZN. 
11 Now referred to as the Taxation and Commercial Division: Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015 (Cth), s 17A. 
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mediation.12 The Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015 (Cth) abolished the concept of the STCT 
as part of an amalgamation of the AAT. Applications that were dealt with in the STCT are now 
heard by the Taxation and Commercial Division of the AAT. However, the lower application 
fee that was payable in relation to applications of that kind has been maintained. 
 
The Australian Commissioner or the taxpayer may appeal to the Federal Court from a decision 
of the AAT on a question of law only. The appeal is restricted to that question of law and does 
not amount to a fresh hearing of the matter. An appeal to the Federal Court is heard by a single 
judge (unless a judge of the Federal Court presided in the AAT in which case the appeal must 
be heard by a full bench of the Federal Court) and the Federal Court may make any order as it 
thinks fit, including an order confirming or varying the decision, although it cannot actually 
amend an assessment.13 If dissatisfied with the Federal Court’s decision, the taxpayer or the 
Australian Commissioner can appeal against the decision to the full Federal Court (unless it 
has already sat in the circumstances outlined in parenthesis above), and ultimately, with leave, 
to the High Court of Australia. 
 
1.2.2 Australian Taxation Office alternative dispute resolution 
Sections 1.2.2.1 and 1.2.2.2 outline Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in the ATO 
generally and the ATO in-house facilitation process, respectively. 
 
1.2.2.1 Alternative dispute resolution in the Australian Taxation Office generally 
The ATO’s Practice Statement Law Administration 2013/3 (PS LA 2013/3)14 states that: 
“When disputes cannot be resolved by early engagement and direct negotiation, the ATO is 
committed to using ADR where appropriate to resolve disputes.”15 PS LA 2013/3 provides that, 
although there is no optimal time for ADR, it may potentially be appropriate: after the ATO 
issues a position paper during an audit; during a review at the objection stage before a final 
decision is made by an ATO officer; or during the litigation stage.16  
 
The ATO’s obligations with respect to ADR come from a number of sources. Commonwealth 
agencies and their legal services providers have an obligation under Appendix B to the 
                                                          
12 CCH Australian Master Tax Guide 2015 (56th ed, CCH, Sydney, 2015) at [¶28-090]. For further details on the 
differences between the former STCT and TAD divisions of the AAT, see Tran-Nam and Walpole, above n 8, at 
483-484. 
13 TAA 1953 (Cth), s 14ZZP.  
14 Australian Taxation Office “Practice Statement Law Administration 2013/3: Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR) in ATO Disputes” (2013) <http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?locid='PSR/PS20133/NAT/ATO'> (last 
accessed 7 November 2016) [“PS LA 2013/3”] provides instruction to ATO personnel on what policies and 
guidelines must be followed when attempting to resolve or limit disputes by means of ADR. 
15 At [5]. 
16 At [17]. 
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Attorney-General's Legal Services Directions 2005 (Cth)17 to act as model litigants in the 
conduct of litigation and in ADR. The model litigant obligation requires agencies to endeavour 
where possible to avoid, prevent and limit the scope of legal proceedings by considering ADR 
before initiating legal proceedings and by participating in ADR where appropriate. The 
requirement to consider ADR is a continuing obligation from the time litigation is contemplated 
and throughout the course of litigation.18  
 
Parties to tax disputes under review in the Federal Court of Australia are obliged under the 
Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth) to file “genuine steps” statements outlining what steps 
they have taken to resolve their dispute or the reasons why they have not taken any.19 Hence, 
the Act encourages parties to take genuine steps to resolve a dispute (including in tax and 
superannuation disputes) before commencing legal proceedings in the Federal Court of 
Australia. Genuine steps that may be taken to resolve a dispute include considering whether 
the dispute can be resolved by an ADR process.20  
 
The basis for the ATO’s settlement of tax disputes is set out in the ATO’s Code of Settlement.21 
Settling disputed matters is consistent with good management of the tax system, overall 
fairness and best use of ATO and other community resources.22 This has become known as 
“the good management rule”, which has been endorsed by the courts and is reinforced by the 
Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth). It imposes an obligation 
on the Australian Commissioner to manage the affairs of the ATO in a way that promotes the 
efficient, effective and ethical use of Commonwealth resources. The Code of Settlement 
provides that ADR approaches, including mediation, may be used as part of settlement 
negotiations.23 
 
ADR is generally initiated by agreement between the parties. PS LA 2013/3 provides that ATO 
personnel involved in disputes should “actively look for opportunities where ADR can help to 
                                                          
17 Issued under the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 55ZF. 
18 Legal Services Directions 2005 (Cth), Appendix B, ss 5.1 and 2(e)(iii). 
19 Civil Disputes Resolution Act 2011 (Cth), ss 6 and 7. 
20 Civil Disputes Resolution Act 2011 (Cth), s 4(1)(d). 
21 Australian Taxation Office “PS LA 2015/1”, above n 2 and Australian Taxation Office “Code of settlement” 
(18 August 2015) <https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Dispute-or-object-to-an-ATO-decision/In-detail/Avoiding-
and-resolving-disputes/Settlement/Code-of-settlement/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). See also, Australian 
Taxation Office “Practical guide to the ATO Code of settlement” (21 August 2015) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Dispute-or-object-to-an-ATO-decision/In-detail/Avoiding-and-resolving-
disputes/Settlement/A-practical-guide-to-the-ATO-code-of-settlement/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
22 Australian Taxation Office “PS LA 2015/1”, above n 2, at [3]; Australian Taxation Office “Code of Settlement”, 
above n 21, at [3]. 
23 Australian Taxation Office “PS LA 2015/1”, above n 2, at [4]; Australian Taxation Office “Code of Settlement”, 
above n 21, at [4];  
342 
 
resolve or progress the dispute.”24 Any opportunities identified should be discussed with the 
relevant manager(s) and appropriate technical staff (including RDR officers) before 
approaching the taxpayer or their advisors.25 
 
Taxpayers can also request ADR. Requests should usually be directed to the tax officer 
managing the dispute, who will discuss the request with the relevant manager(s) and 
appropriate technical staff (including RDR officers) before responding.26 If ADR is requested 
by a taxpayer and the ATO considers that ADR is not appropriate, the ATO will communicate 
the reasons to the taxpayer.27  
 
If parties choose to participate in ADR, they will need to decide on the type of ADR process 
which will best suit their needs and the context of the dispute. PS LA 2013/3 classifies, and 
provides examples of, the ADR processes that may generally be employed. These processes 
are: facilitative (for example, mediation), advisory (for example, early neutral evaluation 
(ENE) or case appraisal) or determinative (for example, expert determination or arbitration).28 
Blended processes where the ADR practitioner plays multiple roles may also be utilised (for 
example, conferencing or conciliation).29 
 
For ADR processes other than those conducted by the AAT or the Federal Court of Australia, 
the ADR practitioner’s fees are ordinarily shared between the parties.30 ATO RDR officers can 
assist in the selection and engagement of external ADR practitioners (who are usually former 
Federal Court or High Court judges).31 Taxpayers’ review and appeal rights are unaffected by 
participating in ADR, subject to the terms of any settlement reached and compliance with the 
legislative timeframes.32 Unless the parties agree otherwise, all ADR processes are conducted 
in a confidential and on a “without prejudice” basis.33 Any communications between parties 
for the purposes of an ADR process is privileged and cannot be used in legal proceedings 
without the consent of the other party.34 
 
                                                          
24 Australian Taxation Office “PS LA 2013/3”, above n 14, at [20]. 
25 At [20]. 
26 At [21]. 
27 At [22]. 
28 At [23]. However, arbitration is regarded as “generally not appropriate for tax disputes”: at [24]. 
29 At [23].  
30 At [30]. 
31 At [32]. 
32 At [52]. 
33 At [41]. 
34 At [42]. 
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1.2.2.2 Australian Taxation Office in-house facilitation process 
During November 2012 to April 2013 the ATO conducted an ADR facilitation pilot using ATO 
facilitators to resolve smaller and less complex indirect tax objections involving issues such as 
substantiation and penalties. The pilot implemented a recommendation made by the Inspector-
General of Taxation (IGT) in May 2012 in his Review into the Australian Taxation Office's Use 
of Early and Alternative Dispute Resolution.35 Following a review of the pilot, with effect from 
1 April 2014, the ATO rolled out the use of facilitation for a range of disputes arising from 
audits and objections in indirect tax, small business and individual taxpayers, and private 
groups and high wealth individuals.36  
 
ATO facilitation is a process where “an impartial ATO facilitator meets with the taxpayer/their 
agent and the ATO case officers to identify issues in dispute, develop options, consider 
alternatives, and attempt to reach an agreement.”37 The facilitators are ATO officers who have 
been trained in facilitation and mediation techniques but are not usually accredited mediators. 
The facilitator will also not have had any previous involvement in the dispute. The ATO state 
that “the facilitator will not establish facts, take sides, give advice, make a decision or decide 
who is ‘right or wrong.’”38 The role of the facilitator is to guide the parties through the process 
and assist them to ensure that there are open lines of clear communication, and messages are 
correctly received. 
 
Facilitations are usually held face-to-face, although in some instances it may be necessary to 
conduct a facilitation by telephone or video link. Facilitation may be particularly appropriate 
if other direct means of discussing and resolving a dispute with the taxpayer have failed.39 In 
such situations the ATO officers responsible for the taxpayer’s audit or objection may consider 
whether facilitation would be “a proportionate and appropriate response in the context of the 
dispute.”40 Taxpayers are not obliged to participate in facilitation if it is offered by the ATO. 
Taxpayers may also request facilitation (by email) to resolve their dispute after discussing their 
request with the ATO officer responsible for their audit or objection, or to their manager. There 
is no charge to taxpayers for the ATO facilitation service. However, taxpayers may choose to 
have representation at the facilitation at their own cost. 
 
                                                          
35 Inspector-General of Taxation Review into the Australian Taxation Office’s Use of Early and Alternative 
Dispute Resolution: A Report to the Assistant Treasurer (Sydney, May 2012) at 44, [3.99]. 
36 Australian Taxation Office “In-House facilitation” (19 November 2015) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Dispute-or-object-to-an-ATO-decision/In-detail/Avoiding-and-resolving-
disputes/Alternative-Dispute-Resolution/In-house-Facilitation/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
37 Australian Taxation Office, above n 36. 
38 Australian Taxation Office, above n 36. 
39 Australian Taxation Office, above n 36. 
40 Australian Taxation Office, above n 36. 
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If a resolution is reached at the facilitation, the facilitator will assist the taxpayer and the ATO 
officers to record the terms of any agreement. If the dispute is not resolved, taxpayers’ review 
and appeal rights are unaffected by participating in the facilitation process, subject to 
complying with the normal timeframes. 
 
1.2.3 Alternative dispute resolution during the litigation stage 
As outlined in PS LA 2013/3, parties to a tax dispute may participate in ADR during the 
litigation stage.41 Both the AAT and Federal Court of Australia can direct the ATO and the 
taxpayer to participate in certain ADR proceedings.42 Furthermore, the Civil Dispute 
Resolution Act 2011 (Cth) requires all parties appearing at the Federal Court of Australia to 
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the judge that they have taken genuine steps (which can 
include the consideration of ADR) to resolve their dispute before coming to a formal hearing 
before the Court.43 The following sections outline the ADR processes available in the AAT 
(section 1.2.3.1) and in the Federal Court of Australia (section 1.2.3.2). 
 
1.2.3.1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
The AATA 1975 (Cth) was amended effective from 16 May 2005 to include ADR provisions. 
Section 3(1) of the amending legislation defines “alternative dispute resolution processes” to 
include conferencing, mediation, neutral evaluation, case appraisal, conciliations and 
procedures or services specified in the regulations. However, specifically excluded from ADR 
in the AAT are arbitration and court procedures or services.44  
 
ADR in the AAT includes the Tribunal’s routine practice of referring all matters to a conference 
moderated by a Conference Registrar.45 Such conference may be held in person or conducted 
over the phone. The process encourages the parties to explore the issues in dispute and 
evidentiary requirements whilst assessing settlement possibilities. The Conference Registrars 
typically assess the suitability of a matter for any further ADR processes in the AAT. 
 
ADR processes may be conducted by a member or officer of the AAT or a person engaged for 
the purpose and considered to be suitable by the Registrar.46 Parties will not incur any costs of 
the ADR unless an external ADR practitioner is requested by the parties. 
 
                                                          
41 Australian Taxation Office “PS LA 2013/3”, above n 14, at [17]. 
42 AATA 1975 (Cth), s 34A; Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 53A. 
43 Civil Disputes Resolution Act 2011 (Cth), ss 6 and 7. 
44 AATA 1975 (Cth), s 3(1)(g), (h). 
45 AATA 1975 (Cth), s 34A. 
46 AATA 1975 (Cth), ss 34A and 34H. 
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If a dispute remains unresolved following a conference and/or other ADR process in the AAT, 
it will generally proceed to an AAT hearing. Any admissions or representations made during 
the ADR process are inadmissible at the hearing, with an exception of a case appraisal report 
or a neutral evaluation report which can be admitted into evidence subject to any objections 
from the parties.47 A tribunal member involved in the ADR process may sit on a final hearing 
of the matter, subject to any objections from the parties.48  
 
1.2.3.2 Federal Court of Australia 
Section 53A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) allows the Court to refer any 
proceedings or part of proceedings to arbitration, mediation or “an alternative dispute 
resolution process.”49 However, the Federal Court will not refer proceedings to arbitration 
without the consent of the parties. Part 28 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) addresses 
ADR in the Federal Court. Rule 28.01 provides that parties must and the Court will, consider 
ADR, as early as practicable and r 28.02 allows a party to apply to the Court to be referred to 
ADR.  
 
Mediation is the most commonly used ADR process in taxation disputes in the Federal Court. 
Most mediations are conducted by Registrars. However, occasionally the Court will refer the 
case to an external lawyer to conduct the mediation. Where the mediation is conducted 
externally the parties will pay the agreed fee to the mediator. Section 53B of the Federal Court 
of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) provides that words said or admissions made at conferences 
conducted by a mediator are not admissible in any court. Where a part of the case is settled at 
mediation, r 28.23 of the Federal Court Rules 2011(Cth) allows the mediator to report to the 
Court only on the agreement reached between the parties. At the end of the mediation the only 
other record of the mediation kept by the Court is a note that the mediation took place. 
 
1.2.4 Other Australian Taxation Office dispute resolution initiatives 
The following sections outline a number of other ATO dispute resolution initiatives. These 
include the ATO’s Disputes Policy and Dispute Management Plan (section 1.2.4.1) as well as 
ATO processes which are aimed at early engagement and resolution of disputes: ATO 
independent review (section 1.2.4.2), the early assessment and resolution (EAR) process in 
AAT disputes (section 1.2.4.3); and the early engagement process for large business taxpayers 
(section 1.2.4.4). 
 
                                                          
47 AATA 1975 (Cth), s 34E. 
48 AATA 1975 (Cth), s 34F. 
49 Non-binding ENE is an example of “an alternative dispute resolution process” contemplated under s 53A of the 
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) used in practice in the Federal Court of Australia. 
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1.2.4.1 Australian Taxation Office Disputes Policy and Dispute Management Plan 
In September 2012 the ATO published a Disputes Policy50 which “aims to provide a 
coordinated and consistent approach to managing disputes” and is the supporting document for 
the ATO’s Dispute Management Plan.51 By providing information in the Disputes Policy about 
their overall approach to dispute management and how they deal with specific types of disputes 
(including tax and superannuation disputes), the ATO aims to promote a resolution culture 
based on the following aspects: effective communication; genuine engagement; collaboration; 
and strategies that are fair and proportionate to the matters in dispute and lead to early 
resolution at minimal cost.52 
 
In November 2012 the ATO published its first Dispute Management Plan 2012-1353 in 
response to a recommendation by the National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory 
Council (NADRAC) for all Commonwealth agencies to have such a plan in place.54 The 
Dispute Management Plan is the cornerstone for dispute management across the ATO and 
applies to all disputes at any stage within the ATO. The annually reviewed Dispute 





 Faster and earlier resolution of disputes; 
 Reduce the number of disputes; 
 Lower your costs and our costs; 
 Enhance our relationship with the community; 




 Avoid disputes where possible; 
                                                          
50 Australian Taxation Office “Disputes policy” (7 September 2015) <https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Dispute-
or-object-to-an-ATO-decision/In-detail/Avoiding-and-resolving-disputes/Resolving-disputes/Disputes-policy/> 
(last accessed 7 November 2016). 
51 Australian Taxation Office Dispute management plan 2013-14 (Canberra, January 2014). 
52 Australian Taxation Office, above n 50. 
53 Australian Taxation Office Dispute management plan 2012-13 (Canberra, October 2012). 
54 See National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council The Resolve to Resolve – Embracing ADR to 
Improve Access to Justice in the Federal Jurisdiction (Barton, 2009) 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/LegalSystem/AlternateDisputeResolution/Pages/NADRACpublications.aspx> (last 
accessed 7 November 2016) at 120. 
55 Australian Taxation Office, above n 51. 
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 Resolve disputes in the simplest and most cost-effective manner taking into 
account the merits and the risks; 
 Resolve disputes as early as possible;  
 Clarify disputes by listening to each other’s views and considering all resolution 
options;  
 Manage disputes in a courteous and fair manner.  
 
The ATO has not released a Dispute Management Plan subsequent to the 2013-14 plan. 
Personal correspondence by the researcher with an ATO RDR Director indicates that there are 
currently no plans by the ATO to update the Dispute Management Plan as “the view is that the 
content from this plan has been rolled up into general dispute management information 
available on the website.”56  
 
Both the Disputes Policy and Dispute Management Plan reflect the ATO’s “intention to 
continue the shift away from adversarial processes, such as litigation, to resolve disputes.”57 
The ATO believe that ongoing dialogue is essential to effective management of disputes. It 
promotes a complete understanding of the facts and circumstances of the dispute. It also 
provides an opportunity for both sides to explain their views and discuss what options are 
available to resolve or limit the scope of the dispute, or remove any blockers to its progress. As 
noted in section 1.2.2.1 above, where appropriate, the ATO will use ADR at any stage to 
resolve the dispute and avoid litigation. However, they “recognise the importance of judicial 
involvement in some cases.”58  
 
1.2.4.2 Australian Taxation Office independent review 
The independent review function took effect from 1 July 2013 and is headed by the Deputy 
Commissioner, RDR. The process is available during the audit stage of the dispute resolution 
procedures. Large business taxpayers (taxpayers with an annual turnover greater than $A250 
million) can request an independent review if they disagree with some or all of a Statement of 
Audit Position received from the ATO regarding income tax, excise, goods and services tax 
(GST), or other forms of tax.59 Taxpayers have 10 working days from when they receive the 
ATO’s Statement of Audit Position to request in writing (including by email) an independent 
                                                          
56 Email from [redacted] (Director, [redacted], Australian Taxation Office) to Melinda Jone regarding the ATO 
Dispute Management Plan (30 June 2015). 
57 Australian Taxation Office, above n 50. 
58 Australian Taxation Office, above n 50. 
59 Australian Taxation Office “Independent review of the Statement of Audit Position for groups with a turnover 
greater than $250m” (7 June 2016) <https://www.ato.gov.au/general/dispute-or-object-to-an-ato-decision/in-
detail/avoiding-and-resolving-disputes/independent-review/independent-review-of-the-statement-of-audit-
position-for-groups-with-a-turnover-greater-than-$250m/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
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review. An independent review may only be requested once for each Statement of Audit 
Position issued. 
 
In an independent review, an independent technical officer outside of the audit area reviews 
the technical merits of the case prior to finalisation of the ATO audit position. The independent 
review is conducted by a senior officer from the ATO’s RDR business line (which is separate 
from the ATO’s Client Engagement group).60 The ATO officer will not have been previously 
involved in the audit and will bring an independent “fresh set of eyes” to the review.61 The 
independent reviewer will consider the merits of the case on the basis of the information already 
available to the Australian Commissioner. The independent reviewer generally will not 
consider new information submitted by the taxpayer.  
 
The independent review process also involves the independent reviewer conducting a case 
conference. A case conference is an informal meeting which provides an opportunity for the 
independent reviewer to discuss the issues with the taxpayer and the ATO audit team. It allows 
the independent reviewer to: confirm the agreed facts; determine and, if possible, narrow down 
the specific areas of disagreement; and ask questions to clarify issues giving rise to 
disagreement.62 The independent reviewer will not provide any observations, 
recommendations or preliminary conclusions during the case conference. The focus of the case 
conference is to discuss and clarify matters raised at audit for the benefit of the independent 
reviewer. Thus, the case conference “is not an ADR forum nor is it a forum to consider whether 
ADR is appropriate or available.”63 
 
The outcome of the independent review process is in the form of recommendations on what 
the independent reviewer considers is the better view of the facts and the application of the law 
to those facts. The independent reviewer will provide the taxpayer with a letter setting out the 
recommendations in relation to the ATO audit team’s Statement of Audit Position. The 
recommendations may also include the reviewer’s suggestions about the way the parties might 
attempt to resolve any remaining dispute, including through formal ADR. Independent reviews 
are generally required to be completed within 12 weeks. Once the independent review is 
finalised, the ATO audit team will complete the audit in accordance with the independent 
reviewer’s recommendations.  
  
                                                          
60 Prior to February 2016, the ATO’s Client Engagement group was known as the Compliance group.  
61 Australian Taxation Office, above n 59. 
62 Australian Taxation Office, above n 59. 
63 Australian Taxation Office, above n 59. 
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1.2.4.3 Early assessment and resolution process in Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
disputes 
The early assessment and resolution (EAR) process was introduced in July 2013 and is applied 
to all cases that are lodged with the AAT.64 Specialist senior ATO officers examine each new 
application to the AAT to look for opportunities to resolve the matter without a lengthy or 
costly tribunal process, saving resources for all parties. The process focuses on early 
engagement with the taxpayer (preferably in person), to listen, discuss and accept evidence of 
events where appropriate. The officer will also engage with other stakeholders in the ATO in 
attempt to resolve the dispute. The primary objective of the process is to bring forward 
resolution of disputes to an earlier point and prior to intensive and costly preparation by both 
parties. Where complete resolution is not achieved, the process aims to identify and narrow the 
issues in dispute, and ensure that only the right matters proceed to hearing without delay. 
Formal ADR processes may also be considered where attempts at direct negotiation have not 
resolved the matter.  
 
1.2.4.4 Early engagement for large business taxpayers 
The early engagement process, available from 1 November 2013, was established by the ATO 
to provide large business taxpayers with an opportunity to meet with the ATO prior to making 
a decision on whether to lodge an amendment or objection request.65 Early engagement is 
available for large business taxpayers who want to: correct an error they have made on a 
previously lodged income tax return; change a technical position they have adopted in an 
income tax return; or object to the assessment they have received for an income tax return.66 
Large business taxpayers can request an early engagement meeting by email. The request must 
include a brief summary of what the taxpayer wants to be corrected or changed, and why.67 
 
The early engagement approach “ensures that the right people are brought together to discuss 
how best to deal with the correction or change” and “it is expected that it will assist with faster 
resolution.”68 No binding opinions are given during the course of the early engagement. If it is 
agreed that seeking an amendment is the best option, the ATO officer involved in the early 
engagement will forward the taxpayer’s amendment request to the appropriate area without the 
need for the taxpayer to re-apply. If it is decided that lodging an objection is the better approach, 
                                                          
64 Australian Taxation Office “Early assessment and resolution” (26 May 2014) 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Dispute-or-object-to-an-ATO-decision/In-detail/Avoiding-and-resolving-
disputes/Litigation/Early-assessment-and-resolution/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
65 Australian Taxation Office “Early engagement – what to expect” (5 October 2016). 
<https://www.ato.gov.au/Business/Large-business/Objections-and-amendments/Early-engagement---what-to-
expect/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
66 Australian Taxation Office, above n 64. 
67 Australian Taxation Office, above n 64. 
68 Australian Taxation Office, above n 64. 
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the ATO officer will discuss with the taxpayer the information that the ATO will require to 
progress the objection. The ATO expect that only one early engagement meeting will be needed 
and that it will occur within two to three weeks of the ATO receiving a request for early 
engagement.69 
  
                                                          
69 Australian Taxation Office, above n 64. 
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Appendix 1.3: The United Kingdom’s Tax Dispute Resolution Procedures 
1.3.1 The United Kingdom tax dispute resolution procedures: Overview1 
The current self-assessment system in the United Kingdom (UK) requires certain taxpayers to 
file tax returns providing details of their taxable income by 31 October following the tax year 
(or 31 January for online returns).2 Based on the information reported by the taxpayer, HM 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) will calculate the tax they owe (or any repayments due, if 
applicable). HMRC carries out compliance checks (also known as enquiries) to make sure a 
specific tax return or claim is correct and/or to check that any payments are for the right amount 
and are made on time.3 Disputes between HMRC and a taxpayer can arise when there is a 
difference in view between HMRC and a taxpayer during a HMRC compliance check.4 
 
HMRC complete a compliance check by either sending the taxpayer one or more decision 
notices or by agreeing a contract settlement5 with the taxpayer. A decision notice can be any 
one of the following:6  
 
 an assessment or amendment to an assessment; 
 a penalty notice if a penalty is due;  
 a letter setting out what the final position is.  
 
When HMRC issue a decision notice, they will also notify the taxpayer whether the decision 
can be appealed against and if so, how to appeal and what time limits apply. Taxpayers who 
disagree with a direct tax decision of HMRC have 30 days from the date of the decision to 
appeal in writing to HMRC against it (and include an explanation of what they disagree with 
                                                          
1 The material in Appendix 1.3 was reviewed by Lynne Oats (Professor of Taxation and Accounting, University 
of Exeter Business School and Deputy Director, Tax Administration Research Centre) on 16 July 2014 and Philip 
Baker QC (Barrister, Field Court Tax Chambers, Gray’s Inn, London and Senior Visiting Fellow at the Institute 
of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London) on 27 July 2014. The researcher is grateful for their feedback. 
2 HM Revenue and Customs “Self Assessment tax returns” (25 October 2016) <https://www.gov.uk/self-
assessment-tax-returns/overview> (last accessed 7 November 2016). It should be noted that, by 2020 HMRC plan 
to have fully replaced annual tax returns with personalised digital tax accounts enabling taxpayers to register, file, 
pay and update their information online at any time. For further information, see HM Revenue and Customs 
Making tax digital (December 2015).  
3 HM Revenue and Customs General information about compliance checks (CC/FS1a, November 2015) at 1. 
4 In the course of an enquiry, under s 28ZA of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (UK), it is possible for the taxpayer 
and HMRC to jointly apply to the tribunal for a binding determination of “any question arising in connection with 
the subject matter of an enquiry.” However, once a joint application on a specific matter has been made to the 
tribunal, the enquiry cannot be closed until the matter referred on the application has been decided. 
5 A contract settlement is a legally binding agreement, where the taxpayer offers to pay everything that is due as 
a result of the compliance check, and HMRC agree not to use their formal powers to recover that amount. 
Taxpayers can only pay through a contract settlement if both the taxpayer and HMRC agree to this, and to the 
terms of the contract. There are no grounds for appeal against the tax, penalty and interest liabilities. Contract 
settlements cannot be entered into for any Value Added Tax (VAT) or VAT penalties that are due: HM Revenue 
and Customs, above n 3, at 3. 
6 At 3. 
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and their reasons). In direct tax, this is known as an “appeal to HMRC.”7 This may lead to 
further discussions between the taxpayer and HMRC officials ‐ usually the HMRC officer who 
is responsible for the decision ‐ with the aim of resolving the dispute. HMRC state that most 
disputes are resolved in this way.8  
 
If discussions between the taxpayer and HMRC do not resolve the matter or if discussions are 
not appropriate or possible, HMRC may offer a review. The taxpayer has 30 days from the date 
of the review offer to either accept it or send the appeal to an independent tax tribunal.9 If the 
taxpayer takes no action within 30 days, the dispute is treated as settled by agreement. 
 
In a HMRC review, HMRC will appoint an officer, who has not previously been involved with 
the HMRC decision that the taxpayer disagrees with, to carry out a review of the decision.10 
The review will usually be completed within 45 days. When the review has been completed 
the review officer will write to the taxpayer informing them of their decision in a review letter 
(that is, the original HMRC decision may be upheld, varied or cancelled). If the taxpayer 
disagrees with the review decision then they can still appeal to the tribunal within 30 days of 
the review letter. 
 
In addition, at any time after the taxpayer has sent their appeal to HMRC, they may either 
request a review by HMRC (if they have not already been offered one) or notify the appeal to 
the tribunal. However, once the taxpayer has accepted a review offer (or asked for a review), 
they may only notify the appeal to the tribunal after either they have been advised by way of a 
review letter of the outcome by HMRC or the 45 day (or other agreed) review period has 
expired.11 
 
The process for disputing an indirect tax decision of HMRC is similar to the process for direct 
tax decisions. However, when HMRC notify the taxpayer of an indirect tax decision that may 
be appealed against, HMRC will offer a review at the same time. If the taxpayer wishes to 
dispute the indirect tax decision, they can either accept HMRC’s offer of a review or appeal 
directly to the tribunal within 30 days of the HMRC decision letter. If the taxpayer accepts 
HMRC’s review offer they can still appeal to the tribunal if they disagree with the outcome of 
the review.12 
 
                                                          
7 HM Revenue and Customs HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) decisions – what you can do if you disagree 
(HMRC1, February 2016) at 1. 
8 At 1. 
9 CCH British Master Tax Guide 2014-15 (Wolters Kluwer, Kingston upon Thames, 2014) at [¶12621]. 
10 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 7, at 1. 
11 At 1. 
12 At 1. 
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When the tribunal receives a notice of appeal, in line with r 23 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-
tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (UK), it will allocate the case to one of the following 
categories depending on the nature and complexity of the appeal:13 
 
 Default Paper cases, which are usually disposed of without a hearing; 
 Basic cases, which will usually be disposed of after an informal hearing and with 
minimal exchange of documents before the hearing; 
 Standard cases, which will usually be subject to more detailed case management 
and be disposed of after a hearing; and  
 Complex cases, which the tribunal considers will: (a) require lengthy or complex 
evidence or a lengthy hearing; (b) involve a complex or important principle or 
issue; or (c) involve a large financial sum. 
 
The tribunal is independent of HMRC and independently appointed expert tax judges and/or 
panel members hear the cases allocated. The tribunal is administered by the HM Courts and 
Tribunals Service (the Tribunals Service) which is part of the UK Ministry of Justice. 
Generally, all appeal hearings are held in public. There is no fee charged to the taxpayer for 
filing an appeal with the tribunal.14 It is intended that the tribunal system is accessible15 (hence 
there is a network of hearing centres across the UK). 
 
The vast majority of tax appeals are first heard by the First-tier Tribunal. However, the Upper 
Tribunal may, in cases falling within the Complex category and with the agreement of the 
parties and the consent of the Presidents of the First‐tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal, hear 
cases in the first instance, without the case being heard by the First‐tier Tribunal.16 Decisions 
of the First‐tier Tribunal may be appealed by the taxpayer or HMRC to the Upper Tribunal on 
a point of law if the First‐tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal gives permission (or leave, in 
                                                          
13 The notice of appeal form does not allow the appellant to indicate as to which category they think their appeal 
should be allocated. However, r 23(3) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 
(UK) provides that: “The Tribunal may give a further direction re-allocating a case to a different category at any 
time, either on the application of a party or on its own initiative.” 
14 In November 2016 the UK Ministry of Justice announced plans to trial a new digital service which will allow 
taxpayers to submit an appeal to an independent tax tribunal online rather than using the current paper-based form. 
However, fees will be imposed, based on the amount of tax or penalty in dispute, to cover administration costs. 
The online process will be available for all types of tax disputes with HMRC. However, the paper-based system 
will remain available for those without internet access or those who prefer to submit an application on paper: Sara 
White “Ministry of Justice trails online alternative to tax tribunal applications” (7 November 2016) CCH Daily 
<https://www.cchdaily.co.uk/ministry-justice-trials-online-alternative-tax-tribunal-applications> (last accessed 
20 November 2016).  
15 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (UK), s 22(4). 
16 Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (UK), rr 23(5)(b) and 28(1). This route may 
be chosen where a case is likely to be litigated to the Court of Appeal (and beyond). 
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Northern Ireland). Decisions of the Upper Tribunal can be appealed on to the Court of Appeal17 
(or Court of Session in Scotland), and ultimately the Supreme Court.  
 
1.3.2 HM Revenue and Customs alternative dispute resolution 
HMRC introduced the application of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedures in the 
resolution of certain tax disputes following an internal review of tax disputes and their 
outcomes conducted in 2009. HMRC established a Dispute Resolution Unit (DRU (UK)) in 
2010 to oversee the development of HMRC’s Litigation and Settlement Strategy (LSS) (see 
section 1.3.4.1 below) and to develop the use of ADR.18 Over a two-year period commencing 
in July 2011, HMRC conducted two ADR pilots in order to test the effectiveness of ADR 
techniques for resolving tax disputes in large or complex cases and in tax disputes arising in 
the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises and individuals (SMEi) population. The aims of the 
pilots were to test whether ADR could be utilised in:19  
 
 Improving the customer experience;  
 Increasing HMRC’s reputation for greater professionalism;  
 Reducing costs for both parties, customer and HMRC, when disputes occur;  
 Reducing the number of cases that reach statutory review and/or Tribunal.  
 
The ADR processes used in the pilots were either facilitated discussions (facilitation) or 
mediation. The ADR pilot for large or complex cases utilised HMRC members of staff who 
had been externally accredited by the Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR)20 to 
facilitate discussion and/or the involvement of third-party accredited mediators. The SMEi 
ADR pilot utilised in-house HMRC-trained facilitators to facilitate discussions. This pilot had 
no access to third-party mediators. In both pilots it was found that “HMRC facilitators have 
proven to be objective and even handed for all types of customer.”21  
 
                                                          
17 Appeals from the Upper Tribunal to the Court of Appeal require permission to appeal, and are only on points 
of law. If the Upper Tribunal refuses this leave to appeal, then approval may be sought from the Court of Appeal: 
CCH, above n 9, at [¶12610]. 
18 In January 2016 the DRU (UK) merged with other areas in HMRC to become Tax Assurance and Resolution 
Policy (TARP), adopting broader governance roles responsible to HMRC’s Tax Assurance Commissioner. 
Responsibility for all operational ADR now lies in HMRC operational teams. 
19 HM Revenue and Customs Alternative Dispute Resolution for SMEs and Individuals: Project Evaluation 
Summary (April 2013) at 3. 
20 CEDR is a London-based mediation and ADR body. It was founded as a non-profit organisation in 1990, with 
the support of the Confederation of British Industry and a number of British businesses and law firms, to encourage 
the development and use of ADR and mediation in commercial disputes: Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution 
“About us” <http://www.cedr.com/about_us/> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
21 HM Revenue and Customs Alternative Dispute Resolution in Large or Complex Cases: Pilot Evaluation 
Summary (September 2013) at 8; HM Revenue and Customs, above n 18, at 8. 
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Subsequent to the completion of the ADR pilots, in 2013 HMRC launched permanent ADR 
programs for large or complex cases (see section 1.3.2.1) and SMEi taxpayers (see section 
1.3.2.2), respectively. The use of ADR where appropriate, by HMRC, is consistent with the 
UK Government-wide Dispute Resolution Commitment. Launched in May 2011 by the UK 
Ministry of Justice and Attorney General, the Dispute Resolution Commitment expects 
government departments and agencies to be proactive in the management of disputes, and to 
use effective, proportionate and appropriate forms of dispute resolution to avoid expensive 
legal costs or court actions.22 
 
1.3.2.1 Alternative dispute resolution for large or complex cases 
Following a two-phase ADR pilot for large or complex cases, HMRC announced on 9 
September 2013 that ADR would continue to be made available to resolve tax disputes for 
large or complex cases. ADR for large or complex cases can be considered either before or 
after the issuance of a formal decision by HMRC. However, the stage at which a particular 
dispute may be suitable for ADR can vary from case to case. The ADR process for large or 
complex cases is available alongside taxpayers’ rights for a review by HMRC or to appeal to 
an independent tax tribunal. Entering into the ADR process also does not affect taxpayers’ 
review or appeal rights if a dispute remains unresolved following ADR. The overall aim of 
ADR for large or complex cases is to “either resolve the issue(s) outright by achieving a 
mutually acceptable outcome or by bringing clarity to the factual landscape or arguments to 
make litigation more efficient.”23 
  
ADR for large or complex cases may involve the use of the following processes:24 
  
(i) Facilitated discussion: a process in which an HMRC externally trained and 
accredited mediator facilitates bringing the parties together but offers no opinion 
on the merits of the arguments being advanced. Sometimes the process involves a 
trained mediator also being provided by the taxpayer to jointly facilitate with the 
HMRC mediator (joint facilitation). The facilitator(s) may challenge each side as 
to how their dispute may play out in front of the Tribunal. The HMRC facilitator 
may or may not be a specialist in the subject matter of the dispute but will not have 
had any prior involvement in working on the case as part of the case team. If the 
taxpayer also provides a facilitator, it is expected that they similarly will have not 
previously worked on the case.  
                                                          
22 Ministry of Justice (UK) The Dispute Resolution Commitment (May 2011) at 1. The Dispute Resolution 
Commitment updated and replaced the UK Government’s ADR Pledge, originally launched in 2001. 
23 HM Revenue and Customs Alternative Dispute Resolution in Large or Complex Cases: Pilot Evaluation 
Summary, above n 20, at 3. 
24 HM Revenue and Customs Resolving Tax Disputes: Practical Guidance for HMRC Staff on the Use of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Large or Complex Cases (April 2012) at 5. 
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(ii) Facilitative mediation: a process in which an independent external mediator is 
jointly engaged by HMRC and the taxpayer to try to bring the parties together but 
offers no opinion on the merits of the arguments being advanced. The mediator 
may challenge each side as to how their dispute may play out in front of the 
Tribunal. A facilitative mediator may or may not be a specialist in the subject 
matter of the dispute but will have no connection with either party.  
 
(iii) Evaluative mediation: a process in which the independent external mediator will 
try to bring the parties together in exactly the same way as in facilitative mediation, 
but also providing their view of the matter as a specialist in the subject matter of 
the dispute. 
 
The former DRU (UK) has published practical guidance for HMRC staff on the use of ADR in 
large or complex cases.25 Either the taxpayer or HMRC may suggest ADR to resolve a dispute. 
If a taxpayer wishes to propose ADR, they must contact their Customer Relationship Manager 
(CRM) or case-owner in the first instance to discuss ADR. Where a case is not considered 
appropriate for ADR, it is generally referred to a HMRC governance panel for consideration.26 
There is no charge for utilising a HMRC facilitator. However, where the parties jointly engage 
an independent external mediator to mediate the dispute, it is generally expected that both 
parties will bear the costs of the mediator equally.27 ADR for large or complex cases is available 
for disputes arising in all tax types, including: corporation tax, income tax, capital gains tax 
(CGT), VAT, pay as you earn (PAYE), customs duty, construction industry scheme and 
penalties. 
 
1.3.2.2 Alternative dispute resolution for small and medium-sized enterprises and 
individual taxpayers 
The ADR service for SMEi taxpayers became part of “business as usual” for HMRC on 2 
September 2013.28 The SMEi ADR service uses independent facilitators from HMRC to 
resolve disputes between HMRC and taxpayers whether or not an appealable decision or 
assessment has been made by HMRC. The ADR service is available alongside taxpayers’ rights 
for a review by HMRC or to appeal to an independent tax tribunal. Entering into the ADR 
process does not affect the taxpayer's review or appeal rights if the dispute remains unresolved 
following ADR.  
 
                                                          
25 See HM Revenue and Customs, above n 23. 
26 HM Revenue and Customs How we Resolve Tax Disputes: The Tax Assurance Commissioner’s Annual Report 
2015-16 (July 2016) at 6. 
27 At 35. 
28 Peter Nias “Mediating tax disputes: All in a day’s work?” (2014) 1241 Tax J 17 at 17. 
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The facilitator is an HMRC member of staff who has received in-house training by HMRC in 
ADR techniques and who has had no prior involvement in the dispute.29 The role of the 
facilitator is to “work with both the customer and the HMRC case-owner to try to broker an 
agreement between them” through meetings and telephone conversations.30 The facilitator will 
“help all parties to obtain a shared and full understanding of the disputed facts and 
arguments.”31 In addition, the facilitator will ensure that there is proper communication 
between the parties and may help to explain what one or other side is trying to say to the other. 
However, the facilitator will not impose their views on either party.  
 
Taxpayers are not charged a fee for using the SMEi ADR service. For cases to be considered 
for the SMEi ADR service taxpayers must complete an online application form and HMRC 
will notify the taxpayer if their request for ADR has been accepted within 30 days. If the dispute 
is suitable for ADR, taxpayers must sign a Memorandum of Understanding which sets out the 
processes and confirms their agreement to take part. The SMEi ADR service is generally 
available for VAT and direct tax disputes.  
 
1.3.3 Alternative dispute resolution during the litigation stage 
ADR is specifically referred to in the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) 
Rules 2009 (UK). These rules provide that the First-tier Tribunal should, where appropriate, 
make the parties aware of the availability of any ADR procedures that may be appropriate for 
the resolution of the dispute and facilitate its use as necessary.32 While the Tribunals Service 
itself does not provide ADR programs, HMRC’s ADR programs may be utilised at any stage 
of a dispute, including once an appeal has been lodged with the Tribunals Service. Thus, the 
above provisions are designed to encourage parties to consider ADR (that is, through HMRC’s 
ADR programs) before any tribunal hearing takes place.33 The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 
(Practice Direction – Pre-Action Conduct) (UK) also encourages parties to consider whether 
some form of ADR procedure might enable them to settle a matter without starting formal court 
                                                          
29 The taxpayer or their agent may make representations for a SMEi case to be considered for movement to the 
large or complex ADR process if they feel strongly that they would like to engage a third-party mediator. 
Acceptance is not guaranteed and there must be approval by both the SMEi governance panel and the Large and 
Complex ADR governance panel: HM Revenue and Customs, above n 23, at 4. 
30 HM Revenue and Customs “Tax disputes: Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)” (8 December 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/tax-disputes-alternative-dispute-resolution-adr> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
31 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 29. 
32 Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (UK), r 3(1). 
33 Email from [redacted] (Senior Policy Advisor, [redacted], HM Revenue and Customs) to Melinda Jone 
regarding HMRC ADR (23 July 2014). 
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proceedings.34 The court may further require evidence that the parties considered some form 
of ADR.35  
 
1.3.4 HM Revenue and Customs’ approach to resolving tax disputes 
HMRC’s LSS sets out the principles within which HMRC handles all tax disputes subject to 
civil law procedures.36 HMRC’s Code of governance for resolving tax disputes (Code of 
Governance) outlines HMRC’s governance and assurance frameworks for decisions in tax 
disputes.37 These HMRC publications are discussed below in sections 1.3.4.1 and 1.3.4.2, 
respectively. 
 
1.3.4.1 HM Revenue and Customs’ Litigation and Settlement Strategy 
HMRC’s LSS was first published in 2007 and “refreshed” in 2011 and 2013. The current (2013 
refreshed) version of the LSS was updated in the light of developments in the UK Courts and 
Tribunals, to align the language of the LSS more closely with HMRC’s then “Vision, Purpose 
and Way”38 and “Customer-centric Business Strategy”, and to reflect changes in the way 
HMRC is organised as well as HMRC’s experience in effective and efficient tax dispute 
resolution, including opportunities for use of ADR.39  
 
The LSS sets out the basis on which HMRC will reach agreement in a tax dispute (subject to 
the over-riding authorities of the Commissioners of HMRC as defined in legislation)40 and 
emphasises the benefits of a collaborative approach in achieving a resolution. The LSS states 




                                                          
34 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (Practice Direction – Pre-Action Conduct) (UK), para 8.1. 
35 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (Practice Direction – Pre-Action Conduct) (UK), paras 4.4(3) and 8.1. 
36 HMRC’s LSS is contained in HM Revenue and Customs Resolving tax disputes: Commentary of the litigation 
and settlement strategy (November 2013) at Annex 1. 
37 See HM Revenue and Customs Code of governance for resolving tax disputes (July 2014). 
38 HMRC’s Vision, Purpose and Way was replaced by a new Mission Statement and revised Strategic Objectives 
at the beginning of 2016. See HM Revenue and Customs “About us” 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-revenue-customs/about> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
39 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 35, at 9. 
40 The collection and management responsibilities of the Commissioners of HMRC as set out in s 5 of the 
Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 (UK) confer discretion on the HMRC Commissioners on 
whether to litigate to resolve a tax dispute that arises with a taxpayer or whether to settle. 
41 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 35, at Annex 1, [1]. 
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(a) the law, whether by agreement with the customer or through litigation; and  
(b) HMRC’s objectives of efficiently determining and collecting the correct tax to 
maximise revenue flows, while reducing costs and improving the customer 
experience.  
 
In addition, the two key elements of HMRC’s approach to tax disputes are:42  
 
(a) supporting customers to get their tax right first time, so preventing a dispute arising 
in the first place; and  
(b) resolving those disputes which do arise in a way which establishes the right tax due 
at the least cost to HMRC and to its customers, which in most cases will involve 
working collaboratively. 
 
A “collaborative working” approach requires both HMRC and the customer (and any agent) to 
work together on a cooperative, non-adversarial basis in order to resolve a dispute.43 HMRC’s 
Commentary on the litigation and settlement strategy provides examples of a collaborative 
working approach between HMRC and its customers as including the following:44 
 
 Early discussion of a particular risk which is under enquiry in order to understand 
fully the relevant facts and the law which might apply to those facts; 
 Jointly agreeing a timetable with key milestones and target dates for: establishing 
facts; providing information or documentation; reviewing documentation; reaching 
decisions; and testing conclusions;  
 Providing regular updates on progress towards key milestones; 
 Establishing a decision tree (that is, agreeing the key questions which need to be 
answered in order to resolve a dispute); and 
 Where a dispute has reached an apparent impasse, it may still be possible for the 
parties to work collaboratively in order to try to unlock the process (for example, 
by jointly agreeing to appoint a third party mediator). 
 
With respect to ADR in the context of the LSS, as noted above, the LSS envisages that in the 
vast majority of cases disputes will be resolved “collaboratively (as opposed to adversarially) 
wherever possible, as the most effective and efficient means (for both sides of the dispute) to 
arrive at the ‘right’ result in a tax dispute.”45 HMRC state that “ADR also presupposes such a 
collaborative approach, therefore Collaborative Dispute Resolution (CDR) should be the norm 
                                                          
42 At 6. 
43 At 18. 
44 At 17. 
45 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 23, at 6. 
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and ADR a toolkit to be used sparingly within this normal way of working.”46 Hence, “the idea 
behind ADR is to provide an additional mechanism when the collaborative approach to dispute 
resolution has lost momentum.”47 Nevertheless, as the LSS applies to the resolution of all 
disputes through civil procedures, “any agreement to resolve a dispute between HMRC and a 
customer – whether it is facilitated by the use of ADR or not – must accord with the terms of 
the LSS.”48 
 
1.3.4.2 HM Revenue and Customs’ Code of governance for resolving tax disputes 
HMRC’s Code of Governance49 sets out HMRC’s internal governance arrangements for 
decisions on how tax disputes should be resolved. The “arrangements described in the code 
provide assurance that the principles of the LSS are applied consistently in practice to the 
resolution of tax disputes.”50 The Code of Governance also outlines the role of HMRC’s Tax 
Assurance Commissioner. The Tax Assurance Commissioner’s role, which was created in July 
2012, is to ensure that the UK Parliament and the public can have confidence in HMRC’s work, 
“with an explicit challenge role to assess whether a proposed settlement secures the right tax 
efficiently and in so doing treats taxpayers even-handedly.”51 The Tax Assurance 
Commissioner has particular oversight of the settlement of large tax disputes, but does not 
engage with specific taxpayers on their liabilities, nor manage HMRC case-workers.  
 
The Code of Governance outlines the decision-making process for resolving tax disputes 
according to the characteristics of the case to ensure that individual disputes are worked 
effectively with sufficient oversight and assurance. The most significant tax dispute cases must 
be decided by a panel of three HMRC Commissioners (including the Tax Assurance 
Commissioner), with the case first having been considered by the Tax Disputes Resolution 
Board (TDRB). The TDRB considers proposals to settle tax disputes in cases where the total 
tax under consideration across all issues is more than £100 million or cases which are 
particularly sensitive, where the decision could have a significant impact on HMRC policy, 
strategy or operations (and may also be likely to prompt significant national publicity).52 
Certain decisions about significant and sensitive risks which do not fall within the remit of the 
TDRB are referred to case boards which sit within HMRC’s business areas. These case boards 
                                                          
46 At 6. 
47 Shelley Griffiths “No discretion should be unconstrained: Considering the ‘care and management’ of taxes and 
the settlement of tax disputes in New Zealand and the UK” (2012) BTR 167 at 172. 
48 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 35, at 30. 
49 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 36. 
50 At 4. 
51 HM Revenue and Customs How we Resolve Tax Disputes: The Tax Assurance Commissioner’s Annual Report 
2012-13 (July 2013) at 5.  
52 HM Revenue and Customs, above n 36, at 5. 
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include the Specialist Personal Tax (SPT), Enforcement and Compliance (E&C) and Large 
Business (LB) Dispute Resolution Boards.53  
                                                          
53 The remits for the TDRB and the business-level case boards are provided in HM Revenue and Customs, above 
n 36, at Annex C and Annex D, respectively. 
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Appendix 1.4: The United States’ Tax Dispute Resolution Procedures 
1.4.1 The United States tax dispute resolution procedures: Overview1 
Under the current self-assessment system in the United States (US), most taxpayers report their 
items of income, deductions and credits to the government and voluntarily assess their tax due 
through the filing of an annual tax return. The US federal tax laws are provided for in the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (I.R.C.)2 and are primarily administered by the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS).3 Disputes between a taxpayer and IRS the generally arise through the 
IRS’s audit (examination) process. Tax disputes can also result from collection actions 
proposed or taken by the IRS.4  
 
A taxpayer’s return may be selected for examination because their return has been red-flagged 
by the IRS because of a possible problem or inaccuracy, or in rare instances the examination 
may be the result of random selection. During the course of an IRS examination, the IRS will 
typically issue one or more Notice of Proposed Adjustments (NOPAs (US)) identifying the 
proposed issues, applying applicable law to the facts, and stating the official IRS position or 
determination. The taxpayer is provided with the opportunity to make a written response to the 
NOPA (US).5 In addition, at the end of the examination, the taxpayer may also request a 
meeting with the IRS examiner and/or the examiner’s supervisor to discuss the proposed 
adjustments.6 If the taxpayer cannot reach an agreement with the examiner and/or the 
examiner’s supervisor at this meeting, the examiner will prepare a report explaining both the 
                                                          
1 The material in Appendix 1.4 was reviewed and subsequently discussed with the researcher by Stewart Karlinsky 
(Professor Emeritus, San Jose State University) on 12 March 2014 and 26 March 2014, respectively. The 
researcher is grateful for his feedback. 
2 Codified at Title 26 of the United States Code (26 U.S.C.).  
3 The IRS is organised into four operating divisions serving groups of taxpayers with similar needs. These 
operating divisions are: (1) Wage and Investment (W&I); (2) Small Business/ Self-Employed (SB/SE)); (3) Large 
Business and International (LB&I) (formerly, Large and Mid-Size Businesses (LMSB)); and (4) Tax-Exempt and 
Government Entities (TE/GE): CCH US Master Tax Guide 2015 (98th ed, CCH, Chicago, 2014) at [¶2701]. 
4 As stated in chapter 5, section 5.3.1 of this thesis, the dispute resolution processes for disputes arising from IRS 
examination and IRS collection differ. The description and DSD evaluation of the US tax dispute resolution 
system in this study generally focus on disputes arising from IRS examinations given that, as outlined in chapter 
2, section 2.2.1 of this thesis, this study focuses on tax disputes concerning taxpayers’ tax liabilities or entitlements 
rather than disputes over collection efforts of the revenue authority. For further information on the dispute 
resolution process for collection cases, see Internal Revenue Service The IRS Collection Process (Pub. No. 594, 
January 2015) and Internal Revenue Service Collection Appeal Rights (Pub. No. 1660, February 2014). 
5 The taxpayer’s written response to the NOPA (US) must be made prior to the Revenue Agent’s Report, issued 
at the end of the IRS examination.  
6 Following an IRS examination, in certain circumstances, taxpayers may choose to enter into a full agreement on 
all issues proposed for adjustment (or a partial agreement on one or more issues proposed for adjustment). The 
taxpayer is then generally unable to exercise appeal rights with the IRS for these issues or contest them in the US 




taxpayer’s and IRS’s positions. Within a few weeks after the meeting, the taxpayer will 
receive:7 
 
 A letter (also known as a 30-day letter) notifying the taxpayer of their rights to 
appeal the proposed changes within 30 days; 
 A copy of the examiner’s report explaining the proposed changes (also known as a 
Revenue Agent’s Report); 
 An agreement or a waiver form; and 
 A copy of Publication 5 Your Appeal Rights and How to Prepare a Protest if You 
Don’t Agree.8 
 
The taxpayer generally has 30 days from the date of the 30-day letter to tell the IRS whether 
they will accept the proposed adjustments or appeal them to the IRS Appeals Office. Founded 
in 1927, the IRS Appeals Office is organisationally located in the Office of the Commissioner 
of the IRS. It is independent of any other IRS office (including the IRS Examination division 
and the Office of the Chief Counsel) and serves as an administrative forum for any taxpayer 
who disagrees with an IRS determination.9 When the IRS Appeals Office receives the 
taxpayer’s appeal, an IRS Appeals officer will review the issues of the taxpayer’s case with “a 
fresh, objective perspective” and schedule a conference with the taxpayer so that the IRS 
Appeals officer and the taxpayer can attempt to negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement.10 
IRS Appeals conferences are informal and are conducted by correspondence, telephone or in-
person.11 The IRS state that most differences are settled at this level.12 
 
Unlike the IRS Examination division, IRS Appeals operates under a delegation of authority 
that allows it to settle cases based on “hazards of litigation.” This authority means that, instead 
of resolving a case based on facts or a clear-cut interpretation of law, IRS Appeals Officers can 
assess what would happen if the case were to go to trial, assign a percentage possibility of 
success or failure in litigation, and then use that information to determine whether and how to 
settle a case.13 
 
                                                          
7 Internal Revenue Service Examination of Returns, Appeal Rights and Claims for Refund (IRS Pub. No. 556, 
September 2013) at 5. 
8 See Internal Revenue Service Your Appeal Rights and How To Prepare a Protest If You Don’t Agree (IRS Pub. 
No. 5, January 1999). 
9 Internal Revenue Service Appeals (IRS Pub. No. 4227, October 2013) at 2. 
10 At 2.  
11 Effective from 1 October 2016, IRS policy in the I.R.M. was revised to reflect that most conferences in IRS 
Appeals are conducted by telephone and to make that the default method. The revision also provides guidance for 
when in-person conferences may be appropriate. See I.R.M. 8.6.1.4.1. 
12 Internal Revenue Service, above n 8, at 8. 
13 Treas. Reg. § 601.106(f)(2). 
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In order to preserve the independence of IRS Appeals officers, the Internal Revenue Service 
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998)14 requires the IRS to implement measures 
to generally prohibit ex parte communication between the Appeals officer and other IRS 
officers “to the extent that such communications appear to compromise the independence of 
the appeals officers.”15 IRS procedure, therefore, prohibits certain communications between 
IRS Appeals officers and officers from originating functions, such as the examination or 
compliance function, unless the IRS Appeals officer provides an opportunity for the taxpayer 
to participate in the communication. If the taxpayer chooses not to participate, the 
communication between the IRS Appeals officer and the other IRS officer is no longer 
prohibited.16 
 
To appeal an IRS tax decision (and thus, request an Appeals conference) the taxpayer must file 
either a formal written protest or a small case request. Taxpayers must file a formal protest:17 
 
 If the total amount of tax, penalties, and interest for any tax period is more than 
$US25,000; 
 In all partnership and S corporation cases, regardless of the dollar amount; 
 In all employee plan and exempt organisation cases, regardless of the dollar 
amount; 
 In all other cases, unless the taxpayer qualifies for other special appeal procedures, 
such as requesting appeals consideration of liens, levies, seizures, or installment 
agreements. 
 
If the total amount of tax, penalties, and interest for each tax period involved is $US25,000 or 
less, and the taxpayer does not meet any of the other criteria for filing a formal protest outlined 
above, the taxpayer may make a small case request instead by sending a letter requesting IRS 
Appeals consideration, indicating the changes the taxpayer does not agree with and the reasons 
why they do not agree. 
 
If the taxpayer does not respond to the 30-day letter (that is, the taxpayer chooses to bypass the 
IRS’s Appeals system),18 or if they respond but do not reach an agreement with an IRS Appeals 
officer, the IRS will send the taxpayer a 90-day letter, also known as a Notice of Deficiency.19 
                                                          
14 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998). 
15 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 1001(a)(4), 112 Stat. 
685, 689 (1998).  
16 IRM 8.1.10.4.1. 
17 Internal Revenue Service, above n 8, at 1.  
18 In most instances, a case petitioned to the US Tax Court will normally be considered for settlement by an IRS 
Appeals Office before the US Tax Court hears the case: Internal Revenue Service, above n 7, at 9. 
19 I.R.C. § 6212(a). 
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The Notice of Deficiency notifies the taxpayer of the IRS’s intent to assess a tax deficiency 
and informs them of their right to file a petition to dispute the proposed adjustments. The 
taxpayer has 90 days (150 days if it is addressed to a taxpayer outside the US) from the date of 
the notice to file a petition with the US Tax Court,20 the US District Court or the US Court of 
Federal Claims.21 A case may be further appealed to the US Court of Appeals22 (or the US 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for decisions of the US Court of Federal Claims) and 
ultimately to the US Supreme Court, if these courts accept the case. 
 
1.4.2 Internal Revenue Service alternative dispute resolution programs 
In 1990 Congress passed the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA 1990)23 which 
mandated that all federal government agencies begin to implement alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) procedures into their administrative dispute processes in order to reduce the 
time and cost associated with resolving disputes. In 1998, the RRA 1998 enacted I.R.C. § 7123. 
This section directed the IRS to implement procedures to allow a broader use of early appeals 
programs and to establish procedures that allow for ADR processes such as mediation and 
arbitration. Pursuant to these mandates, the IRS created five main post-filing ADR programs 
designed to resolve cases much earlier than the normal IRS Appeals process: (1) Fast Track 
Settlement (FTS); (2) Fast Track Mediation (FTM) (replaced as from 18 November 2016);24 
(3) Early Referral (ER); (4) Post Appeals Mediation (PAM); and (5) Arbitration (eliminated as 
from 21 September 2015). In addition, in 2012 the IRS developed a new post-filing ADR 
program called the Rapid Appeals Process (RAP). All of the IRS’s ADR programs are optional 
and consensual (that is, both parties must agree to participate). The current main post-filing 
                                                          
20 If the amount in the taxpayer’s case is $US50,000 or less for any one tax year or period, the taxpayer can request 
that the case be handled under the small tax case procedure in the US Tax Court. If the US Tax Court approves, 
the taxpayer can present their case to the US Tax Court for a decision that is final and that they cannot appeal: 
Internal Revenue Service, above n 7, at 12. 
21 The US Tax Court is the main court for trying disputes between taxpayers and the IRS. It reviews deficiencies 
asserted by the IRS for: income tax; estate tax, gift tax; or certain excise taxes of private foundations, public 
charities, qualified pension and other retirement plans, or real estate investment trusts. The US Tax Court generally 
hears cases before any tax has been assessed and paid. The US District Court and the US Court of Federal Claims 
generally hear tax cases only after the taxpayer has paid the tax and filed a claim for a credit or refund: at 12. 
22 Except for cases tried under the small case procedure of the US Tax Court. 
23 The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990) was re-enacted 
as the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870 (1996). 
24 FTM was replaced by Fast Track Mediation – Collection (FTMC), a fast track mediation program specifically 
directed at resolving certain collection cases and issues. The former FTM was available for certain qualifying 
SB/SE taxpayers with either examination or collection cases. Under FTMC any type of taxpayer can participate 
in the program, provided the taxpayer meets the eligibility requirements set forth in the revenue procedure and 
the taxpayer’s case is being worked on in the IRS’s collection function. Section 1.4.2.2 of this appendix outlines 
the currently available FTMC (and not the former FTM). While not applicable to disputes arising from an IRS 
examination, an outline of FTMC has been included for the purposes of completeness. It has also been included 
due to its recent replacement of its predecessor program (which was then relevant to both examination and 
collection disputes). For further information on the former FTM, see Internal Revenue Service Rev. Proc. 2003-
41, 2003-25 I.R.B. 1047 [“Rev. Proc. 2003-41”]. 
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IRS ADR programs (as well as the eliminated Arbitration program) are outlined in sections 
1.4.2.1-1.4.2.6.  
 
1.4.2.1 Fast Track Settlement  
Fast Track Settlement (FTS)25 is designed to help certain LB&I, SB/SE and TE/GE taxpayers 
expeditiously resolve disputes during an IRS examination. The FTS program is aimed at 
resolving issues arising during the examination process within a goal of 120 days (LB&I) or 
60 days (SB/SE and TE/GE) from acceptance of the FTS application. FTS “brings Appeals 
resources to a mutually agreed upon location to resolve the dispute before the 30-day letter is 
issued.”26 An IRS Appeals Official trained in mediation is assigned to act as a neutral third 
party in the FTS process.27 The Appeals Official firstly attempts to facilitate an agreement 
between the parties and if that fails, they may make a recommendation regarding the settlement 
of any or all issues (both factual and legal). If the settlement proposal is acceptable to both 
parties, it may be adopted. The Appeals Official will have settlement authority and can exercise 
that authority to write up the settlement of FTS issues agreed to by the parties. Communications 
made during FTS sessions are confidential except as provided by statute.28 
 
Taxpayers may request FTS after the IRS has issued a NOPA (US) but has not issued a 30-day 
letter and the taxpayer has submitted a written response to the NOPA (US). FTS is generally 
available for factual and legal issues, and issues that require consideration of the hazards of 
litigation. Either the taxpayer or the relevant IRS operating division Team Manager may 
suggest participation in the FTS program. If both parties agree to use FTS, they may contact 
the FTS Program Manager to determine if FTS is appropriate.29 The taxpayer may withdraw 
from FTS at any time by notifying the relevant IRS operating division Team Manager and the 
FTS Appeals Official in writing. If there are any unresolved issues after the FTS process, the 
taxpayer retains all of their otherwise applicable appeal rights to request consideration through 
the traditional IRS Appeals process (or alternatively pursue their claim in court) for these 
issues.  
                                                          
25 The FTS program is formally documented in Internal Revenue Service Rev. Proc. 2003-40, 2003-25 I.R.B. 
1044 [“Rev. Proc. 2003-40”].  
26 Internal Revenue Service Appeals: Introduction to Alternative Dispute Resolution (IRS Pub. No. 4167, July 
2012) at 2. 
27 An IRS Appeals Team Case Leader (ATCL), trained in mediation or, in limited cases, an IRS Appeals Officer, 
trained in mediation, in conjunction with an IRS Appeals Team Manager, serves as the neutral FTS Appeals 
Official. The taxpayer does not have the option of using a non-IRS employee as a mediator in the FTS program. 
The expense of the FTS Appeals Official is met by the IRS: Internal Revenue Service “Rev. Proc. 2003-40”, 
above n 25, at [5.01]. 
28 The prohibition against ex parte communications between IRS Appeals Officers and other IRS employees 
provided by section 1001(a) of the RRA 1998 does not apply to the communications arising in FTS because IRS 
Appeals personnel, in facilitating an agreement between the taxpayer and the relevant IRS operating division, are 
not acting in their traditional IRS Appeals settlement role: at [5.11]. 
29 To apply to the program, the parties must complete and execute an application for FTS. All applications require 
the approval of a FTS Program Manager before acceptance into FTS: at [4.02]. 
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1.4.2.2 Fast Track Mediation – Collection 
Fast Track Mediation – Collection (FTMC)30 may generally be utilised by all types of taxpayers 
to resolve certain collection cases and issues. Cases may arise in the IRS collection process 
when taxpayers do not make required tax payments (including interest and penalties, where 
applicable) in full or on time after receiving a bill from the IRS, and collection actions are 
proposed or taken by the IRS. FTMC is designed to allow IRS collection personnel and 
taxpayers the opportunity to mediate their disputes with an IRS Appeals mediator acting as a 
neutral third party.31 The Appeals mediator assists IRS collection personnel and the taxpayer 
in understanding the nature of the dispute and uses mediation techniques to focus issues and 
lead IRS collection personnel and the taxpayer to self-determine the outcome of the dispute. 
The goal is to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution consistent with applicable law within an 
average of 30 to 40 business days from the initial joint discussion between the Appeals 
mediator and the parties. Unlike under FTS, the Appeals mediator does not have settlement 
authority and will not render a decision regarding any issue in dispute. As the Appeals mediator 
cannot require either party to accept a certain outcome, the issues submitted to the FTMC 
process may only be resolved if both the taxpayer and IRS collection personnel reach an 
agreement. Communications made during FTMC sessions are confidential except as provided 
by statute.32 
 
Issues dealt with under the FTMC program include both legal and factual issues. Unlike FTS, 
FTMC is generally not available for issues for which resolution will depend on an assessment 
of the hazards of litigation and which require the Appeals mediator to use delegated settlement 
authority. Either the taxpayer or IRS collection may suggest participation in FTMC. The 
program may be used only when all other collection issues are resolved but for the issue(s) for 
which FTMC is being requested. A request for participation in FTMC should be initiated after 
an issue has been fully developed and before IRS collection has made a final determination 
regarding the issue. To apply for the FTMC program, the parties must complete an Agreement 
to Mediate.33 Either party may withdraw from the mediation process at any time by notifying 
the other party and the Appeals mediator in writing of the withdrawal. If there are any 
unresolved issues after the FTMC process, the taxpayer retains all of their otherwise applicable 
                                                          
30 The FTMC program is formally documented in Internal Revenue Service Rev. Proc. 2016-57, 2016-49 I.R.B. 
786 [“Rev. Proc. 2016-57”].  
31 The IRS Appeals mediator is an IRS Appeals employee who has been trained in mediation. The taxpayer does 
not have the option of using a non-IRS employee as a mediator in the FTMC program. The expense of the IRS 
Appeals mediator is met by the IRS: at [5.02]. 
32 The prohibition against ex parte communications between IRS Appeals Officers and other IRS employees 
provided by section 1001(a) of the RRA 1998 does not apply to the communications arising in the FTMC program 
because IRS Appeals personnel, in facilitating an agreement between the taxpayer and IRS collection, are not 
acting in their traditional IRS Appeals settlement role: at [6.08]. 
33 All applications to the FTMC program require the approval of an IRS Appeals Manager before acceptance into 
FTMC: at [4.05]. 
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appeal rights to request consideration through the traditional IRS Appeals Office process (or 
alternatively pursue their claim in court) for these issues.  
 
1.4.2.3 Early Referral 
The Early Referral (ER)34 program allows taxpayers under an IRS examination to request the 
transfer of a developed but unagreed issue to the IRS Appeals division while the other issues 
in the case continue to be developed in the IRS Examination division. Accordingly, the IRS 
Appeals division takes jurisdiction over all issues accepted for ER while all other issues in the 
case remain in the IRS Examination division’s jurisdiction. ER is a process to resolve cases 
more expeditiously through the IRS Examination and Appeals divisions working 
simultaneously. The early resolution of a key issue may also encourage taxpayers and the IRS 
to agree on other issues in the case.35 
 
Appropriate issues for ER include issues that: if resolved, can reasonably be expected to result 
in quicker resolution of the entire case; both the taxpayer and the IRS Examination division 
agree should be referred early to IRS Appeals; are fully developed; and are part of a case where 
the remaining issues are not expected to be completed before IRS Appeals could resolve the 
ER issue. Issues with respect to which a 30-day letter has been issued are excluded from ER. 
 
Either the taxpayer or IRS Examination may initiate ER to the IRS Appeals division. Where 
the taxpayer initiates the process, they must submit a written request to their case/group 
manager.36 The regular IRS Appeals procedures, including taxpayer conferences, apply to ER 
issues. If an agreement is reached with IRS Appeals on an ER issue, generally a Form 906, 
Closing Agreement on Final Determination Covering Specific Matters, is prepared.37 If an 
agreement is not reached, the taxpayer may generally request PAM (see section 1.4.2.4 below) 
for the issue. If PAM is not requested, IRS Appeals will return jurisdiction over the issue to the 
IRS Examination division. IRS Appeals will not reconsider an unagreed ER issue if the entire 
case is later protested to IRS Appeals unless there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances regarding the ER issue.  
 
A taxpayer may withdraw an ER request after the IRS Appeals takes jurisdiction over the 
issues. The withdrawal request must be communicated in writing to the Appeals Officer 
                                                          
34 The ER program is formally documented in Internal Revenue Service Rev. Proc. 99-28, 1999-29 I.R.B. 109 
[“Rev. Proc. 99-28”]. 
35 Internal Revenue Service, above n 26, at 2. 
36 If the case/group manager does not approve the ER request with respect to any issue, the taxpayer retains the 
right to pursue the administrative appeal of any proposed deficiency related to that issue at a later time: Internal 
Revenue Service “Rev. Proc. 99-28”, above n 34, at [2.10]. 




assigned the ER. The withdrawal from ER is treated the same as if no agreement was reached 
on the ER issues. 
 
1.4.2.4 Post Appeals Mediation 
Post Appeals Mediation (PAM)38 is available for certain cases that are already in the IRS 
Appeals process. The program is available only after IRS Appeals settlement discussions are 
unsuccessful and, generally, when all other issues are resolved but for the issue(s) for which 
mediation is being requested. PAM is a non-binding process that uses the services of a 
mediator, as a neutral third party, to help IRS Appeals and the taxpayer reach their own 
negotiated settlement. PAM utilises an IRS Appeals employee who is a trained mediator and 
is independent of the IRS Appeals officer that the taxpayer has been dealing with.39 IRS 
Appeals pay the expenses associated with the IRS Appeals mediator. In addition to the IRS 
Appeals mediator, the taxpayer may elect to use a non-IRS co-mediator.40 The taxpayer is 
required to pay the expenses associated with a non-IRS co-mediator. 
 
The mediator’s role is to act as a facilitator, assisting in defining the issues and promoting 
settlement negotiations between IRS Appeals and the taxpayer. The mediator does not have 
settlement authority in the mediation process and will not render a decision regarding any issue 
in dispute. The PAM process is confidential except as provided by statute.41 
 
A taxpayer or IRS Appeals may request PAM after consulting with each other. Taxpayers may 
request PAM if they are already in the IRS Appeals process with any qualifying issues and 
their case is not docketed in any court. To request PAM, the taxpayer must send a written 
request to the appropriate IRS Appeals Team Manager.42 Upon approval of the request to 
mediate, the taxpayer and IRS Appeals must enter into a written agreement to mediate. The 
goal is to achieve resolution within 60-90 days from the approval of the PAM application.43  
 
If IRS Appeals and the taxpayer reach an agreement on some or all of the issues through the 
mediation process, IRS Appeals will use established closing procedures including, where 
                                                          
38 The PAM program is formally documented in Internal Revenue Service Rev. Proc. 2014-63, 2014-53 I.R.B. 
1014 [“Rev. Proc. 2014-63”]. 
39 The IRS Appeals Team Manager and the taxpayer are required to select the IRS Appeals mediator from a list 
of trained employees who, generally, will be from the same IRS Appeals office or geographic area where the case 
is assigned, but will not be a member of the same team that was assigned to the case: at [9.01]. 
40 If an election is made to use a non-IRS co-mediator, the taxpayer and the IRS Appeals Team Manager are 
required to select the mediator from any local or national organisation that provides a roster of mediators: at [9.01]. 
41 To ensure that one party is not in a position to exert undue influence on the mediator, ex parte contacts with the 
mediator outside the mediation session are prohibited: at [10.03]. 
42 The acceptance of a request for PAM requires the approval of an IRS Appeals Team Manager after they have 
conferred with the IRS Appeals Office of Tax Policy and Procedure: at [7.03].  
43 Internal Revenue Service “Post-Appeals Mediation” (25 January 2016) <http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Post-
Appeals-Mediation> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
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appropriate, the preparation of a Form 906, Closing Agreement on Final Determination 
Covering Specific Matters.44 If IRS Appeals and the taxpayer do not reach an agreement on an 
issue being mediated, a 90-day letter will be issued with respect to all unagreed issues (allowing 
the taxpayer to file a petition in the US Tax Court, the US Court of Federal Claims or the US 
District Court). Either party may withdraw from the process at any time before reaching a 




On January 18, 2000 IRS Appeals initiated a two-year pilot program offering arbitration 
procedures in order to comply with requirements under section 7123(b) of the I.R.C. that such 
a program should be established. Rev. Proc. 2006-44, 2006-2 C.B. 80045 formally established 
the Appeals arbitration program on 30 October 2006. Generally, arbitration was available for 
cases in which a limited number of factual issues remained unresolved following settlement 
discussions in the IRS Appeals division.46 However, effective from 21 September 2015, the 
IRS Appeals arbitration program was eliminated due to “the general lack of demand for 
arbitration and the fact that its use as a tool to settle disputes without litigation has not proven 
successful.”47 During the 14-year period in which arbitration was available, only two cases 
were settled using arbitration.48  
 
1.4.2.6 Rapid Appeals Process 
In July 2012, the IRS announced a new Rapid Appeals Process (RAP)49 for LB&I cases where 
the IRS Appeals division uses FTS techniques to convert a LB&I “pre-conference meeting” 
into a “working conference” involving the IRS Appeals division, the IRS Examination division 
and the taxpayer to resolve unagreed tax issues.50 Thus, RAP takes place while the case is in 
Appeals’ jurisdiction, with IRS Appeals managing and administering the program. RAP 
provides LB&I and taxpayers an opportunity to resolve their disputes with an IRS Appeals 
officer utilising mediation skills and settlement authority.51 The IRS Appeals Officer uses 
mediation techniques to focus the issues and guide LB&I and the taxpayer to self-determine 
                                                          
44 Internal Revenue Service, above n 37. 
45 Obsoleted by Internal Revenue Service Rev. Proc. 2015-44, 2015-38 I.R.B. 354 [“Rev. Proc. 2015-44”]. 
46 At [2.0]. 
47 At [3.0]. 
48 At [3.0]. 
49 There is no IRS revenue procedure for RAP. However, the procedures for IRS Appeals employees to follow 
when working a RAP case are contained in IRM 8.26.11.  
50 IRM 8.26.11.1. 
51 IRM 8.26.11.2. 
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the outcome of the dispute.52 If successful, RAP can resolve issues in one conference and 
avoids the time and cost of completing the normal Appeals process. RAP is a voluntary process 
and if either party objects to using RAP, IRS will utilise the traditional Appeals process. Either 
party may withdraw from RAP at any time. If the case (in whole or in part) is not resolved 
using RAP, the taxpayer is entitled to traditional Appeals consideration on all remaining 
unagreed issues.53 
 
1.4.3 Other Internal Revenue Service dispute resolution programs 
Sections 1.4.3.1 and 1.4.3.2 respectively note selected other pre-filing and post-filing IRS 
dispute resolution programs. 
 
1.4.3.1 Pre-filing 
The IRS offers a number of pre-filing dispute resolution programs. These programs include, 
but are not limited to: the Pre-Filing Agreement (PFA) program;54 Private Letter Ruling;55 
Industry Issue Resolution (IIR) program;56 Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) program57 and; 
the Compliance Assurance Process (CAP) program.58 While the existence of these programs is 
acknowledged, as noted in chapter 2, section 2.2.1 of this thesis, an examination of pre-filing 
programs is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
1.4.3.2 Post-filing 
Other IRS post-filing dispute resolution initiatives include, but are not limited to: the 
Accelerated Issue Resolution (AIR) program;59 Delegation Order 4-24;60 and Delegation Order 
4-25.61 However, as noted in chapter 2, section 2.2.2 of this thesis, these programs are excluded 
from the definition of ADR used in this study. This is primarily because these processes do not 
specifically involve an “impartial person assist[ing] those in a dispute to resolve the issues 
between them.”62 The exclusion of these processes from the definition of ADR is further 
                                                          
52 IRM 8.26.11.2. 
53 IRM 8.26.11.9.2. 
54 See Internal Revenue Service Rev. Proc. 2016-30, 2016-21 I.R.B. 981 [“Rev. Proc. 2016-30”]. 
55 See Internal Revenue Service Rev. Proc. 2017-1, 2017-1 I.R.B. 1 [“Rev. Proc. 2017-1”]. 
56 See Internal Revenue Service Rev. Proc. 2016-19, 2016-13 I.R.B. 497 [“Rev. Proc. 2016-19”]. 
57 See Internal Revenue Service Rev. Proc. 2015-41, 2015-35 I.R.B. 263 [“Rev. Proc. 2015-41”].  
58 See Internal Revenue Service “Compliance Assurance Process” (26 August 2016) 
<http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Compliance-Assurance-Process> (last accessed 7 November 2016) 
and IRM 4.51.8. 
59 See Internal Revenue Service Rev. Proc. 94-67, 1994-2 C.B. 800 [“Rev. Proc. 94-67”]. 
60 See IRM 1.2.43.22. 
61 See IRM 1.2.43.23. 
62 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council Dispute Resolution Terms: The Use of Terms in 
(Alternative) Dispute Resolution (Barton, 2003) 
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consistent with the mandates of the ADRA 1990 and the RRA 1998 which encouraged federal 
agencies to use neutral third party ADR techniques. 
 
1.4.4 Alternative dispute resolution in the United States Tax Court  
Under Tax Court Rule 124, the ADR processes available in the US Tax Court include voluntary 
binding arbitration and voluntary non-binding mediation.63 Tax Court Rule 124(a) provides 
that the parties may move that any factual issue in controversy be resolved through voluntary 
binding arbitration. The motion may be made before trial at any time after the case is at issue. 
Upon the filing of the motion, the Chief Judge will assign the case to a Judge or Special Trial 
Judge for disposition of the motion and supervision of any subsequent arbitration.64 The parties 
are to agree to, inter alia, the identity of the arbitrator or the procedure used to select the 
arbitrator65 and to the prohibition against ex parte communication with the arbitrator.66 The 
parties must also agree to be bound by the findings of the arbitrator in respect of the issues to 
be resolved. Once the arbitrator renders a decision, the parties are to report promptly to the 
court the findings made by the arbitrator and are to attach to the report any written report or 
summary that the arbitrator may have prepared.67  
 
Tax Court Rule 124(b) provides that “parties may move by joint or unopposed motion that any 
issue in controversy be resolved through voluntary nonbinding mediation.”68 Such a motion 
may be made at any time after a case is at issue and before the decision in the case is final. 
Where mediation is opted for, the parties are to jointly select a mediator. If the parties cannot 
agree on a mediator, they may agree to a procedure to be used to select a mediator.69 In addition, 
the parties may seek the assistance of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in 
selecting a mediator.70 Parties may give consideration to requesting that a Judge or Special 
Trial Judge of the US Tax Court acts as the mediator.71 If the parties reach an agreement on all 
or some of the issues through the mediation process, a stipulation of settled issues or a decision 
                                                          
<http://www.ag.gov.au/LegalSystem/AlternateDisputeResolution/Pages/NADRACpublications.aspx> (last 
accessed 7 November 2016) at 4. 
63 Tax Court Rule 124(c) also provides for the use of “Other Methods of Dispute Resolution” with or without 
involvement by the Court. 
64 Tax Court Rule 124(a). 
65 Tax Court Rule 124(a)(2)(C). 
66 Tax Court Rule 124(a)(2)(E). 
67 IRM 35.5.5.3. 
68 However, except in extraordinary circumstances, mediation is generally not available in the US Tax Court if it 
has already been made available to the taxpayer or tried once without success, for example, at the IRS Appeals 
level: IRM 35.5.5.5. 
69 IRM 35.5.5.7. 
70 IRM 35.5.5.7. 
71 Tax Court Rule 124(b)(2). 
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document will be drafted for the parties’ signature and submission to the US Tax Court. If the 
parties are not able to reach an agreement on an issue being mediated, the parties will prepare 
for trial as normal.72  
 
1.4.5 Taxpayer Bill of Rights and the Taxpayer Advocate Service 
Since assuming her position in 2001, National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA) Nina Olson has 
emphasised the protection of taxpayer rights in tax administration. In her 2007 Annual Report 
to Congress, and in later reports, she proposed a new Taxpayer Bill of Rights.73 On 10 June 
2014, the IRS formally adopted the NTA’s proposal. The Taxpayer Bill of Rights takes the 
rights that exist throughout the I.R.C., the RRA 1998 and the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) 
and presents them in a clear and useful way.74 The Taxpayer Bill of Rights75 outlines, inter alia, 
that taxpayers have the right to be informed of IRS decisions about their tax accounts and to 
receive clear explanations of the outcomes. Taxpayers are also entitled to a fair and impartial 
administrative appeal of most IRS decisions and generally have the right to take their cases to 
court. In addition, the Taxpayer Bill of Rights outlines that taxpayers have the right to receive 
assistance from the Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) if they are experiencing financial 
difficulty or if the IRS has not resolved their tax issues properly and timely through its normal 
channels. 
 
The TAS is an independent organisation within the IRS, headed by the NTA. Each state has at 
least one Local Taxpayer Advocate (LTA) who is independent of the local IRS office and 
reports directly to the NTA. The mission of the TAS is to help taxpayers resolve problems with 
the IRS and to recommend changes to prevent the problems.76 The organisation fulfils its 
mission through two types of advocacy: case advocacy (assisting taxpayers in resolving 
problems with the IRS) and systemic advocacy (identifying areas in which groups of taxpayers 
are experiencing problems with the IRS and, to the extent possible, proposing administrative 
or legislative changes to resolve or mitigate those problems).77 
 
In assisting taxpayers to resolve problems with the IRS, the NTA can issue a taxpayer 
assistance order (TAO) if the NTA “determines the taxpayer is suffering or about to suffer a 
                                                          
72 IRM 35.5.5.6. 
73 See Nina E Olson National Taxpayer Advocate 2007 Annual Report to Congress (Internal Revenue Service, 
December 2007); Nina E Olson National Taxpayer Advocate 2011 Annual Report to Congress (Internal Revenue 
Service, December 2011); and Nina E Olson National Taxpayer Advocate 2013 Annual Report to Congress 
(Internal Revenue Service, December 2013).  
74 Nina E Olson National Taxpayer Advocate 2013 Annual Report to Congress, above 73, at 5. 
75 The Taxpayer Bill of Rights contains 10 rights and is incorporated in Internal Revenue Service Your Rights as 
a Taxpayer (IRS Pub. No. 1, December 2014) which is given to every taxpayer selected for an IRS examination. 
76 IRM 13.1.1.12. 
77 IRM 13.1.1.2.  
374 
 
significant hardship as a result of the manner in which the internal revenue laws are being 
administered” by the IRS.78 Significant hardship means “serious privation caused or about to 
be caused to the taxpayer”79 and includes (a) an immediate threat of adverse action; (b) a delay 
of more than 30 days in resolving taxpayer account problems; (c) the incurring by the taxpayer 
of significant costs (including fees for professional representation) if relief is not granted; or 
(d) irreparable injury to, or a long-term adverse impact on, the taxpayer if relief is not granted.80 
A TAO can direct the IRS to take a specific action, cease a specific action or refrain from taking 
a specific action; or can order the IRS to expedite, review, or reconsider an action at a higher 
level.81  
 
The IRS must comply with a TAO unless it is appealed and then modified or rescinded by the 
NTA, the Commissioner of the IRS, or the Deputy Commissioner.82 The NTA may not make 
a substantive determination of any tax liability. A TAO is not intended to be a substitute for an 
established administrative or judicial review procedure, but rather it is intended to supplement 
existing procedures if a taxpayer is about to suffer or is suffering a significant hardship. In 
addition, a taxpayer’s right to administrative or judicial review is not diminished or expanded 
in any way as a result of the taxpayer seeking assistance from TAS.  
 
1.4.6 Taxpayer Advocacy Panel 
Additionally, included under the auspices of the NTA, is the Taxpayer Advocacy Panel (TAP). 
The TAP is a group of about 75 citizen volunteers who listen to taxpayers, identify taxpayers’ 
issues, and make suggestions for improving IRS service and customer satisfaction.83 The TAP 
is demographically and geographically diverse, with at least one member from each state, the 
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. The TAP is a Federal Advisory Committee to the IRS 
and it also serves as a focus group that makes recommendations to the IRS and the NTA. The 
TAP does not act on behalf of individual taxpayers and is limited to recommending changes 
that do not require legislative action. The TAS provides funding for the staff and research to 
support the TAP.84 Taxpayers may submit their comments and suggestions for improving the 
IRS to the TAP online or by phone.  
 
                                                          
78 I.R.C. § 7811(a)(1)(A). 
79 Treas. Reg. § 301.7811-1(a)(4)(ii). 
80 I.R.C. § 7811(a)(2). 
81 Treas. Reg. § 301.7811-1(c). 
82 Treas. Reg. § 301.7811-1(b). 
83 Internal Revenue Service “Taxpayer Advocacy Panel (TAP)” (13 April 2016) 
<https://www.irs.gov/Advocate/Taxpayer-Advocacy-Panel> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
84 IRM 13.1.1.3.6.1. 
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1.4.7 Low Income Taxpayer Clinics 
Low Income Taxpayer Clinics (LITCs) serve individuals who have a problem with the IRS and 
whose income is below a certain level. 85 LITCs are independent from the IRS and the program 
is administered by the TAS. Most LITCs can provide representation before the IRS or in court 
on audits, tax collection disputes, and other issues for free or for a small fee. Some LITCs 
provide education for low income taxpayers and taxpayers who speak English as a second 
language about their taxpayer rights and responsibilities. While LITCs are not part of the IRS, 
they receive partial funding from the IRS via the LITC grant program. LITC grantees are 
generally legal aid or legal service organisations; clinics at law, business or accounting schools; 
and other not-for-profit organisations that provide services to the poor. Each clinic determines 
if prospective clients meet the income poverty guidelines and other criteria before it agrees to 
represent a client. 
  
                                                          
85 Internal Revenue Service “Low Income Taxpayer Clinics” (4 May 2016) <http://www.irs.gov/Advocate/Low-
Income-Taxpayer-Clinics> (last accessed 7 November 2016). 
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Appendix 3: Information Sheets and Sample Letter 
Appendix 3.1: Information Sheet for Alternative Dispute Resolution Participants 
 
College of Business and Law 
 
Melinda Jone 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
Telephone: +64 021 045 1059   
Email: melinda.jone@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
  
1 April 2015  
 
Tax Disputes System Design 




You are invited to participate in the research study: “Tax Disputes System Design”. This research is being 
conducted by Melinda Jone, for completion of a Doctoral Dissertation in the Department of Accounting and 
Information Systems at the University of Canterbury under the supervision of Professor Adrian Sawyer and 
Associate Professor Andrew Maples. This research has been reviewed and approved by the University of 
Canterbury’s Human Ethics Committee.  
 
The objective of this study is to develop general guidance in tax dispute systems design (DSD) and to evaluate 
and subsequently adapt the general guidance in the context of the New Zealand tax disputes resolution procedures 
based on feedback obtained from selected stakeholders in New Zealand. DSD is aimed at reducing the costs of 
handling disputes and producing more satisfying and durable resolutions. DSD is thus important to a well-
functioning tax disputes resolution system in New Zealand. 
 
This research involves interviews with selected stakeholders in New Zealand. Accordingly, you have been 
selected to participate in an interview due to your specialist knowledge and/or experience with the tax disputes 
resolution procedures in New Zealand and/or with dispute resolution (including Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR)). The interview is expected to last between 20-30 minutes. Attached to this information sheet are two 
additional information sheets (labelled “Dispute Systems Design” and “The New Zealand Tax Disputes 
Resolution Procedures”) and also a list of possible questions that you may be asked in the interview (labelled 
“Interview Questions”). It is important that you read all of these documents before participating in the interview. 
The reading of these documents should take you no longer than 15-20 minutes. 
 
A digital voice recorder will be used to document the interviews, subject to your consent. You will be given the 
opportunity to review the interview transcript. Participation is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw at any 
stage up until the writing up of the thesis. If you withdraw, I will remove information relating to you up until the 
point of your withdrawal should this remain practically achievable. 
 
The results of the project may be published, but you may be assured of the complete confidentiality of data 
gathered in this investigation. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality, your identity in any publications will be 
disguised. For example, participants will be referred to as “Inland Revenue Representative”, “Judicial Member 
1”, Tax Practitioner 1”, “ADR Practitioner 1”, Tax Academic 1” or “ADR Academic 1” as applicable. The digital 
voice recordings and interview transcripts will be kept in locked and secure facilities and/or in password protected 
electronic form and will not be available to anyone other than the researcher and her supervisors. All information 
provided will be retained in secure storage for 10 years, after which it will be destroyed. However, a thesis is a 
public document and will be available through the UC Library. If you wish to receive a copy of the project results 
at the end of the research project, you can indicate this on the consent form attached. 
 
Should you have any queries about your participation in this study, please do not hesitate to contact myself at 
melinda.jone@pg.canterbury.ac.nz or my supervisors: Professor Adrian Sawyer at 
adrian.sawyer@canterbury.ac.nz or Associate Professor Andrew Maples at andrew.maples@canterbury.ac.nz. 
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Any complaints about this project should be addressed to The Chair, Human Ethics Committee, University of 
Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz). 
 
If you agree to participate in the study, you are asked to complete the attached consent form and return it by email 









Department of Accounting and Information Systems 




A J Sawyer 
 
Dr Adrian Sawyer 
Professor of Taxation 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 




A J Maples 
 
Andrew Maples 
Associate Professor of Taxation 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 





Appendix 3.2: Information Sheet for Tax Participants and Inland Revenue Representatives 
 
College of Business and Law 
 
Melinda Jone 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
Telephone: +64 021 045 1059   
Email: melinda.jone@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
  
1 April 2015  
 
Tax Disputes System Design 




You are invited to participate in the research study: “Tax Disputes System Design”. This research is being 
conducted by Melinda Jone, for completion of a Doctoral Dissertation in the Department of Accounting and 
Information Systems at the University of Canterbury under the supervision of Professor Adrian Sawyer and 
Associate Professor Andrew Maples. This research has been reviewed and approved by the University of 
Canterbury’s Human Ethics Committee.  
 
The objective of this study is to develop general guidance in tax dispute systems design (DSD) and to evaluate 
and subsequently adapt the general guidance in the context of the New Zealand tax disputes resolution procedures 
based on feedback obtained from selected stakeholders in New Zealand. DSD is aimed at reducing the costs of 
handling disputes and producing more satisfying and durable resolutions. DSD is thus important to a well-
functioning tax disputes resolution system in New Zealand. 
 
This research involves interviews with selected stakeholders in New Zealand. Accordingly, you have been 
selected to participate in an interview due to your specialist knowledge and/or experience with the tax disputes 
resolution procedures in New Zealand and/or with dispute resolution (including Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR)). The interview is expected to last between 20-30 minutes. Attached to this information sheet is an 
additional information sheet on DSD (labelled “Dispute Systems Design”) and also a list of possible questions 
that you may be asked in the interview (labelled “Interview Questions”). It is important that you read both of these 
documents before participating in the interview. The reading of these documents should take you no longer than 
15-20 minutes. 
 
A digital voice recorder will be used to document the interviews, subject to your consent. You will be given the 
opportunity to review the interview transcript. Participation is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw at any 
stage up until the writing up of the thesis. If you withdraw, I will remove information relating to you up until the 
point of your withdrawal should this remain practically achievable. 
 
The results of the project may be published, but you may be assured of the complete confidentiality of data 
gathered in this investigation. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality, your identity in any publications will be 
disguised. For example, participants will be referred to as “Inland Revenue Representative”, “Judicial Member 
1”, Tax Practitioner 1”, “ADR Practitioner 1”, Tax Academic 1” or “ADR Academic 1” as applicable. The digital 
voice recordings and interview transcripts will be kept in locked and secure facilities and/or in password protected 
electronic form and will not be available to anyone other than the researcher and her supervisors. All information 
provided will be retained in secure storage for 10 years, after which it will be destroyed. However, a thesis is a 
public document and will be available through the UC Library. If you wish to receive a copy of the project results 
at the end of the research project, you can indicate this on the consent form attached. 
 
Should you have any queries about your participation in this study, please do not hesitate to contact myself at 
melinda.jone@pg.canterbury.ac.nz or my supervisors: Professor Adrian Sawyer at 
adrian.sawyer@canterbury.ac.nz or Associate Professor Andrew Maples at andrew.maples@canterbury.ac.nz. 
Any complaints about this project should be addressed to The Chair, Human Ethics Committee, University of 
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Appendix 3.3: Sample Letter to Members of the Judiciary 
 
College of Business and Law 
 
Melinda Jone 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
Telephone: +64 021 045 1059   
Email: melinda.jone@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
  
22 June 2015 
 
[Participant’s name] 
[Participant’s address details] 
 
Tax Disputes System Design Interview 
  
Dear [Participant’s name], 
 
My name is Melinda Jone and I am currently pursuing the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of 
Accounting and Information Systems, at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch. As a requirement for the 
degree, I am conducting a study on “Tax Disputes System Design” under the supervision of Professor Adrian 
Sawyer and Associate Professor Andrew Maples. This research has been reviewed and approved by the University 
of Canterbury’s Human Ethics Committee. 
  
The objective of my study is to develop general guidance on tax disputes system design (tax DSD) and then 
subsequently adapt this guidance in the context of the New Zealand tax dispute resolution procedures. As part of 
this study I am seeking to interview selected stakeholders in New Zealand with knowledge on and/or experience 
with the tax disputes resolution procedures in New Zealand, on the tax DSD guidance developed. 
  
Accordingly, as a member of the New Zealand judiciary with specialist knowledge on and experience with the 
tax disputes resolution procedures in New Zealand, I would like to invite you to participate in an interview. The 
interview will be conducted either face-to-face or by telephone and is expected to last up to 30 minutes. You will 
be provided with background information to the interview as well as the interview questions in advance of the 
interview. 
 
If you would like to accept this offer of participating in an interview (or would like further details about 
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Appendix 3.4: Information Sheet for Members of the Judiciary 
 
College of Business and Law 
 
Melinda Jone 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
Telephone: +64 021 045 1059   
Email: melinda.jone@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
  
22 June 2015  
 
[Participant’s name]  
[Participant’s address details] 
 
Tax Disputes System Design 
Information Sheet for Members of the Judiciary 
  
Dear [Participant’s name], 
 
You are invited to participate in the research study: “Tax Disputes System Design”. This research is being 
conducted by Melinda Jone, for completion of a Doctoral Dissertation in the Department of Accounting and 
Information Systems at the University of Canterbury under the supervision of Professor Adrian Sawyer and 
Associate Professor Andrew Maples. This research has been reviewed and approved by the University of 
Canterbury’s Human Ethics Committee.  
 
The objective of this study is to develop general guidance in tax dispute systems design (DSD) and to evaluate 
and subsequently adapt the general guidance in the context of the New Zealand tax disputes resolution procedures 
based on feedback obtained from selected stakeholders in New Zealand. DSD is aimed at reducing the costs of 
handling disputes and producing more satisfying and durable resolutions. DSD is thus important to a well-
functioning tax disputes resolution system in New Zealand. 
 
This research involves interviews with selected stakeholders in New Zealand. Accordingly, you have been 
selected to participate in an interview due to your specialist knowledge and experience with the tax disputes 
resolution procedures in New Zealand. The interview is expected to last up to 30 minutes. Attached to this 
information sheet is an additional information sheet on DSD (labelled “Dispute Systems Design”) and also the 
lists of the possible questions that you may be asked in the interview (labelled “Interview Questions” and 
“Additional Questions”). It is important that you read both of these documents before participating in the 
interview. The reading of these documents should take you no longer than 15-20 minutes. 
 
A digital voice recorder will be used to document the interviews, subject to your consent. You will be given the 
opportunity to review the interview transcript. Participation is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw at any 
stage up until the writing up of the thesis. If you withdraw, I will remove information relating to you up until the 
point of your withdrawal should this remain practically achievable. 
 
The results of the project may be published, but you may be assured of the complete confidentiality of data 
gathered in this investigation. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality, your identity in any publications will be 
disguised. For example, you may be referred to as “Judicial Member 1”. The digital voice recordings and interview 
transcripts will be kept in locked and secure facilities and/or in password protected electronic form and will not 
be available to anyone other than the researcher and her supervisors. All information provided will be retained in 
secure storage for 10 years, after which it will be destroyed. However, a thesis is a public document and will be 
available through the UC Library. If you wish to receive a copy of the project results at the end of the research 
project, you can indicate this on the consent form attached. 
 
Should you have any queries about your participation in this study, please do not hesitate to contact myself at 
melinda.jone@pg.canterbury.ac.nz or my supervisors: Professor Adrian Sawyer at 
adrian.sawyer@canterbury.ac.nz or Associate Professor Andrew Maples at andrew.maples@canterbury.ac.nz. 
Any complaints about this project should be addressed to The Chair, Human Ethics Committee, University of 
Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz). 
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Appendix 4: Consent Forms 
Appendix 4.1: Consent Form for Alternative Dispute Resolution Participants 
 
College of Business and Law 
 
Melinda Jone 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
Telephone: +64 021 045 1059   
Email: melinda.jone@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
  
1 April 2015 
 
Tax Disputes System Design 
Consent Form for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Participants 
 
1. I have been given a full explanation of this project and have had the opportunity to ask questions.  
 
2. I understand what is required of me if I agree to take part in the research.  
 
3. I understand that participation is voluntary and I may withdraw at any time up until the writing up of the 
thesis. Withdrawal of participation will also include the withdrawal of any information I have provided should 
this remain practically achievable. 
 
4. I understand that all interviews, whether face-to-face, by telephone, Skype or video conference, will be audio-
taped unless I request otherwise. 
 
5. I understand that I will be given the opportunity to review the interview transcript. 
 
6. I understand that any information or opinions I provide will be kept confidential to the researcher and her 
supervisors and that any published or reported results will not identify the participants.  
 
7. I understand that a thesis is a public document and will be available through the University of Canterbury 
Library. 
 
8. I understand that all data collected for the study will be kept in locked and secure facilities and/or in password 
protected electronic form and will be destroyed after 10 years.   
 
9. I understand that this project has been reviewed and approved by the Human Ethics Committee of the 
University of Canterbury.  
 
10. I understand that I can contact the researcher: Melinda Jone at melinda.jone@pg.canterbury.ac.nz or her 
supervisors: Professor Adrian Sawyer at adrian.sawyer@canterbury.ac.nz and Associate Professor Andrew 
Maples at andrew.maples@canterbury.ac.nz for further information. If I have any complaints, I can contact 
the Chair of the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-
ethics@canterbury.ac.nz).  
 
11. By signing below, I agree to participate in this research project.  
 
 
……………………………………. …………………………………….. ……………….  
(Name of participant)    (Signature of participant)       (Date)  
 
 Please tick if you would like to receive a copy of the research results at the end of the project. 
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A J Sawyer 
 
Dr Adrian Sawyer 
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A J Maples 
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Appendix 4.2: Consent Form for Tax Participants and Inland Revenue Representatives 
 
College of Business and Law 
 
Melinda Jone 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
Telephone: +64 021 045 1059   
Email: melinda.jone@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
  
1 April 2015 
 
Tax Disputes System Design 
Consent Form for Tax Participants/ Inland Revenue Representatives 
 
1. I have been given a full explanation of this project and have had the opportunity to ask questions.  
 
2. I understand what is required of me if I agree to take part in the research.  
 
3. I understand that participation is voluntary and I may withdraw at any time up until the writing up of the 
thesis. Withdrawal of participation will also include the withdrawal of any information I have provided should 
this remain practically achievable. 
 
4. I understand that all interviews, whether face-to-face, by telephone, Skype or video conference, will be audio-
taped unless I request otherwise. 
 
5. I understand that I will be given the opportunity to review the interview transcript. 
 
6. I understand that any information or opinions I provide will be kept confidential to the researcher and her 
supervisors and that any published or reported results will not identify the participants.  
 
7. I understand that a thesis is a public document and will be available through the University of Canterbury 
Library. 
 
8. I understand that all data collected for the study will be kept in locked and secure facilities and/or in password 
protected electronic form and will be destroyed after 10 years.   
 
9. I understand that this project has been reviewed and approved by the Human Ethics Committee of the 
University of Canterbury.  
 
10. I understand that I can contact the researcher: Melinda Jone at melinda.jone@pg.canterbury.ac.nz or her 
supervisors: Professor Adrian Sawyer at adrian.sawyer@canterbury.ac.nz and Associate Professor Andrew 
Maples at andrew.maples@canterbury.ac.nz for further information. If I have any complaints, I can contact 
the Chair of the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-
ethics@canterbury.ac.nz).  
 
11. By signing below, I agree to participate in this research project.  
 
 
……………………………………. …………………………………….. ……………….  
(Name of participant)    (Signature of participant)       (Date)  
 
 Please tick if you would like to receive a copy of the research results at the end of the project. 
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A J Sawyer 
 
Dr Adrian Sawyer 
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Andrew Maples 
Associate Professor of Taxation 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 





Appendix 4.3: Consent Form for Members of the Judiciary 
 
College of Business and Law 
 
Melinda Jone 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
Telephone: +64 021 045 1059   
Email: melinda.jone@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
  
22 June 2015  
 
[Participant’s name] 
[Participant’s address details] 
 
Tax Disputes System Design 
Consent Form for Members of the Judiciary 
 
 
1. I have been given a full explanation of this project and have had the opportunity to ask questions.  
 
2. I understand what is required of me if I agree to take part in the research.  
 
3. I understand that participation is voluntary and I may withdraw at any time up until the writing up of the 
thesis. Withdrawal of participation will also include the withdrawal of any information I have provided should 
this remain practically achievable. 
 
4. I understand that all interviews, whether face-to-face, by telephone, Skype or video conference, will be audio-
taped unless I request otherwise. 
 
5. I understand that I will be given the opportunity to review the interview transcript. 
 
6. I understand that any information or opinions I provide will be kept confidential to the researcher and her 
supervisors and that any published or reported results will not identify the participants.  
 
7. I understand that a thesis is a public document and will be available through the University of Canterbury 
Library. 
 
8. I understand that all data collected for the study will be kept in locked and secure facilities and/or in password 
protected electronic form and will be destroyed after 10 years.   
 
9. I understand that this project has been reviewed and approved by the Human Ethics Committee of the 
University of Canterbury.  
 
10. I understand that I can contact the researcher: Melinda Jone at melinda.jone@pg.canterbury.ac.nz or her 
supervisors: Professor Adrian Sawyer at adrian.sawyer@canterbury.ac.nz and Associate Professor Andrew 
Maples at andrew.maples@canterbury.ac.nz for further information. If I have any complaints, I can contact 
the Chair of the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-
ethics@canterbury.ac.nz).  
 
11. By signing below, I agree to participate in this research project.  
 
 
……………………………………. …………………………………….. ……………….  
(Name of participant)    (Signature of participant)       (Date)  
 
 Please tick if you would like to receive a copy of the research results at the end of the project. 
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Appendix 5: Supplementary Information Sheet for Interview Participants 
 
Dispute Systems Design 
 
Dispute Systems Design (DSD) refers to a deliberate effort to identify and improve the way an 
organisation addresses conflict by decisively and strategically arranging its dispute resolution 
processes. The concept of DSD originated in the context of workplace conflict. Within this context, 
a number of general DSD principles have been formulated by various practitioners in the DSD 
field. However, to date, to the researcher’s knowledge, there have been no DSD principles 
developed for use in the context of the design of tax dispute resolution systems.  
 
Table 1 contains a set of general tax DSD principles derived by the researcher based on the 
general DSD principles in the DSD literature. It is intended that the tax DSD principles derived 
can be adapted by tax administrations around the world and used in either developing or improving 
their tax disputes resolution procedures. This study is set against the background of the increasing 
use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes by revenue authorities around the world in 
resolving tax disputes. 
 
This interview will seek your feedback on the researcher’s general tax DSD principles contained 
overleaf in Table 1: 
 
(i) In the context of tax dispute resolution generally; and  
(ii) on how they may be adapted in the context of the New Zealand tax disputes 
resolution system.  
 
Please note the following dispute resolution terms:  
 
 Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR): an umbrella term for processes, other than judicial or 
tribunal determination, in which an impartial person assists those in a dispute to resolve the issues 
between them. ADR processes can generally be classified as facilitative, advisory or 
determinative: 
  
- In facilitative processes, an ADR practitioner assists the parties to identify the disputed 
issues, develop options, consider alternatives and endeavour to reach an agreement about 
some issues or the whole of the dispute (for example, facilitation and mediation).  
- In advisory processes, an ADR practitioner considers and appraises the dispute and provides 
advice on some or all of the facts of the dispute, the law, and possible or desirable outcomes 
(for example, neutral evaluation).  
- In determinative processes, an ADR practitioner evaluates the dispute and makes a 
determination (for example, arbitration). 
 
 Interests-based approaches: focus upon the underlying interests of the parties with the aim of 
producing solutions which satisfy as many of those interests as possible (for example, facilitation 
and mediation). 
 
 Rights-based approaches: determine who is ‘right’ according to an independent and objective 
standard such as precedent, socially accepted behavioural standards or legal benchmarks (for 
example, arbitration and litigation).  
 
 Power-based approaches: characterised by the use of power (the ability to coerce someone into 
something they would not ordinarily do) and frequently involve the exchange of threats and/or 




Table 1: The General Tax DSD Principles 
 
(1)  Stakeholders are included in the design process. For example, stakeholders may be 
involved in pilot ADR programs and in reviews and consultations on the tax dispute 
resolution system. 
(2)  The system has multiple options for addressing conflict including interests, rights 
and power-based processes. For example, the system’s options for addressing 
conflict may include: direct negotiation, internal review and litigation as well as 
interests and rights-based ADR options. In addition, interests and rights-based ADR 
options should also be available at the audit and litigation stages. 
(3)  The system provides for loops backward and forward. Loop-back mechanisms 
allow parties to return from rights and power-based options back to interests-based 
options and loop-forward mechanisms allow parties to move directly to a rights-based 
option without having to go through all of the earlier interests-based options. For 
example, ADR options available at the litigation stage can provide loop-back 
mechanisms and the ability for taxpayers to by-pass the revenue authority’s internal 
review process can provide a loop-forward mechanism. 
(4)  There is notification before and feedback after the resolution process. Notification 
in advance of taking a proposed action affecting others can prevent disputes that arise 
through misunderstanding or miscommunication and can identify points of difference 
early on so that they may be negotiated. Post-dispute analysis and feedback can help 
parties to learn from disputes in order to prevent similar disputes in the future. For 
example, in order to prevent disputes from arising, general notification of potential 
areas for disputes can be provided through the revenue authority’s compliance 
activities and campaigns, and through the publication of case notes on court decisions. 
To prevent similar disputes in the future, feedback on disputes can be provided 
through the publication of general statistics on dispute matters and through post-
dispute analysis and publication of feedback collected from participants in revenue 
authority ADR programs.  
(5)  The system has an internal person or unit that functions as a mentor and advisor 
for revenue authority staff. Revenue authority staff should have access to an internal 
person or unit to which they can go to for mentoring and advice on ADR techniques. 
(6)  Procedures are ordered from low to high cost. The steps in the formal disputes 
procedures should be arranged in a low to high cost sequence (notwithstanding that 
high upfront costs are generally likely to be incurred by taxpayers involved in tax 
disputes). The use of additional ADR options can also add additional costs at the stage 
of the formal disputes procedures at which they are utilised. However, if the dispute 
is resolved at this stage, then parties do not have to subsequently move further up the 
sequence to higher cost processes. 
(7)  The system has multiple access points. The system should allow taxpayers to enter 
the system through many access points, structurally. For example, entry at the level of 
internal review or entry at the level of external appeal. There should also be a range 
of methods to deliver notification of entry to the dispute resolution system. For 
example, by personal delivery, electronic means of communication or post. In 
addition, multiple forms of access to the system should be provided through the 
provision of forms and guides in different languages and in alternative formats, and a 
choice of access persons should be available for certain taxpayers to approach 






(8)  The system includes training and education for stakeholders. For example, the 
general in-house training of revenue authority staff should include a specific 
component on conflict management and resolution. Revenue authority staff acting as 
facilitators or mediators should receive specialised training in mediation developed by 
external ADR specialists. Education about the dispute system can be provided through 
information about the disputes resolution procedures provided on the revenue 
authority’s website, the publication of guides on the disputes resolution procedures, 
revenue authority guidelines on the disputes procedures and online learning material 
for tax agents. 
(9)  Assistance is offered for choosing the best process. For example, revenue authority 
guidelines on the disputes resolution procedures in order to assist in the appropriate 
use of processes, and the existence of a unit within the revenue authority responsible 
for overseeing (and providing advice on) the ADR programs available. In addition, 
requests for ADR should be approved by relevant staff from the above unit. 
(10)  Taxpayers have the right to choose a preferred process. Choice of a preferred 
process may be offered in a number of ways including (but not limited to): taxpayers 
can choose to have an internal review, appeal externally or do both; the choice for 
taxpayers to use ADR is made available alongside their existing review and appeal 
rights; taxpayers can choose to use ADR (if it is appropriate) once a dispute reaches a 
tribunal or court; and qualifying taxpayers can choose to have matters dealt with in a 
tribunal or court using small tax case procedures. 
(11)  The system is fair and perceived as fair. The disputes resolution system as a whole 
should be fair and perceived as fair. For example, the internal review function of the 
revenue authority should be independent from the audit or compliance function. In 
addition, revenue authority staff acting as facilitators or mediators in ADR programs 
of the revenue authority should be fair and perceived as fair. For example, revenue 
authority facilitators or mediators should have had no prior involvement in the 
particular dispute. 
(12)  The system is supported by senior revenue authority members. There should be 
visible evidence of sincere championship of the disputes resolution system and of 
ADR by senior revenue authority members. For example, through speeches, 
presentations, media statements or other releases. 
(13)  The system is aligned with the mission, vision and values of the organisation. For 
example, the disputes resolution system should be integrated into the organisation 
through the revenue authority’s taxpayers’ charter (or equivalent), and the revenue 
authority’s approach towards dispute resolution, outlined in its Disputes Policy (or 
equivalent), should be aligned with its overall mission, vision and values. In addition, 
the revenue authority’s future plans with respect to dispute resolution should feature 
in its Strategic Plan (or equivalent). 
(14)  There is evaluation of the system. For example, evaluation of the tax dispute 
resolution system can occur through regular or one-off surveys on the system 
conducted for the revenue authority by external agencies; evaluation can be provided 
by submissions, reviews and reports from government-appointed entities, 
parliamentary committees and other external stakeholders; taxpayers can provide 
general feedback on the system (for evaluation) to the revenue authority, for example, 
through completing online forms and participants in ADR programs can be invited to 
provide feedback (for evaluation) at the conclusion of the ADR process. 
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The New Zealand Tax Disputes Resolution Procedures1 
 
Tax disputes in New Zealand typically arise when a taxpayer and Inland Revenue have not 
reached agreement on an issue following an Inland Revenue investigation or audit. The 
disputes procedure involves a number of statutorily prescribed and administrative steps as set 
out in Figure 1. The steps in the dispute resolution process generally include the following:  
 
 Either the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (the Commissioner) or the taxpayer issues 
a Notice of Proposed Adjustment (NOPA).  
 The responding party will issue a Notice of Response (NOR). 
 If the NOR is not accepted in full, a conference is held to discuss outstanding issues (an 
administrative step). 
 If issues are still not resolved, a Disclosure Notice is issued by the Commissioner. 
 A Statement of Position (SOP) is then issued by each party.  
 Matters are then referred to Inland Revenue’s Disputes Review Unit for adjudication 
(an administrative step). 
 If the Disputes Review Unit decides the issue in favour of the taxpayer, that is the end 
of the dispute. If the decision is in favour of the Commissioner, then the taxpayer can 
refer the matter to the Taxation Review Authority (TRA) or the High Court. 
 
As indicated in Figure 1, after the conference phase, in certain (limited) circumstances, 
taxpayers can request to opt out of the disputes process after the conference phase if certain 
criteria are met.  
 
ADR features in the New Zealand tax dispute resolution procedures through the availability of 
conference facilitation (as an option in the conference phase). The conference facilitator is a 
senior Inland Revenue member of staff who has not previously been involved in the dispute. 
ADR is also potentially available in the TRA and the High Court (for example, judicial 
settlement conferences, mediation or other form of ADR agreed to by the parties).   
                                                          
1 This section of the supplementary information sheet, describing the New Zealand tax dispute resolution 
procedures, was provided to the ADR participants only. 
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Figure 1: The New Zealand Tax Dispute Resolution Procedures 
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Appendix 6: Interview Guide 
 
Interview Questions  
 
Questions in the context of tax dispute resolution generally: 
 
1. Which of the tax DSD principles do you think is/are the most important? Why? Which 
of the tax DSD principles do you think is/are the least important? Why? Please rank the 
14 DSD principles in order of importance (from highest to lowest).  
 
2. Are there any tax DSD principles which require modification? If so, how should they 
be modified? Why should they be modified? 
 
3. Are there any additional tax DSD principles that you think should be added? If so, what 
are they? Why should they be added?  
 
4. Are there any tax DSD principles that you think should be deleted? If so, which one(s)? 
Why should they be deleted?  
 
Questions in the context of the New Zealand tax dispute resolution procedures: 
 
5. Are there any changes that you would make to your ranking of the 14 DSD principles 
(in Question 1) in the context of the New Zealand tax dispute resolution procedures? If 
so, please explain them. 
 
6. Are there any further changes (modifications/additions/deletions) to the tax DSD 
principles that should be made in the context of the New Zealand tax dispute resolution 
procedures? If so, please describe them. 
 
7. Do you think that are there any issues in applying the tax DSD principles to the existing 




8. Linking back to the example provided in DSD principle 7 of the provision of forms and 
guides in different languages, do you think that the dispute resolution system should 
recognise the different ethnic backgrounds of taxpayers? If not, why? If so, how? How 
would this apply in the New Zealand context? 
 





Appendix 7: Sample Notices and Emails to Practitioner and Academic 
Participants 
Appendix 7.1: Sample New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) Notice 
Invitation to Participate in Research on Tax Disputes System Design 
 
Melinda Jone, a PhD student at the University of Canterbury, is currently undertaking research 
on the topic of tax disputes system design. As part of this research, she is looking to interview 
practitioners with experience of the New Zealand tax disputes resolution procedures. She is 
seeking feedback on dispute systems design principles in both the general context of tax dispute 
resolution as well as the specific context of tax dispute resolution in New Zealand. Lawyers 
who are willing to be interviewed should contact Melinda Jone at 
melinda.jone@pg.canterbury.ac.nz.  
 
Appendix 7.2: Sample Arbitrators’ and Mediators’ Institute of New Zealand (AMINZ) Notice 
Invitation for Participation in Research on Tax Dispute Systems Design 
 
Melinda Jone is pursuing the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Accounting 
and Information Systems, at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch. As a requirement for 
the degree she is conducting a study on “Tax Dispute Systems Design” under the supervision 
of Professor Adrian Sawyer and Associate Professor Andrew Maples. This research has been 
reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury’s Human Ethics Committee. 
 
The objective of her study is to develop general guidance on tax dispute systems design (tax 
DSD) and then subsequently adapt this guidance in the context of the New Zealand tax dispute 
resolution procedures. As part of the study Melinda is seeking to interview accredited ADR 
practitioners in New Zealand on the tax DSD guidance developed. Some 
knowledge/experience in DSD is preferable (but not a requirement). If you would like to 
participate in an interview (or would like further details about participating in an interview), 
please email: melinda.jone@pg.canterbury.ac.nz. 
 
Appendix 7.3: Sample Association of Dispute Resolvers and Institute of Arbitrators and 
Mediators Australia (LEADR & IAMA) Notice 
Invitation for Participation in Tax Disputes Systems Design Research 
 
Melinda Jone, a PhD student at the University of Canterbury, is currently undertaking research 
on tax disputes system design. As part of this research, she is looking to interview accredited 
ADR practitioners in New Zealand, on the application of tax dispute system design principles 
in tax dispute resolution. Accredited ADR practitioners in New Zealand who are willing 





Appendix 7.4: Sample Email Sent to Additional Practitioners and Academics Identified by the 
Researcher 
Dear [participant’s name], 
 
I am a postgraduate student at the University of Canterbury currently undertaking a PhD on the 
topic of tax disputes system design (tax DSD). As part of my research I am conducting some 
interviews with various stakeholders in the areas of DSD, dispute resolution (including ADR) 
and tax disputes resolution. The objective of the interviews is to seek feedback on a set of tax 
DSD principles which I have derived, both in the context of tax disputes resolution generally 
as well as in the context of the NZ tax dispute resolution procedures. I was therefore, wondering 
whether you would be interested in participating in a short (telephone) interview due to your 
knowledge on [tax] dispute resolution? I would very much value your feedback. 
 
If you are interested, I will provide you with some background reading material on the topic 
(including the interview questions) which will need to be read in advance of the interview. The 
reading of this material should take approximately you 15-20 minutes.  
 











1. What are the ways in which Inland Revenue seeks to achieve stakeholder (e.g. 
taxpayers, tax agents, Inland Revenue staff) ‘buy-in’ into the disputes resolution 
procedures? If so, how? 
 
2. Is the NZ dispute resolution system supported/ ‘championed’ by the Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue and senior Inland Revenue staff? If so, in what way(s)? How important 
would you regard this support/ championship? Could it be improved? 
 
3. What is your understanding with respect to stakeholders’ perceptions of current Inland 
Revenue facilitated conferences? Do you think the current conference facilitation 
process could be improved? If so, how? 
 
4. What is your view on engaging independent external mediators instead of Inland 
Revenue staff as facilitators? 
 
5. Do you think that additional alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes should be 
incorporated within the tax dispute resolution procedures? Why/ why not? If so, please 
explain them. 
 
6. What advice would you give to taxpayers (and their agents) in dealing with a dispute 
with Inland Revenue? 
 
7. Do you think that the current tax dispute resolution procedures are achieving the 
original objectives for the dispute resolution system put forward by the Richardson 
Committee in 1994? Do you think that the current system is efficient and effective in 








1. Do you think taxpayers should be given more choice in the current New Zealand tax 
dispute resolution procedures with respect to being able to choose between particular 
dispute resolution processes/ methods to resolve their dispute? Why/ why not? If so, 
how?  
 
2. Do you think that the current tax dispute resolution procedures are achieving the 
original objectives for the dispute resolution system put forward by the Richardson 
Committee in 1994 (to “prevent unnecessary disputes arising; and resolve those 
disputes that do occur fairly and expeditiously, and in accordance with the law”)? Do 
you think that the current system is efficient and effective in terms of time and cost? 
Could this be improved? If so, how? 
 
3. Would you make any modifications and/or additions to the DSD principles to provide 
for small taxpayers in the tax dispute resolution system? Why/ why not? If so, what 
changes would you make?  
 
4. Do you think that additional alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes (to the 
existing conference facilitation process) should be incorporated within the tax dispute 
resolution procedures? Why/ why not? If so, please explain them. 
 
5. Do you think that facilitators (or mediators) involved in the tax dispute resolution 
procedures should be firstly be trained and skilled in dispute resolution/ mediation or 
firstly be an expert in tax? Please explain. 
 
6. Do you think that facilitators (or mediators) involved in the tax dispute resolution 
procedures should be Inland Revenue members of staff or external independent 
mediators? Please explain. 
 
7. What are your views on providing the option for taxpayers to engage an external 
independent mediator to facilitate/mediate jointly with Inland Revenue facilitators in 
Inland Revenue facilitated conferences?  
 
8. What are you views on Inland Revenue’s culture or mindset towards dispute resolution? 
Could this be improved? If so, how? 
                                                          
1 Not all of the interview questions were answered by the members of the judiciary due to the more restricted 
extent of their knowledge and experience with the current New Zealand tax dispute resolution system. 
